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The pervasive use of computers has revolutionized both
the practice of law and the conduct of business. Agreements
once performed on the basis of an oral promise or a hand
shake, at one end of the spectrum, or only following lengthy
negotiations and exchanges of drafts of documents which had
to be recreated from scratch at each stage, at the other, often
are now governed by writings prepared with minimal effort,
based on a computerized form used by a party to the contract,
or its attorneys, in some prior deal. The ease of "block and
copy" drafting of contracts and similar instruments, and the
often corresponding decrease of close attention paid to any
particular agreement in the drafting stage, increases the potential for misunderstanding among the parties to those
agreements when the time comes for them to perform. When
litigation results, the threshold issues for the parties, their
counsel, and the court are often the same: What are the complete terms of the parties' agreement? What was the parties'
intent in entering into the agreement? And, how can we prove
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(or challenge) said terms and intent?
In Mississippi, as in every jurisdiction, a considerable
body of law governs the resolution of these questions. Many
separately articulated-if not always well defined-interpretational guides and evidentiary principles apply. This article
explores the process and the rules used by Mississippi courts
to determine and effectuate contractual intent, as well as the
circumstances under which Mississippi courts and juries may
consider evidence beyond the "four corners" of the written
instrument. This discussion is relevant to practically every
negotiation, drafting session, lawsuit, and settlement involving the written word.1 For that reason, attorneys responsible
' While much of the discussion in this article focuses on written contracts,
with certain exceptions-some of which will be discussed later, and some of which
are beyond the scope of this article-many of the same rules and guides used to
construe and interpret written contracts, and to apply the parol evidence rule to
written contracts, also pertain to, inter alia, antenuptial (or "prenuptial") agreements, see, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 656 So. 2d 1143 (Miss. 1995), bills of lading, see,
e.g., Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Nichols & Co., 83 So. 5 (Miss. 1919), affd, 256
U.S. 540 (1921), certificates of deposit, see, e.g., Wallace v. United Mississippi
Bank, 726 So. 2d 578 (Miss. 1998); Cooper v. Crabb, 587 So. 2d 236 (Miss. 1991),
corporate charters, see, e.g., Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Capital Elec. Power
Ass'n, 222 So. 2d 399 (Miss.), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 113 (1969), deeds, see,
e.g., Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Nettleton Fox Hunting & Fishing Ass'n, 672
So. 2d 1235 (Miss. 1996); Baker v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 218 So. 2d
39 (Miss. 1969), covenants not to compete, see, e.g., Landry v. Moody Grishman
Agency, Inc., 181 So. 2d 134 (Miss. 1965), divorce decrees, see, e.g., Norton v.
Norton, 742 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1999); Crist v. Lawrence, 738 So. 2d 267 (Miss. Ct.
App. 1999), easements, see, e.g., Bivens v. Mobley, 724 So. 2d 458 (Miss. Ct. App.
1998), guaranty agreements, see, e.g., Turnbough v. Steere Broad. Corp., 681
So. 2d 1325 (Miss. 1996), indemnity agreements, see, e.g., Heritage Cablevision v.
New Albany Elec. Power Sys., 646 So. 2d 1305 (Miss. 1994); Blain v. Sam Finley,
Inc., 226 So. 2d 742 (Miss. 1969), indorsements, see, e.g., Hawkins v. Shields, 57
So. 4 (Miss. 1912), insurance policies, see, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Buddy Jones Ford, Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 734 So. 2d 173 (Miss. 1999), leases, see,
e.g., IP Timberlands Operating Co. v. Denmiss Corp., 726 So. 2d 96 (Miss. 1998);
Malsbury v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 161 So. 2d 649 (Miss. 1964), marital property
settlements, see, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 381 So. 2d 1333 (Miss. 1980), mortgages,
see, e.g., United Miss. Bank v. GMAC Mortgage Co., 615 So. 2d 1174 (Miss.
1993), negotiable instruments, see, e.g., Wilkins v. Bancroft, 193 So. 2d 571 (Miss.
1966), partnership divisions, see, e.g., McKee v. McKee, 568 So. 2d 262 (Miss.
1990), promissory notes, see, e.g., Estate of Parker v. Dorchak, 673 So. 2d 1379
(Miss. 1996); Gilchrist Tractor Co. v. Stribling, 192 So. 2d 409 (Miss. 1966), purchase options, see, e.g., Busching v. Griffin, 542 So. 2d 860 (Miss. 1989); releases,
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for drafting legal documents, as well as those who handle
litigation concerning them, should benefit from this examination-the former by being alerted to the many pitfalls associated with imprecise or incomplete draftsmanship, and the
latter by being better prepared to litigate the consequences of
imprecise or incomplete draftsmanship. This article should
also prove useful to the judges before whom these disputes
come and those whose interest in the process of giving
meaning and consequence to written agreements is more academic.
I. THE GOAL OF 'CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
Divining the intent of the parties is the first rule of
contract construction.2

In construing and interpreting a written contract,3 a

see, e.g., Ellis v. Powe, 645 So. 2d 947 (Miss. 1994), restrictive covenants, see, e.g.,
Griffin v. Tall Timbers Dev., Inc., 681 So. 2d 546 (Miss. 1996); Kemp v. Lake
Serene Property Owners Ass'n, 256 So. 2d 924 (Miss. 1971), scholarship certificates, see, e.g., Weeks v. Mississippi College, No. 98-CA-00245-COA, 1999 WL
410552 (Miss. Ct. App. June 22, 1999), security agreements, see, e.g., Kelso v.
McGowan, 604 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1992); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. State Bank &
Trust Co., 571 So. 2d 937 (Miss. 1990), settlement agreements, see, e.g., Meek v.
Warren, 726 So. 2d 1292 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998), surety agreements, see, e.g., Alexander v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 100 So. 2d 347 (Miss. 1958), trusts, see, e.g., Hart
v. First Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 112 So. 2d 565 (Miss. 1959); Hart v. First Nat'l
Bank of Jackson, 103 So. 2d 406 (Miss. 1958), warranties, see, e.g., Ford Motor
Co. v. Olive, 234 So. 2d 910 (Miss. 1970), and wills, see, e.g., Estate of Williams
v. Junius Ward Johnson Mem'l Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 672 So. 2d 1173
(Miss. 1996), including joint and mutual wills, see, e.g., Monroe v. Holleman, 185
So. 2d 443 (Miss. 1966). As such, this Article - beyond its value to legal scholars,
law students, judges, and their law clerks - should interest not only "contract
lawyers" but also lawyers who specialize in, inter alia, family law, estate planning, general civil litigation, financial services, insurance, and real property transactions. For the sake of simplicity, this Article will use "contract" or "instrument"
as default terms, unless the circumstances dictate otherwise.
2 Freeman v. Greenville Convalescent Home, Inc., No. 96-CA-00466-COA, 1998
WL 881772, at *5 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998).
' To paraphrase Professor Corbin, "interpretation" is the process of determining the meaning of the words and symbols used in the contract, while "construction" is the process of determining the legal effect of those words and symbols in
light of many factors external to the contract itself. 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN
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court's primary concern is to ascertain and give effect to the
mutual intent of the parties at the time of contracting.4 A
ON CONTRACTS § 534, at 7-9 (1960); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (1981) ("Interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof
is the ascertainment of its meaning."); id. § 200 cmt. c, at 82 ("Interpretation is
not a determination of the legal effect of words or other conduct."); id. § 200
note, at 82 (noting that Section 200 "rephrase[s]" Section 226 of the first Restatement of Contracts "to make it clear that 'interpretation' relates to meaning,"
whereas "construction" relates to "the ascertainment of legal operation or effect");
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.7, at 255-56 (2d ed.
1998); 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.3, at 7-11 (Joseph M.
Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1998). See generally Robert Braucher, Interpretation and Legal
Effect in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 13 (1981); E.
Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967);
Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 833 (1964).
In practice courts often blur the line between construction and interpretation,
frequently using the terms interchangeably. See FARNSWORTH, supra, § 7.7, at 256
("Although courts have sometimes endorsed this distinction, they have often ignored it
by characterizing the process
of construction
as that
of
'interpretation' . ..... ) (footnote omitted); Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Stat-

utes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41, 52 n.79 (1995) (remarking that the
distinction between construction and interpretation "proves difficult to maintain,
and courts have largely ignored it"). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS ch. 9 intro. note, at 81 ("[Sltating separately rules with respect to
various aspects of the process [of interpreting and applying agreements] may
convey an erroneous impression of the psychological reality of the judicial process
in which many elements are typically combined in a single ruling.").
Nonetheless, the distinction between construction and interpretation is pedagogically useful, in that it helps us understand what courts do with written contracts (even if the courts themselves are not cognizant of the distinction between
determining the meaning of the parties' words and their legal consequences).
Thus, we may distinguish between the "[i]nterpretation of words and of other
manifestations of intention forming an agreement, or having reference to the
formation of an agreement," and "the process of determining from such manifestations what must be done or forborne by the respective parties in order to conform
to the terms of the contract or agreement." Williams v. Batson, 187 So. 236, 238
(Miss. 1939) (en banc). Some contracts must be interpreted by courts, others need
not be. All contracts that come before a court must be construed. Even if a writing requires no interpretation because -the objective meaning of the words and
symbols used is sufficiently clear, the court must still construe the writing before
giving it legal effect.
That said, the discussion in Part II of this article treats construction and
interpretation as an integrated process, and does not try to distinguish "rules of
construction" from "rules of interpretation." In the words of Professor Corbin:
"[Tihe construction of a contract starts with the interpretation of its language but
does not end with it . . . ." 3 CORBIN, supra, § 534, at 9.

' See Wallace, 726 So. 2d at 586; Heritage Cablevision, 646 So. 2d at 1312;
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Mississippi court-which, for purposes of this article, will also
include any court considering a written agreement subject to
Mississippi law-must give effect to the objective intent of
the parties as it is expressed or apparent in writing, as opposed to the subjective intent of parties who failed to fully
capture their intent when they wrote the contract in question.6 In so doing, the court must consider not only the mean-

Kight v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply, Inc., 537 So. 2d 1355, 1358 (Miss. 1989); Stabiler
v. Webb, 375 So. 2d 980, 984 (Miss. 1979); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Parsons, 122 So. 544, 548 (Miss. 1929); Freeman, 1998 WL 881772, at *5 (mutual
intent of parties "primary rule" of contract interpretation).
' The rules of contract construction and interpretation, as well as the parol
evidence rule, are all rules of substantive law. See, e.g., Cox v. Howard, Weil,
Laboussie, Friedrichs, Inc., 619 So. 2d 908, 912 (Miss. 1993); Kendrick v. Robertson, 111 So. 99, 101-02 (Miss. 1927). Thus, federal courts, as well as state courts
in other jurisdictions, asked to construe and interpret contracts subject to Mississippi law are bound by Mississippi law. See, e.g., H & W Indus., Inc. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 911 F.2d 1118, 1120-23 (5th Cir. 1990); Carlo Corp. v. Casino
Magic of La. Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 904, 907-09 (S.D. Miss. 1998); Galata v. Turner, 602 So. 2d 794, 796-97 (La. Ct. App. 1992). See generally HOWARD 0. HUNTER,
MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 7.b, at 7-11 (1989).
6 See Cherry v. Anthony, Gibbs, Sage, 501 So. 2d 416, 419 (Miss. 1987) ("The
most basic principle of contract law is that contracts must be interpreted by objective, not subjective standards. A court must effect a determination of the meaning of the language used, not the ascertainment of some possible but unexpressed
intent of the parties." (quotation omitted)); 'accord IP Timberlands Operating Co.
v. Denmiss Corp., 726 So. 2d 96, 104 (Miss. 1998); Burton v. Choctaw County,
730 So. 2d 1, 6 (Miss. 1997); Century 21 Deep South Properties, Ltd. v. Keys,
652 So. 2d 707, 718 (Miss. 1995); Heritage Cablevision, 646 So. 2d at 1312-13;
Simmons v. Bank of Miss., 593 So. 2d 40, 42-43 (Miss. 1992); Pursue Energy
Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 349, 351 (Miss. 1990); Osborne v. Bullins, 549 So. 2d
1337, 1339 (Miss. 1989); UHS-Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hosp.,
Inc., 525 So. 2d 746, 754 (Miss. 1987); Rogers v. Morgan, 164 So. 2d 480, 484
(Miss. 1964); In re Estate of Huddleston, No. 97-CA-01080-COA, 1999 WL 30541,
at *3 (Miss. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1999).
As the Mississippi Supreme Court explained thirty-five years ago:
Generally speaking, the cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to
that intention if it can be done consistently with legal principles. Whatever may be the inaccuracy of expression or the inaptness of the words
used in an instrument in a legal view, if the intention of the parties can
be clearly discovered, the court will give effect to it and construe the
words accordingly. It must not be supposed, however, that an attempt is
made to ascertain the actual mental processes of the parties to a particular contract. The law presumes that the parties understood the import
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ing of the terms chosen by the parties to it, but also the legal
consequence of those terms.
II.

THE PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

This Court must seek the meaning most coherent in
principle with the best justification which may be
found for that language.'
Over time, courts and scholars have recognized certain
"rules" or "maxims" of construction and interpretation to guide
courts and litigants in their efforts to give effect to the parties'
mutual intention at the time of contracting. These rules appear in no code, and there is less than universal agreement
among courts and commentators as to whether all of the maxims set forth below are legitimate guides to construction and
as to what priorities, if any, courts are to observe among the
various rules.
The prevailing view among American courts and commentators is that a court need not find ambiguity' or less-than-

of their contract and that they had the intention which its terms manifest. It is not within the function of the judiciary to look outside of the
instrument to get at the intention of the parties and then carry out that
intention regardless of whether the instrument contains language sufficient to express it; but their sole duty is to fred out what was meant by
the language of the instrument. This language must be sufficient, when
looked at in the light of such facts as the court is entitled to consider,
to sustain whatever effect is given to the instrument. Taking into consideration this limitation, it may be said that the object of all rules of
interpretation is to arrive at the intention of the parties as it is expressed in the contract. In other words, the object to be attained in
interpreting a contract is to ascertain the meaning and intent of the parties as expressed in the language used.
Byrd v. Rees, 171 So. 2d 864, 867-68 (Miss. 1965); see also Cooper v. Crabb, 587
So. 2d 236, 241 (Miss. 1991) ("[Llegal purpose or intent should first be sought in
an objective reading of the words employed, to the exclusion of parol or extrinsic
evidence. Courts are not at liberty to infer an intent contrary to that emanating
from the text at issue.").
Lehman-Roberts Co. v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 673 So. 2d 742, 744 (Miss.
1996) (paraphrasing Simmons, 593 So. 2d at 43). What could be clearer?
8

See infra subpart II.A.
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full integration 9 before it may apply these rules of construction and interpretation to determine the meaning and consequence of the parties' written agreement. Rather, a trial court
may-indeed, should-use these rules, along with all relevant
evidence, to ascertain the existence of an ambiguity or a lessthan-fully integrated agreement, in the first place, as well as
to resolve any such ambiguity or fill the "gaps" created by
partial integration once identified.1
See infra subpart II.B.
See, e.g., Hibbett Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Biernbaum, 375 So. 2d 431, 434
(Ala. 1979); Neal & Co. v. Association of Village Council Presidents Reg'l Hous.
Auth., 895 P.2d 497, 504 (Alaska 1995); Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 398 (Ariz. 1984); Shawmut Bank Connecticut, N.A. v. Connecticut Limousine Serv., Inc., 670 A.2d 880, 884 (Conn. App.
Ct.), cert. denied, 673 A.2d 1143 (Conn. 1996); Sutton v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 686
A.2d 1045, 1050 (D.C. 1996); First Nat'l Bank of Creston v. Creston Implement
Co., 340 N.W.2d 777, 781 (Iowa 1983); Starr v. Fordham, 648 N.E.2d 1261, 1269
(Mass. 1995); Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 189 A.2d 448, 454-55
(N.J. Super Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 191 A.2d 63 (N.J. 1963); C.R. Anthony
Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 817 P.2d 238, 242-43 (N.M. 1991); Production Credit
Ass'n of Fargo v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118, 126 (N.D. 1990); Abercrombie v. Hayden
Corp., 883 P.2d 845, 853 (Or. 1994); Stewart v. Selder, 473 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Tex.
1971); Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995);
New England Educ. Training Serv., Inc. v. Silver Street Partnership, 595 A.2d
1341, 1344 (Vt. 1991); Emrich v. Connell, 716 P.2d 863, 866 (Wash. 1986) (en
banc); FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 7.3, at 216-22, § 7.10, at 275-76;
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3.3, at 128,
§ 3.12, at 153-54 (4th ed. 1998); JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS
§ 84, at 384-85, § 86, at 406-08 (3d ed. 1990); Mark K Glasser & Keith A.
Rowley, On Parol: The Construction and Interpretation of Written Agreements and
the Role of Extrinsic Evidence in Contract Litigation, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 657, 66469, 700-01, 707-09 (1997); Margaret N. Kniffin, A New Trend in Contract Interpretation: The Search for Reality as Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 OR. L. REV. 643,
649-63 (1995); Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 189-90 (1965); see also R. Wayne Estes &
Kirsten C. Love, The Ubiquitous Yet Illusive "Merger" Clause in Labor Agreements:
Semantics, Applications, and Effect on Past Practice, 87 KY. L.J. 1, 14 (1999) ("[If
a valid contract was entered into, it must then be determined if the written contract was the final expression of the agreement between the parties ....
[Ajny
relevant evidence may be used to determine if the agreement was a final expression of the parties because the parol evidence rule does not apply to this inquiry."); Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretation in California: Plain Meaning, Parol
Evidence and Use of the "JustResult" Principle, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 557, 570 &
n.67 (1998) ("The California courts repeatedly apply a contextual analysis in determining how to interpret contracts."). See generally Eyal Zamir, The Inverted
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This "modified objectivist,"" or "contextual," approach
1 2
underlies both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
and
13
the Uniform Commercial Code. According to the Restatement (Second), which was informed by and took account for
the Code's treatment of these issues,"' the questions of
whether and to what extent a writing is integrated and
whether it is unambiguous are questions of fact, to be determined by the trial judge based on all relevant evidence-including, but not limited to, the circumstances
surrounding the formation of the contract-and in light of the
relevant rules of construction and interpretation." As a
threshold matter, the trial judge determines, based on all
relevant evidence, whether and to what extent the writing is
integrated. 16 In the absence of integratiorl, ambiguity is irrel-

Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
1710 (1997).
" See CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 422-23 (4th ed. 1999); KNIFFIN,
supra note 3, § 24.6, at 25-30.
12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 200-03, 209-10, 212-16 (1981).
See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the
Restatement approach.
13 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-202 (1981); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2202 cmt. 1 (1995); infra subpart II.D; see also Larry T. Garvin, The Changed
(and Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 285, 347 &
n.378 (1999) ([Als a number of courts and commentators have observed, the
Article 2 parol evidence rule [ius itself substantially a rejection of the old fourcorners approach to parol evidence.") (citing e.g., Barbara Oil Co. v. Kansas Gas
Supply Corp., 827 P.2d 24, 35 (Kan. 1992), Herman Oil, Inc. v. Peterman, 518
N.W.2d 184, 188 (N.D. 1994), Sundlun v. Shoemaker, 617 A.2d 1330, 1334 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992), and 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 7.3, at 216)).
See generally infra subpart II.D for a discussion of parol evidence and construction and interpretation issues under the Uniform Commercial Code.
14 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. g, at 90; id.
§ 202 reporter's note, at 91; id. § 203 cmt. d, at 94; id. § 203 reporter's note, at
96; id. § 209 cmt. c, at 116; id. § 209 reporter's note, at 117; id. § 210 cmt. a, at
118; id. § 212 reporter's note, at 128; id. § 216 cmt. a, at 137.
"' See infra notes 16, 19-20.
,6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 cmt. c, at 116 ("Whether
a writing has been adopted as an integrated agreement is a question of fact to be
determined in accordance with all relevant evidence ....
Ordinarily the issue
whether there is an integrated agreement is determined by the trial judge in the
first instance as a question preliminary to an interpretative ruling or to the ap-
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evant, and the parol evidence rule will not apply to prohibit
the parties from presenting extrinsic evidence to the trier of
fact, who will be charged with determining the existence,
terms, and effect of the parties' agreement. 7 If the trial judge
finds that the writing is partially or fully integrated, the next
question is whether it is ambiguous-that is, whether the
words of the partially or fully integrated writing are reasonably susceptible to more than one legal meaning. 8 This, too,
the trial judge decides based on all relevant evidence.' 9 In

plication of the parol evidence rule."); id. § 210 cmt. c, at 118-19 ("Partial integration . . . . may be shown by any relevant evidence, oral or written . . ."); see
also id. § 209 reporter's note, at 117 ("(A]ll relevant evidence, including evidence
extrinsic to the document in question, is admissible on the issue whether the
parties intended the document to be integrated . . ."); id. § 210 cmt. b, at 118
("That a writing was or was not adopted as a completely integrated agreement
may be proved by any relevant evidence ....
and wide latitude must be allowed
for inquiry into the circumstances bearing on the intention of the parties." (emphases added)); id. § 214(a)-(b) ("Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish
(a) that the writing is or is not an integrated agreement; (b) that the integrated
agreement, if any, is completely or partially integrated . . . ."); id. § 214 cmt. a,
at 133 ("Writings do not prove themselves ....
The preliminary determination
[as to integration] is made in accordance with all relevant evidence, including the
circumstances in which the writing was made or adopted.").
"' See, e.g., Walley v. Bay Petroleum Corp., 312 F.2d 540, 543-44 (5th Cir.
1963) (applying Mississippi law); see also Matthews v. Drew Chem. Corp., 475
F.2d 146, 148-50 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Florida law); infra note 669 and accompanying text.
18 See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
19 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 212(1) ("The interpretation of
an integrated agreement is directed to the meaning of the terms of the writing or
writings in light of the circumstances . . . ." (emphasis added)); id. § 212 cmt. b
("[Tihe rule stated in {§ 212(1)] is not limited to cases where it is determined
that the language used is ambiguous. Any determination of meaning or ambiguity
should only be made in the light of the relevant evidence of the situation and
relations of the parties, the subject matter of the transaction, preliminary negotiations and statements made therein, usages of trade, and the course of dealing
between the parties." (emphasis added)); id. § 214(c) ("Agreements and negotiations
prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are admissible in
evidence to establish . . . (c) the meaning of the writing, whether or not integrated . . . ."); id. § 214 cmt. b ("Words, written or oral, cannot apply themselves to
the subject matter. The expressions and general tenor of speech used in negotiations are admissible to show the conditions existing when the writing was made,
the application of the words, and the meaning or meanings of the parties. Even
though words seem on their face to have only a single possible meaning, other
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making these threshold determinations of integration and
ambiguity, the trial court should also consider the relevant
rules of construction and interpretation. °
This view, however, is by no means universal. A minority
of courts and commentators adhere to a more "objectivist" approach,2 which purports to require a judge to determine the
existence of ambiguity and the presence and extent of integration by looking solely at what appears within the written
contract itself-a "four corners" test, so to speak.22 The preponderance of published Mississippi Supreme Court and Mississippi Court of Appeals cases discussing the construction
and interpretation of contracts tend toward the "objectivist"
approach, requiring that the court make a threshold finding
that the "four corners" of the instrument reveal some lack of
integration or some ambiguity (or both) before the court may
resort to any interpretational aids.2
meanings often appear when the circumstances are disclosed." (emphasis added));
see also id. § 202(1) ("Words and other conduct are interpreted in the light of all
circumstances . ... "); id. § 202 cmt. b ("The meaning of words and other symbols
commonly depends on their context . . . . In interpreting the words and conduct
of the parties to a contract, a court seeks to put itself in the position they occupied at the time the contract was made . . . ."); id. § 209 cmt. a (1[Bloth integrated and unintegrated agreements are to be read in the light of the circumstances and may be explained or supplemented by operative usages of trade, by
the course of dealing between the parties, and by the course of performance of
the agreement.").
2 See id. § 202 cmt. a ("The ["Rules in Aid of Interpretation" set forth in
§ 202] are applicable to all manifestations of intention and all transactions ....
They do not depend upon any determination that there is an ambiguity, but are
used in determining what meanings are reasonably possible as well as in choosing among possible meanings.").
21 See KNAPP, CRYSTAL & PRINCE, supra note 11, at 421-22.
22 See, e.g., J & B Steel Contractors, Inc. v. C. Iber & Sons, Inc., 642 N.E.2d
1215, 1218 (Ill. 1994); Jake C. Byers, Inc. v. J.B.C. Invs., 834 S.W.2d 806, 814
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Trinova Corp. v. Pilkington Bros., P.L.C., 638 N.E.2d 572,
576 (Ohio 1994); American State Bank v. Adkins, 458 N.W.2d 807, 809-10 (S.D.
1990); Pulaski Nat'l Bank v. Harrell, 123 S.E.2d 382, 387 (Va. 1962); Ralph
James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131,
1148-59 (1995). See generally Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain
Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 533 (1998) (discussing both "contextual" and "objectivist" views and identifying numerous cases of each view illustrative).
See, e.g., Heritage Cablevision v. New Albany Elec. Power Sys., 646 So. 2d
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In the oft-cited case of Pursue Energy Corp. v.Perkins,'
the Mississippi Supreme Court prescribed the following
"three-tiered process" for construing and interpreting written

1305, 1312-13 (Miss. 1994); Gilich v. Mississippi State Hwy. Comm'n, 574 So. 2d
8, 11 (Miss. 1990); Malone v. Malone, 379 So. 2d 926, 929 (Miss. 1980); Seal v.
Seal, 312 So. 2d 19, 21 (Miss. 1975); Gaston v. Mitchell, 4 So. 2d 892, 893 (Miss.
1941); Harris v. Townsend, 58 So. 529, 529 (1912); Independent Healthcare
Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Bruce, No. 96-CA-00989-COA, 1998 WL 881795, at *3
(Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998); see also IP Timberlands Operating Co. v. Denmiss
Corp., 726 So. 2d 96, 104, 110 (Miss. 1998) ("Whenever . . . the intent and object
of the contracts cannot be ascertained from the language employed . . . parol
evidence may be introduced to show what was in the minds of the parties at the
time of making the contract.") (quotation omitted); Cherry v. Anthony, Gibbs,
Sage, 501 So. 2d 416, 419 (Miss. 1987) ("Parol evidence as to surrounding circumstances and intent may be brought in where the contract is ambiguous, but
where, as here, the contract was found to be unambiguous, it has no place. The
parties are bound by the language of the instrument.").
But see, e.g., Fortune Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Pate's Elec. Co., 356 So. 2d
1176, 1178 (Miss. 1978) ("[W]hether a written contract was intended to be the
final and complete expression of the agreement must be determined from the
circumstances of the case."); Mississippi Rice Growers Ass'n (A.A.L.) v. Pigott, 191
So. 2d 399, 403 (Miss. 1966) ("In determining whether a contract exists, it is incumbent on the court to try to arrive at the intention of the parties, which must
be determined in light of the existing circumstances."); Bivens v. Mobley, 724
So. 2d 458, 462-63 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) ("Facts regarding intent are to be determined from the circumstances surrounding the transaction."); see also, e.g., Griffin
v. Tall Timbers Dev., Inc., 681 So. 2d 546, 551 (Miss. 1996) ("In construing covenants imposing restrictions and burdens on use of land, the language used will be
read in its ordinary sense, and the restriction and burden will be construed in
light of the circumstances surrounding its formulation, with the idea of carrying
out its object, purpose and intent . . . ."); Simmons v. Bank of Miss., 593 So. 2d
40, 43 (Miss. 1992) ("We must read these two clauses in the manner that best
fits the words of the lease in its entirety, open to the implicit, as we absorb the
explicit. We seek as well that meaning most coherent in principle with the best
justification which may be found for this language, given the underlying substantive facts, most important of which are that Landowner put not one penny into
the building Bank's predecessor built and that the building may feasibly be removed without undue harm to the remainder." (emphases added)); Williams v.
Batson, 187 So. 236, 238 (Miss. 1939) (en banc) ("The standard of interpretation
of an integration (written instrument), except where it produces an ambiguous
result, or is excluded by a rule of law establishing a definite meaning, is the
meaning that would be attached to the integration by a reasonably intelligent
person acquainted with all operative usages and knowing all the circumstances
prior to and contemporaneous with the making of the integration . . . ." (citing 1
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 226 (1932)) (emphasis added)).
24 558 So. 2d 349 (Miss. 1990).
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instruments:
First, the court will attempt to ascertain intent by examining the language contained within the "four corners" of the
instrument in dispute.
Particular words should not control; rather, the entire
instrument should be examined.
This so-called "four corners" doctrine calls for construction through application of correct English definition and
language usage. In other words, an instrument should be
construed in a manner which makes sense to an intelligent
layman familiar only with the basics of English language. Of
course, exceptions exist (i.e., when a word has a distinctive
legal meaning).
When an instrument's substance is determined to be
clear or unambiguous, the parties' intent must be effectuated.
In cases in which an instrument is not so clear (e.g.,
different provisions of the instrument seem inconsistent or
contradictory), the court will, if possible, harmonize the provisions in accord with the parties' apparent intent. A cursory
examination of the provisions may lead one to conclude that
the instrument is irreconcilably repugnant; however, this may
not be a valid conclusion. If examination solely of the language within the instrument's four corners does not yield a
clear understanding of the parties' intent, the court will generally proceed to another tier in the three-tiered process. This
entails discretionary implementation of applicable "canons" of
contract construction ....
Application of "canons" of construction may provide a
court with an objective inference of the parties' intent. But if,
at this step in the process, intent remains unascertainable
(i.e., the instrument is still considered ambiguous), then the
court may resort to a final tier in the three-tiered process of
construction. This final tier entails consideration of extrinsic
or parol evidence. In other words, consideration of the totality
of the circumstances attendant the devising of an instrument
may help reveal the parties' intent ....

' Id. at 352-53 (quotations, citations, and parentheticals omitted); accord Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Nettleton Fox Hunting & Fishing Ass'n, 672 So. 2d
1235, 1237-38 (Miss. 1996); see also Barnett v. Getty Oil Co., 266 So. 2d 581, 586
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"Four corners" analysis does not require a court to literally
construe an instrument; rather, it limits the quantum of evidence a court may consider in making its threshold determinations whether or not the "instrument's substance" is clear and
unambiguous.26 As a consequence, the Mississippi Supreme

(Miss. 1972) ("Where the intentions of the parties to an instrument appear clear
and unambiguous from the instrument itself, the court should look solely to the
instrument and give same effect as written. If, however, a careful reading of the
instrument reveals it to be less than clear, definite, explicit, harmonious in all its
provisions, and free from ambiguity throughout, the court is obligated to pursue
the intent of the parties, and, to determine the intent, must resort to extrinsic
aid."); American Oil Co. v. Estate of Wigley, 169 So. 2d 454, 458 (Miss. 1964)
("[Tihe intention of the contracting parties . . . must be determined . . . from the
instrument itself in which it is clearly expressed, or from the instrument and the
surrounding circumstances. .. ").
The Pursue Energy court preceded its analysis with the proviso: "Of course,
the so-called three-tiered process is not recognized as a rigid "step-by-step" process. Indeed, overlapping of steps is not inconceivable." Pursue Energy, 558 So. 2d
at 351 n.6.
More than half a century earlier, in Sumter Lumber Co. v. Skipper, 184 So.
296 (Miss. 1938), the Mississippi Supreme Court explained the process this way:
The rules for the construction of deeds or contracts are designed to ascertain and follow the actual or probable intention of the parties, and
are: When the language of the deed or contract is clear, definite, explicit,
harmonious in all its provisions, and free from ambiguity throughout, the
court looks solely to the language used in the instrument itself, and will
give effect to each and all its parts as written. When, however, the language falls short of the qualities above mentioned and resort must be
had to extrinsic aid, the court will look to the subject matter embraced
therein, to the particular situation of the parties who made the instrument, and to the general situation touching the subject matter, that is
to say, to all the conditions surrounding the parties at the time of the
execution in respect to all such said surrounding conditions, giving
weight also to the future developments thereinabout which were reasonably to be anticipated or expected by them; and when the parties have
for some time proceeded with or under the deed or contract, a large
measure, and sometimes a controlling measure, of regard will be given
to the practical construction which the parties themselves have given it,
this on the common sense proposition that actions generally speak even
louder than words.
Id. at 298-99, quoted with approval in Brashier v. Toney, 514 So. 2d 329, 332
(Miss. 1987).
26 See, e.g., Ham v. Cerniglia, 18 So. 577, 578 (Miss. 1895) ("If strict regard
be had to the literal terms of the written contract, it would appear to be a lease;
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Court frequently appears to "cheat" by referring to one or more
of the following primary rules of construction while conducting
its "four corners" analysis. Strictly speaking, however, only a
resort to the circumstances surrounding the formation of the
contract2 7 or the "practical construction" afforded to the agreement by the parties at and after the time of formation" necessarily requires looking beyond the "four corners."
A. Key Concept: Ambiguity
To say this paragraphis free from doubt ignores the
fact that intelligent lawyers reading it have come to
opposite views .... In the absence of the two parties

who signed it informing us precisely what was meant,
the most enlightened argument from here to the millennium would never remove the cloud cast by the
words.29
An instrument is ambiguous if one or more terms or provisions are susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning."
Mere disagreement between the parties about the meaning of a
provision of a contract is not enough to make the contract ambiguous."'
but looking below the surface, and through the mere form employed, we have no
hesitation in declaring the contract one of conditional sale. The total value of the
property is named in the face of the instrument, and the 'monthly rentals,' as
they are called; but these monthly installments, if paid promptly, would quickly
equal the value of the property.").
27 See infra subpart II.C.7.
28 See infra subpart II.C.8.
29 Frazier v. Northeast Miss. Shopping Ctr., Inc., 458 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (Miss.
1984).

30 See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Buddy Jones Ford, Lincoln-Mercury,
Inc., 734 So. 2d 173, 176 (Miss. 1999); IP Timberlands Operating Co. v. Denmiss
Corp., 726 So. 2d 96, 110 (Miss. 1998); J & W Foods Corp. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 723 So. 2d 550, 552 (Miss. 1998); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, 258 So. 2d 798, 800 (Miss. 1972). See generally HUNTER, supra note 5, § 7.13, at 7-20. Ambiguity does not void an agreement if other
evidence can sufficiently and reliably explain the ambiguous term or provision.
Freeman v. Greenville Convalescent Home, Inc., No. 96-CA-00466-COA, 1998 WL
881772, at *5 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998).
" Cherry v. Anthony, Gibbs, Sage, 501 So. 2d 416, 419 (Miss. 1987); accord
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If a contract is clear and unambiguous, its meaning and
effect are matters of law which may be determined by the
court, and which should be enforced as written.3 2
1. "Patent"vs. "Latent"Ambiguity
Ambiguity may be patent-appearing "on the face of the
contract"3 -- or latent--"aris[ing]from words which are uncer3
tain when applied to the subject matter of the contract."
In Traders'Insurance Co. of Chicago v. E.D. Edwards Post
No. 22, G.A.R., 3 the defendant insurer undertook to insure
the plaintiffs hall and its contents "for the term of three years
from the fourteenth day of January, 1903, at noon, to the fourteenth day of January, 1904, at noon."36 Finding these two
statements of duration-"for the term of three years" and "from
the fourteenth day of January, 1903, at noon, to the fourteenth
day of January, 1904, at noon"-each to be "perfectly clear in

Burton v. Choctaw County, 730 So. 2d 1, 6 (Miss. 1997); IP Timberlands, 726
So. 2d at 104; Whittington v. Whittington, 608 So. 2d 1274, 1278 (Miss. 1992);
Hynson v. Jeifries, 697 So. 2d 792, 795 (Miss. Ct. App. 1997).
32 See Buddy Jones Ford, 734 So. 2d at 176; IP Timberlands, 726 So.
2d at
106; Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247, 252 (Miss. 1985); Smith v. First Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Grenada, 460 So. 2d 786, 790 (Miss. 1984); Dennis v.
Searle, 457 So. 2d 941, 945 (Miss. 1984); Pfisterer v. Noble, 320 So. 2d 383, 384
(Miss. 1975).
See Burton, 730 So. 2d at 8; Ham v. Cerniglia, 18 So. 577, 578 (Miss.
1895); see also Lamb Constr. Co. v. Town of Renova, 573 So. 2d 1378, 1380-83
(Miss. 1990) (holding contract patently ambiguous where "unit" price of $5.50 per
foot times total number of feet-5,530---did not equal total price indicated for all
5,530 feet, which was indicated as "$18,725.00," rather than mathematically correct "$29,425.00"); Carlisle v. Estate of Carlisle, 252 So. 2d 894, 895-96 (Miss.
1971) (holding that testamentary grant of "one-half value of home" was patently
ambiguous because it is unclear whether testatrix meant "the home" to mean
house only, house and some of property on which it sits, house and all of property on which it sits, etc., and "courts have generally held term 'home' has much
broader meaning than 'house').
IP Timberlands, 726 So. 2d at 104, 110; see, e.g., Tinnin v. First United
Bank of Miss., 570 So. 2d 1193, 1195 (Miss. 1990); Dennis, 457 So. 2d at 947;
James v. Board of Supervisors of Wilkinson County, 117 So. 111, 113 (Miss.
1928); Miles v. Miles, 30 So. 2, 3 (Miss. 1901).
38 So. 779 (Miss. 1905).
Id. at 779.
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itself, but... mutually inconsistent and contradictory,"3 7 the
court found the policy to be ambiguous-or, in its words, "a
palpable case of equivocation in description, induced, doubtless,
by clerical misprision.""
Patent ambiguity was also the focus of the court's analysis
in Schlottman v. Hoffman,39 where a codicil to the testatrix's
will granted to each of her two sons "$5 00," which the court
recognized could be read as either "$5.00" or "$500."4o The
court described the ambiguity as follows:
When different sums may be expressed by the use of the same
characters or figures, according to their collection, and, as arranged, an uncertainty as to their meaning is suggested, an
ambiguity appears upon the face of the instrument; and such,
we think, is disclosed by the codicil in this case. We cannot
say whether the sum given to the legatees is $5, or $500.
There is an absence of the decimal mark, but the ciphers are
linked together, removed by an unusual space from the figures they qualify, and written, not on the line, but somewhat
above it.41
37

id.
Id.
"
18 So. 893 (Miss. 1895).
,0 See id. at 895-96.
, Id. at 896.
What, then, to do?
'

[Iff, as we have said, there exists an ambiguity on the face of the codicil, then, unless parol evidence may be received, the codicil is inoperative .
because the court would not know what sum to decree to be
paid.
Id. Having previously recited testimony regarding discussions the testatrix had
with her neighbor and her lawyer at the time the will was executed, the court
resolved the ambiguity based on the evidence of those surrounding circumstances:
Looking, in the case before us, to the situation of the testatrix, the condition of her family, the character and quantity of her estate, and the
res gestae of the execution of the will, we see clearly what she meant
and intended to do, and no violence is done to the words she has employed, nor is anything added thereto, by accepting the figures of the
codicil as meaning $5, instead of $500. They may mean, indifferently,
the one or the other.
Id. (emphasis added).
The role of surrounding circumstances in construing and interpreting contracts
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In Miles v. Miles,4 2 the issue was not patent ambiguity,
but rather ambiguity that arose when the court tried to apply
the terms of the document to its subject matter (i.e., "latent"
ambiguity). In Miles, Theus N. Miles, one of two sons of General William R. Miles, sought to purchase his brother Edward
H. Miles's interest in their father's estate. After several letters
and conversations,
Ed. and Theus and their father met at Goodhope on July 1,
1897, and the following acts were done: Ed. executed a conveyance of "my entire interest in the estate of W.R. Miles, my
father, to Theus N. Miles and Alice Merrick Miles, for and
during their lives, with remainder over to the issue of their
bodies. This contract embraces anything and everything that I
would inherit at my father's death, be the same real estate,
personal property, or ornaments, payment to be made by
Theus N. Miles".... On the same day, the father executed a
conveyance to Theus N. Miles and wife for life, remainder to
their issue, of two plantations known, respectively, as
"Quofaloma" and "Omega," beginning the conveyance with
these words: "Whereas, my son E.H. Miles has sold his interest in my estate to his brother, Theus N. Miles."... [Oln
that same day the father wrote his will, though it was not
finally executed until six days thereafter. This will provides
that: "Whereas, my son Edward H. Miles sold his entire interest in my estate to his brother, Theus N. Miles; and whereas,
on the first day of July, 1897, I made a deed to said Theus N.
Miles of the Omega and Quofaloma plantations, which, in
connection with advances theretofore made, constituted his
and his brother Edward's full share of my estate,"-therefore
he proceeds to devise his remaining
two plantations,
43
Goodhope and Black Bayou, to his wife.

is discussed further in subpart II.B.7, infra. More generally, the role of extrinsic
evidence-including, but not limited to extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract-in construing and interpreting ambiguous
contracts is discussed further in Part III, infra.
.2 30 So. 2 (Miss. 1901).
43 Id.
at 2-3.
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The court explained the consequences of these acts as follows:
Ed. Miles conveyed to Theus his "entire interest in the estate
of W. R. Miles," his father. If his father had been dead, there
would have been no ambiguity whatever of any sort. But we
learn aliunde the deed that his father was then living, and
Ed. therefore had no interest in his estate. This creates a
latent ambiguity, an intermediate one, and raises the question, what is meant by the terms "entire interest in the estate
of W. R. Miles?""
The issue on appeal was whether Ed had a lien against
Omega to secure Theus's promise to pay $10,000 for Ed's "entire interest" in their father's estate. The court said "Yes":
The bill shows what they meant and understood to be conveyed by these terms, which are not in themselves ambiguous, but are made so by the development of the fact that Gen.
Miles was then alive. The deed related to property as conveyed, and expressly reserved a lien on it for $10,000. It appears from the bill that Omega was the subject of the conveyance, and the property understood by the parties as the
interest of Ed. in the estate of his father, and Ed also renounced claim to everything else of the estate. The express
lien is clearly enforceable against Omega. 5
2. Who Decides Whether an Instrument Is Ambiguous?
Whether a written agreement is ambiguous is a question of
law for the court. 6 Because the existence of ambiguity is a

Id. at 3.
Id. (citations omitted).
, See Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 725 So. 2d 779, 781 (Miss.
1998); Lamb Constr. Co. v. Town of Renova, 573 So. 2d 1378, 1383 (Miss. 1990);
Whittington v. Whittington, 608 So. 2d 1274, 1278 (Miss. 1992).
Unlike integration, which may exist in degrees, see infra subpart II.B.1, a
contract is either ambiguous or it is not. A finding of "partial ambiguity" is,
therefore, not an acceptable result of the trial court's initial determination. Cf
Lehman-Roberts Co. v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 673 So. 2d 742, 744 (Miss. 1996)
(calling trial court's findings and conclusions-including but not limited to trial
court's statement that subject clause was "somewhat ambiguous"-"a bit confusing").
"
"

19991 CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION & INTERPRETATION

95

conclusion of law, the appellate courts will review a trial court's
determination de novo.47
In Estate of Parker v. Dorchak,' the decedent (Parker)
sold his step-son (Dorchak) an option to purchase a residence
known as "Windy Acres." Dorchak was to pay $10,000 cash and
$20,000 over time for the option to purchase Windy Acres for a
total of $225,000, inclusive of the option payments. 4 More
than a year later, Dorchak exercised the option to buy Windy
Acres, executing a promissory note for $215,000-the $225,000
purchase price, less the $10,000 already paid for the option-secured by a deed of trust on the property. The promissory note obligated Dorchak to pay interest on the $215,000 indebtedness "from date."50 The meaning of this phrase was the
central issue at trial and on appeal. Parker's executrix argued
that "from date" meant that interest began accruing on the
date of the promissory note, whereas the Dorchaks argued that,
because the note did not require them to make monthly installment payments until they occupied the premises, that "from
date" meant interest would accrue beginning when they took
occupancy.5 1 Ultimately, the chancellor agreed with the
Dorchaks, and Parker's executrix appealed. The Mississippi
Supreme Court addressed the standard of review issue as follows:
In his Supplemental Opinion and Ruling, the Chancellor
made brief note of this provision in the note, but he then
looked to extrinsic evidence as to the parties' intent, most
notably with regard to an option contract which was drafted
over one year prior to the date of the note. The Chancellor
was without discretion to so consider extrinsic evidence, unless he first found that the promissory note was ambiguous
under the Parol Evidence Rule. The Chancellor's ruling
makes no mention of a finding of ambiguity in the note prior

See IP Timberlands Operating Co. v. Denmiss Corp., 726 So. 2d 96, 104,
108 (Miss. 1998); Whittington, 608 So. 2d at 1278.
" 673 So. 2d 1379 (Miss. 1996).
'9 Id. at 1380.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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to looking at extrinsic evidence, and as such, although wellreasoned, does not employ the proper legal analysis. Accordingly, it is for this Court to conduct a de novo review of the
facts, taking into consideration the applicable considerations
under the Parol Evidence Rule. 2

3. Who Decides What the Ambiguous Terms Mean?
On the other hand, a writing is ambiguous, the trier of fact
must determine the meaning of its terms or provisions.5 3
In Deer Creek Construction Co. v. Peterson,' the deed of
trust and note executed by Mrs. Peterson to Deer Creek provided, in relevant part: "Note payable ninety days from date,
with interest after maturity at 9% per annum until fully
paid."55 The court explained that
Mrs. Peterson was allowed to testify, over the objections
of Brown and Deer Creek..., that Mr. Brown told her the
house would be finished within ninety days and that no inter-

est would be due on the note until such time as the house was

52 Id. at 1381. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment for the

Dorchaks:
After conducting said de novo review, and considering the competing
canons of contract construction, it is apparent that the judgment reached
by the trial judge was correct, although his legal analysis may have
been incomplete. The language of the promissory note is in fact ambiguous, and a consideration of the extrinsic evidence, as well as of the note
itself, leads inescapably to the conclusion that the "from date" language,
which forms the basis of this entire appeal, should not be interpreted in
the manner which the Executrix asserts.
Id. at 1382. The so-called "canons of construction" alluded to by the Dorchak court
will be addressed at length later in this article, see infra subparts II.C-.E, as will
the parol evidence rule, see infra Part III. For present purposes, this case supports
the rule that an appellate court's review of a trial court's finding of ambiguity is
de novo.
58 See Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 725 So. 2d 779, 781 (Miss.
1998); Lamb Constr. Co. v. Town of Renova, 573 So. 2d 1378, 1383 (Miss. 1990);
Dennis v. Searle, 457 So. 2d 941, 945 (Miss. 1984). See generally Barnett v. Getty
Oil Co., 266 So. 2d 581, 586 (Miss. 1972) ("If, however, a careful reading of the
instrument reveals it to be less than clear, definite, explicit, harmonious in all its
provisions, . . . the court is obligated to pursue the intent of the parties.").
14
412 So. 2d 1169 (Miss. 1982).
55 Id. at 1172.
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finished ....
The construction proposal of Brown, accepted by Mrs. Peterson, dealing with the specifications and price contains no
provision with reference to time of completion. However, a
note and deed of trust executed by Mrs. Peterson for the purpose of securing Deer Creek and Brown for the construction
price provided "Note payable ninety days from date, with
interest after maturity at 9% per annum until fully paid."
These three instruments represent all of the written agreement with respect to the construction of this house.5"
The court noted that, "[wihen a contract for the construction of a house contains no specific time in which the construction is to be completed, the general rule is that a reasonable
period of time for construction is inferred. However, where the
contract is ambiguous or indefinite as to the construction period, then parol evidence is admissible for clarification." 7 The
court continued:
[Tihe proposal for building the home submitted by Deer Creek
and Brown to Mrs. Peterson and accepted by her must be
read together with the note and deed of trust which she executed to Deer Creek and Brown for the purpose of securing
the construction price in order to determine the intent of the
parties. When this is done, a clear ambiguity appears as to
the length of time for construction because the proposal submitted by Deer Creek and Brown to Mrs. Peterson was silent
as to when the construction would be completed. Yet, the note
and deed of trust given to secure Deer Creek and Brown during the construction period clearly states that it was due and
payable in ninety days .... Therefore, it was not error for the
trial court to allow... Mrs. Peterson's testimony, that Brown
told her that the house would be completed within ninety
days, in order to shed light on the ambiguity. Brown testified
that he did not make such a representation. The jury was
properly allowed to resolve the question.58

56 Id.
17

Id. (citations omitted).

58 Id. (citation omitted).
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Because the resolution of ambiguity, once the trial court
has found it to exist, is a question of fact, the appellate court
must respect the trial court's finding as long as it is supported
by credible evidence and is not manifestly wrong.5 9
4. How Does the Issue Arise?
Any court asked to enforce a contract must first determine
what the contract says, and
if the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous, the
[court] must enforce it as written. However, if it is less than
clear, the court must then attempt to ascertain the intent of
the parties. As a [court] must determine how clear a contract
is before he can determine its meaning, whether a party raises a claim of ambiguity or not is in a very real sense
irrelevant."

'" See Lamb Constr. Co. v. Town of Renova, 573 So. 2d 1378, 1383 (Miss.
1990); see also Kight v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply, Inc., 537 So. 2d 1355, 1358 (Miss.
1989) ("[Tlhe interpretation of an ambiguous writing by resort to extrinsic evidence presents a question of fact."). If the issue is decided by a jury, then the
appellate court should respect the jury's verdict unless it is "against the overwhelming weight of the evidence." Adams v. Green, 474 So. 2d 577, 581 (Miss.
1985).
" Century 21 Deep South Properties, Ltd. v. Keys, 652 So. 2d 707, 717 (Miss.
1995).
The Century 21 court went on to contrast ambiguity from contract defenses: "This is what sets ambiguity apart from the affirmative defenses. The clarity
of a contract must always be considered before a contract may be enforced,
whereas the consideration of non-plead affirmative defenses is not required." Id.
The court then quoted from Hertz Commercial Leasing v. Morrison, 567 So. 2d
832, 835 (Miss. 1990):

As defenses to a contract action, failure of consideration, illegality
and statute of frauds are similar. Each assumes the contract on its face
entitles plaintiff to prevail but then reaches into the bag of rules prescribing forms and limiting the power of persons to contract and pulls
one out, saying, "See, this contract may not be enforced." Each finds a
rule of law external to the contract and brings it to bear to bar the
plaintiffs action.
Century 21, 652 So. 2d at 717. The Century 21 court concluded:
Ambiguity, however, is not a rule of law external to the contract. It
is if anything internal, concerned with what the contract means and not
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5. The Consequences of Ambiguity
If the trial court, in the course of conducting its "four corners" analysis,6 1 finds that the written instrument is other
than "clear and unambiguous," Pursue Energy Corp. v.
Perkins62 instructs the trial court to discretionarily apply any
relevant "canons" of construction." These canons (or "rules" or
"maxims") are the subjects of subparts I.C and II.D, infra.'
In the course of applying one or more canons of construction, the trial court may have to resort to extrinsic evidence."
And, in any event, if applying the canons does not resolve the
ambiguity as a matter of law, the court will consider extrinsic
evidence." Part III of this article more fully examines the per-

with whether the contract should be enforced. Clearly, one cannot determine the enforceability of a contract until one first determines its meaning. Ambiguity analysis, unlike affirmative defense analysis, is by its
very nature a necessary step in the examination of every contract. Ambiguity therefore does not need to be affirmatively pled by either party.
Ambiguity analysis of the contract was not error.
Id. (emphasis added).
6 See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
6'2558 So. 2d 349 (Miss. 1990).
Pursue Energy Corp., 558 So. 2d at 352 ("If examination solely of the language within the instrument's four corners does not yield a clear understanding
of the parties' intent, the court will generally proceed to another tier in the
three-tiered process. This entails discretionary implementation of applicable
'canons' of contract construction."). See supra text accompanying note 25.
" Additionally, subpart II.E, infra, discusses rules of construction and interpretation that the Mississippi Supreme Court has applied to particular types of
instruments. The rules discussed in subpart II.E are, generally speaking, subordinate to the "primary" rules of construction and interpretation discussed in subpart
II.C, and either subordinate to or on a par with the "secondary" rules of construction and interpretation discussed in subpart II.D.
65 For example, extrinsic evidence would be required to apply either the "surrounding circumstances" rule, see infra subpart II.C.7, or the "practical construction" rule, see infra subpart II.C.8, and would also be required to apply the presumption against illegality, see infra subpart II.C.5, at least to the extent necessary to get the trial court to take judicial notice of the applicable law or public
policy which is threatened by a particular construction or interpretation of the
instrument's terms.
6 See Pursue Energy Corp., 558 So. 2d at 353 ("[11f, [after applying the relevant canons of construction], intent remains unascertainable (i.e., the instrument
is still considered ambiguous), then the court may resort to a final tier in the
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missible uses of extrinsic evidence in construing and interpreting a written instrument that is latently6 7 or patently' ambiguous.
B. Key Concept: Integration
The parties to an agreement often reduce all or part of
it to writing. Their purpose in so doing is commonly to
provide reliable evidence of its making and its terms
and to avoid trusting to uncertain memory .... In the
interest of certainty and security of transactions, the
law gives special effect to a writing adopted as a final
9
expression of an agreement."
If the parties to a written contract intend it to serve as a
final expression of their agreement as to the terms contained in
the writing, then the contract is said to be integrated.0 All
prior negotiations and agreements regarding the subject matter
of an integrated term or agreement are "merged" into that
integrated term or agreement.7 1
2
For example, in Gilchrist Tractor Co. v. Stribling,7
the parties first entered into a preliminary written agreement
which provided, among other things, that further written
agreements would be made later, dealing more specifically
with each of the several aspects of the transaction. This was
done, and these contracts, prepared later in the light of the

three-tiered process of construction. This final tier entails consideration of extrinsic or parol evidence.").
e See supra notes 34, 42-45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33, 35-41 and accompanying text.
89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS ch. 9, topic 3 intro, note, at 114

(1981).

'0 See id. § 209(1); FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 7.3, at 215.
7
See Houser v. Brent Towing Co., 610 So. 2d 363, 365 (Miss. 1992); Singing
River Mall Co. v. Mark Fields, Inc., 599 So. 2d 938, 946 (Miss. 1992); Mississippi
State Hwy. Comm'n v. Cohn, 217 So. 2d 528, 531 (Miss. 1969); Grenada Auto Co.
v. Waldrop, 195 So. 491, 492 (Miss. 1940); State Hwy. Dep't v. Duckworth, 172
So. 148, 150 (Miss. 1937); Red Snapper Sauce Co. v. Boiling, 50 So. 401, 401
(Miss. 1909); Odoneal v. Henry, 12 So. 154, 155 (Miss. 1892).
72 192 So. 2d 409 (Miss. 1966).
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developed facts, supplemented the original written agreements and superseded prior oral agreements, if any. They
dealt with the same subject matter and the contracting parties were the same ....
Prior discussions and oral agreements, if any, were merged into and superseded by the final
agreements of the parties as reflected by their detailed written contracts.73
1. Full vs. PartialIntegration
An integrated agreement may be either fully integrated or
only partially integrated. A fully integrated contract is one that
is a final and complete expression of all the terms agreed upon
between or among the parties.7 4 If a contract is fully integrated, all prior and contemporaneous negotiations are merged into
the written contract.75
In Keys v. Rehabilitation Centers, Inc.,76 the court explained the effect of the fully integrated closing documents on
the rights and obligations established in a preliminary indemnity agreement that pre-dated the closing:
[Tlhe Keyses argue that their indemnity obligations are governed by the May 13, 1982, purchase agreement and not by
the indemnity agreement delivered at closing on July 1,
1982 .... The short answer is that their fundamental premise is wrong. The purchase agreement ....
was not the sale
itself. By its terms, it contemplated a closing a little over six
weeks later, or whenever the necessary administrative approvals were obtained. At closing the terms of the purchase
agreement merged into the closing documents: the deeds, bill

7' Gilchrist Tractor Co., 192 So. 2d at 417; see also, e.g., West v. Arrington,
183 So. 2d 824, 827 (Miss. 1966) ("[AIll negotiations between the Arringtons and
West were merged in the deed which the grantee accepted and under which he
and his grantees claim.").
" See Housing Auth., City of Laurel v. Gatlin, 738 So. 2d 249, 251 (Miss.

1998); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 7.3, at 215-16.

§ 210(1)

(1981);

5 See Singing River Mall, 599 So. 2d at 946; see also Continental Gin Co. v.
Freeman, 237 F. Supp. 240, 244-45 (N.D. Miss. 1964), affd, 381 F.2d 459 (5th
Cir. 1967).
76 574 So. 2d 579 (Miss. 1990).
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of sale, promissory notes, and the indemnity agreement. The
closing documents themselves subsumed the comparable provisions of the purchase agreement."

A contract is partially integrated if the written agreement
is a final and complete expression of some or all of the terms
contained therein, but not all of the terms agreed upon between
or among the parties are contained in the written agreement.7" For example, an agreement is only partially integrated
"if the writing omits a consistent additional agreed term which
is (a) agreed to for separate consideration, or (b) such a term as
in the circumstances might naturally be omitted from the writ"
ing. 79
In Walley v. Bay Petroleum Corp.,"0 the trial judge excluded extrinsic evidence that tended to show that the appellee had
agreed to sell its products on competitive terms. The trial judge

77
7'

Keys, 574 So. 2d at 583.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has explained:

The written provisions adopted by contracting parties merge only those
prior and contemporaneous writings which are contained within as the
final and complete expression of their agreement ....
This does not
mean, however, that a separate contract may not be entered into to
explain or supplement the existing contract.
Security Mut. Fin. Corp. v. Willis, 439 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (Miss. 1983); see also
Fortune Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Pate's Elec. Co., 356 So. 2d 1176, 1178 (Miss.
1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210(2) (1981); FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 3, § 7.3, at 215.
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216(2). The Restatement provides
the following illustration:
A and B in an integrated writing promise to sell and buy [respectively] a specific automobile. As part of the transaction they orally agree
that B may keep the automobile in A's garage for one year, paying $15
a month [above and beyond the selling price of the car]. The oral agreement is not within the scope of the integration and is not superseded.
Id. § 216 illus. 3, at 138 (emphasis added). The Restatement counsels that "[tihis
situation is especially likely to arise when the writing is in a standardized form
which does not lend itself to the insertion of additional terms," such as negotiable
instruments, leases and conveyances, and the like. Id. § 216 cmt. d., at 138-39.
Also, certain terms collateral to a negotiable instrument would, if included in the
terms of the instrument, destroy its negotiability; therefore, it is "natural" to leave
such terms off the face of the instrument. Id. at 139.
" 312 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1963).
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assumed that the three writings in question-two notes and a
letter of guaranty-"constitute[d] a full integration of the
agreement between the parties."1 The Fifth Circuit disagreed:
[T]he three writings are so incomplete as to show on their

face that they were not intended to constitute the full agreement between the parties.
In essence, the evidence offered, and rejected, went to
show that, in addition to the recitation of consideration received contained in the notes, there was promissory consideration to the appellant, namely, appellee's promise to sell the
products to Walco on competitive terms .... [Slince the writ-

ings constituted only a partial integration of the agreement,
the appellant could show the existence of additional, promissory consideration for his promise of guaranty.82
a. Mississippi Common Law Presumes That a Written
Contract Is Fully Integrated
Mississippi courts presume that written agreements are
fully integrated.' This rebuttable presumption, ancient in origin," and still embraced by Mississippi common law, is at
81 Walley, 312 F.2d at 544 (applying Mississippi law).
82

Id. at 544-45 (footnote omitted).

See Bank of Lena v. Slay, 170 So. 635, 636 (Miss. 1936) ("It is well settled
in this state that, when parties deliberately put their agreement in writing, it
will be presumed that the whole contract was embodied in such writing . . .");
see also, e.g., Hoerer v. First Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 254 So. 2d 754, 759 (Miss.
1971); Parker v. McCaskey Register Co., 171 So. 337, 339-40 (Miss. 1936); Red
Snapper Sauce Co. v. Bolling, 50 So. 401, 401 (Miss. 1909); Houck v. Wright, 23
So. 422, 422 (Miss. 1898). But see Fortune Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Pate's Elec.
Co., 356 So. 2d 1176, 1178 (Miss. 1978) ("[Wlhether. a written contract was intended to be the final and. complete expression of the agreement must be determined from the circumstances of the case.").
" See, e.g., Kerr v. Calvit, 1 Miss. (Walker) 115, 118 (1822) ("lit cannot be a
safe or salutary rule, to allow a contract to rest partly in writing, and partly in
parol. Whenever it is reduced to writing, that is to be considered the evidence of
the agreement, and every thing resting in parol, becomes thereby extinguished.")
(citing Jackson v. Bradt, 2 Cai. R. 169 (N.Y. 1804)). See generally 4 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2426, at 81-93 (James H.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1972) (tracing the origins of the parol evidence rule, including
but not limited to the doctrine of merger and the presumption that written
agreements are integrated, and concluding that the modern version of rule and its
basic trappings came into being by end of 1600s).
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odds with both the Uniform Commercial Code"5 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts~s-both of which reject the

85 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202 cmt. 1 (1995) ("This section defi-

nitely rejects . . . [any assumption that because a writing has been worked out
which is final on some matters, it is to be taken as including all the matters
agreed upon.").
While the Mississippi legislature has adopted section 2-202 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, see MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-202 (1981), it has not adopted the
official comments-including, but not limited to, the comment quoted above, see
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-1-101 et seq. (1981 & Supp. 1998). Nonetheless, a number
of Mississippi cases have turned to the official comments for guidance on matters
governed by Article 2. See, e.g., Patel v. Telerent Leasing Corp., 574 So. 2d 3, 7
(Miss. 1990); Beck Enter., Inc. v. Hester, 512 So. 2d 672, 676 (Miss. 1987); Rester
v. Morrow, 491 So. 2d 204, 211 (Miss. 1986); Franklin County Coop. v. MFC
Servs. (A.A.L.), 441 So. 2d 1376, 1378 (Miss. 1983); Bell v. Hill Bros. Constr. Co.,
419 So. 2d 575, 577 (Miss. 1982); Derden v. Morris, 247 So. 2d 838, 839 (Miss.
1971); see also, e.g., Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117,
1123 (5th Cir. 1985); Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Brown, 709 F.2d 898, 900 (5th Cir.
1983); Weathersby v. Gore, 556 F.2d 1247, 1256-57 (5th Cir. 1977); Curry v. Sile
Distrib., 727 F. Supp. 1052, 1054 (N.D. Miss. 1990); C.R. Daniels, Inc. v. Yazoo
Mfg. Co., 641 F. Supp. 205, 209-10 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
Even if Mississippi courts were to construe section 75-2-202 consistently with
official comment 1, parties would be able to vary the provisions of the UCC by
explicit agreement. See MISs. CODE ANN. § 75-1-102(3) (1981). Therefore, parties
to a written agreement subject to the UCC could easily include language in the
operative provision(s) that has the effect of creating a presumption of full integration, as well as precluding the resort to extrinsic evidence of the types that the
UCC otherwise makes admissible. See infra subpart III.D.
86 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 210 cmt. a, at 118 (1981)
(counseling that § 210(1) "is to be read with the definition of integrated agreement in § 209, to reject the assumption sometimes made that because a writing
has been worked out which is final on some matters, it is to be taken as including all the matters agreed upon"); id. § 209 illus. 3, at 116-17 ("In the absence of contrary evidence, the writing is taken to be an integration; whether it
is a complete integration is decided on the basis of all relevant evidence."); see
also Braucher, supra note 3, at 16 & n.23.
According to the Restatement, a party may prove complete or partial integration on the basis of "any relevant evidence." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210 cmt. b, at 118. While a written, facially integrated, and unambiguous contract signed by both parties may be decisive of the extent of integration,
"a writing cannot of itself prove its own completeness, and wide latitude must be
allowed for inquiry into circumstances bearing on the intention of the parties." Id.
The Restatement offers the following illustration:
A, a college, owns premises which have no toilet or plumbing facilities or
heating equipment. In negotiating a lease to B for use of the premises
as a radio station, A orally agrees to permit the use of [toilet and

1999] CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION & INTERPRETATION

105

presumption that, simply because a writing is integrated as to
some terms, it is fully integrated as to all terms.
The rationale for presuming full integration is fairly
straightforward: Once the parties have reduced their agreement to writing they are presumed to have selected from prior
negotiations only the promises and agreements for which they
choose to be bound.
b. The Significance of "Merger"or
"Integration"Clauses

To manifest their intention to create a completely integrated agreement, parties will often include a "merger" or "integration" clause8 7 stating something to the effect that the writing
contains or constitutes "the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes any and all prior agreements, arrangements, or understandings between the parties relating to
the subject matter," and that there are no "oral understandings, statements, promises or inducements contrary to the
terms of' the writing." The effect of including such a clause,

plumbing] facilities in an adjacent building and to provide heat. The
parties subsequently execute a written lease agreement which makes no
mention of [the use of the adjacent] facilities or heat. The question
whether the written lease was adopted as a completely integrated agreement is to be decided on the basis of all relevant evidence of the prior
and contemporaneous conduct and language of the parties.
Id. § 210 illus. 1, at 118 (emphasis added).
" Merger and integration clauses serve essentially the same purpose, have essentially the same effect, and are often used and referred to interchangeably. The
difference between them is that an integration clause recites that the written
contract constitutes the sole and complete agreement between or among the parties, while a merger clause recites that the written contract supersedes all prior
oral or written agreements, leaving the written contract the sole remaining, and
therefore complete, agreement between or among the parties. See Glasser &
Rowley, supra note 10, at 711 n.254. Thus, a merger clause presupposes prior
oral and/or written agreements, whereas an integration clause does not.
" Holland v. Mayfield, No. 96-CA-01169-SCT, 1999 WL 353023, at *3 (Miss.
June 3, 1999); see, e.g., Franklin v. Lovitt Equip. Co., 420 So. 2d 1370, 1371
(Miss. 1982); Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Wooley, 217 So. 2d 632, 637 (Miss.
1969); Housing Auth., City of Laurel v. Gatlin, 738 So. 2d 249, 250 (Miss. Ct.
App. 1998); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 7.3, at 223-25; MURRAY, supra
note 10, § 84, at 386; Estes & Love, supra note 10, at 11-12.

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69

as a general rule, is to make evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements and representations "varying, modifying,
or controlling the written agreement ... inadmissible."89
However, the mere fact that a written contract contains a
merger or integration provision does not guarantee full integration." For example, in Swinny v. Cities Service Oil Co.,9 the
written contract contained the following provision: "In the
event of the sale of products in tank car lots to customers in
the territory covered by this agreement, the Corporation shall
pay to the Distributor such commission as shall be agreed upon." 2 Cities Service Oil Co. did, in fact, sell products in tank
car lots to customers in the territory covered by its agreement
with Swinny (the "Distributor"), but did not pay Swinny any
commission because Swinny did not negotiate the deal. 3 In
the ensuing lawsuit, Swinny offered testimony that Cities had
orally agreed to pay him one-eighth of one cent per gallon

" Stribling Bros. Mach. Co. v. Girod Co., 124 So. 2d 289, 293 (Miss. 1960);
accord Berry v. McKay, 194 So. 299, 300 (Miss. 1940); see, e.g., Grenada Auto.
Co. v. Waldrop, 195 So. 491, 492 (Miss. 1940) (finding merger in a contract that
stated '[tIhis contract constitutes the entire agreement; no waivers or modifications shall be valid unless written upon or attached hereto," and "all promises,
verbal understandings, or agreements of any kind pertaining to this purchase not
specified herein are hereby expressly waived."); Gatlin, 735 So. 2d at 250-51; see
also Phillips v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 792 F.2d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1986); General
Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. American Air Filter Co., 696 F.2d 375, 378 (5th Cir.
1983) (both applying Mississippi law).
go See, e.g., Lambert v. Mississippi Limestone Corp., 405 So. 2d 131, 132-33
(Miss. 1981) (approving resort to extrinsic evidence, despite the presence of merger clause, where two paragraphs of written agreement appeared to be in conflict
with one another); Dunavant Enter., Inc. v. Ford, 294 So. 2d 788, 789-91 (Miss.
1974) (approving resort to extrinsic evidence, despite the presence of merger
clause, where writing "called for cotton to be produced on 1,600 acres situated in
Marks, Mississippi," despite the fact that there were not, in fact, 1,600 acres in
Marks, Mississippi on which cotton could be grown). See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216 cmt. e, at 140 ("Written agreements often contain
clauses stating that there are no representations, promises or agreements between
the parties except those found in the writing . . . . But such a clause does not
control the question whether the writing was assented to as an integrated agreement . .
").
91 197 So. 2d 795 (Miss. 1967).
92 Swinny, 197 So. 2d at 796 (emphasis added).
93

Id. at 797.
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sold." The trial court found for Cities, and Swinny appealed.
The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Cities' argument
that the oral agreement regarding Swinny's commission was
incompetent because the written contract contained a written
merger and no-oral-modification clause:
[Cities] contends that the "alleged oral agreement" is unenforceable as to the commission because the contract contains a
paragraph in which it is said: "This agreement constitutes the
entire agreement between the parties, and may not be
changed except by written agreement signed by an executive
officer of [Cities]."
We do not agree with the argument that this suit is an
effort to change the contract or amend it. The effort made by
[Swinny] was to enforce the contract. The amount of the commissions to be paid from time to time was by agreement to be
determined by the parties. There was no agreement in contract requiring that the amount of commissions should be in
writing. It expressed an agreement to pay commissions, the
amount of which would be agreed upon later. From time to
time, [Swinny] was paid one-eighth of one cent, and it was
mutually understood that this was the amount of the commission. This agreement as to the amount of the commission does
not vary the terms of the contract, and it is enforceable since
the contract does not come within the terms of the Statute of
Frauds ...

"

c. Finding PartialIntegration
Parties can make their contracts in such forms as they see fit,
and if they wish they can reduce some agreements to writing
and leave others to oral expression and still others to partially oral and partially written form. A written agreement,
though not a complete integration, may be the complete statement of certain things that have been negotiated out and
agreed upon-the so-called "partial integration."'

94

Id.

9' Id. at 798.
" Aboussie v. Aboussie, 441 F.2d 150, 154 (5th Cir.) (footnote omitted) (applying analogous Texas law), withdrawn in part, on other grounds, 446 F.2d 56
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As a general proposition, for a Mississippi court to determine that a written agreement is not fully integrated, it must
decide as a matter of law either that the writing is facially
incomplete or that, when viewed in light of the totality of evidence regarding the transaction, the writing does not appear to
be the complete embodiment of the terms relating to the subject matter of the writing.9 7 Borrowing terminology more typically associated with questions of ambiguity, we may describe
these two indicia of partial integration as "patent" incompleteness and "latent" incompleteness, respectively."
1). Patent (Facial)Incompleteness
patent, or facial, incompleteness is easy to understand and
apply in the context of the "three-tiered" process of construction
and interpretation prescribed by Pursue Energy Corp. v.
Perkins.9 A written agreement may be facially incomplete be(5th Cir. 1971).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210 cmt. c, at 118-19
(1981) ("It is often clear from the face of a writing that it is incomplete and
cannot be more than a partially integrated agreement. Incompleteness may also
be shown by other writings . .. . [oir it may be shown by any relevant evidence ..
").
98 See supra subpart II.A.1 (discussing patent and latent ambiguity). A thorough review did. not reveal any published Mississippi decision or commentary that
uses these precise terms in the context of construing contracts; nonetheless, the
terms are apt. The term "patently incomplete" (or some variation thereof) is invoked in a handful of reported contracts decisions. See, e.g., Lichter v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F.2d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 1944); Chicago, Rock Island &
Pac. R.R. v. Furniture Forwarders of St. Louis, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 62, 64 (E.D.
Mo. 1967), affd, 393 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1968); In re Big Cahaba Coal Co., 183 F.
662, 663 (N.D. Ala. 1910); In re Marriage of Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 803
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999); In re Appeal of Dist. Council 88, Am. Fed'n of State, County
& Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO, 430 A.2d 1217, 1220 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981);
Hammond v. Wheeler, 347 S.W.2d 884, 894 (Mo. 1961); Merrick v. New York

Subways Adver. Co., 178 N.Y.S.2d 814, 819 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958); Blume v.
MacGregor, 148 P.2d 656, 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Davis, 155 S.E. 105, 107-08 (Ga. Ct. App. 1930); Cassetta v. Baima, 288 P. 830,
831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930); Walsh v. Hunt, 52 P. 115, 116 (Cal. 1898). The term
"latently incomplete" (or some variation thereof) is used in only one reported contracts decision. See Telephone Interconnect Corp. v. Bunch, 1982 WL 215188, at
*2 (Va. Cir. Ct., Warren Cty. Mar. 31, 1982).
" 558 So. 2d 349, 352-53 (Miss. 1990). See supra notes 24-25 and accompany-
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cause, inter alia, (1) blanks in the writing are not filled in,0 °
(2) the writing explicitly refers to or incorporates a conversation or a past, contemporaneous, or future agreement not included with or in02 the writing,'01 or (3) the agreement omits
necessary terms. 1
ing text.
10 See, e.g., Lore v. Smith, 133 So. 214, 215 (Miss. 1931) ("A writing is incom-

plete as an agreement where blanks as to essential matters are left in it, unless
they can be supplied from other parts of the writing itself, or unless and until
such blanks are lawfully filled.") (quotation omitted); see also, e.g., Grant v. Imperial Motors, 539 F.2d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 1976) ("Obviously, the contracts are incomplete since blanks as to a material matter, the deduction of an acquisition
charge from the finance charge to be refunded in the event of prepayment, are
left therein.") (applying analogous Georgia law).
101 See, e.g., Paymaster Oil Mill Co. v. Mitchell, 319 So. 2d 652, 657 (Miss.
1975) (holding that a written agreement including the phrase "per our conversation" was not the entire contract between the parties "since the conversation . . .
was incorporated into it"); Swinny v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 197 So. 2d 795, 796-97
(Miss. 1967) (holding that a written agreement clearly left a term to be later
agreed upon by parties and was not fully integrated, despite presence of merger
clause). See generally Valley Mills, Div. of Merchants Co. v. Southeastern Hatcheries of Miss., Inc., 145 So. 2d 698, 703 (Miss. 1962) ("Where the writing expressly refers to a conversation between the parties in reference to the subject-matter,
the courts generally admit evidence of the conversation.").
See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text for more discussion of the
Swinny case.
10" See, e.g., Universal Computer Serv., Inc. v. Lyall, 464 So. 2d 69, 76 (Miss.
1985) (holding that where the written employment contract "only related to duties
of employment, non-competition clauses, etc." and "did not address salary or commission," . . . [iut therefore follow[ed] that the employment agreement [wa]s not
the entire contract between the parties and therefore the chancellor was correct
in admitting other evidence to evince the total agreement"); see also Broome
Constr. Co. v. Beaver Lake Recreational Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d 545, 547 (Miss.
1969) (finding extent of integration to be a fact issue where "Itihe particular
writing asserted by Broome to constitute the contract is claimed by Beaver Lake
not to be a complete and accurate integration of that instrument, because it omits
the FHA approval clause"). See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 7.15, at
327-31 (discussing omitted terms).
The mere fact that a term is omitted from a writing does not necessarily
mean that the writing is not fully integrated and enforceable as written. See, e.g.,
Bruce v. Bruce, 687 So. 2d 1199, 1203 (Miss. 1996) (finding no error in the trial
court's refusal to modify written amended agreement due to the parties' failure to
carry a provision in the original agreement regarding health insurance forward
into an amended agreement). On the other hand, the omission of an essential
term may make the contract unenforceable, obviating the need for construction
and interpretation. See, e.g., Duke v. Whatley, 580 So. 2d 1267, 1273-74 (Miss.
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2). Contextual (Latent)Incompleteness
The second indicia of partial integration-that the writing
does not appear to be the complete embodiment of the terms
relating to the subject matter of the writing-is more elusive,
particularly in light of the Mississippi Supreme Court's commitment to a "four corners" approach at the outset of any effort
to construct or interpret a written instrument." 3 The best
proof of contextual, or latent, incompleteness seems to be the
existence of one or more collateral agreements between or
among the parties to the written instrument before the
court'°--assuming that the court will consider evidence of
collateral agreements in the face of a facially integrated written
instrument.
For example, in Chism v. Omlie, 5 Omlie agreed to convey to Chism "a 428 acre ranch, certain designated farming
equipment, and the furniture in the house on the ranch except
'personal- things'" agreed to by the parties"':
Thereafter Mrs. Omlie was permitted by Mrs. Chism to remove some clothing and other small items but Mrs. Chism
refused to allow Mrs. Omlie to remove certain other items of
personal property which Mrs. Omlie claimed she reserved as
"personal things."
Mrs. Omlie then filed this suit in chancery averring...
1991) ("While courts may supply reasonable terms which the parties omitted in
the contracting process, such as a time for performance, essential terms such as
price cannot be left as open ended questions in contracts which anticipate some
future agreement.") (citing Smith v. Mavar, 21 So. 2d 810, 811 (Miss. 1945)).
'
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Knight v. McCain, 531 So. 2d 590, 595-96 (Miss. 1988); Lyall, 464
So. 2d at 76; Valley Mills, 145 So. 2d at 702; Chism v. Omlie, 124 So. 2d 286,
288-89 (Miss. 1960); Green v. Booth, 44 So. 784, 784 (Miss. 1907); see also, e.g.,
Walley v. Bay Petroleum Corp., 312 F.2d 540, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1963) (applying
Mississippi law) (holding that written agreement, which consisted of three documents, but which excluded alleged collateral agreement by seller's agent to sell on
'competitive terms," was only partially integrated).
The Walley case is discussed more fully in the text accompanying supra
notes 80-82. Collateral agreements in general are discussed more fully in subpart
III.A.2.b, infra.
10 124 So. 2d 286 (Miss. 1960).
106 Chism, 124 So. 2d at 287.
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that the parties agreed that the "personal things" referred to
in the conveyance consisted of a dining room suite, bedroom
suite, television, and various other household items which
Mrs. Chism refused to allow Mrs. Omlie to remove from the
ranch home... 107
At trial, Omlie
and her witnesses testified as to the oral understanding between herself and [Chism]. She testified that she pointed out
to [Chism] each item which is now in dispute and which
[Omlie] was excepting, and that they agreed thereon; that it
would not be necessary to list in the contract the excepted
items because both of them understood what was meant by
"personal things."1"
The chancellor found that "the intention of the parties was
that the 'personal things' excepted by Mrs. Omlie from the
conveyance consisted of the dining room suite, bedroom suite,
television, and other items sued for by Mrs. Omlie." °9 The
supreme court affirmed:
[Tihe written agreement of the parties clearly shows that
the parties had a collateral agreement concerning the personal property located in the ranch house, and that such agreement was not embodied in the writing. The writing shows
clearly that the parties did not intend that the writing embody that element of their negotiations which concerned the
furnishings in the ranch house. What the parties intended to
do and that which they did was to enter into a collateral
agreement which rested in parol and which was not integrated into the writing.1

'o

Id. at 287-88.

contend[ing] that
Id. at 288. Chism "objected to all such testimony .....
this testimony was inadmissible under the rule that parol evidence may not be
admitted to vary the terms of a written contract." Id. The common law parol
evidence rule, and the many exceptions to it, are the subjects of Part III, infra.
"'

"o' Chism, 124 So. 2d at 288.
Id. at 288-89.

"o
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2. Who Decides Whether and to What Extent
an Instrument Is Integrated?
Whether an agreement is integrated-and, if so, whether it
is fully or only partially integrated-is determined by the trial
court.111
3. The Consequences of Integrationor the Lack Thereof
Why does it matter whether a particular contract is or is
not integrated? Because, if the parties have made a written
contract and if the written contract is fully integrated, then any
evidence of any other prior or contemporaneous agreement
between the same parties, regarding the same subject matter,

"

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209(2) & 210(3) (1981). Professor

Adams notes:
[Ilt is exclusively up to the trial judge, even in a jury trial, to decide
whether a written contract is fully or partially integrated. This is because the parol evidence rule applies to exclude contradictory evidence
only if the disputed terms are integrated .

. .

. [A] rule allowing the

jury to consider any relevant evidence in deciding whether the writing
was intended to be a complete integration without any limitations, would
emasculate, if not repeal, the parol evidence rule.
Charles F. Adams, Contract Litigation: The Roles of Judge and Jury and the Stan-

dards of Review on Appeal, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 223, 230 (1992) (quotation,
footnotes, and emphasis omitted).
But see Fortune Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Pate's Elec. Co., 356 So. 2d 1176, 1178
(Miss. 1978) ("Since the question whether the written contract was the final and
complete expression of the agreement between the parties can be decided only on
the basis of the evidence and since the evidence in this case was conflicting, it is
clear that a jury issue was presented .

. . .").

Apparently finding no support in

this state's jurisprudence for the argument that integration was a question of fact,
the Fortune Furniture court cites only non-Mississippi cases to support its conclusion. Id. (citing Putnam v. Dickinson, 142 N.W.2d 111 (N.D. 1966), and Spitz v.
Brickhouse, 123 N.E.2d 117 (Ill. Ct. App. 1954)). In so doing, the Fortune Furniture
court departed significantly from the "mainstream" of Mississippi case law, opting
instead to anticipate the fact-based approach advocated by the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts three years later. But Fortune Furniture overshot the Restatement,

which recognized the factual element of the question of integration, but left its
resolution to the trial judge, not the jury. See generally supra notes 11-25 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the "majority" approach of the Restatement
and the "minority" approach taken by the Mississippi Supreme Court in most cas-
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is inadmissible for1 12purposes of varying or contradicting the
written agreement.
Part III of this article discusses the parol evidence rule and
the many exceptions to it at greater length.

C. PrimaryRules of Constructionand Interpretation
To clarify this vast cloud of legal rhetoric, a few rules
should be set forth.'

Having conducted a "four corners" analysis and having
found that writing is not fully integrated and unambiguous,
Mississippi courts should apply one or more of the following
"rules" in an effort to resolve the lack of integration or ambiguity before resorting to parol evidence.

112 As Professor Corbin put it, if the parties have made a written contract

to which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent
understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of
varying or contradicting the writing.
3 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 573, at 357 (footnote omitted). Thus, in the words of
the Fifth Circuit, "parol evidence allegedly elucidating intent but contradicting the
express terms of a written agreement is never admissible." Chase Manhattan Bank
v. First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 1049 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying analogous
Florida law).
The Restatement (Second) advises:
The principal effects of a binding integrated agreement are to focus
interpretation on the meaning of the terms embodied in the writing . .. ,
to discharge prior inconsistent agreements, and, in a case of complete
integration, to discharge prior agreements within its scope regardless of
consistency . . . . [Tihe admissibility of evidence to contradict an integrated agreement or to add to a completely integrated agreement is
restricted, and a limit is thus placed on the power of the trier of
fact . ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 9, topic 3 intro, note, at 114-15.
113 Midsouth Rail Corp. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 697 So. 2d 451, 455
(Miss. 1997).
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1. Afford Words and Phrases Their "PlainMeaning"

Courts should give each word and phrase in a written
agreement its plain, ordinary, commonplace meaning,"" unless doing so would cause a result that is contrary to the clearly manifested intention of the parties..5 or to law or public
policy. 116

An example of the first exception is Paine v. Sanders,"7
where the court pronounced:
Where the testator's intention appears clearly from the will
taken as a whole, this intention cannot be defeated because
the testator's intention is expressed in ungrammatical language, or because his intention is expressed in inaccurate and
incorrect language."'
The law and public policy exception was at issue in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Chicago Insurance Co.,"' where both insur-

ers tried to exercise the "other insurance" provisions of their respective policies, effectively depriving the insured of any cover-

14 See Independent Healthcare Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Bruce, No. 96-CA-00989COA, 1998 WL 881795, at *4 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998); see also First Nat'l
Bank of Laurel v. Commercial Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 157 So. 2d 502, 504
(Miss. 1963) ("Where a testator is not familiar with the technical meaning of
words, the words used in the will are to be taken in their ordinary and common
acceptance.").

"' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3)(a) ("Unless a different

intention is manifested, where language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is
interpreted in accordance with that meaning .

. . .");

see also Williams v. Batson,

187 So. 236, 238 (Miss. 1939) (en banc) ("The ordinary meaning of language
throughout the country is given to words unless circumstances show that a different meaning is applicable.").
11 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 676 So. 2d 271, 275 (Miss. 1996);
see also Berry v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 142 So. 445, 446 (Miss. 1932) ("[W]e have
repeatedly announced that the court would enforce contracts made by parties, if
not prohibited by law or public policy, according to the terms of the contracts."),
affd, 145 So. 887 (Miss. 1933).
"7 135 So. 2d 188 (Miss. 1961).
...Paine, 135 So. 2d at 191; see also Davenport v. Collins, 51 So. 449, 449
(Miss. 1910) (arguing for giving effect to testator's intent notwithstanding "any
mere indistinctness in its phraseology, or awkwardness of expression, in the mere
words used").
19

676 So. 2d 271 (Miss. 1996).
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age. The court invoked the "mutual repugnance" rule set forth
in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Chappel12 ° and held that the
plain meaning of each insurer's "other insurance" clause must
be ignored:
The central problem posed by this matter is that while
both policies cover the claim, each insurer has attempted to
limit its respective liability and coordinate its insurance with
the other policy. In so doing, both Allstate's and Chicago's
"other insurance" clauses come into conflict. Standing alone,
each policy would provide primary coverage.
Allstate provides that its policy shall be primary to umbrella policies covering the same loss. The clause is not activated by Chicago's coverage of the claim because Chicago's
insurance policy is not an umbrella policy. Chicago's policy, on
the other hand contains a "pro rata" clause providing that
where there are conflicting "other insurance" clauses, the loss
shall be prorated among the insurers....
...Chicago's "other insurance" clause expressly provides
that its coverage is in excess of all other coverage. In contrast,
Allstate's "other insurance" clause expressly concedes that its
coverage is primary....
Each insurer in the present dispute seeks to shift to the
other party its responsibility to the insured. Both parties are,
in effect, arguing that "your excess exceeds my excess. ...
We hold that the rule of repugnancy is applicable in
cases in which "other insurance" clauses or "excessive coverage" clauses conflict. We have long followed the rule that the
courts must enforce contracts as they are written, unless such
enforcement is contrary to law or public policy. Syllogistic

246 So. 2d 498 (Miss. 1971). In Chappell, the court stated:
The view most often accepted is to the effect that when there is a conflict in the policies, escape v. escape, escape v. excess or excess v. excess, the two policies are indistinguishable in meaning and intent, (and
therefore) one cannot rationally choose between them and must, therefore, be held to be mutually repugnant and must be disregarded.
Chappell, 246 So. 2d at 504 (quotation omitted).
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folly awaits the unwary justice who seeks to harmonize the
conflicting terms presented herein using traditional rules of
construction. Public policy and common sense must step in
when legal jargon fails. Where competing insurance policies
each contain conflicting "other insurance" clauses or "excessive coverage" clauses, the clauses shall not be applied and
benefits under the policies shall instead be pro rated according to the coverage limits of each policy ... "'
In cases not governed by the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code,122 the "plain meaning" of the contract's terms
will prevail over any usage of trade, course of dealing, or course
of performance not adopted by the contracting parties in the
terms of the contract itself.
For example, in Citizens National Bank of Meridian v. L.L.
Glascock, Inc.,23 a contractor (Glascock) argued that he was
entitled to be paid for supplemental work not within the terms
of the written contract but orally requested by an agent of the
owner." Glascock based this argument on the custom in the
construction industry by which a contractor will comply with
"change requests" made by the owner or the owner's representative, with the understanding that satisfying "change requests" may cost the owner more than the original bid." The
owner (Citizens) argued that "the very purpose of the contract"
was to protect against increased costs by obligating Glascock to
complete the building for the lump sum of $679,560.26 Declaring that a written contract "expresses the agreement of the
parties and that it prevails over custom,"12 7 the court then examined the specific contract provisions and summarized its
findings as follows:
Article 15 sets forth the method of payment for extra work,
Allstate, 676 So. 2d at 274-75 (citations and footnote omitted).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-1-101 et seq. (1981 & Supp. 1998). See infra subpart
III.D for a discussion of the admissibility of extrinsic evidence under the Code.
'23 243 So. 2d 67 (Miss. 1971).
124 Citizens Nat'l Bank of Meridian, 243 So. 2d at 68.
"'

'22

'2
126
127

Id. at 70.
Id.
Id.
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notable of which is that, "no extra work or change shall be
made unless in pursuance of a written order from the owner,"
and Article 16 provides that in any event no claim for extra
work shall be valid unless the contractor gives the architect
written notice of his claim "before proceeding to execute the
work. * * *"....

We can only conclude in comparing these plain terms to
the vague assumption of the contractor that custom of the
trade would [amend] the written document in his behalf, that
the former prevails. The written contract anticipated every
contingency upon which this suit was based ....
The owner,
being desirous of limiting its financial obligation, should not
have its pocketbook exposed to the custom of architects and
contractors unless it agrees thereto.... ."

However, if the writing stipulates the meaning of a particular term, the stipulated meaning, rather than the "plain"
meaning, will prevail' 2 9 -as long as all conditions necessary
to invoked the stipulated term are met.' Likewise, a techni-

12 Id. at 70-71. But cf Independent Healthcare Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Bruce,
No. 96-CA-00989-COA, 1998 WL 881795, at *4 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998) ("In
the context of a commercial lease, we conclude that we must give the meaning to
the phraseology that is customarily afforded in the setting of commercial leases
generally.").
12 See, e.g., Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Broadus, 205 So. 2d 925, 927 (Miss.
1968) (holding that an insured's disabling sickness was not covered because it
was contracted and became manifest prior to the effective date of the insured's
sickness and accident policy, which defined term "sickness" as sickness or disease
contracted while the policy was in force); see also, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Gregg, 526 So. 2d 554, 557 (Miss. 1988) (holding that an insurance
policy covered chiropractic services because the definition of "medical services" in
the policy was expansive enough to cover "healing arts in addition to practice of
medicine"); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Day, 487 So. 2d 830, 832 (Miss. 1986) (holding that a policy which failed to define the term "theft" necessarily covered temporary unlawful possession for purposes of vandalism); Bacot v. Duby, 724 So. 2d
410, 417-18 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that, where instrument failed to define
the term "land," the term would be afforded its usual legal meaning-to wit, the
agreement conveyed both surface and mineral interests in designated property, despite the argument that the testatrix/grantor intended to transfer the surface
interest to a different grantee).
130 See Gunn v. Principal Cas. Ins. Co., 605 So. 2d 741, 742-43 (Miss. 1992)
(recognizing that "words such as 'relative' may, by law, be restricted in scope or
given meaning other than or different from common and ordinary usage," but
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cal term or term-of-art will prevail over a13 common-usage definition where the circumstances so dictate. 1
2. Construe the Contract as a Whole
Courts should avoid "ascertaining the meaning of a contract by resort to solitary or fragmentary parts of the instrument."132 "The language used in a single clause or sentence is
not to control as against the evident purpose and intention" of
the contracting parties as shown by the whole document.131 In
construing a particular provision, a court should look at the
instrument as a whole and determine the provision's meaning
3
in the context of the entire agreement.
If a contract consists of more than one document, or if a

refusing to apply policy definition of "relative" to uninsured motorist (UM) portion
of policy because definition stated "As used throughout this policy and shown in
bold type . . . Relative means" and the term "relative" appearing in UM provision
was not "shown in bold type").
131 See Miller v. Fowler, 28 So. 2d 837, 838 (Miss. 1947) ("The language of a
contract must be given its usual and ordinary meaning, unless it is clear the certain words or terms are employed in a technical sense."); see also Johnson ex rel.
Blocket v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 726 So. 2d 167, 169 (Miss. 1998) (construing "use" in the Mississippi Uninsured Motorist Act, MISS. CODE ANN. § 8311-103(b) (1991), as "a legal term of art with a broad definition in this context").
But see First Natl Bank of Laurel v. Commercial Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 157
So. 2d 502, 504 (Miss. 1963) ("Where a testator is not familiar with the technical
meaning of words, the words used in the will are to be taken in their ordinary
and common acceptance.").
1
Texaco, Inc. v. Kennedy, 271 So. 2d 450, 452 (Miss. 1973); see also Kyle v.
Wood, 86 So. 2d 881, 886 (Miss. 1956) ("II]ntention is to be collected . . . from a
consideration of all provisions of the instrument and every part thereof, taken
together, rather than from any particular clause, sentence or form of words."),
quoted with approval in Carlisle v. Estate of Carlisle, 233 So. 2d 803, 804 (Miss.
1970).
133 Kyle, 86 So. 2d at 886. Accord Carlisle, 233 So. 2d at 804-05.
" See Holloman v. Holloman, 691 So. 2d 897, 899 (Miss. 1996); Brown v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 606 So. 2d 122, 126 (Miss. 1992); Kennedy, 271 So. 2d at 452;
Hewitt v. Frazier, 219 So. 2d 149, 153 (Miss. 1969); Mitchell v. Eagle Motor
Lines, Inc., 87 So. 2d 466, 469 (Miss. 1956); Hines Motor Co. v. Hederman, 30
So. 2d 70, 72 (Miss. 1947); Continental Cas. Co. v. Pierce, 154 So. 279, 281 (Miss.
1934); Harris v. Townsend, 58 So. 529, 529 (Miss. 1912); Freeman v. Greenville
Convalescent Home, Inc., No. 96-CA-00466-COA, 1998 WL 881772, at *5 (Miss.
Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 202(2) (1981).
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contract incorporates another document by reference, then all
documents comprising the contract or transaction should be
read together to give full effect to the intent of the parties.'3 5
For example, in Garrett v. Hart,136 the written contract
stated that certain houses "would be 'constructed according to
the plans and specifications in the hands of William Garrett,
which have been mutually agreed upon by and between' the
parties."13 7 The defendants (Schneider's estate and Hart) argued that the written contract did not bind them to pay the
plaintiff (Garrett) in full because Garrett had failed to complete
the houses that were the subject of the contract. 3 ' The chancellor recognized that the written contract was, standing alone,
incomplete; nonetheless, he found for Garrett by reading the
contract together with the plans and specification incorporated
by the contract.3 s The supreme court upheld the chancellor's
ruling:
From the reading of the instrument it does not contain
all details necessary to build a house-shell or complete-and
it is necessary to look elsewhere. There were plans and specifications prepared and in the hands of Mr. Garrett which
were to guide the construction, and these were to be initialed.
The drawing designated as plans and specifications, signed by
Mr. Schneider, was exhibited to the bill of complaint, and was
admitted as Exhibit C to Mr. Garrett's testimony. There was
no other set of plans and specifications submitted by anyone
in the records....

'"
(Miss.
liams
Miss.

See United Miss. Bank v. GMAC Mortgage Co., 615 So. 2d 1174, 1176
1993); Stockett v. Exxon Corp., 312 So. 2d 709, 711-12 (Miss. 1975); Wilv. Batson, 187 So. 236, 238 (Miss. 1939) (en banc); Doe v. Bernard, 15
319, 323 (1846).
13 168 So. 2d 497 (Miss. 1964).
1
Garrett, 168 So. 2d at 503.
138
1

Id. at 499-503.
Id. at 503.

o Id.; see also, e.g., Mississippi State Hwy. Comm'n v. Patterson Enters., Ltd.,
627 So. 2d 261, 263 (Miss. 1993) ("As the subcontract contained a clause incorporating the terms of the prime contract, the claim prohibition against the commission in the prime contract merged into the subcontract. Therefore, when Mallette
accepted final payment, even though doing so over Patterson's objection, any
claim Patterson or Mallette might have had against the commission was extin-
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Gilchrist Tractor Co. v.

[In the absence of anything to indicate a contrary intention,
instruments executed at the same time, by the same contracting parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the
same transaction will be considered and construed together,
since they are, in the eyes of the law, one contract or instrument.
Construing contemporaneous instruments together
means simply that if there are any provisions in one instrument limiting, explaining, or otherwise affecting the provisions of another, they will be given effect as between the
parties themselves and all persons charged with notice so
that the intent of the parties may be carried out and the
whole agreement actually made may be effectuated.
Where the terms employed to express some particular
condition of a contract are ambiguous and cannot be satisfactorily explained by reference to other parts of the contract
and the parties have made other contracts in respect of the
same subject matter, apparently in pursuance of the same
general purpose, it is always permissible to examine all of
them together in aid of the interpretation of the particular
condition; and if it is found that the ambiguous terms have a
plain meaning by a comparison of the several contracts and
an examination of their provisions, that meaning should be
attributed to them in the particular condition.142

guished under the terms of the prime contract .....
141 192 So. 2d 409 (Miss. 1966).
142 Gilchrist, 192 So. 2d at 417-18 (quotations and citations omitted).
Applying the principles to the facts of the case before it, the Gilchrist Tractor court found that there was no ambiguity or lack of integration once the various agreements at issue were read together.
In this case, the parties first entered into a preliminary written agreement which provided, among other things, that further written agreements would be made later, dealing more specifically with each of the
several aspects of the transaction. This was done, and these contracts,
prepared later in the light of the developed facts, supplemented the
original written agreements and superseded prior oral agreements, if
any. They dealt with the same subject matter and the contracting par-
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3. Afford Each Provision Meaning and Purpose
Mississippi law presumes that parties who go to the effort
to consummate a written contract intend for each word and
provision of the contract to have meaning and purpose. 4
Therefore, Mississippi courts should construe contracts, if possible, so that no word or provision is rendered "repugnant,
senseless, ineffective, meaningless, or incapable of being carried out in the overall context of the transaction consistently
with all of the other provisions" of the contract. 1"

ties were the same. Under the circumstances here, each document is a
component part of the contract covering the over-all agreement, and all
must be considered together in order to determine the intention of the
parties as finally arrived at . . . The provision relating to the Cook
credit is not ambiguous, and, in any event, it must be considered in the
context of the whole agreement.
Id. at 417.
In Stockett v. Exxon Corp., the defendants argued that the trial court had
erred by reading the various documents together rather than construing the third
amendment to a land purchase option agreement in isolation. Stockett v. Exxon
Corp., 312 So. 2d 709, 719 (Miss. 1975). The court made short shrift of the
defendants' argument:
Defendants contend . . . . [tihat the third amendment to the land
purchase option should be isolated and separated from all of the other
instruments and construed by itself and, if so construed, the third
amendment was without consideration because admittedly the $10 cash
consideration recited therein was not paid.
This argument is without any merit. It is perfectly obvious to us, as
it was to the trial judge, that it takes all of these instruments to make
the mosaic of this most complicated matter. All are inextricably woven
into the warp and woof of the cloth. It is impossible to remove a part
without destroying the whole.
Id. at 711-12.
" See Glantz Contracting Co. v. General Elec. Co., 379 So. 2d 912, 917 (Miss.
1980); Freeman v. Greenville Convalescent Home, Inc., No. 96-CA-00466-COA,
1998 WL 881772, at *5 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998).
'" Wilson Indus., Inc. v. Newton County Bank, 245 So. 2d 27, 30 (Miss. 1971).
Accord Freeman, 1998 WL 881772, at *5; see also Williams v. Batson, 187 So.
236, 239 (Miss. 1939) (en banc) ("An interpretation which gives a reasonable,
lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations of intention is preferred to an
interpretation which leaves a part of such manifestations unreasonable, unlawful
or of no effect."). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(a)
(1981) ("[A]n interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective mean-
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Put another way, Mississippi courts should, if possible,
give effect "to all words, clauses and provisions of the instrument, if they are not inconsistent with each other or with the
general intent of the whole [instrument] when taken as an
entirety, . . . unless the court is satisfied that no [particular]
effect was intended to be given a particular word or
phrase."" 5 No word or provision should be construed to nullify or strike some other word or provision "unless such a result
6
is fairly inescapable."11

ing to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect . . . ."); id. cmt. b, at 93 ("Since an agreement
is interpreted as a whole, it is assumed in the first instance that no part of it is
superfluous.").
In Harris v. Townsend, the dispute before the court was the construction of a
note promising that "[o]n demand or at my death I or my estate" would pay the
amount indicated on the face of the note ($292.50). Harris v. Townsend, 58 So.
529, 529 (Miss. 1912). The question was: At what time did the statute of limitations begin to run on the obligee's claim for repayment? Id. The court stated:
The contention of appellant is that the words "or at my death" and the
words "or my estate" in this note are surplusage, that therefore it was
collectible on demand, and consequently the statute of limitations began
to run . . . immediately upon its execution, or, if these words are not
surplusage, that appellee still had the right to collect it, and if necessary
to institute suit on it, immediately upon its execution, and that consequently the statute of limitations began to run at that time.
Neither of these positions are tenable. We must, if possible, in construing any contract, give effect to each word contained in it; and, if the
language thereof is plain and unambiguous, it is unnecessary to invoke
any rule of construction in order to interpret it. While the intention of
the parties to this note is succinctly, it could not have been more
plainly, expressed.
It is clear that the payee had a right to collect the note at any
time she so desired during the life of the maker, and also that she had
the option of waiting until his death to collect it. It is true that she had
the right to sue on the note at any time she so desired, but it is also
true that she had a right to wait until the death of the maker so to do;
and consequently the statute of limitations did not begin to run until
that event occurred.
Id.
Paine v. Sanders, 135 So. 2d 188, 191 (Miss.
Continental Cas. Co. v. Pierce, 154 So. 279,
ples Bank & Trust Co. v. Nettleton Fox Hunting
1235, 1239 (Miss. 1996); Manson v. Magee, 534 So.
'"

144

1961) (quotation omitted).
281 (Miss. 1934); accord Peo& Fishing Ass'n, 672 So. 2d
2d 545, 548 (Miss. 1988).
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In Continental Casualty Co. v. Pierce,4 7 the issue for the
court was whether the injury of one employee (Pierce), suffered
while riding in the employer's car driven by a fellow employee
(Toney), was covered by the employer's (Easterling's) insurance
policy, despite the exclusion in the employer's policy for injuries
to her employees." 8 The policy contained two pertinent provisions:
Clause A is in this language: "Hereby agrees to Insure
the Assured Named in the Schedule Against Loss... for
damages on account of bodily injuries... accidentally suffered... within the policy period by any person or persons,
by reason of the ownership, maintenance or use (including
loading or unloading) of any of the automobiles described in
the Schedule; excluding injuries suffered by any employee of
the Assured while operating or caring for the automobiles
covered hereby, and also excluding injuries suffered by any
employee while in the course of his employment in the usual
trade, business or profession of the Assured .... ."
The other clause is in this language: "Additional Assureds. If the automobiles covered by this policy are 'private
passenger' or 'commercial' automobiles any person or persons
while riding in or operating any of such automobiles and any
person, firm or corporation responsible for the operation
thereof, shall be considered as an additional Assured under
this policy .... The coverage afforded by this paragraph shall
not apply unless the riding, use or operation above referred to
be with the permission of the Assured named in the Schedule
of this policy . .. ."
...
[J]nder Clause A employees of the insured are expressly excluded while operating or caring for the automobile
"covered hereby," and the policy also expressly excluded employees of the insured while in the course of their employment
in the usual trade, business, or profession of the insured.
Clearly, John Toney, the driver of the automobile, and appellee [Pierce], who was engaged in her usual employment as
Mrs. Easterling's servant, come within these exclusions. In

"4

154 So. 279 (Miss. 1934).
Pierce, 154 So. at 280.

124
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other words, the policy did not protect Mrs. Easterling against
liability for injuries received by either of them. The trouble
arises out of this language under the subsequent clause entitled "Additional Assureds".... The argument is that under
that language John Toney was an additional assured; that he
was insured against liability for appellee's injury, although
Mrs. Easterling, to whom the
policy was issued, was not in149
sured against such liability.

Expressing its desire not to strike any part of the policy
"unless such a result is fairly inescapable,"150 the court held
that the Additional Assureds provision could not be read so as
to extend coverage to injuries to Easterling's employees, which
are explicitly excluded by Clause A, because doing so "would
require the writing into the policy of something which is not
there, and the striking out of something which is there, to hold
that the coverage of the policy included an employee of hers
who[se injury], according to the terms of the policy, was expressly excluded therefrom."' 5 '
In Brown v. Hartford Insurance Co.,' 52 the subject insurance policy provided the following definition for purposes of the

149 Id.
150

at 281.

Id.

Id.
The court also dispensed with Pierce's proposed construction as unreasonable:
The construction contended for by appellee [Pierce] is not a reasonable one. It is hard to conceive that an insurance company would write
a policy of that kind. For illustration: If Mrs. Easterling had been
driving the automobile accompanied by appellee, her employee, and the
latter had been injured by her negligent driving, clearly the policy would
not have protected Mrs. Easterling against liability for such injury, because it expressly so provides. But according to appellee's contention, the
policy does insure Mrs. Easterling's servant, John Toney, against liability
for an injury to appellee resulting from his negligent driving. In other
words, Mrs. Easterling, who procured the policy and paid the premium
therefor, would not be insured, while her servant, John Toney, who had
nothing to do with procuring the policy, would be insured. We are of
opinion that the contract bears no such construction.
Id. at 281-82. The maxim that contracts should be construed in a reasonable (and
fair) manner is the subject of subpart II.C.4, infra.
162 606 So. 2d 122 (Miss. 1992).
151
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policy's uninsured motorist (UM) coverage:
C. Uninsured motor vehicle means a land motor vehicle or
trailer of any type:
1. To which no bodily injury liability or policy applies at
the time of the accident.
2. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies
at the time of the accident. In this case its limit for bodily
injury liability must be less than the minimum limit for bodily injury liability specified by the financial responsibility law
of the state in which your covered auto is principally garaged.
3. Which is a hit and run vehicle whose operator or owner cannot be identified and which hits:
a. you or any family member;
b. a vehicle which you or any family member are
occupying; or
c. your covered auto.1"
The issue for the supreme court was whether UM coverage
was available if there was no physical contact between an insured and uninsured vehicle:
Clause C contains three sub-parts, but the contract does not
expressly state whether all three sub-parts must be met, or
whether each sub-part individually defines an uninsured
vehicle. That is to say, should the sub-parts be read as being
separated by the word "and" or the word "or?" When construing a contract, we read the contract as a whole, so as to give
effect to all of its clauses. Viewing Clause C in light of this
rule, physical contact is not required when an uninsured vehicle or its driver are identified. This is so because both subclauses 1 and 2 describe vehicles and drivers that are identified, while sub-clause 3 describes a hit and run vehicle,
which leaves the scene of an accident, and consequently cannot be identified. To require an insured to identify a hit and
run vehicle would render the insured's protection from a hit
and run vehicle meaningless."5

"
154

Brown, 606 So. 2d at 125 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 125-26 (citations omitted).
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Following this same logic, courts should give meaning and
effect to an amendment that is separate and apart from that
afforded to the contract it amends because "[an amendment to
a contract presumably amended something."155
4. Require a Fair and Reasonable Construction
A proffered construction or interpretation "must be reasonable to warrant adoption." 116 Mississippi courts should
give the words of an instrument "a reasonable construction,
where that is possible, rather than an unreasonable one,"5 7
and should avoid constructions that "give words a meaning
they will not bear."5 ' A construction leading to an absurd,
harsh, or unreasonable result should be avoided, unless the
terms are express and lend themselves to no other reasonable
interpretation.'5 9
In Frazier v. Northeast Mississippi Shopping Center,
Inc.,160 the parties entered into a written lease which had a
primary term of eight years, starting September 1, 1964, and
afforded the lessees, (the Fraziers) two four-year options to
extend the lease under the same terms and conditions applying
to the primary term. 16 ' The lease provided, in part: "If the
" Freeman v. Greenville Convalescent Home, Inc., No. 96-CA-00466-COA, 1998
WL 881772, at *5 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998).
15 Lehman-Roberts Co. v. State Highway Comm'n of Miss., 673 So. 2d 742,
744 (Miss. 1996); see Frazier v. Northeast Miss. Shopping Ctr., Inc., 458 So. 2d
1051, 1054 (Miss. 1984); see also Rubel v. Rubel, 75 So. 2d 59, 65 (Miss. 1954)
(I[T]he words of a contract should be given a reasonable construction, where that
is possible, rather than an unreasonable one . . . ."); Williams v. Batson, 187 So.
236, 239 (Miss. 1939) (en banc) ("An interpretation which gives a reasonable,
lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations of intention is preferred to an
interpretation which leaves a part of such manifestations unreasonable, unlawful
or of no effect.").
"' Mississippi Rice Growers Ass'n (A.A.L.) v. Pigott, 191 So. 2d 399, 403
(Miss. 1966); see Leach v. Tingle, 586 So. 2d 799, 802 (Miss. 1991).
' Leach, 586 So. 2d at 802; see Hicks v. Bridges, 580 So. 2d 743, 746 (Miss.
1991); Hutton v. Hutton, 119 So. 2d 369, 374 (Miss.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834
(1960).
"' See Frazier,458 So. 2d at 1054; Pigott, 191 So. 2d at 403; Rubel, 75 So. 2d
at 65; McCain v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 172 So. 495, 500 (Miss. 1937).
" 458 So. 2d 1051 (Miss. 1984).
...Frazier, 458 So. 2d at 1052.
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Lessees elect to renew the lease under said option, said lessees
must give the Lessor written notice not less than 6 months
prior to the end of the term of this lease." 6 2 The lease further
provided:
Five years after start of lease, Lessee has the option to request Lessor to expand the building an additional 20 feet or
any part thereof, at the rear at an annual rental increase of
18-percent of total gross additional construction cost .... If
the option to expand is exercised, it is understood that this
lease, inclusive of all options, shall be beginning anew."
On or about February 20, 1980, during the last year of the
second renewal term, the Fraziers sought to exercise the option
for additional space, but the lessor (Shopping Center) refused.' The Fraziers sued for, but were denied, a declaratory
judgment." 5 On appeal, the Fraziers argued that they had "a
clear, unambiguous right to extend the lease by their letter
dated February 20, 1980."'" The Shopping Center responded
that "a clear interpretation of the lease" provided the Fraziers
with "a period of five years from and after September 1, 1964,
the beginning of the lease, in which to exercise the 67
rights contained in this particular paragraph, and no longer."1
The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancery
court's judgment for the Shopping Center:
We content ourselves with fully agreeing with the chancellor that it was manifestly unreasonable for the Fraziers to
wait some fifteen years and five months after the start of the
lease, and just a little more than six months before its end, to
exercise their rights under this paragraph.
There was no increase in rent for sixteen years in a centrally located shopping center in one of the liveliest cities in
this state. To claim that by this February 20, 1980, letter the

162

Id.

16 Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
I64
'
166

117

Id. at 1053.

Id.
Id. at 1053-54.
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Fraziers extended the lease for another eight, twelve or sixteen years at the same rent is simply incredible.
Parties are bound by what they promise in writing. But,
we are not bound to adopt a construction not compelled by the
instrument in which we would have to believe no man in his
right mind would have agreed to."6
The court concluded that
the right granted the Fraziers was a simple option, given
without additional consideration, which they were free to
exercise or ignore. On the other hand, until the time for the
exercise of the option had expired, Shopping Center was
bound by the option it granted. Shopping Center had no right
to compel its exercise, or even be notified by the Fraziers of
their intent to exercise the option until the right expired. It is
for this reason Courts generally hold that time is of the essence in exercising a simple option....
The Fraziers had the right to exercise the option five
years after September 1, 1964, which was August 31, 1969.
We must agree with the chancellor that the Fraziers had no
right to wait over ten years following in which to exercise the
option."6 9
In Lehman-Roberts Co. v. State Highway Commission,'7"
Lehman-Roberts agreed to perform "random clearing" work related to a highway construction project conducted under the
Commission's auspices.1"7' The contract called for the Commission to pay Lehman-Roberts $4,000 per acre, based on an estimate of 82 acres of random clearing.'72 The Commission ultimately paid Lehman-Roberts $401,716-compared to the original $328,000 estimate-for clearing 101.929 acres. 73 LehmanRoberts claimed that it was entitled to payment for clearing
174.44 acres and sued for the balance due according to that

'
169
170

Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1054-55.
673 So. 2d 742 (Miss. 1996).

172

Lehman Roberts Co., 673 So. 2d at 742.
Id. at 742.

17

Id.

17.

at 742-43.
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The contract provision at the heart of the parties' dispute
provided:
The limits of clearing shall be 60 feet (horizontal measure)
from the centerline, both left and right of centerline as directed by the engineer. The area measured for payment for random clearing will be the acres actually cleared of trees and
will not include any paved areas or any areas which do not
contain trees.175
The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that the provision could not reasonably bear the construction that LehmanRoberts proposed:
Lehman-Roberts claims that it was required to clear a
60-foot zone, from the centerline of the roadway out to the 60foot limit of clearing line, anywhere up and down the highway
the engineer directed clearing. Lehman-Roberts interpreted
the contract provisions as providing for payment for clearing
the 60-foot zone, less the pavement which was specifically
excluded from the payment ....
.... Lehman-Roberts knew from the beginning that only
82 acres of random clearing had been estimated for the project. It claims, however, that if a portion of the project has
trees located on it and it was directed to clear trees, no matter how many in number, it was to be paid for clearing from
the edge of the pavement to the 60-foot limit. ...
.... The language of the clause first sets out what must
be cleared, and that is what is directed by the engineer. The
next part of the clause sets out what areas would be pay
areas, and those are the areas not paved containing trees.
Lehman-Roberts claims that the paved areas are specifically
excluded, therefore they understand why they do not get paid
for that 12 feet. The shoulder and slope are as well excluded
if they do not contain trees. Lehman-Roberts would have the
phrase "any areas which do not contain trees" mean that the
engineer would not direct them to clear such area. Further-

174 Id.

at 743.

...Id. at 742.

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69

more, Lehman-Roberts would have the phrase "payment for
random clearing will be the acres actually cleared of trees"
mean they are entitled to payment based on a 48-foot width,
no matter how many trees were at that particular station.
Lehman-Roberts would have the Commission pay for areas
not actually cleared.
Where there is a dispute as to the meaning of a contract
clause, a party's interpretation must be reasonable to warrant
adoption .... The Lehman-Roberts interpretation is unreasonable. The parties may have interpreted the clause differently, but it is not ambiguous.'76
Mississippi courts should also "endeavor to give a construction most equitable to the parties, and one which will not give
one of
them an unfair or unreasonable advantage over the oth177
er."
In UHS-Qualicare,Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hospital,
Inc., 7 the court was asked to decide whether a hospital (Gulf
Coast) was justified under the terms of its contract with its
manager/owner (Qualicare) in declaring Qualicare in material
breach and terminating the contract because Qualicare unilaterally raised hospital rates over which Gulf Coast had "both
final and immediate authority" under the terms of their contract. 7 ' The court found itself
confronted with a rather novel situation. UHS-Qualicare has
done something-raise the rates-which Gulf Coast by a
simple resolution of its Board of Directors, if not by a letter
from its president, has unequivocal authority to override-immediately.

16 Id. at 744 (citations omitted).
...Rubel v. Rubel, 75 So. 2d 59, 65 (Miss. 1954); accord Mississippi Rice
Growers Ass'n (A.A.L.) v. Pigott, 191 So. 2d 399, 403 (Miss. 1966); see also
Citizens' Bank v. Frazier, 127 So. 716, 717 (Miss. 1930) (holding that Mississippi
courts are obligated "to give to a contract a construction or interpretation, if possible, which will square its terms with fairness and reasonableness, each party
towards the other . . .).
...525 So. 2d 746 (Miss. 1987).
".. UHS-Qualicare, 525 So. 2d at 755.
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The novel situation we confront today is one about which
the contract provides no express directive. Put abstractly, the
question is this: where one party to a contract acts with respect to a matter where the other has unqualified authority,
has the acting party breached materially? Assuming arguendo
that the acting party has breached the contract, is the other
party allowed the radical remedy of termination where it has
complete power of cure, where it could by its own action supersede the offending act of the other? The question suggests
its own answer: No, absent express contractual language to
the contrary.
Absent clear language to the contrary, we regard it wholly unreasonable that the language of a twenty year, multimillion dollar contract, be read to provide that any failure
(whether material or not) to keep, observe or perform, etc.
will suffice to trigger the termination clause. Such a result
would be productive of great economic waste. An implied
requirement that breaches justifying termination be material
is only fair, while the contrary reading could only produce
harsh, unreasonable, expensive and unintended consequences.
The concept of material breach is sufficiently familiar and
well-known that contracting parties and their drafting attorneys are charged with knowledge of it. If they wish to exclude
it from their contract, they must do so clearly."s
The court concluded:
Moreover, in its termination efforts Gulf Coast was obviously
thinking in terms of material breaches. In its July 12, 1983,
letter, Gulf coast states "We regard each of the foregoing as
material breaches. ... " The August 15, 1983, letter twice

refers to "material breaches." Nothing in the record suggests
that, until time came for its lawyers to write their brief, Gulf
Coast ever considered that it had authority to invoke the termination clause in the event of breaches not "material."18'

Id. at 755-56 (emphasis omitted).
at 756.

181 Id.
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5. Avoid Illegality
Mississippi law presumes that contracts are made for lawful purposes." 2 Therefore, if a contract or contractual provision is susceptible to two reasonable constructions, one of
which comports with statutory law, regulation, common law, or
public policy and one of which does not, the court should construe the contract or contractual provision in such a way as to
make it legal. 1"
For example, in Grandberry v. Mortgage Bond & Trust
Co.,"' the second (MB&T) and third (Grandberry) lienholder.
against a parcel of improved real property orally agreed that
MB&T-who was initiating the foreclosure sale-would bid
enough at the sale to cover the principal and interest due on
the second lien and the agreed amount of $1,646 toward the
third lien. 5' In reliance on that oral promise, Grandberry did
not attend the foreclosure sale. MB&T, however, bought the
property in foreclosure for less than the amount of its lien,
"8 See Wilson Indus., Inc. v. Newton County Bank, 245 So. 2d 27, 31 (Miss.
1971) ("[Wlrongdoing will not be presumed and in the absence of any proof to the
contrary, it is proper to indulge a presumption that in their business and social
relations all persons act honestly and properly."); see also Orgill Bros. v. Perry,
128 So. 755, 757 (Miss. 1930) ("There is always a prima facie presumption of law
of right doing, not wrong doing.").
1
See Security Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Cox, 299 So. 2d 192, 194 (Miss. 1974);
Crabb v. Comer, 200 So. 133, 135 (Miss. 1941); Citizens' Bank v. Frazier, 127 So.
716, 717 (Miss. 1930); Clay v. Allen, 63 Miss. 426, 430-31 (1886); Merril v.
Melchior, 30 Miss. 516, 531 (1855); Riley's Adm'rs v. Vanhouten, 5 Miss. 428, 429
(1840); see also Williams v. Batson, 187 So. 236, 239 (Miss. 1939) (en banc) ("An
interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations of intention is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part of
such manifestations unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect."); Orrell v. Bay Mfg.
Co., 40 So. 429, 430 (Miss. 1906) ("Where a contract is susceptible of two interpretations and capable of being fulfilled in two distinct ways, one permitted [sic]
and the other condemned by the law, that construction will be placed upon the
contract which will validate it. The law presumes a lawful intent, instead of an
illegal one, on the part of all contracting parties."). See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) & cmt. c (1981) (favoring "lawful" constructions
over "unlawful" ones); id. § 207 ("In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a
promise or agreement or a term thereof, a meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred.").
132 So. 334 (Miss. 1931).
Grandberry, 132 So. at 334-35.
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thereby cutting off Grandberry. When Grandberry complained,
MB&T answered that the alleged oral agreement was unenforceable, inter alia, as against the statute of frauds." The
Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed:
Keeping in mind the general principle that, viewing all the
terms of an agreement and all the surrounding circumstances,
it is the duty of courts to give to a contract that construction
or interpretation, if possible.., so as to make it legal, rather
than take another course of construction which would make it
illegal, we think there is no title to land involved here, nor
any payment of the debt of another, but simply that the effect
of the agreement was that appellee, so far as any rights or
interest of appellants were concerned, should start the bidding at the aggregate amount of the [second] deed of trust,
plus the agreed amount, $1,646, which appellants were to
have out of their deed of trust, plus costs of sale....
.... [An agreement between parties, uniting their interest as lienholders, as to the division among themselves of the
proceeds of a foreclosure sale, or as to the distribution or
sharing of profits and losses between them in respect to such
proceeds, is not within the statute of frauds, either in letter
or spirit . . ."
6. Avoid Implied Terms
Mississippi courts do not favor implying terms into written
agreements"SS:
[U]nless the implication be indispensable or inescapable,
courts will be reluctant to embark upon the dangerous venture of importing into an agreement, by declaratory resort to
implication, what so far as the court may definitely know was
not at the moment of the contract actually agreed upon by the

"6 Id. at 335.
,, Id. at 335-36 (citation omitted).
See Williams, 187 So. at 239 ("The court should not interpolate into or
eliminate from a written contract words of material legal consequence in order to
uphold it."); see, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Lackey, 397 So. 2d 1100, 110203 (Miss. 1981) (refusing to imply covenant to maintain general merchandise
business on leased premises where lease provided for "a fixed substantial adequate minimum rent" not tied to revenues of any business so situated).
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parties, and particularly must this be true where, as here, the
parties have at much pains and in detail undertaken to reduce their agreement to such specific written terms as to
evince their purpose to expressly cover every phase of their
5 9
understanding."
In J.O. Hooker & Sons, Inc. v. Roberts Cabinet Co.,
defendant, Hooker,

9

the

served as the general contractor for the renovation of residences owned by the Bessemer Public Housing Authority
("BPHA") in Bessemer, Alabama. The renovation involved
tearing out fixtures, such as cabinets, and Hooker's contract
with the BPHA provided that the BPHA, as the owner of the
property, had the option to either keep or salvage fixtures
which needed to be torn out during the renovation process .... Under said general contract, the cabinets were to
become the property of Hooker and to be removed by him in
the event that the BPHA elected not to keep said cabinets.
Hooker entered into a subcontract agreement with Roberts. .. , pursuant to which Roberts was required to "furnish
cabinets, tops, plastic laminates on walls and furr [sic] down
materials and fronts for hot water heaters as per plans and
specs for the price listed below." The agreement also provided
that "the price includes the cost of tear-out (sic.) old cabinets
and installation of new cabinets." 9 '
A dispute arose between Hooker and Roberts as to who

...Goff v. Jacobs, 145 So. 728, 729 (Miss. 1933) (citation omitted).
In Goff, the court was asked to read a term in the written agreement that
one party was "to assume all 1930 taxes" to mean that the party was, in fact, to
be responsible for all drainage taxes in subsequent years, as well. Goff, 145 So.
at 729. The court was not so inclined:
[Wie are directly requested to read into the written agreement between
these parties a further provision, and to insert that provision to the
same effect as if expressly therein written by the parties, that the purchaser would assume these drainage taxes and assessments not only for
the year 1930, but "for all subsequent years." To such a request we are
constrained to return a negative response.

Id.

190 683 So. 2d 396 (Miss. 1996).
"' J.O. Hooker, 683 So. 2d at 398.
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was responsible for disposing of the cabinets, as required in the
Hooker-BPHA contract:
Roberts asserted that the subcontract did not obligate
him to dispose of the cabinets, but Hooker contend[ed] that
the "as per specs and plans" language in the subcontract
agreement served to incorporate by reference the general contract and that Roberts thus assumed Hooker's duties to dispose of the cabinets."
The Hooker court observed:
[Tihe subcontract in the present case is clear and unambiguous in that it clearly provides that Roberts' bid price includes
the cost of tearing out and installing new cabinets, but is
completely silent as to any duty on the part of Roberts to
dispose of the cabinets. Hooker concedes that the subcontract
with Roberts was silent on this issue, but argues that the
"specifications for the general contract disclosed that this was
within the kitchen cabinet portion of the job."...
Hooker asserts that "[tihe specifications on the kitchen
cabinet portion of the job, included in the Roberts-Hooker contract by reference, provided that the scope of the job included
removing all existing kitchen cabinets and shelves and disposing of them in accordance with local laws and ordinances." It
is true that the subcontract refers to the "plans and specs" of
the general contract, but said language does not in any way
indicate an intent by Roberts to assume additional and expensive duties which were not set forth in the subcontract.
The term "as per specs and plans" is better understood as
applying to the "furnish[ing]" of cabinets and not to their
"removal."'93
The parties cited several cases in support of their respective arguments, none of which, in the opinion of the court, provided "strong authority" to resolve their dispute. 9 4 Instead,
the court turned to whether Hooker raised a genuine issue of

Id. at 399.
Id. at 400-01.
19 Id. at 401.
"'

13
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material fact regarding Roberts' duty to dispose of the cabinets
that was sufficient to defeat Roberts' motion for summary judgment.'9 5 The court explained:
Hooker asserted in his affidavit that:
It is very rare for a subcontractor such as Roberts
not to do their own cleanup. The only time we have ever
contracted with a sub-contractor who did not handle
their own cleanup was when the job was within driving
distance of our office in Thaxton, Mississippi.
The duty of Hooker to remove the cabinets in the present
case, however, arose from specific and detailed contractual
provisions entered into between Hooker and the BPHA. The
subcontract agreement, as noted earlier, expressly provided
that the bid price included the "tear-out" and installation of
the cabinets. If Hooker had desired that Roberts be obligated
to assume the specific contractual obligations set forth in the
general contract to dispose of the cabinets, then it would have
been a simple matter to include in the subcontract language
obligating Roberts to do so.
It would have been highly advisable for Hooker to have
insisted on such language in the subcontract, regardless of his
understandings regarding industry customs. This Court is
hesitant to find that parties have impliedly assumed obligations to perform expensive duties based on vague assertions of
industry custom when the assumption of said duties could
easily have been provided for in the subcontract. This Court
is especially reluctant to do so in the present case, given that
the duties involved are not general obligations to remove
materials, but rather specific tasks which Hooker contractually obligated himself to perform.
On these facts, this Court concludes that, as a matter of
law, Roberts did not assume the specific contractual duties
relating to the removal of the cabinets, and that there accordingly exists no genuine issues of material fact with regard to
this issue."

19 Id.
19'

Id. at 401-02.
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Implied terms are generally permitted in only two types of
cases. First, implied terms are permitted when necessary to
effectuate the intent of the parties as evidenced by the agreement as a whole.' 97 Examples of this type of case include implying (1) that a contract which sets no time for performance
must be performed within a "reasonable" time, considering the
condition and circumstances of the parties, and may not be
terminated without reasonable notice to the party whose performance is subject to the "reasonable time" requirement; 9 '
(2) that, "in the absence of some provision in the contract authorizing termination or cancellation, every contract is presumed irrevocable"; 99 and, (3) that, "[wlhere a contract is performable on the occurrence of a future event, there is an implied agreement that neither party will place any obstacle in
the way of the happening of such event, and where a party is
himself the cause of the failure he cannot rely on such condition to defeat his liability.""'
Implied terms are also permitted when they arise by opera20 1
tion of law, such as the implied warranty of habitability;

19

See REO Indus., Inc. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 932 F.2d 447,

455-56 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[I]t must appear from the express terms of the contract
that the implied term was so clearly in the contemplation of the parties that they
deemed it unnecessary to express it, or the implied term must be indispensable
to give effect to the intent of the parties as disclosed by the contract as a
whole."). Namely,
[ilf there is to be any implication, it must result from the language employed in the instrument or be indispensable to carry the intention of
the parties into effect. Terms are to be implied in a contract, not because they are reasonable, but because they are necessarily involved in
the contractual relationship so that the parties must have intended them
and have only failed to express them because of sheer inadvertence or
because they are too obvious to need expression.
17A AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 379, at 399-400 (1991).
19 See, e.g., Warwick v. Matheny, 603 So. 2d 330, 335-37 (Miss. 1992).
1
Id. at 336; accord Garner v. Hickman, 733 So. 2d 191, 195-96 (Miss. 1999);
Ham Marine, Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 454, 460 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying Mississippi law).
20" Warwick, 603 So. 2d at 337. Accord Garner, 733 So. 2d at 195.
2'0 See Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466, 470 (Miss. 1974) (Inzer,
J., specially concurring); Brown v. Elton Chalk, Inc., 358 So. 2d 721, 722 (Miss.
1978).
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and the im-

In Oliver, eight of nine justices recognized that an implied warranty of habitability should be read into a contract between the builder-vendor of a new home
and the first purchaser of that home, notwithstanding that the builder-vendor and
purchaser had reduced the terms of their transaction to a writing that would
otherwise merge all prior agreements and understandings. See Oliver, 303 So. 2d
at 469-70 (Inzer, J., specially concurring, joined by Rodgers, P.J., and Patterson,
Walker, and Broom, JJ.); id. at 470-73 (Robertson, J., dissenting, joined by
Gillespie, C.J., and Sugg, J.). However, because the plaintiff was not the original
purchaser of the home, the specially concurring justices joined Justice Smith in
affirming the circuit court's judgment in favor of the builder because the warranty
was too "remote." See id. at 470 (Inzer, J., specially concurring). The dissenting
justices did not adopt the distinction between first purchasers of new homes and
remote purchasers, relying on prior decisions of the court regarding privity of
contract issues. See id. at 470-72 (Robertson, J., dissenting). Ultimately, the dissenting justices in Oliver won the day on the issue of privity. See Keyes v. Guy
Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So. 2d 670, 672-73 (Miss. 1983) (abrogating privity requirement so that a remote home purchaser may sue the builder for breach of
the implied warranty).
2"2 See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Baymon, 732 So. 2d 262, 269
(Miss. 1999); Merchants & Planters Bank v. Williamson, 691 So. 2d 398, 405
(Miss. 1997); Cenac v. Murry, 609 So. 2d 1257, 1272 (Miss. 1992); UHS-Qualicare,
Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hosp., Inc., 525 So. 2d 746, 757 (Miss. 1987); see
also MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-1-203 (1981). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
In Cenac, for example, the Cenacs purchased a country store from the
Murrys by executing a contract for deed, whereby the Cenacs would make a down
payment and monthly payments for ten years, at the end of which the Murrys
would transfer title to the Cenacs. Cenac, 609 So. 2d at 1259. The court noted
that
a final clause in the agreement stated that, if the purchaser chose not to
exercise her right to purchase, the contract would become null and void,
and all rights of the purchaser would be forfeited and terminated. All
money and other consideration paid by the purchaser to the seller would
be retained by the sellers free of any claim from the purchaser, it being
agreed that such sums constitute a reasonable rental fee for the property
and a reasonable sum as liquidated damages to the sellers if the right
to purchase were not exercised.
Id. at 1260.
Some 18 months into the deal, the Cenacs sued the Murrys, seeking to rescind the contract, alleging, inter alia, breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. Id. The Cenacs chronicled numerous accounts of bizarre and offensive
behavior by the Murrys, which the Cenacs claimed was aimed at forcing them to
abandon the store before they gained title to it. Id. at 1260. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the Murrys had, in fact, breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing implied into their contract with the Cenacs:
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plied warranties of title,"3 merchantability,2 "4 and fitness
for a particular purpose" 5 set forth in Article 2 of the Mis-

Good faith is the faithfulness of an agreed purpose between two parties,
a purpose which is consistent with justified expectations of the other
party. The breach of good faith is bad faith characterized by some conduct which violates standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.
... The Cenacs argue that Murry has breached the covenant of
good faith pointing to Murry's abusive, aberrant, intimidating, harassing
behavior which has made their life a living hell. We agree. We trust
that the facts of this case establish Murry's breach of the good faith
duty and have nothing to add. Murry's motive is clear. With $30,000.00
in hand and $925.00 monthly payments for each month for ten years,
Murry would also get the store back, a healthy windfall, if he could only
drive the Cenacs out of town forcing a forfeiture of the contract. In addition to Murry's bizarre behavior, he clearly misrepresented material facts
to the Cenacs when they were negotiating for the "purchase" of the
store.
Id. at 1272-73.
203 MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-312 and 75-2A-211 (1972 & Supp. 1999); see, e.g.,
Huff v. Hobgood, 549 So. 2d 951, 953-54 (Miss. 1989); Hicks v. Thomas, 516
So. 2d 1344, 1348 (Miss. 1987).
The Mississippi Supreme Court has also recognized an implied warranty of
title which attaches to the sale of a non-negotiable chose in action such that, "if
the chose is a nullity, the assignee may recover its price irrespective of the
seller's ignorance of the defect." Gilchrist Tractor Co. v. Stribling, 192 So. 2d 409,
417 (Miss. 1966). This implied warranty exists, according to the Gilchrist Tractor
court, even thought the sale or assignment is made "without recourse." Id.
2"
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-314 and 75-2A-212; see, e.g., Gast v. Rogers-Dingus Chevrolet, 585 So. 2d 725, 728 (Miss. 1991); Settlemires v. Jones, 736 So. 2d
471, 473-74 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
In Beck Enterprises, Inc. v. Hester, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that
section 75-2-314 applies to both new and used goods, although used goods are
reasonably expected to require more maintenance and repair. See Beck
Enterprises, Inc. v. Hester, 512 So. 2d 672, 675 (Miss. 1987); accord Settlemires,
736 So. 2d at 473-74. If the used goods conform to the quality of other similar
used goods, they will normally be merchantable. Beck Enterprises, 512 So. 2d at
675; Settlemires, 736 So. 2d at 474.
The implied warranty of merchantability may not be waived or disclaimed,
except as permitted by statute. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-18 (Supp. 1999); id. § 752-315.1 (Supp. 1999); see Gast, 585 So. 2d at 728; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Ford Motor Co., 736 So. 2d 384, 390 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
206 MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-315 and 75-2A-213; see, e.g., J.L. Teel Co. v.
Houston United Sales, Inc., 491 So. 2d 851, 859 (Miss. 1986); Massey-Ferguson,
Inc. v. Evans, 406 So. 2d 15, 17-18 (Miss. 1981).
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, like the implied
warranty of merchantability, may not be waived or disclaimed, except as permit-
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sissippi Uniform Commercial Code.
7. Account for Surrounding Circumstances
When construing and interpreting a contract, a court
should take into account the circumstances surrounding the
formation of the contract. °5 In so doing, the court should
place itself, as near as possible, in the exact situation of the
parties when they executed the instrument, so as to determine
their intentions, the objects to be accomplished, obligations
created, time of performance, duration, mutuality, and other
essential features.0 7

ted by statute. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-18; id. § 75-2-315.1; see Gast, 585 So. 2d
at 728; J.L. Teel, 491 So. 2d at 859.
20 See Williams v. Batson, 187 So. 236, 238 (Miss. 1939) (en banc); see, e.g.,
Griffin v. Tall Timbers Dev., Inc., 681 So. 2d 546, 551 (Miss. 1996) ("In construing covenants imposing restrictions and burdens on use of land, . . . the restriction and burden will be construed in light of the circumstances surrounding its
formulation, with the idea of carrying out its object, purpose and intent . .
").
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 cmt. a, at 115 (1981)
("[Bloth integrated and unintegrated agreements are to be read in the light of the
circumstances and may be explained or supplemented by operative usages of
trade, by the course of dealing between the parties, and by the course of performance of the agreement."); id. § 201 cmt. b, at 83-84 ("Uncertainties in the meaning of words are ordinarily greatly reduced by the context in which they are
used. . . . In general, the context relevant to interpretation of a bargain is the
context common to both parties.").
" As the Restatement (Second) states:
In interpreting the words and conduct of the parties to a contract, a
court seeks to put itself in the position [the parties] occupied at the time
the contract was made. When the parties have adopted a writing as a final expression of their agreement, interpretation is directed to the meaning of that writing in the light of the circumstances. The circumstances
for this purpose include the entire situation, as it appeared to the parties,
and in appropriate cases may include facts known to one party of which
the other had reason to know.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. b, at 87 (emphasis added) (internal reference omitted); see also Williams, 187 So. at 238 ("The standard of interpretation of an integration (written instrument), except where it produces an ambiguous result, or is excluded by a rule of law establishing a definite meaning, is
the meaning that would be attached to the integration by a reasonably intelligent
person acquainted with all operative usages and knowing all the circumstances
prior to and contemporaneous with the making of the integration, other than oral
statements by the parties of what they intended it to mean." (emphasis added)).
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For example, in McKee v. McKee,"' the court construed
an agreement distributing property formerly held by a partnership comprised of a brother (John) and sister (Margaret) in
order to determine who had the best claim to 69.6 acres of
property formerly a part of a $15,000,000 partnership estate as
follows:
One thing on which the parties agree is that John made an
original proposal for the division of property in a letter...
dated October 15, 1983. In the letter he admittedly offered
Margaret the "Klondike Place", totaling approximately 973
acres, a portion of which was the disputed 60 (61 in the letter) acres of the Chism purchase. On the next page of the
letter, he stated that he would receive "60 acres of the Chism
property-Roper Place-and the Dunn Cut, 25 acres."...
.... On December 30, 1983, Margaret listed her understanding of the property division. In this listing, she received
a "Kiondike Place" totaling 973 acres. John received a 60 acre
tract described as "Roper", with "Chism" handwritten beside
the word Roper. The total acreage for Margaret was 3720
gross acres and 3480 cultivatable acres. John's total acreage

208 568 So. 2d 262 (Miss.

1990). The dispute in McKee centered around the

following tracts of land:
(1) Klondike Place: A large tract of land which may or may not contain
the 69.6 acres at issue. Regardless of where those 70 acres end up, both
parties agree that Margaret is entitled to "the Klondike Place." She
claims that it should contain 973 acres, while her brother maintains that
it comprises 912 acres, more or less. With the 9.6 acres around the
Taylor Ginning Company removed, the Klondike Place contains only 903
acres.
(2) Chism Property: 120 acres of land purchased in 1973 by J & M
McKee from the M.E. Chism Estate. It is comprised of two (2) separate
rectangular tracts of approximately sixty (60) acres each ....
(3) Dunn Cut: A 25 acre tract of land which is mentioned most often in
connection with the "Roper cut." . . .
(4) "The 9.6 Acres": A tract of land which may or may not be part of
the Taylor Ginning Company. John claims it is an integral part of the
operation of Taylor Ginning Co., and since he received the Company
under the property division agreement, he claims that he should receive
it as well. Margaret maintains that it should go to her as part of the
Klondike Place.
Id. at 265-66 (emphasis omitted).
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was 3680 gross acres, and 3440 cultivatable acres.... [Tihe
"final" agreement was signed by the parties on January 7 and
9....
The final signed document signed by both parties, states
on page two that Margaret was to receive the identical
3720/3480 ratio of gross to cultivatable acreage mentioned
previously, while John was to receive 3680/3440, also as before. Considering the amount of confusion generated by the
terminology used to refer to the various tracts, this is one of
the few logical pieces of information this Court was able to
find in the record or the exhibits. It also purports to be the
final agreement of the parties.
Under general principles of contract law, one should look
to the "four corners" of a contract whenever possible to determine how to interpret it. Of course, this is possible only when
the intent of the parties is "clear or unambiguous." The "contract" at issue here cannot be characterized as such. In fact,
an examination of various "canons" of contract construction is
likewise of little help. The only remaining step is to consider
the "totality of circumstances" surrounding the final contract,
which has been done. The final agreement in the case sub
judice makes no sense unless it is examined in conjunction
with other correspondence between the parties.
...
[A] combined reading of the various written correspondence leads to a more internally harmonious result. The
chancellor's decision on this point is manifestly contrary to a
total reading of all prior documents, and therefore is reversed,
with the disputed 60 acres of the Chism property awarded to
Margaret. Under this interpretation, the total number of
acres awarded to each party is consistent with all previously
agreed- to documents.
...The 9.6 acres in question lies immediately adjacent
to the Taylor Ginning Company and has apparently been
used for years as a disposal or refuse site for the Company.
The parties seem to agree that John is to receive the entity
known as "Taylor Ginning Company" pursuant to the terms of
the agreement. John maintains that the agreement also encompasses the 9.6 acre adjacent disposal site; Margaret
claims it does not.
In the documents transmitted between the parties, the
"Taylor Ginning Company" is mentioned many times, but
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exactly what this means is never made clear ....
John testified at the hearing that he believed the Gin
Company owned the 9.6 acres in question. Whether this is in
fact true, he convincingly described the importance of the 9.6
acres to the ginning operation; Margaret was unable to provide equally convincing proof in support of her contention.
Unlike the facts surrounding the Klondike Place/Chism/Roper
dispute, the Gin Company was described in only the most
general of terms in the correspondence between Margaret and
John, and the 9.6 acres was never specifically mentioned at
all. Therefore, the chancellor was within his discretion in
awarding the 9.6 acre dump site to John. There is no contrary
indication from the surrounding documents.2"
In Payne v. Campbell,2 10 Mullins had leased the land in
question to Morehead, reserving a royalty of one-eighth (1/8) of
the oil and gas produced on the land.211 Mullins then conveyed to Hodge:
[o]ne-half (1/2) of the whole of any oil, gas or other minerals,
except sulphur, on and under and to be produced from said
lands; delivery of said royalties to be made to the purchaser
herein in the same manner as is provided for the delivery of
royalties by any present or future mineral lease affecting said
lands."'
Hodge, in turn, granted to Payne "three-eighths (3/8) of the
whole of any oil, gas or other minerals," under said lands.1
The question for the court was whether the one-half granted by
Mullins to Hodge was properly read as one-half of Mullins's
one-eighth royalty interest or a one-half royalty interest-in
which case, Mullins would have granted to Payne more than
Mullins could grant-and, therefore, whether Payne's interest
was three-eighths of Hodge's one-half of Mullins's one-eighth
(3/64 of the whole) or three-eighths of one-half (3/16 or 12/64 of

209 Id. at 266-67 (emphasis, citations and footnote omitted).
210

164 So. 2d 780 (Miss. 1964).

21 Payne, 164 So. 2d at 783.
1

Id. at 782.

213

Id.
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the whole).214
Ruling that the "one-half' grant had to be read both in the
context of the entire granting instrument and in light of the
circumstances surrounding Mullins's grant of the interest to
Hodge, the court concluded that Mullins had granted to Hodge
only one-sixteenth; therefore, Hodge could grant Payne only
3/64:
When the aforesaid royalty deeds were executed there
was outstanding of record a ten-year mineral lease executed
by Joe V. Mullins and wife to E. G. Morehead dated February
9, 1943, which provided for the payment to lessors a royalty
of 1/8 of the oil and gas produced ....
The usual royalty provided for in oil leases in Mississippi
prior to and at the time of the execution of the royalty deed
from Joe V. Mullins and wife to T. F. Hodge on March 28,
1944, was a 1/8 of the whole of all oil, gas and other minerals,
except sulphur. At that time the prevailing price being paid
landowners per royalty acre in Amite County was $5 to $7
per acre. The amount paid by Hodge to Mullins for said royalty conveyance was $1,000, or $6.51 per acre, if the royalty
deed is interpreted as conveying a 1/2 of 1/8 of the oil and gas
produced from said lands ....
The chancellor entered a decree adjudging that the deed
from Joe V. Mullins and wife to T. F. Hodge dated March 28,
1944, conveyed 1/2 of 1/8 royalty in the oil, gas and other
minerals, except sulphur, in and under the lands involved ....
**

*

Only one royalty was conveyed by the Mullins to Hodge
and it was to be paid out of and deducted from the present or
any future lease. It would be impossible to deduct a 1/2 royalty from the 18 royalty provided for in the then existing lease.
The interpretation made by the trial court is reasonable, conforms to the manifest intention of the parties, the usages of
the oil business, and avoids unreasonable results.
Appellants contend that the said royalty conveyances are
plain and unambiguous and need no interpretation by the

214

Id. at 784.
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court, and the royalty conveyed by Mullins to Hodge was
stated as 1/2 of the whole of any oil, gas and other minerals
produced from the lands. This may be true if the conveyances
were considered in a vacuum separate and apart from the
lease referred to therein and without considering the circumstances of the parties and the subject matter. But ....
[tihe
words of the conveyance should be considered in the context
in which they are used. We are of the opinion that when the
royalty conveyance from Mullins to Hodge is applied to the
thing on which it operates, it is ambiguous. Therefore, evidence showing all the circumstances surrounding the transactions was admissible....

Unless the parties clearly manifest a contrary intent "surrounding circumstances" may include any prior course of dealing between the parties,2 16 as well as any operative usages of
trade.2 17 Courts should also construe all contracts in light of
any applicable state or federal law or constitutional provision
in effect at the time the contract was formed.1 8
Generally, Mississippi courts will not consider evidence of
surrounding circumstances unless their "four corners" analysis
of the written agreement suggests that the agreement is ambig-

215 Id.
210 A

at 783-84 (citations omitted).

"course of dealing" is "a sequence of previous conduct between the parties
to an agreement which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of
understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

223(1) (1981); see also MISS. CODE ANN.

§

75-1-205(1)

(1972). For a more thorough discussion of the role of course-of-dealing evidence in
construing and interpreting contracts under the Mississippi Uniform Commercial
Code, see infra subpart III.D.2.a.
217 A "usage of trade" can refer either to a habitual or customary practice in a
particular trade or location, or to a meaning ascribed to a word or phrase that is
commonly understood by those in a particular trade or location. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

219 cmt. a, at 146; see also MISs. CODE ANN.

§

75-1-

205(2). For a more thorough discussion of the role of trade usages in construing
and interpreting contracts under the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code, see
infra subpart III.D.2.b.
"' See, e.g., Johnson ex rel. Blocket v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 726 So.
2d 167, 169 (Miss. 1998); Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Payne, 603 So. 2d 343, 348-49
(Miss. 1992); Switzer v. Switzer, 460 So. 2d 843, 845-46 (Miss. 1984); Houston
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Maples, 375 So. 2d 1012, 1015 (Miss. 1979); Dunnam v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 668, 670 (Miss. 1979).

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69

uous, incomplete, or both. 219
At issue in Tufts v. Greenwald22 1 was whether a term
calling for the plaintiff to deliver a soda fountain to the defendant "as soon as possible" contemplated that the plaintiff, who
both manufactured and sold soda fountains, would manufacture
and deliver a soda fountain to the defendant "as soon as possible," or that the plaintiff would deliver an already-manufactured soda fountain to the defendant "as soon as possible."2 2 '
The facts latter construction would have favored the defendant:
In the case before us the terms of the agreement may refer
indifferently to a soda fountain to be thereafter manufactured
and consigned to the defendants, or to one then in existence,
to be immediately forwarded. The plaintiff says that, by reason of the fact that he was a manufacturer, he construed the
contract to mean that the fountain was to be manufactured
and sent to the defendants, and that this was done as soon as
practicable. The defendants say that they intended to order a
fountain then in stock, and ready for immediate shipment,
and that this was well understood by the agent of plain2
tiff. 2
Because of this ambiguity, the Mississippi Supreme Court
held that the trial court
did not err in permitting the defendant Greenwald to testify
that the contract made between his firm and the agent of the
plaintiff was for the purchase of a soda-water fountain then
See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text; see, e.g., State ex rel. Lafayette County v. Hall, 8 So. 464, 464 (Miss. 1891) ("We recognize the correctness of
the legal proposition upon which the argument of appellant's counsel rests, viz.,
that, where a contract or obligation is expressed in ambiguous terms, and therefore admits of two interpretations, the circumstances under which it was entered
into, and the understanding of the parties, may be resorted to in aid of its construction. But this is a mere rule of interpretation, and cannot be appealed to for
the purpose of creating an ambiguity in an instrument which is unequivocal in its
language, and of well settled legal import."); see also, e.g., O.J. Stanton & Co. v.
Mississippi State Hwy. Comm'n, 370 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1979) (refusing to
consider evidence of trade usage and custom absent ambiguity).
220 6 So. 156 (Miss. 1889).
221 Tufts, 6 So. at 157.
222 Id.
219
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represented by the agent to be in stock and capable of immediate shipment. The testimony did not tend to contradict the
written agreement, but to apply it to its subject-matter. There
is nothing in the agreement or order of shipment indicating
that the plaintiff was to manufacture for the defendants a
soda fountain, but, because he was a manufacturer and
known to be such by the defendants, he assumed that the
shipment was to be as soon "as possible" after the fountain
should have been made by him, and because it was so shipped
that the defendants were by their contract bound to accept it.
The plaintiff thus unconsciously appeals to the same principle
from which his objection seeks to preclude the defendant, viz.,
that a contract shall be interpreted by the circumstances and
conditions under which it was entered into. It is not competent to contradict or vary the written words which the parties
have selected as the exponent of their contract, but, where the
language used is susceptible of different meanings, the law
says it means what the parties understood it to mean.'
8. Consider the Parties'Own "PracticalConstruction"
Mississippi courts, asked to construe a facially unclear
instrument, should consider the interpretation placed upon the
instrument by the parties (and their successors) in seeking the
intent of the parties." As the court in Sumter Lumber Co. v.
Skipper225 counseled:
The rules for the construction of deeds or contracts are
designed to ascertain and to follow the actual or probable
intention of the parties and are: When the language of the
deed or contract is clear, definite, explicit, harmonious in all
its provisions, and free from ambiguity throughout, the court
looks solely to the language used in the instrument itself, and
will give effect to each and all its parts as written. When,
however, the language falls short of the qualities above, mentioned and resort must be had to extrinsic aid, the court will
look to the subject matter embraced therein, to the particular

22

Id.

22,

See St. Regis Pulp & Paper Corp. v. Floyd, 238 So. 2d 740, 744 (Miss.

1970).
22

184 So. 296 (Miss. 1938).
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situation of the parties who made the instrument, and to the
general situation touching the subject matter, that is to say,
to all the conditions surrounding the parties at the time of
the execution of the instrument, and to what, as may be fairly
assumed, they had in contemplation in respect to all such
said surrounding conditions, giving weight also to the future
developments thereinabout which were reasonably to be anticipated or expected by them; and when the parties have for
some time proceeded with or under the deed or contract, a
large measure, and sometimes a controlling measure, of regard will be given to the practical construction which the
parties themselves have given it, this on the common sense
proposition that actions generally speak even louder than
words .22
In Weeks v. Mississippi College,"' one of the plaintiffs'
great-great-grandfathers had donated a sum of money to Mississippi College in the 1850s, in return for which he had received a written "scholarship certificate," which read, in relevant part:
This is to certify that Dr. E.G. Banks of Clinton, having paid
to the Mississippi College scholarship Note for the sum of
Five Hundred Dollars with accrued interest, now he, the said
Dr. E.G. Banks, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns are entitled to a Perpetual Scholarship in said Mississippi College.228
The certificate was used on numerous occasions by various
persons claiming rights to the certificate through E.G. Banks,
and "the College's records indicate[d] that the college repeatedly honored the certificate for tuition in various amounts for
various students whenever the certificate was presented or
upon the written request" of the daughter or granddaughter of

226

Sumpter Lumber, 184 So. at 298-99; accord Quinn v. Mississippi State

Univ., 720 So. 2d 843, 850-51 (Miss. 1998); Farragut v. Massey, 612 So. 2d 325,
329 (Miss. 1992).
227 No. 98-CA-00245-COA,
1999 WL 410552 (Miss. Ct. App. June 22, 1999).
228 Weeks, 1999 WL 410552, at *1.
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E.G. Banks.2 2 9
In 1991, plaintiff David Weeks sought to send his wife,
plaintiff Susan Weeks, to Mississippi College using the
scholarship certificate to pay all of her educational expenses for
four years. The College responded that it would honor the certificate for tuition in the amount of one course per semester.23 ° The Weekses sued. At trial, the chancellor, having reviewed evidence of the certificate's historical use, "held that the
certificate entitled the user to the greater of $100 tuition credit
or one course per semester."3 1 On appeal, the Weekses argued that, because the chancellor had found the certificate to
be ambiguous, he should have construed it strictly against the
College under the rule of contra proferentem."2 The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that, while the certificate was ambiguous, the rule of contra proferentem should yield when the
"practical construction" given to the ambiguous certificate over
the years clearly supported the chancellor's judgment:
The great fallacy of their argument is their claim that
the chancellor found that the term "scholarship," in its ambiguity, meant either "full" scholarship rights of free tuition,
fees and expenses of attending college, or some lesser or limited amount thereof. The chancellor only found that the term
was ambiguous. Having made that determination, he then
found it proper, in construing the term "scholarship," to accord considerable weight to the evidence of the actual performance of the contract. This Court finds that, as a matter of
law, it was proper for him to so rule. This, so-called, "practical
construction" rule of interpretation was applied by the Mississippi Supreme Court in St. Regis Pulp & Paper Corp. v.
Floyd, 238 So. 2d 740 (Miss. 1970), where it held that the interpretation placed upon the instrument by the original contracting parties and by their successors deserves consideration ... 23

229
230

Id.
Id.

at *1-2.
at *1.

232

Id.
See id. at *5-6. See generally infra subpart II.D.1.

233

Weeks, 1999 WL 410552, at *6 (citation omitted).

231
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D. Secondary Rules of Construction and Interpretation
In addition to, or sometimes in conjunction with, the primary rules of construction and interpretation just discussed,
Mississippi courts also rely from time to time on a number of
"secondary" rules. These secondary rules are easier both to
define and to apply than the foregoing, more general principles.
However, a court should apply the following secondary rules
only if two or more provisions of a contract, or two or more reasonable readings of the provisions of a contract, remain uncertain after the court has applied the foregoing primary rules." 4
In response to a citation to the case of City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Gaslight & Coke Co., the Weeks court found
that each of those requirements was satisfied in the case at bar. From
the first instance of its use, up to the complained of instance, the course
of dealing between the heirs and assigns under the certificate and the
College was uniform, unquestioned, and fully concurred in by both parties. The course of conduct consisted of either, tuition credit in the
amount of $100 or the cost of one course per semester.
Weeks, 1999 WL 410552, at *7. See City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Gaslight &
Coke Co., 41 N.E. 239, 241 (Ohio 1895) (holding that "[tlo have any value as a
practical construction, the course of dealing should be uniform, unquestioned, and
fully concurred in by both parties.").
,
See Williams v. Batson, 187 So. 236, 238 (Miss. 1939) (en banc) (recognizing
availability of "several secondary rules" of interpretation that may be applied
"[w]hen, but not unless, the meaning to be given to a written instrument remains
uncertain after applying thereto . . . the primary rules in aid [of interpretation]");
see, e.g., Weeks, 1999 WL 410552, at *5-6 (electing to resolve ambiguity by following parties' "practical construction" of contract, rather than following maxim of
contra proferentem advocated by appellants).
Writing about these secondary maxims of construction and interpretation,
Professor Patterson has observed:
There is some doubt whether they have reliable guidance value for judges, or are merely justifications for decisions arrived at on other grounds,
which may or may not be revealed in the opinion. This rather cynical
view is supported by two observations. One is that for any given maxim
that would persuade a judge to a certain conclusion a contrary maxim
may be found that would persuade him to the opposite (or contradictory)
conclusion . . ..
The second reason . . . for believing that the [secondary] maxims of
interpretation are ceremonial rather than persuasive is that in many
instances the court will set forth in its opinion the whole battery of
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1. ContraProferentem (Construe Against
the Drafting Party)
Ambiguous contract terms are construed most strongly
against the party responsible for drafting them."'
2. Noscitur a Sociis (Take Words in Their
Immediate Context)
The meaning of a word may be affected by its immediate
context."6 Therefore, a court should construe or interpret a
word in the context of the terms immediately preceding and
following it. 237

maxims and then proceed to decide the case on the basis of an analysis
of the terms of the contract and the facts of the dispute, without indicating which maxim or maxims, if any, were applied or invoked in reaching
that decision.
Patterson, supra note 3, at 852-53 (emphasis added).
' See Wallace v. United Mississippi Bank, 726 So. 2d 578, 588 (Miss. 1998);
Love Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Oil Producing Co., 152 So. 829, 831 (Miss. 1934);
see, e.g., Wade v. Selby, 722 So. 2d 698, 701 (Miss. 1998); Farragut v. Massey,
612 So. 2d 325, 330 (Miss. 1992); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Stewart, 608 So. 2d
1120, 1126 (Miss. 1992); Leach v. Tingle, 586 So. 2d 799, 801 (Miss. 1991);
Stampley v. Gilbert, 332 So. 2d 61, 63 (Miss. 1976); Globe Music Corp. v. Johnson, 84 So. 2d 509, 511 (Miss. 1956); see also Estate of Parker v. Dorchak, 673
So. 2d 1379, 1381-82 (Miss. 1996) (recognizing this "well-known canon of construction," but recognizing that another canon of construction applied to facts of the
case led to different resolution than would be reached if the court relied solely on
contra proferentem; and, therefore, concluding that contract was ambiguous).
The presumption against the drafter is less pronounced when the other party
has taken an active role in the drafting process or is particularly knowledgeable.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 reporter's note, at 105-06 (1981),
and cases cited therein.
Contra proferentem is by far the most frequently invoked secondary maxim in
the reported Mississippi cases. Any substantive discussion of the numerous insurance policy cases in which Mississippi courts have invoked this maxim would
significantly lengthen this article. As it is, the discussion of insurance policy construction undertaken herein consumes 14 pages. See infra subpart II.E.4.
' See Evans v. City of Jackson, 30 So. 2d 315, 317 (Miss. 1947) ("[U]nder the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis . . . the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it."). See generally
Patterson, supra note 3, at 853 ("Noscitur a sociis. The meaning of a word in a
series is affected by the others in the same series; or, a word may be affected by
its immediate context.").
237 See Evans, 30 So. 2d at 317 (stating that closely situated words, "being
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In Stephens v. Railway Officials' & Employees' Accident
Ass'n,238 the subject insurance policy covered indemnity
against two categories of losses:
First, against those injuries, or death, caused by external,
violent, accidental means which leave a visible mark upon the
body; and, second, against those injuries, or death, caused by
means which leave no visible, external mark upon the
body .... By this [second] paragraph it is provided that the
appellee will pay one-tenth of the face of the policy where "the
member shall suffer an injury of which there shall be no visible, external mark on his body sufficient to cause death, and
it shall appear by an autopsy that such injury contributed to
his death,

...

or if such injuries or death shall resultfrom the

intentional acts of any person other than the insured, except
as the result of quarreling or fighting, whether such other
person be sane or insane." It is to be noted carefully that
there is no exception in the first category against liability
when the body shows the visible, external marks of violent,
accidental death, when death is caused by the intentional act
of another than the insured. That exception applies alone to
the second category, and this second category embraces the
distinctive class of injuries, "of which there shall be no visible,
external mark on the body."239
The insured's employee was killed by the intentional act of
someone other than the insured, in such a way that there was
a visible, external mark-specifically, his head was "split
open."24 The insurer apparently argued that the insured was
entitled to indemnity only in the amount of one-tenth of the
face value of the policy, on the ground that the employee's
death was covered by the italicized passage above.2 41 The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed, holding that "the words,
'such injuries or death,' preceding the words, 'resulting from
the intentional act of another,'.., under the maxim, 'Noscitur

associated together, take color from each other").
21 So. 710 (Miss. 1897).
Stevens, 21 So. at 710 (emphasis added).
240
241

Id. at 711.
Id. at 710.
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a sociis,'... mean injuries or death of the kind with those just
before in the same sentence specified . . . that is, injuries or
death when no visible, external mark is left on the body."24 2
And, therefore, because the employee's death did leave a visible, external mark, it fell within the first category of injury or
death-namely, "injuries, or death, caused by external, violent,
accidental
means which leave a visible mark upon the
243
body."
3. Ejusdem Generis (Limit Generalities to Things
of the Same Genre as Those Specified)
When an enumeration of specific things is followed by
some more general word or phrase, then the general word or
phrase will usually be construed to refer only to things of the
same general nature or class as those specifically enumerated.' However, this rule will yield if its application "would
defeat the purpose sought to be accomplished by the use of the

22 Id.
2'3

Id.

at 710-11.
at 711.

Noscitur a sociis appears to have been of very limited use to the Mississippi
courts in cases involving contract construction-as opposed to statutory construction. See, e.g., State Farm Ins. Co. v. Gay, 526 So. 2d 534, 537 (Miss. 1988);
Evans v. City of Jackson, 30 So. 2d 315, 317 (Miss. 1947); Rouse v. Sisson, 199
So. 777, 780 (Miss. 1941). Stephens is the only reported case in more than a
century to apply the doctrine to a contract, and Williams is the only reported decision in that same span to have explicitly considered and rejected the doctrine's
application to a contract.
24 State v. Russell, 187 So. 540, 543 (Miss. 1939); see, e.g., Witherspoon v.
Campbell, 69 So. 2d 384, 388 (Miss. 1954) ("[tlhe ordinary oil and gas lease refers
to the minerals that are to be explored for as being 'oil, gas and other minerals,'
and under the doctrine of ejusdem generis the words 'and other minerals' have
reference to other minerals of like kind and character which are not a part of the
soil, such as the oil and gas specifically mentioned."). See generally Patterson, supra note 3, at 853 ("A general term joined with a specific term will be deemed to
include only things that are like (of the same genus as) the specific one. ...
E.g., S contracts to sell B his farm together with the 'cattle, hogs, and other
animals.' This would probably not include S's favorite house-dog, but might include a few sheep that S was raising for the market.").
The doctrine of ejusdem generis only applies to an ambiguous contract. See
Yazoo Properties v. Katz & Besthoff No. 284, Inc., 644 So. 2d 429, 432 (Miss.
1994); Cole v. McDonald, 109 So. 2d 628, 637 (Miss. 1959).
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words," and "do violence to the manifest intention of the parties
as represented by their deed and by their acts and.., defeat
the express purpose which the parties were seeking to
accomplish."2 45
In American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co. v. Hancock,246
the collision policy at issue relieved the insurer from liability if
the vehicle was subject to a bailment lease, conditional sales
contract purchase agreement, mortgage, "or other encumbrance." 7 The truck was, in fact, subject to a lease-but not
a bailment lease.2 4 The insurer
admitted in its brief that the lease from Ashley to Automatic
Poultry Feeder Company did not constitute a bailment
lease ....

The appellant then shifted gears and claimed that the
said lease from Ashley would constitute an "other encumbrance" not specifically declared and described in the policy
and, therefore, the entire policy would be voided. The only encumbrances specifically enumerated before the general term
"other encumbrance" is used, are bailment lease, conditional
sale, purchase agreement, or mortgage.
Applying the rule of ejusdem generis to this contention,
the lease from Ashley to Automatic Poultry Feeder Company
does not qualify as an "other encumbrance." It is not similar
to a sale or mortgage agreement in any respect.249

24 Singer v. Tatum, 171 So. 2d 134, 144 (Miss.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 845
(1965). The Mississippi Supreme Court has noted that

[1like all other rules of construction, [ejusdem generis] is simply an aid
invoked by the courts in determining the intent with which words are
used and should not be applied when so to do would defeat the purpose
sought to be accomplished by the use of the words, the meaning of
which is under consideration.
We think that to apply the rule of ejusdem generis to the case at
bar would be to do violence to the manifest intention of the parties as
well as to defeat the manifest purpose which the parties were seeking to
accomplish.
Cole, 109 So. 2d at 636 (quotation omitted).
24

186 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1966).

2 American Fidelity, 186 So. 2d at 217.
2 Id. at 217.
249

Id.
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4. Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius
(Exclude Similar Things Not Specified)
On the other hand, when an enumeration of specific things
is not followed by some more general word or phrase, then
things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated are deemed to be excluded.2 50 Thus, for example,
"[w]here only one exception is mentioned in a contract, the rule
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies and exceptions
not mentioned cannot be engrafted upon it.""'
In Gilchrist Tractor Co. v. Stribling,"2 Stribling argued
that he was entitled to continue supplying two of his former
customers, Cook Construction and Hyde Construction, because
the agreement by which he sold his exclusive franchise to
Gilchrist Tractor included a provision that made Stribling "personally responsible for any liability or responsibility of Gilchrist
Tractor Company, Inc. or Stribling Bros. Machinery Co., Inc. to
Cook Construction Company and Hyde Construction Company
growing out of any contracts with either or both of said companies to furnish equipment at less than retail prices .... .""
Applying the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that the only permissible
exception to the non-competition agreement was precisely the
one (and only one) set forth in the parties' written agreements:
The provisions of the agreement executed by Stribling
prohibit[] him from competing in the sale of Caterpillar equip-

2" See Stennis v. Board of Supervisors, 98 So. 2d 636, 645 (Miss. 1957)
(McGehee, C.J., dissenting) (translating this maxim as "the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another"); see, e.g., Gilchrist Tractor Co. v. Stribling, 192
So. 2d 409, 414-16 (Miss. 1966). See generally Patterson, supra note 3, at 853-54
("If one or more specific terms are listed, without any general or inclusive terms,
other items although similar in kind are excluded. E.g., S contracts to sell B his
farm together with the 'cattle and hogs on the farm.' This language would be
interpreted to exclude the sheep and S's favorite house-dog.").
251 Gilchrist Tractor, 192 So. 2d at 415.
252 192 So. 2d 409 (Miss. 1966). For additional discussion of the Gilchrist case,

see supra notes 72-73, 142-43 and accompanying text.
' Gilchrist Tractor, 192 So. 2d at 414.
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ment in Mississippi for five years ....
There is one, and only one, exception to the prohibition.
It is stated clearly, in unmistakable terms:
It is understood that Roger W. Stribling now owns certain machinery and equipment and he may proceed with
the orderly liquidation or disposal of said equipment and
machinery by either sale or rental purchase agreements.
This is the only exception, and must be construed as negativing the suggestion that it was intended that there should
be others.
If it had been contemplated that Stribling should continue to have the right to supply Cook or Hyde with Caterpillar
equipment until these credits were exhausted in the course of
writing seven contracts, it would have been easy to say so.
The logical assumption is that, if it had been so intended,
there would have been some reference to the fact, especially
since the retaining of such a right by Stribling is inconsistent
with the basic purpose of the main transaction, and would be
an exception to the Non-Competition Agreement.'
5. Favor Specific Terms Over General Terms
If a general provision and a specific provision in the same
contract or other instrument conflict or are inconsistent, the
specific provision controls or qualifies the meaning of the
general.255 More specific language in a contract is to be given

Id. at 415-16 (emphasis added).
As is true with noscitur a sociis, see supra note 233, this maxim appears to
have been of very limited use to the Mississippi courts in cases involving contract-as opposed to statutory--construction. Stribling is the only reported case in
more than a century to apply the doctrine to a contract.
2
See Estate of Parker v. Dorchak, 673 So. 2d 1379, 1382 (Miss. 1996);
Garrett v. Hart, 168 So. 2d 497, 503 (Miss. 1964); Williams v. Batson, 187 So.
236, 239 (Miss. 1939) (en banc); see e.g., Busching v. Griffin, 542 So. 2d 860, 864
(Miss. 1989) ("Neither law nor language leave doubt how we should read an instrument respecting an interest in land when it uses words such as 'five (5)
acres, more or less' followed by 'more particularly described' or the like. The
'more particular' description controls, modifying, if not replacing, the 'more or less'
language."); see also Forbes v. Columbia Pulp & Paper Co., 275 So. 2d 92, 95
2I
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greater weight than general provisions. 6 However, this preference7 will yield if the parties clearly manifest a contrary in25
tent.
In Camden Fire Insurance Ass'n v. New Buena Vista Hotel
Co.,258 the court considered an apparent conflict between the
terms of a repair clause included in an insurance policy and the
terms of a specifically-negotiated rider to the policy:
[Tihe repair clause... being a part of the policy itself... is
subordinate to the provisions of the rider. It is not an exception to the rider, but the rider itself is a specific and controlling provision dealing with a different liability, and prevails
over the terms and conditions of the policy. Since the rider is
presumed to have expressed the exact agreement of the parties, it controls the policy insofar as it enlarges, modifies or
restricts the terms thereof, as it is a specific statement relating to the subject involved .... [Wihere a rider is attached to
printed forms of general use, and is intended to apply most
specifically to the condition of the parties named in the policy,
the rider has a predominating influence in determining the
meaning and intent of the policy .... [Tihe reason for the
rule is that additions to a policy by a rider are actually for
the purpose of modifying the general terms of the policy, and
therefore, being specific, control the more general terms of the
1
59
policy.
In Schlater v. Lee,2" the apparent conflict was between
two provisions in a will:

(Miss. 1973) ("W]here there are both general and special provisions in a contract
relating to the same thing, the special provisions control."); Carrere v. Johnson,
115 So. 196, 196-97 (Miss. 1928) (recognizing rule that "where property is described in a conveyance in general terms, followed by a specific description by
metes and bounds, the latter description will control instead of the former," but
finding it inapplicable in the case sub judice). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(c) & cmt. e (1981).
'

See Dorchak, 673 So. 2d at 1382.

'

Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 24 So. 2d at 850-51 (citations omitted).
78 So. 700 (Miss. 1918).

257 See RETATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
258 24 So. 2d 848 (Miss. 1946).
26

§ 203 cmt. e, at 94-95.
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Item 1. I give, devise, and bequeath to my son, Thomas
Blewett [a tract of land described] . .. , together with any all
notes and indebtedness that is now due and owing to me from
said son Thomas, hereby acquitting and discharging him from
the same. This devise to my said son Thomas to be in full of
all demands on his part against my estate and to be all he is
to receive therefrom, he not to account for the property heretofore given him, but the foregoing in addition thereto.
Item 5. I give, devise and bequeath to my daughter Mary
Wooldridge and her heirs during her natural life [terms of gift
described]. At her death to be sold and the proceeds to be
divided between my heirs share and share about... .261
Thomas's lawful heirs, argued, inter alia, that the provision in item 1 excluding Thomas from sharing in the estate of
the testator further than the bequests to him in item 1 conflicted with the provision in item 5 providing for a sale and
distribution of the remainder at Mary Wooldridge's death between the heirs of the testator, which would have included
Thomas.2 62 The court found no irreconcilable conflict:
[Tihe two items are not in conflict, but may be read together
and harmonized so as to get the real intent of the testator
from the language used in the two items. It is very clear that
the testator intended by item 1 to make certain provision for
Thomas G. Blewett, Jr., and to expressly exclude him from
taking anything further from the estate. At the death of the
testator, Thomas G. Blewett, Jr., accepted and took the estate
provided for him under item 1 of the will in lieu of any other
claim; and he could not accept the bequest in item 1 and also
claim an interest as an heir at the death of Mary Wooldridge,
life tenant, as provided in item 5.... Item 5 of the testator's
will here being a general provision, and item 1 being a specific provision, the latter must control and prevail over the former. Therefore we hold that the legatee Thomas G. Blewett,
Jr., was by express provision in item 1 excluded from taking

261 Schlater, 78 So. at 700.
6

Id.

at 700-01.
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from the estate of the testator under item 5 of the will.2"
6. FavorHandwriting to Typing and

Typing to Printing
Except where the parties clearly manifest a contrary intent, handwritten contract provisions are favored when they
conflict with or alter typewritten or printed provisions, and
typewritten provisions are favored when they conflict with or
alter printed provisions.2 As the Mississippi Supreme Court
explained in Dale v. Case..:
The reason why greater effect is given to the written than to
the printed part of a contract, if they are inconsistent, is that
the written words are the immediate language and terms
selected by the parties themselves for the expression of their
meaning, while the printed form is intended for general use
without reference to particular objects and aims."'

In H&W Industries, Inc. v. Occidental Chemical Corp.,267
both the purchase order typed by the plaintiff (H&W) and the
purchase acknowledgement form, prepared by the defendant
(Occidental) in response to a call from H&W confirming its
order, showed that H&W would purchase fifteen hopper cars
full of resin from Occidental at a price of $ 0.185 per
pound. 26 ' The back of Occidental's purchase acknowledgement
form contained several pre-printed terms, one of which providId. at 701.
See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. General Refrigeration & Appliance Co., 218
So. 2d 724, 726 (Miss. 1969); see also Thornhill v. System Fuels, Inc., 523 So. 2d
983, 988 n.2 (Miss. 1988) (stating that "when the written provisions of a contract
cannot be reconciled with the printed provisions, the written provisions con263
26"

trol . .

.

.");

Holifield v. Perkins, 103 So. 2d 433, 434 (Miss.

1958) ("If an

instrument's typeset printing cannot be reconciled with provisions which are filled
in by the parties, then the filled-in provisions control."). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

203 cmt. f, at 95 (1981) ("It is sometimes

said .. . that handwritten terms control typewritten and printed terms, and typewritten control printed.").
26 64 So. 2d 344 (Miss. 1953).
266 Dale, 64 So. 2d at 349 (quotation
267 911 F.2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1990).
21 H&W Indus., 911 F.2d at 1120.

omitted).
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ed that "[p]rices and terms of payment are subject to change
without notice and will be those in effect on date of shipment.""6 9 Occidental was to deliver the carloads in three installments. Between the first and second shipments, the market price of the resin increased unexpectedly, and Occidental
notified H&W that subsequent shipments would be at a price
in excess of $ 0.185 per pound, citing to the "subject to change"
term on the back of the purchase acknowledgement form. "7 '
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict in favor of H&W, despite Occidental's "subject to change" term:
The district court rejected Occidental's contention that
the boilerplate provision created an ambiguity or conflict with
the price contained in both parties' purchase orders. The court
concluded that "any ambiguity created in this case by the
exchange of documents is unilaterally created by the defendant," and refused to give the instruction that the price terms
should "drop out" of the contract. We find no error in the
district court's assessment.
The typewritten provisions on the purchase order forms
and the order acknowledgment form take precedence over the
printed boilerplate provisions .... 271
In Hardie Tynes Foundry & Machine Co. v. Glen Allen Oil
Mill,272 the Mississippi Supreme Court counseled: "[If the
written and printed matter can possibly be reconciled, this will
be done, it being presumed that the instrument contains no
clauses not intended by the parties." 273 Hardie Tynes dealt
with a contract part of which was printed, part of which was
typed, and part of which was handwritten:
The proposition of the company, accepted by the oil mill May

Id. at 1120 n.2.
See id. at 1120-21.
271 Id. at 1122-23.
272 36 So. 262 (Miss. 1904).
273 Hardie Tynes, 36 So. at 263 (quotation omitted); see also Ford v. Jones, 85
So. 2d 215, 217 (Miss. 1956) ("The rule that the written provisions of a deed
control over the printed provisions applies only when the former cannot be reconciled with the latter, and where they are wholly inconsistent.").
21'

210
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22, 1902, and thus becoming a contract on its face complete,
is on a printed blank, the spaces filled in with writing, and
begins thus: "We propose to make and deliver __ F. 0. B. __
August __ 1902 __ unless delayed by strikes, fires or manufacturing contingencies beyond our reasonable control," the
engine, etc., describing the subjects of the manufacture ....
This contract is followed in typewriting by attached specifications of the work to be done, more elaborate than appear in
the accepted proposition. At the end of these are typewritten
specifications, which are also in the shape of a proposition,
and which provide that the oil mill should prepare the foundation, and that the company should furnish a mechanic to
erect, if desired, at certain wages, etc., and they conclude
thus, in typewriting: "Price and terms to be in accordance
with our printed contract herewith attached and made a part
of these specifications .... Immediately under this we find,
in manuscript, this: "It is understood that the above described
engine will be shipped August 15th, 1902, failing to do so,
Hardie Tynes agrees to pay as forfeit, $5 per day for every
day behind this time,.
274
The court, asked to decide whether the handwritten addendum specifying the shipment deadline and the delay penalty
was "independent of and uncontrolled by the reservation as to
strikes, etc. in the proposition first signed,"" 5 answered "No":
[Tihe original paper was to ship "_ August __ 1902 __
unless delayed by strikes," etc., and the written addendum
simply fixes a date in August, and provides for damages per
diem for delay in shipment; and we think it should be read as
providing for the damages in addition to the first proposed
contract, and for the exact day of shipment, all subject to the
clause "unless delayed by strikes," etc.27
Pruitt v. Dean2 77 addressed both the rule favoring writing
or typing to printing and the exception limiting the rule's appli-

27,

Hardie Tynes, 36 So. at 263.

275

Id.

276

id.

'"

21 So. 2d 300 (Miss. 1945).
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cation to those instances where the handwritten or typed cannot be reconciled with the printed:
While the question is not free from difficulty, we are of
the opinion that since it is conceded that printed forms were
used for the execution of both deeds of trust,. . and that this
printed provision was modified by the draftsman of such
deeds of trust, either with pen and ink or by typewriter, before their execution, by inserting... the words "according to
law,".
the parties intended that the words "according to
law" in each of said deeds of trust should be substituted for
the entire printed provision... relating to how the notice of
the time, place, and terms of sale should be given; that is to
say, that since the quoted provision, as a whole, in the printed form, dealt with the matter of how the sale should be advertised,... the parties in modifying such provision by inserting the words "according to law" intended that the sale
should be advertised only in the manner then provided by
law ....

In so holding, we are not unmindful of the rule that
while written (or typewritten) parts of a contract prevail over
the printed part, it is nevertheless true that whenever it is
possible by any reasonable interpretation, when there is no
conflict or inconsistency between the two, they should be
reconciled so as to give effect to both. However, we have decided after a careful study of the instruments in question that
a reasonable interpretation of them leads only to the conclusion that the inserted typewritten words in reference to how
the lands were to be advertised had the effect of superseding
the printed provision in regard thereto in its entirety.27 8
7. Favor Terms Stated Earlierin the
Agreement Over Terms Stated Later
Where two provisions of an instrument cannot be otherwise harmonized, terms stated earlier in an agreement are favored over subsequent terms,"' with one noteworthy excep-

278 Pruitt, 21 So.
29 See Thornhill

2d at 303-04.
v. System Fuels, Inc., 523 So. 2d 983, 988 n.2 (Miss. 1988)
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tion: "The latter of two clauses of a will that are in irreconcilable conflict is the latest expression of the intention of the testator or testatrix where there is no other guide, and should prevail ....

-2 0

("In a deed where there are two repugnant clauses, the first must prevail.").
This seemingly most-secondary-of-all rule will not only yield to any of the
primary rules, but to the secondary rules that specific terms control general
terms with which they conflict, regardless of the order in which the general and
specific terms appear, see, e.g., Schlater v. Lee, 78 So. 700, 701 (Miss. 1918)
('[Elven though we recognize as a guide the rule that, in case of conflict in the
provisions of a will, the last item shall control and annul the first provision, still
the rule is that, where there is an inconsistency between two provisions in a will,
one a specific and the other a general provision, the specific provision must prevail over the general provision, regardless of the order in which it stands"), and
(2) when the written provisions of a contract cannot be reconciled with the printed provisions, the written provisions control, see, e.g., Dale v. Case, 64 So. 2d
344, 349 (Miss. 1953).
280 Dealy v. Keatts, 128 So. 268, 270 (Miss. 1930).
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E. Rules Applicable to Specific Types of Agreements
1. Guaranty Agreements2 81
A guarantor is entitled to a "strict construction," such that
its guaranty "may not be extended by construction or implication beyond the precise terms" of the written guaranty.2 "2
"The person claiming under the guaranty has the burden of
showing that the debt whose recovery is sought falls within the
contractual terms and that
all conditions upon the guarantor's
28 3
liability have occurred."
That said, if the guaranty is clearly a "continuing guaranty," a court should construe to cover all transactions, including those arising in the future which are within the description
or contemplation of the agreement, and to remain in force until
revoked by the guarantor.2 "4 In deciding whether a guaranty
is limited or continuing, a court may consider evidence of surrounding circumstances. 2 s
...The Mississippi Supreme Court has explained:
[A] guaranty contract possesses the following characteristics: (1) A guarantor is secondarily liable to the creditor on his contract and his liability
is fixed only by the happening of the prescribed conditions at a time
after the contract itself is made; (2) the contract of a guarantor is separate and distinct from that of his principal, and his liability arises
solely from his own contract, although its accrual depends on the breach
or performance of a prior or collateral contract by the principal therein;
(3) a guarantor enters into a cumulative collateral engagement, by which
he agrees that the principal is able to and will perform a contract which
he has made or is about to make, and that if he defaults the guarantor
will, on being notified, pay the resulting damages-i.e., a guarantor is an
insurer of the ability or solvency of the principal, although this
characteristic is not present in an absolute guaranty or a guaranty of
payment, but only in a conditional guaranty or a guaranty of collection;
and (4) except where the guaranty is absolute, generally the guarantor is
entitled to notice of the default of the principal.
Brent v. National Bank of Commerce of Columbus, 258 So. 2d 430, 434 (Miss.
1972).
282 American Oil Co. v. Estate of Wigley, 169 So. 2d 454, 458 (Miss. 1964).
23 EAC Credit Corp. v. King, 507 F.2d 1232, 1236 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying
Mississippi law).
284 See, e.g., Ivy v. Grenada Bank, 401 So. 2d 1302, 1302-03 (Miss. 1981);
Brent, 258 So. 2d at 434-35.
28 See Wingo-Ellett & Crump Shoe Co. v. Naaman, 167 So. 634, 635-36 (Miss.
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In Merchants' & Farmers' Bank v. Calmes,285 the guaranty provided:
Brooksville, Miss., Dec. 6th, 1898. We hereby guaranty the
account of Calmes & St. John Co. with the Merchants &
Farmers Bank of Macon, Miss., to the amount of $2,500. It is
agreed and understood that this guaranty is to cover all
amounts which above firm may owe the said Bank to the
above specified amount. 7
The court held the guaranty to be "not a continuing one," but
rather "confined to the account as of its date."'
By contrast, in Brent v. National Bank of Commerce of
Columbus,"9 the court found the following to be a continuing
guaranty:
I hereby give this continuing guaranty to the said Bank of
Brooksville, Mississippi, hereinafter called "Bank," its
transferees or assigns, for the payment in full, together with
all interest, attorney fees, other fees, and charges of whatsoever nature and kind, of any indebtedness, direct or contingent whether secured or unsecured, of said debtor to said
Bank up to the amount of Sixty Five Thousand and no/100
(65,000.00) Dollars, whether due or to become due, and
whether now existing or hereafter arising.2"

1936) ("[11n determining whether the guaranty is limited or continuing, that construction should be adopted which best accords with the intention of the parties,

as manifested by the terms of the guaranty, in connection with the subject matter
and surrounding circumstances, neither enlarging the words beyond their natural

import in favor of the creditor nor restricting them in aid of the [guarantor]."
(quotation omitted)); see also Estate of Wigley, 169 So. 2d at 458 ([Tlhe extent of
the guarantor's undertaking. . . must be determined . . . from the instrument
itself in which it is clearly expressed, or from the instrument and the surrounding circumstances" where it is not clearly expressed.).
2"
35 So. 161 (Miss. 1903).
21 Calmes, 35 So. at 161.
21 Id. at 162.
289 258 So. 2d 430 (Miss. 1972).
290 Brent, 258 So. 2d at 430; see id. at 434-35.
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2. Surety Agreements29 '
As a general rule, courts should construe contracts of
surety so as to not expand the surety's obligation beyond that
for which it has expressly contracted.29 2 A surety's liability is
measured by the express terms of its covenant, as contained in
the contractual (and statutory) obligations of its principal, and
in the surety agreement or bond.293
A gratuitous surety is favored by the law, and is entitled to
have its undertaking strictly construed in its favor.2 4 Gratu-

291 The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated:

ITIhe distinguishable attributes of a contract of suretyship are as follows:
(1) A surety is primarily and directly liable to the creditor on his
contract from the beginning; (2) the undertaking of a surety is made at
the same time and usually jointly with that of his principal, and binds
him jointly to the performance of the very contract under which the
liability of the principal accrues; (3) the contract of the surety is a direct
original agreement with the obligee that the very thing contracted for
shall be done-i.e., the surety is an insurer of the debt or obligation; and
(4) a surety is held to know every default of his principal and is liable
without notice.
Id. at 434.
292 See Alexander v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 100 So. 2d 347, 349 (Miss. 1958);
Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Koelling, 57 So. 2d 562, 563 (Miss. 1952).
292 Alexander, 100 So. 2d at 349. In both Alexander and Mississippi Fire Insurance Co. v. Evans, the issue for the court was whether the defaulting obligor's
surety was required to reimburse the obligor's creditors for the attorneys' fees the
creditors incurred recovering from the defaulting obligor. Both courts said "no,"
because neither surety bond provided for the payment of attorneys' fees to parties
other than the obligor. See Alexander, 100 So. 2d at 349; Mississippi Fire Ins. Co.
v. Evans, 120 So. 738, 743-44 (Miss. 1929).
29 See Koelling, 57 So. 2d at 563; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Currie, 178
So. 104, 105 (Miss. 1938); W.T. Raleigh Co. v. Rotenberry, 164 So. 5, 5-6 (Miss.
1935). In Rotenberry, the gratuitous surety's contract
ha[d] three essential features: It [wals to pay (1) the prior indebtedness
of the dealer (2) for any and all goods previously sold to said dealer,
and the two foregoing features must be (3) shown by the seller's books.
The contract made the seller's books the evidence upon which the liability was to be shown. The contract cannot be extended by construction so
as to show the liability, or either of the two required elements of that
liability, by any other means than the seller's books. The books must
themselves furnish the information required with reasonable certainty
without the aid of parol testimony or . . . [writings] kept otherwise than
in and as a part of the books themselves.
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itous sureties assume their obligations "without pecuniary remuneration."2 95 As such,
[t]heir liability is ... strictissimi juris. They have a right to
stand on the terms of their obligation, and, having consented
to be bound to a certain extent only, their liability must be
found within the terms of that consent, strictly construed.2
A compensated surety is not entitled to such preferential
treatment; rather, "[wihile its liability may not be extended
beyond the terms of the contract, if the contract is susceptible
of two constructions, one of which will uphold and the other
defeat the claim, in that event, the construction favorable to
the insured will be adopted"'297 :
[Tihe rule of strictissimijuris which operates in favor of gratuitous sureties is inapplicable, in a suit against a compensated surety. This merely means, however, that a compensated
surety is not entitled to a strict or technical construction of
the contract, but that on the contrary the obligation is to be
considered in the same light as any other contract, and that
the obligation of such a surety should not be extended beyond
the scope of his undertaking as deduced from the terms, conditions and circumstances of the instrument. The rule is one
of construction, and if there is no ambiguity, the plain intention of the parties cannot be disregarded or enlarged by construction. It is essential not merely that performance of the
contract shall operate, but that it must be so intended, for the
direct benefit of the third person.29

Rotenberry, 164 So. at 6; see also, e.g., Hederman v. Cox, 193 So. 19, 22 (Miss.
1940) (reciting Rotenberry and recognizing that gratuitous surety's obligation could
not, at common law, 'be extended by imposing thereon a new and a different date
for performance by the principal to the hurt or possible hurt of the surety-the
obligation of the surety must not be extended to any other period of time than is
expressed or necessarily included in the contract itself").
295 Currie, 178 So. at 105.
Id. (emphasis added).
Koelling, 57 So. 2d at 563; see, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Wood, 57
So. 2d 141, 142 (Miss. 1952) (holding that surety is liable under its bonds for
losses to buyers of all stock sold by misrepresentation, even if coverage on its
face only applied to preferred stock and that sold was common stock).
2"
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hewes, 199 So. 93, 98 (Miss. 1940),
'
'
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As with a guaranty, a suretyship can be either limited (to
one or more specified obligations of the principal) or continuing.299 A suretyship may also be unlimited or limited with regard to the amount of money the surety may potentially be
liable to pay. 00
3, Indemnity Agreements
Agreements that attempt to indemnify a party against its
own negligence are "not favorites of the law."' 0' Mississippi

modified on other grounds, 199 So. 772 (Miss. 1941).
In Koelling, the court recognized an ambiguity between the terms of the
principal's contract and the surety bond:
In the former, 80% of the contract could be drawn as the work progressed, but the remaining 20% could not be paid until the job was
completed. In the latter, while performance in accordance with the contract was required, the obligees might retain as little as 10% at final
completion. The only effect of this ambiguity was that the obligees could
pay up to 90% as the work progressed. Under the above authorities, the
construction favorable to the insured must be adopted, and the 10% provision as to retainage must prevail.
Koelling, 57 So. 2d at 563-64.
See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
s See Currie, 178 So. at 105. In Currie,
[tihe contractual relation between the appellee and appellant was not
one of unlimited suretyship. It was unlimited as to duration, but it constituted a continuing guaranty or security, limited as to amount, to wit,
the sum of $1,000; and when the surety made good the alleged delinquency of the agent to the full extent of this limited liability, he could
not further be held responsible on the bond for other delinquencies occurring during a continuance of the agency.
Id.
301 Blain v. Sam Finley, Inc., 226 So. 2d 742, 745 (Miss. 1969).
Indeed, in
some instances, they have been deemed void as contrary to public policy. See, e.g.,
Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Burdette Cotton Gin Co., 726 So. 2d 1202, 1206 (Miss.
1998) (holding that indemnity clause with regard to utility service provider is
void as against public policy).
The willingness of Mississippi courts to uphold clauses excusing a party from
the consequences of its own negligence seems to vary depending, at least in part,
on the relationship between the parties. For example, anticipatory releases from
negligence in contracts between public utilities and their customers

have traditionally been held void as a matter of public policy "(1) to dis-
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courts should enforce such provisions only if they "are made at
arm's length without disparity of bargaining power,"0 2 and if
they express an intent to indemnify against the indemnitee's
own negligence in clear and unequivocal terms. 3

courage negligence by making wrongdoers pay damages, and (2) to protect those in need of goods or services from being overreached by others
who have power to drive hard bargains." Where, as here, the customer
has only one choice for an electrical provider, the danger of the utility
overreaching through inclusion of an indemnity clause is increased.
Entergy, 726 So. 2d at 1206 (citation omitted) (quoting Bisso v. Inland Waterways
Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1955)). As the Entergy court explained:
"It is the general rule that a public utility or common carrier cannot
contract against liability for his own negligence, and it may not be
doubted that such a tort feasor may not recover under an indemnity
agreement which impinges upon this rule." We hold that an indemnity
clause in a utility service contract such as the one at issue here intrudes upon the public policy of this State requiring utilities to "exercise
the highest degree of care" in constructing and maintaining electrical
lines. We cannot allow a utility to contract away its well-established
duty of protecting the general public.
Entergy, 726 So. 2d at 1206 (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Standard Oil Co., 292
F. Supp. 337, 339-40 (S.D. Miss.), affd, 403 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1968)).
On the other hand, Mississippi courts have upheld indemnity clauses in contracts between a utility and a non-customer. See, e.g., Heritage Cablevision v. New
Albany Elec. Power Sys., 646 So. 2d 1305, 1313 (Miss. 1994) (holding that cable
company is required to indemnify utility company for latter's negligence pursuant
to licensing agreement); see also, e.g., Mississippi Power Co. v. Roubicek, 462 F.2d
412, 417 (5th Cir. 1972); Lorenzen v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 546 F. Supp. 694,
697-98 (S.D. Miss. 1982), affd, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983). The Entergy court explained that the ration'ale for upholding anticipatory releases in such cases "revolved around the negotiation of two private concerns, unaffected by the greater
public policy consideration" present in the relations between a utility and its customers. Entergy, 726 So. 2d at 1206.
302 Blain, 226 So. 2d at 745-46.
S0 Id. at 746. "[W]hile private contracts of this type are not favorites of the
law, they are enforceable provided they are made at arm's length without disparity of bargaining power, and the intent of the parties is manifestly plain and
unequivocal." Id. at 745-46. Moreover, "[wihen the contract expressly indemnifies
a person against the costs and expenses incident to certain acts, or arising from
a certain claim, it extends to the costs and expenses of defending groundless
suits," as well as the costs and expenses of suing the indemnitor to make good
on the contract of indemnity. Id. at 745-46; see also, e.g., Morgan v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 191 So. 2d 917, 923-24 (Miss. 1966) (affirming award
of attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by indemnitee in suing to enforce indemnity agreement which clearly and unambiguously provided for indemnitee's
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In Blain v. Sam Finley, Inc.,"' Blain agreed to construct
a section of highway for the Mississippi State Highway Commission. Blain then sub-contracted with Finley to do a portion
of the work called for in Blain's contract with the Commission."' Finley's sub-contract with Blain included the following
indemnity provisions:
8. PROTECTION OF WORK AND INDEMNITY AGAINST
NEGLIGENCE:
Subcontractor agrees to. .. so perform the subcontract
and subcontract work as to avoid injury or damages to persons or property for which Contractor may be held liable in
damages... and to fully indemnify and save harmless Contractor from all such claims for damages and from all expenses and attorneys' fees incident thereto, arising out of or in
anywise connected with the subcontract work.
12. INDEMNITY:
* ,,*Subcontractor shall also pay all of the expense and
cost and attorney's fees incurred by Contractor ... in the investigation or defense of any action arising out 6f this subcontract.

.

. , whether such claim is valid or not, or out of the

performance
der. .o"

or non-performance

of the work

hereun-

Harvey, an employee of Blain, was killed when his car
collided with an asphalt spreader belonging to Finley." 7
Harvey's estate sued both Finley and Blain. Thereafter, Blain
demanded indemnity and defense from Finley pursuant to the
sub-contract, but Finley refused. 0 8 Blain and Finley ultimately prevailed in the suit by Harvey's estate, and Blain unsuccessfully sued Finley to reimburse Blain for its attorney's fees
and expenses incurred in defending the action by Harvey's estate.3"9 The supreme court reversed:

attorneys' fees and expenses).
so4 226 So. 2d 742 (Miss. 1969).
"'

'06
307

Blain, 226 So. 2d at 743-44.
Id. at 744.

Id.

3o8 Id.
'09

Id.

at 744-45.
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The determinative issue in the case at bar revolves
around the interpretation and effect to be given to the indemnity provisions of the subcontract between Blain and
Finley .... It is clear that section 8 of the indemnity contract
in the case at bar is geared to the work and the negligence of
the subcontractor. The subcontractor-indemnitor expressly
agreed in paragraph 8 of the subcontract "to .. . save harmless Contractorfrom all such claims for damages and from all
expenses and attorneys'fees incident thereto, arising out of or
in anywise connected with the subcontract work." This language is plain, clear in meaning and free from ambiguity ....
Although section 12 is for the most part concerned with
claims for labor, materials, equipment and similar related
items, section 12 is not limited to these items. Section 12
specifically provides: "Subcontractor shall also pay all of the
expense and cost and attorney's fees incurred by Contractor.., in the investigation or defense of any action arisingout
of this subcontract or out of the non-payment of any claim of
any third party, whether such claim is valid or not, or out of
the performance or non-performance of the work hereun-

der...

."

By construing all of sections 8 and 12 together, the intention of the contracting parties to indemnify the contractor,
Blain, against
his own negligent acts is clearly and unequivo310
cally shown.
4. Insurance Policies
Mississippi courts strictly construe any ambiguity in an
insurance policy against the insurer and in favor of the insured."' This is particularly true when the policy provision in

3" Id. at 746 (emphasis added by the court).
311 See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Buddy Jones Ford, LincolnMercury, Inc., 734 So. 2d 173, 176 (Miss. 1999); Lewis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 730
So. 2d 65, 68 (Miss. 1998); Burton v. Choctaw County, 730 So. 2d 1, 8 (Miss.
1997); Harrison v. Allstate Ins. Co., 662 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Miss. 1995); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So. 2d 658, 662 (Miss. 1994); Home Owners Ins. Co. v. Keith's Breeder Farms, Inc., 227 So. 2d 293, 295 (Miss. 1969);
Caldwell v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 160 So. 2d 209, 212-13 (Miss. 1964).
Put more bluntly: "If this Court finds an insurance policy ambiguous, we must
necessarily find in favor of coverage." J&W Foods Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
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question is an exclusion from or limitation on coverage.3 12 A
risk that "comes naturally within the terms of a policy" should
not be construed as falling outside of the policy "unless the
intent of the parties to exclude it appears clearly."313 A condition tending to defeat coverage "must be expressed or so clearly
implied that it cannot be misconstrued."3 1 "
In Jackson v. Daley,31 the Mississippi Supreme Court
recently considered whether coverage for "injuries resulting
from 'ownership, maintenance, or use' of a county automobile"
encompassed fatal injuries sustained by a driver whose car
flipped after striking a dirt pile left in the road by a county
dump truck.3 16 The court originally concluded that the accident was not covered by the policy, because the driver's collision with the dirt dumped by the county truck was "too remote"

Ins. Co., 723 So. 2d 550, 552 (Miss. 1998) (emphasis added).
"The basic reason that uncertainty is decided in favor of the insured is that
the insurer prepares the policy and should not be allowed by the use of obscure
or ambiguous exceptions to defeat the purposes for which the policy was sold."
Buddy Jones Ford, 734 So. 2d at 177 (citing Evana Plantation, Inc. v. Yorkshire
Ins, Co., 58 So. 2d 797, 800 (Miss. 1952); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Bass, 44 So. 2d
532, 533 (Miss. 1950)); see also Lewis, 730 So. 2d at 72 (Banks, J., dissenting)
("Insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and as such ambiguities are to be
construed liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer."); United
States Fidelity & Guar., Co. v. Ferguson, 698 So. 2d 77, 80 (Miss. 1997) (holding
that, because contracts for insurance are adhesion contracts, courts must protect
insureds).
" See, e.g., Buddy Jones Ford, 734 So. 2d at 177; Lewis, 730 So. 2d at 68;
Burton, 730 So. 2d at 8; Garriga, 636 So. 2d at 662; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Latham, 249 So. 2d 375, 378 (Miss. 1971); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Taylor, 233 So. 2d 805, 810 (Miss. 1970); Keith's Breeder Farms, 227 So. 2d at
296; American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Union Gas Co., 118 So. 2d 334, 335
(Miss. 1960); Griffim v. Maryland Cas. Co., 57 So. 2d 486, 489-90 (Miss. 1952).
See generally Home Ins. Co. v. Thunderbird, Inc., 338 So. 2d 391, 394 (Miss.
1976) ("In accord with the general standard of giving effect to the purpose of the
contract, the rule is that provisos, exceptions, or exemptions, and words of limitation in the nature of an exception, are strictly construed against the insurer,
where they are of uncertain import or reasonably susceptible of a double construction." (quoting 2 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 15:92 (2d ed. 1959)).
'" Home Insurance, 338 So. 2d at 394 (quoting 2 COUCH, supra note 313,
§ 15:93).
3,' Id. (quoting 2 COUCH, supra note 313, § 15:93).
X15739 So. 2d 1031 (Miss. 1999) (en banc).
316 See Jackson, 739 So. 2d at 10-41.
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to constitute an "injury) resulting from ... use of a county
automobile."3 17 On rehearing, the court reversed course. Following the earlier decision of Merchants Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,318 wherein the court found the insurer
liable for injuries sustained by a driver whose car collided with
large poles that had been left on the highway after their use
was required to remove the insured's vehicle from a ditch,319
the Jackson court, on rehearing, found coverage.320
In Cox v. Peerless Life Insurance Co.,32 the policy covered, inter alia, "accidental bodily injury sustained while driving or riding within any automobile, truck or bus. . . , provided
such bodily injuries are caused solely by reason of an automo3 22
The insured was knocked to the
bile, truck or bus accident."

floor of a bus by another passenger while the bus was stopped
at a station in order to load and unload passengers.3" The insurer argued that the insured's injuries were not covered because she was not injured "as a result of an accident to the
bus."32 The court disagreed:

We do not think that the term "bus accident" in the policy
should be restricted to a casualty to the bus itself. Certainly
this does not accord with common understanding of that
phrase. We think that within the meaning of the phrase "bus
accident" is the unusual, undesigned, and unexpected occurrence of insured's fellow passenger accidentally colliding with
insured in the bus and causing injuries. [The insurer's] suggested interpretation would be a very narrow construction of
the policy, and would not accord, we think, with the usual
3
and common understanding of the phrase "bus accident." 2

317 See Jackson v. Daley, No. 96-CA-00642-SCT,

1998 WL 800123, at *10 (Miss.

Nov. 19, 1998), withdrawn and superseded on rehearing, 739 So. 2d 1031 (Miss.
1999) (en banc).
318 188 So. 571 (Miss. 1939).
319 Merchants Co., 188 So. at 571-71.
'" Jackson, 739 So. 2d, at 1141-42.
321 135 So. 2d 411 (Miss. 1961).
322 Cox, 135 So. 2d at 411 (emphasis added).
323 id.
32,
31

Id.
Id.

at 412 (emphasis added).
at 413. This author is hard pressed to think of spilling coffee on his lap

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69

At issue in Universal UnderwritersInsurance Co. v. Buddy
Jones Ford, Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.,32 6 was whether the $10,000
limitation on liability for "employee dishonesty" was cumulative
with regard to several acts of embezzlement by a single employee or whether each act of embezzlement was subject to a
separate limitation on liability:3 27

while driving as an "automobile accident"; and, therefore, is not too sure about
the court's description of the "usual and common understanding of the phrase 'bus
accident.'"
734 So. 2d 173 (Miss. 1999).
"'
Universal Underwriters, 734 So. 2d at 176. The policies contained the following provisions relating to the type of loss covered and the maximum amount
of liability or limits for loss were set forth in the policies as follows:
EMPLOYEE DISHONESTY-WE will pay for LOSS of MONEY, SECURITIES, and other property which YOU sustain resulting directly from any
fraudulent or dishonest act committed by an EMPLOYEE with manifest
intent to:
(a) cause YOU to sustain such a LOSS, and;
(b) obtain financial benefit for the EMPLOYEE, or any other person or organization intended by the EMPLOYEE to receive such
benefit other than salaries, commissions, fees, bonuses, promotions,
awards, profit sharing, pensions, and other EMPLOYEE benefits
earned in the normal course of employment.
9. THE MOST WE WILL PAY-LOSS payment will not reduce OUR
liability for other LOSSES. From the amount of LOSS, WE will deduct
the net amount of all recoveries obtained or made by YOU (other than
LOSS covered by any other bond or insurance) or US. If the net LOSS
is in excess of the deductible stated in the declarations, and regardless
of the number of persons or organizations included in YOU, the most
WE will pay:
(a) under EMPLOYEE DISHONESTY, is the limit stated in the
declarations as applicable to a LOSS caused by one or more EMPLOYEES, or to all LOSS caused by one EMPLOYEE or in which
the EMPLOYEE is concerned or implicated;
Regardless of the number of years this Coverage Part continues in force,
the limit stated in the declarations is not cumulative from one period to
another, or from one year to another.
The policies also contained a discovery requirement and conditions for coverage
for employee dishonesty in the policies which read as follows:
1. DISCOVERY-LOSS is covered only if discovered not later than one
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Patsy Ellis embezzled a total amount of $233,082.97 from
Jones Ford. Universal argues that the policy language is
unambiguous, and clearly states that the $10,000 limit of liability and the $250 deductible in the declarations for "Employee Dishonesty" apply to "all LOSS caused by one EMPLOYEE or in which the EMPLOYEE is concerned or implicated." Thus, Universal argues that the limit of liability and
deductible apply to the total amount of loss caused by Ellis,
rather than to each of the 175 separate occasions of embezzlement in which she engaged.
.... The Insuring Agreement, in turn, defines "loss," for
the purpose of employee dishonesty, to mean "LOSS of MONEY... which YOU sustain resulting directly from any fraudulent or dishonest act committed by an EMPLOYEE with
manifest intent to: (a) cause YOU to sustain such a LOSS;
and (b) obtain financial benefit for the EMPLOYEE." Jones
Ford maintains, therefore, that the limitations clause plainly
and unambiguously applies to all loss resulting directly from
each fraudulent or dishonest act committed by an employee.
It argues that "[i]f Universal had wished to have the Limitation clause apply to the entire loss caused by all the acts of
embezzlement by an employee, Universal simply could have
defined 'loss' in the Insuring Agreement as loss of money
resulting directly from any fraudulent act, or series of related
fraudulent or dishonest acts, committed by an employee."3
The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancery
court's finding that the "employee dishonesty" provision was
ambiguous and, construing the ambiguity against the insurer
(Universal), held that each act of embezzlement was separately
covered up to $10,000.329
In Lewis v. Allstate Insurance Co.,33 the policy in question excluded from coverage "bodily injury or property damage
resulting from [an act or omission intended or expected to

year from the end of the Coverage Part period.
Id. at 175.
311 Id.
at 176 (alteration in original).
32
See Id. at 177-78.
' 730 So. 2d 65 (Miss. 1998).
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cause bodily injury or property damage .... [elven if the bodily
injury or property damage is of a different kind or degree, or is
sustained by a different person or property, than that intended
or expected." 3 ' The insured (Thompson), along with two other
persons, went to the residence of one Maury Richardson, planning to set it afire with molotov cocktails. 3 2 Thompson alleged that he believed the residence to be unoccupied at the
time, and that their intent was to destroy Richardson's property, not to cause bodily injury."' 3 Unknown to Thompson and
his cohorts, Donnell Bowie was sleeping upstairs in
Richardson's house when it caught fire.3" Bowie died of
smoke inhalation, and Thompson and his cohorts were arrested
and charged with Bowie's murder.3 35
Thompson's parents sought defense under their
homeowner's policy 36 against the civil action that followed.
Allstate tendered a defense under reservation of rights, and
sued for a declaratory judgment that coverage was excluded
due to the "intentional acts" exclusion quoted above.337 The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate." 8
Bowie's survivors appealed, arguing that the intentional acts
exclusion did not apply because Thompson did not intend to
cause bodily harm. 39 A divided Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed:
Lewis argues that the policy in this case should be read
to exclude coverage for bodily injury resulting from an act or
omission intended or expected to cause bodily injury and to
exclude coverage for property damage resulting from an act or
omission intended or expected to cause property damage.
However, according to Lewis, the exclusionary provision does

3' Lewis, 730 So. 2d at 68 (emphasis omitted).

Id. at 67.
333

Id.

334 Id.
MId.

Id.
3V Id.

at 67-68.
Id. at 68.

3"

Id.
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not apply to a claim for bodily injury that results from an act
intended or expected to cause only property damage. We disagree with Lewis's construction ....
[Tihe policy, as written, only requires that the insured
intended or expected property damage which resulted in property damage or bodily injury for the exclusionary clause to apply. Normally, Allstate would have to show that Thompson
intended the property damage, or expected that property
damage was substantially certain as a result of his actions.
However, Thompson's admission (and Lewis's assent to that
admission) that he intended to, or at least expected that the
actions by Green and Wilson would, cause property damage,
satisfies Allstate's burden and is sufficient to invoke the exclusion. Because of the language of the policy, Thompson's intent regarding bodily injury is irrelevant. Accordingly, since
the question of intent of the insured is settled, summary judgment was proper.'"

In Harrison v. Allstate Insurance Co.," the court balanced a facially unambiguous policy provision that precluded

"~

Id. at 68, 72. Justices Banks and Sullivan disagreed:

Here the problem is the disjunctive nature of the exclusionary provision. The explanatory "even if" . . . in the policy language should have
been expanded to say that the exclusion applies even if property damage
was intended and bodily injury resulted and vice versa if indeed that
was what was meant as Allstate now contends. But because it was not,
the policy exclusion could reasonably be interpreted as having more than
one meaning.
The Lewis' interpretation is that it applies where property damage
is intended even if the property damage is of a different kind or degree
or sustained by different property and it applies similarly where bodily
injury is intended and the bodily injury is of a different kind or to a different person than intended. It follows, in their view, that it does not
apply where, as here, property damage was intended and bodily injury
occurred.
The Lewis' interpretation of the exclusionary clause is just as reasonable as that asserted by Allstate. In light of the fact that the policy
is subject to more then one interpretation it is ambiguous and should
have been construed in favor of the insureds.
Id. at 72-73 (Banks, J., dissenting, joined by Sullivan, P.J.) (footnote omitted).
341 662 So. 2d 1092 (Miss. 1995).
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"stacking" of uninsured motorist coverage against the fact that
the insurer included in the premium for the no-stacking policy
an additional charge for the insured's second car.34 2 The insured, Dudley Harrison, who was involved in an accident with
an uninsured motorist on May 17, 1991,
was insured under an Allstate automobile policy which insured two vehicles. Prior to amendments, the policy provided
uninsured motorist coverage of $10,000 per person and
$20,000 per accident for each occurrence. Allstate charged a
premium of $22.50 for the first car and each additional car
thereafter. Thus, an insured would be charged $45 for stacking two vehicles. In 1989, Allstate added Endorsement
AU1865-1 to its policies which prohibits stacking. Allstate
also amended its billing structure to charge a single premium
of $52.40 for uninsured motorist coverage under a policy listing two or more vehicles (hereinafter referred to as the multicar rate), and charged $28.40 for a policy listing only one
vehicle (hereinafter referred to as the single car rate) ....

As

the result of Harrison's accident, Allstate tendered a check for
uninsured motorist benefits to him in the amount of $10,000
and paid $1,000 for applicable medical payments coverage.
Allstate, however, denied Harrison's claim for an additional
$10,000 in uninsured motorist benefits.'
The Mississippi Supreme Court found Harrison's argument
"well taken":
[An insurer's attempt to preclude stacking is ineffective...
where the policy language clearly precludes stacking but the
declaration sheet charges separate uninsured motorist premiums thereby rendering the policy, as a whole, ambiguous.
3.2

Harrison, 662 So. 2d at 1093. The court explained:

"Stacking" refers to the practice of allowing an insured to add or "stack"
the limits of each vehicle covered under an insurance policy to pay for
damages sustained in an accident. For example, if the insured obtained
a policy providing $10,000 in uninsured motorist coverage for bodily
injury on two vehicles, the maximum recovery would be $20,000 ($10,000
plus $10,000).
Id. at 1093 n.1.
' Id. at 1093 (footnote omitted).
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Where separate premiums are paid, the presumption arises in
favor of aggregation of uninsured motorist coverage, notwithstanding clear and unambiguous language to the contrary.
Although the policy language precluding stacking is
clear, we find that Harrison was actually charged separate
premiums for his two vehicles under the guise of one lump
sum on his declaration sheet. Because the premium for two
cars is $24 more than the premium for one car, Allstate clearly charges an additional premium for the second car.'"
If an insurance policy covers only items contained within
or located at a particular structure or location, "the temporary
removal of property from its usual place of storage for cleaning
or repairing will not affect the coverage while the property is
thus temporarily away from its designated location." 5
In Keith's Breeder Farms,the policy covered the contents of
"Poultry House No. 1. "346 At the time of the loss, the nests
and other items that normally resided in Poultry House No. 1
had been temporarily removed in order to clean the building. 7 The court found that, given the "long-standing" custom
of the poultry business to periodically remove the nests and
thoroughly clean the buildings that ordinarily house them,
[i]t would be a strained and tortuous construction indeed if
for two or three weeks of each year while the nests were outside purely and simply for cleaning, scrubbing and disinfecting [the building] there would be no coverage, but that immediately when this necessary periodical cleaning was completed
and the nests were moved back inside the poultry house, that
the coverage would be automatically reinstated. In our

3" Id. at 1094 (citations omitted); see Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Bridges, 350 So. 2d 1379, 1381 (Miss. 1977); see also Government Employees Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 446 So. 2d 1002, 1006 (Miss. 1984) (finding policy ambiguous both
because of excess premium charged for additional vehicles and because "no-stacking" language in policy conflicted with declaration sheet providing separate UM
coverage for three vehicles and charging separate premiums for three vehicles).
" Home Owners Ins. Co. v. Keith's Breeder Farms, Inc., 227 So. 2d 293, 296
(Miss. 1969).
'" Keith's Breeder Farms, 227 So. 2d at 294.
347

Id.
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opinion, neither the insurer nor the insured intended for this
to be the case.3"
As the court explained elsewhere:
[T]he statement that property is in, or contained in, a particular house, is not a promissory stipulation or warranty that
the property will remain there at all times during the life of
the policy, but is used merely to identify the particular property insured. s4

If the provisions of an insurance policy conflict with a relevant statute, the statute controls and its terms are incorporated into the policy.3 5
In Atlanta Casualty Co. v. Payne,5 1 the court considered
the effect of the Mississippi Uninsured Motorists Act 52 on the
uninsured motorist coverage in the insured's policy:
Although the Paynes do not contend that the language of
the exclusionary provision was ambiguous, the record indicates that they did not have a sufficient understanding of the
ramifications of its language to make an informed partial
rejection or waiver of uninsured motorist coverage when they
signed the exclusion agreement. We believe that it is ... logical ... to place the burden of proof on the insurer to show
that such an exclusion or any other quasi-rejection of uninsured motorist insurance was a knowing and informed decision.
This Court has consistently viewed any attempts by
insurance companies to contract away the protections afforded

"'
Keith's Breeder Farms, 227 So. 2d at 295; see also Boyd v. Mississippi
Home Ins. Co., 21 So. 708, 708-09 (Miss. 1897) (refusing to construe casualty
policy as covering only ginned cotton after it had been removed from ginning
house and stored in cotton house when cotton in question was destroyed while in
ginning house and ready to be moved to cotton house, because such construction
would be "technical, to the last degree" and contrary to common knowledge and
custom or persons dealing with cotton farming and ginning trades).
3,9 Boyd, 21 So. at 709.
31 See Dunnam v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 668,
670 (Miss.
1979).
35' 603 So. 2d 343 (Miss. 1992).
'02 MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-11-101(1) et seq. (Supp. 1998).

1999] CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION & INTERPRETATION

181

to injured insureds by the Uninsured Motorists Act as invalid.
The humanitarian purposes of the statute have been furthered by decisions made from theperspective of the injured
insured, enabling the same recovery which would have been
possible had the injury been caused by a financially responsible motorist. 3

All that said, insurance policies are contracts,"5 and their
construction and interpretation "is according to the same rules
which govern other contracts."3 55 Therefore, when the words

Payne, 603 So. 2d at 348-49 (citations and parenthetical omitted).
Sessoms v. Allstate Ins. Co., 634 So. 2d 516, 519 (Miss. 1994); see Cauthen
v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 88 So. 2d 103, 104 (Miss. 1956).
Krebs v. Strange, 419 So. 2d 178, 181 (Miss. 1982); see, e.g., J&W Foods
Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 723 So. 2d 550, 552 (Miss. 1998) ("Initially, in interpreting an insurance policy, this Court should look at the policy as
a whole, consider all relevant portions together and, whenever possible, give operative effect to every provision in order to reach a reasonable overall result."). See
generally Murriel v. Alfa Ins. Co., 697 So. 2d 370, 371 (Miss. 1997) ("[Tlhe relationship between an insurance company and its insured is controlled by the nature of the contract, and the respective duties of the parties are specifically stated by the provisions of the insurance policy.").
As the Mississippi Supreme Court posited long ago:
What is a policy of insurance? It is the instrument setting forth the
contract of insurance. It is the evidence of the agreement between the
insurer and the insured. Its purpose is to show the considerations, the
terms, the contract of indemnity, the privileges, the benefits, and the
conditions. The usual rules for construing contracts should be applied in
considering contracts of insurance. The controlling purpose in the construction of all contracts should be to find the intention of the parties.
To this end it is necessary to inspect the whole instrument. It will not
do to limit the consideration to one part of a writing, isolated from the
other parts. The true intention can only be gathered from all of the
words, all of the clauses, and all that may be shown by the entire paper.
Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 61 So. 311, 311 (Miss. 1913).
At issue in the recent case of Hare v. State, was whether the clear and unambiguous terms of an insurance policy could "trump" the equitable right of subrogation. Hare v. State, 733 So. 2d 277, 282 (Miss. 1999). Reviewing cases from a
number of jurisdictions, as well as earlier related decisions of its own, the Mississippi Supreme Court answered "no," thus carving out an exception to "plain meaning" construction of unambiguous insurance policies:
[Ulnder Mississippi law two different types of subrogation exist:
subrogation, arising from operation of law, and
(1) equitable
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(2) conventional subrogation, arising from contract. Union Mortgage,
Banking & Trust Co. v. Peters, 18 So. 497 (Miss. 1895); St. Paul Prop.
& Liability Ins. Co. v. Nance, 577 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Miss. 1991). In
Peters, this court distinguished between the two as follows:
The principle of equitable subrogation does not arise from contract (for that is conventional subrogation), but is a creation of the
court of equity, and is applied in the absence of an agreement
between the parties, when otherwise there would be a manifest
failure of justice.
Peters, 18 So. at 500. Similarly, the Nance court noted that subrogation
had equitable origins but that it could now arise in statutory or contractual contexts. Nance, 577 So. 2d at 1240.
The State asserts that the case sub judice is obviously one of conventional subrogation, and the bottomline issue is then whether the
subrogation clause is sufficiently clear and broad to entitle the insurer to
recover despite the "made whole" rule.
Hare, 733 So. 2d at 281-82. The "made whole" rule
is the general principle that an insurer is not entitled to equitable subrogation until the insured has been fully compensated. Most other jurisdictions follow the "made whole" rule in its broadest terms. Some courts
adopting the rule have explained that the rule is most consistent with
principles of equity and justice upon which the doctrine of subrogation is
based. One court has reasoned that "where either the insurer or the
insured must to some extent go unpaid, the loss should be borne by the
insurer for that is a risk the insured has paid it to assume."
Id. at 281 (citations and parentheticals omitted) (quoting Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins.
Co., 253 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Wis. 1977)). Furthermore,
[miany of those jurisdictions following the "made whole" rule allow the
rule to be overridden by provisions in an insurance contract, as the
State asks this Court to do in the case sub judice.
The core issue is then whether Mississippi should follow the Arkansas approach . . . or the Ohio approach . . . . In Hrenko, the Supreme
Court of Ohio held that the subrogation clause at issue was of the conventional sort, and thus, by its clear language, it applied....
In Franklin, the Supreme Court of Arkansas ....
held that "the
equitable nature of subrogation requires that no distinction need be
made between equitable and conventional rights of subrogation."
Franklin incurred over $124,000 in medical expenses, and
Healthsource paid only $71,120.65 of those bills. Before the issue of
double recovery could arise, Franklin would have to recover in excess of
$50,000 to be "made whole" for his medical expenses alone which does
not even consider the amount of additional damages Franklin incurred
that have been valued at over $400,000. Therefore, the Arkansas Supreme Court found that Franklin could not have enjoyed a double recovery.
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of an insurance policy are "plain and unambiguous," a Mississippi court should "afford them their plain, ordinary meaning
and ... apply them as written, "356 as long as doing so is not
contrary to law or public policy."' 7

Here both parties cannot be "made whole." Hare endured pain and
suffering in nasal surgery and now has a permanent facial scar. The
State . . . only paid $6,056.50 in medical expenses out of a total
$8,667.50. Hare's expert witnesses by affidavit stated a potential recovery
of between $50,000.00 and $175,000.00. Thus, the $10,000.00 recovered
by Hare cannot possibly be said to have "made him whole" or to have
been a double recovery.
[Tihis Court adopts the "made whole" rule and holds that it is not
to be overridden by contract language, because the intent of subrogation
is to prevent a double recovery by the insured, especially here as expressly stated in the State Health Plan. Until the insured has been fully
compensated, there cannot be a double recovery. Otherwise, to allow the
literal language of an insurance contract to destroy an insured's equitable right to subrogation ignores the fact that this type of contract is
realistically a unilateral contract of insurance and overlooks the insured's
total lack of bargaining power in negotiating the terms of these types of
agreements.
Id. at 282-84 (citations omitted) (discussing, inter alia, Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Mut. of Ohio v. Hrenko, 647 N.E.2d 1358 (Ohio 1995); Franklin v. Healthsource of
Ark., 942 S.W.2d 837 (Ark. 1997)).
' Lewis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 730 So. 2d 65, 68 (Miss. 1998); accord Jackson v.
Daley, 739 So. 2d 1031, 1041 (Miss. 1999) (en banc). See Lowery v. Guaranty
Bank & Trust Co., 592 So. 2d 79, 82 (Miss. 1991); Overstreet v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
474 So. 2d 572, 575 (Miss. 1985); Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Prince, 375 So. 2d
417, 418 (Miss. 1979); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Deposit Guar. Natl Bank, 258
So. 2d 798, 801 (Miss. 1972). As the Mississippi Supreme Court has explained:
Rules of construction are useful only where the language used is ambiguous or unclear .... No rule of construction requires or permits the
Court . . . to enlarge an insurance company's obligations where the provisions of its policy are clear.
State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glover, 176 So. 2d 256, 258 (Miss. 1965). But see
Boyd v. Mississippi Home Ins. Co., 21 So. 708, 708-09 (Miss. 1897) ("[Insurance]
policies must always be construed with reference to the nature and kind of property insured, the uses to which it is ordinarily, within the common knowledge of
men, put, and custom of the country in dealing with it, and the parties to such
contracts must be held to have all this in view in making the contract.").
3" The Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the "plain
meaning" rule when the plain meaning of the policy is contrary to law or public
policy. See supra note 116; see, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636
So. 2d 658, 662-65 (Miss. 1994) (holding that "reduction clause" for workers' coin-
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Any rider attached to an insurance policy is "part and
parcel" of the policy and the two must be construed together.3"5 Likewise, the application attached to or giving rise to an
insurance policy is a part of the insurance contract, and the
policy should be construed together with the application.35 9
Where the terms of the application and policy conflict, the
terms of the policy will ordinarily govern, unless the conflict is
due to a clerical error in the policy, mutual mistake, fraud, or
the like.3 6 °
5. Settlement Agreements
Mississippi law "favors" agreements made to settle disputes and, generally speaking, Mississippi courts will enforce a
settlement agreement between the parties "absent any fraud,
mistake, or overreaching."361 An enforceable settlement agreement is a contract between the settling parties, and will be con62
strued and interpreted accordingly.

pensation benefits, while not ambiguous, was unenforceable as "contrary to public
policy").
'" Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Bouldin, 56 So. 609, 614 (Miss. 1911).
359 See Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Flanagan,
284 So. 2d 33, 35
(Miss. 1973).
' See id. at 37.
...McManus v. Howard, 569 So. 2d 1213, 1215 (Miss. 1990); see, e.g., Hines v.
Hambrick, 49 So. 2d 690, 693-95 (Miss. 1951); see also McBride v. Chevron
U.S.A., 673 So. 2d 372, 379 (Miss. 1996) ("Our law favors settlement for many
reasons, not the least of which includes the expeditious closure of cases.").
The Mississippi Supreme Court:
[we are] thoroughly committed to the doctrine that, where money is paid
with a recital that it is in full settlement of all demands, or of all accounts, or similar wording, when it is accepted, it is full settlement
therefor, although there might be, in fact, more due than the recital in
the check or warrant showed.
State Hwy. Dep't v. Duckworth, 172 So. 148, 150 (Miss. 1937); see, e.g., Colonial
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Cook, 374 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Miss. 1979); Blue Ribbon
Creamery v. Monk, 147 So. 329, 330 (Miss. 1933); A. Greener & Sons v. P.W. Cain
& Sons, 101 So. 859, 859-60 (Miss. 1924).
' See, e.g., Holland v. Mayfield, No. 96-CA-01169-SCT, 1999 WL 353023, at
*4 (Miss. June 3, 1999); Taylor v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 519 So. 2d 436,
437-38 (Miss. 1988); Hines, 49 So. 2d at 693-94.

1999] CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION & INTERPRETATION

185

For example, Warwick v. Gautier Utility District.3 considered whether a release and settlement agreement resolving
a chancery court proceeding brought by Warwick alleging an
unlawful taking of some of his property also, contrary to
Warwick's intention and understanding, settled his otherwise
unrelated claim pending in circuit court for breach of contract. 6' The court held that it did not:
Warwick argues that the Release and Settlement Agreement
refers only to the claims and issues connected with the specific cause of action in Jackson County Chancery Court which
involved the taking of certain property of Warwick's in which
he held a reversionary interest and not to all causes of action
that may exist between the parties. Specifically, Warwick
argues that the chancery court cause of action did not concern
or decide any claim or issue related directly or indirectly to
the 1970 Agreement which Warwick sought to have enforced
in the circuit court matter. Thus, he argues that Gautier
Utility District is not released from liability under the terms
of the 1970 Agreement. We agree.
The Release and Settlement Agreement specifically
states as follows:
That Charles E. Warwick, being an adult resident citizen above the age of twenty-one (21), for the consideration of Ninety Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($90,000.00), to him in hand paid, including cash and
other good and valuable consideration, receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, does hereby
release and forever discharge Gautier Utility District
and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company,
their agents, servants, employees, successors, assigns,
executors, administrators, and all other persons, firms
and/or corporations, except as specified herein, of and
from any and all claims of any kind or nature growing
out of or in any way connected with the taking of the
undersigned's property which is in dispute in the lawsuit
known as Charles E. Warwick v. Gautier Utility District

738 So. 2d 212 (Miss. 1999).
3" Warwick, 738 So. 2d at 213.
3'
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fied in the Chancery Court of Jackson County, Mississippi, bearing Cause No. 58,113.
The Release and Settlement Agreement clearly did not
apply to the action for breach of contract pending in circuit
court. Although the agreement does state that it releases
Gautier Utility District "from any and all claims of any kind
or nature growing out of or in any way connected with the
taking of the undersigned's property which is in dispute in
the lawsuit known as Charles E. Warwick v. Gautier Utility
District filed in the Chancery Court of Jackson County, Mississippi, bearing Cause No. 58,113," a fair and complete reading of the agreement reveals that the intent of the parties
was to extinguish all claims regarding the taking of the real
property only. The release of "any and all claims" clearly
refers to claims arising from the taking of the property. Irrespective of the taking, the separate claim for breach of contract still stands. Both parties to the chancery court lawsuit
were aware of the lawsuit pending in circuit court, yet in the
agreement they limited the release and settlement agreement
to the "lawsuit known as Charles E. Warwick v. Gautier Utility District filed in the Chancery Court of Jackson County,
Mississippi, bearing Cause No. 58,113." While the agreement
specifically addressed the claim involving the taking of property, the breach of contract claim pertaining to the dispute
over utility charges was never mentioned in the Release and
Settlement Agreement. It is clear through examination of the
words incorporated in the Release and Settlement Agreement
that the parties did not intend a release or settlement of the
breach of contract claim pending in Circuit Court.3
6. Releases
Mississippi courts subject releases to "rigid scrutiny" and
will not enforce a release unless it is "fairly and honestly negotiated and understandingly entered into."36 6 Mississippi
courts will not uphold a release "if any element of fraud, deceit,

30

Id. at 215-16.

'" Farragut v. Massey, 612 So. 2d 325, 330 (Miss. 1992) (quotation omitted);
accord Quinn v. Mississippi State Univ., 720 So. 2d 843, 851 (Miss. 1998).
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oppression, or unconscionable advantage is connected with the
transaction."3 7 Nor should a Mississippi court construe a
release to extend to anyone not a party to the release3 or to
any claim not mentioned therein, 6 9 absent some manifestation of the releasing party's intent that its release be so construed.
In Country Club of Jackson, Mississippi, Inc. v. Sauci-

er,370 the plaintiff, Saucier, was injured while riding in a vehicle driven by Stevens, who was killed in the accident. Saucier
made a claim against Stevens' estate and his insurer, who paid
Saucier $30,000, "[bly way of settlement and release, dated
March 14, 1984. "371 Saucier then sued the Country Club, alleging "dram shop" liability. The Country Club argued that
Saucier's March 14, 1984 release extinguished any claim she
might have against the Country Club.

72

The chancery court

disagreed, and the supreme court affirmed:
The appellant Country Club contends that it is a third
party beneficiary of the release between the guest passenger

'

Kansas City, Memphis & Birmingham Ry. v. Chiles, 38 So. 498, 499 (Miss.

1905).
' See Weldon v. Lehmann, 84 So. 2d 796, 797 (Miss. 1956) ("In order for a
release of one joint tort-feasor to have the effect of releasing the other joint tortfeasor, the satisfaction received by the injured party must be intended to be and
must be accepted as full compensation for the damages sustained."); accord Holland v. Mayfield, No. 96-CA-01169-SCT, 1999 WL 353023, at *4 (Miss. June 3,
1999); Smith v. Falke, 474 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Miss. 1985); see also Country Club
of Jackson, Miss., Inc. v. Saucier, 498 So. 2d 337, 339-40 (Miss. 1986) ("[AIn injured party executing a release incident to a settlement with one tortfeasor releases others by whom or on whose behalf no considerations have been given only
where the intent to release the others is manifest.").
"Extrinsic evidence must be considered in determining whether a settlement
agreement was intended to release a person who was not a party to the agreement." Holland, 1999 WL 353023, at *4; see, e.g., Falke, 474 So. 2d at 1046.
' See, e.g., Smith v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Grenada, 460 So. 2d
786, 787 (Miss. 1984) (holding that "where there is no language in the release
agreement which could fairly be construed to render it a general release, the
unmentioned personal secured transactions remained viable after execution of the
release and may be enforced by the secured according to their tenor").
370 498 So. 2d 337 (Miss. 1986).
'1
Saucier, 498 So. 2d at 338.
'
Id.
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and the driver's estate and is a member of a specified class
discharged under the general release language: "All other
persons, firms, organizations, or corporations..."
Recently in Smith v. Falke, 474 So. 2d 1044 (Miss. 1985)
this Court .... held that the language of the release discharging a codefendant and "all others whatsoever" could not
be construed to release another codefendant absent a manifest intent to do so.
...

In this case the Court in a finding of fact determined

that the parties did not intend that The Country Club benefit
from the release. It is also clear that appellant was a stranger
to the release contract and paid no consideration for it, nor
was consideration paid for its benefit....
[A]n injured party executing a release incident to a settlement with one tortfeasor releases others by whom or on
whose behalf no considerations have been given only where
the intent to release the others is manifest. No such intent
appears here. 73
In passing on the validity of a release, "all surrounding
conditions should be fully developed, and the relative attitudes
of the contracting parties clearly shown."37 4 In Kansas City,
Memphis & Birmingham Railway Co. v. Chiles,3 7 the court
pulled no punches regarding the significance of the evidence regarding surrounding circumstances or the validity of the subject release:
The bare statement of the circumstances attendant upon the
procuring of the release in the instant case is more than sufficient to demonstrate that there was an utter absence of that
good faith and full understanding of legal rights which are
indispensable to the validity of such releases.... [Tihe action

of the court in admitting the correspondence which had
passed between counsel for appellee and the officials of appellant was clearly correct. This proof made clearly visible the
secret springs moving the officials of the claims department,

...Id. at 338-40 (citations omitted).
.. Farragut v. Massey, 612 So. 2d 325, 331 (Miss. 1992).
...38 So. 498 (Miss. 1905).
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and tended to throw light upon some of the details of the
iniquitous scheme by which an ignorant, suffering, and impecunious man, by proffer of financial relief from present distress, joined with vague and misleading suggestions of future
benefits and favors, was tricked into bartering away substantial rights for a grossly inadequate consideration, by signing
papers the contents of which, according to his testimony,
which is strongly corroborated by the circumstances in evidence, were deliberately and designedly misrepresented. 7"

Mississippi courts should not permit a party to use an
"anticipatory release" as a means to escape liability for its own
tortious acts 3 7 7-- particularly when those acts clearly "exceed
the scope of the [activities] contemplated in the release."37 8
7. ArbitrationAgreements
Mississippi courts should construe arbitration agreements
liberally "so as to encourage the settlement of disputes and the
prevention of litigation," and should indulge "every reasonable
presumption... in favor of the validity of arbitration proceedings.

In IP

Timberlands Operating Co., Ltd. v.

Denmiss

'6
Chiles, 38 So. at 499. In Farragut,the court likewise found that the combination of ambiguous language and surrounding circumstances contraindicated
the trial court's summary judgment for the drafter of the release, Massey, and
his co-party, Barnett. Farragut,612 So. 2d at 330.
'
Farragut,612 So. 2d at 330; see, e.g., L & A Contracting Co. v. Hube, 133
So. 2d 394, 395-96 (Miss. 1961) (holding that release in right-of-way deed did not
extend to excuse "wilful or grossly negligent damage to the surface of and timber
on grantors' adjacent property" caused by installation of culvert by subcontractor
of grantee); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Smith, 43 So. 611, 611-12 (Miss. 1907)
(refusing to construe release from liability for damage arising out of construction
and operation of railroad tracks to cover flooding due to necessity of elevating
grade on streets at some future date to facilitate pedestrian and vehicular traffic
crossing railroad tracks).
378 Farragut,612 So. 2d at 331. See supra subpart II.E.3 for more discussion
of "anticipatory releases" (i.e., indemnity agreements).
'" Hutto v. Jordan, 36 So. 2d 809, 812 (Miss. 1948); accord IP Timberlands
Operating Co. v. Denmiss Corp., 726 So. 2d 96, 103, 106 (Miss. 1998); Herrin v.
Milton M. Stewart, Inc., 558 So. 2d 863, 864-65 (Miss. 1990); Craig v. Barber,
524 So. 2d 974, 977 (Miss. 1988).
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Corp., the Mississippi Supreme Court resolved two conflicting lines of authority, by holding that it "will respect the right
of an individual or an entity to agree in advance of a dispute to
arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution." "
726 So. 2d 96 (Miss. 1998).
31

IP Timberlands Operating Co., 726 So. 2d at 104. IP Timberlands involved

an apparently frequent area of uncertainty in arbitration agreements-to wit, does
"arbitration" mean arbitration, or does it mean appraisal? Id. at 98. The trial
court found that, as a matter of law, "arbitration" did mean appraisal. I& The
Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed:
The purchase option expressly stated that the price was to be fixed
by three arbitrators, not appraisal. Denmiss contends that the term
"arbitrators" unambiguously contemplated appraisal, however, the purchase option is not necessarily ambiguous. Although, the analysis for an
ordinary contract may end at the plain wording expressed, this Court
has discussed the difficulty in determining if the parties' agreement
actually contemplated arbitration instead of appraisal....
In what may be the best single source to derive intent, the 1945
agreement provided for the use of arbitrators in one other instance.
Under the lease agreement, Kraft paid $1,000,000 on the day of the
agreement and was obligated to make another payment to complete the
transaction. Kraft had the option of paying a flat $1,250,000 to make
complete consideration, or Kraft could elect to pay an amount that was
to be based upon the amount of timber on the leased lands. To arrive at
the total under the second option, the parties stipulated in the agreement to a set price for different types of lumber (for example, Kraft
would pay $1.50 per one thousand feet of pine pulpwood, $7 per one
thousand feet of hardwood sawtimber, etc.) that would be multiplied by
the amount of timber estimated by a timber cruise. The agreement provided that the firm of Pomeroy & McGowin Estimators were to make an
estimate of the timber upon the lands. However, if Pomeroy could not
perform the estimate, then the parties were to each choose one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators were to agree on the third arbitrator. If the
two arbitrators could not agree upon the third arbitrator, then the parties were to ask a U.S. District Court Judge of Mississippi to choose the
third arbitrator. These three arbitrators were to select another firm of
estimators.
Under this provision of the agreement, the use of the term "arbitrators" cannot be reconciled with the use of "appraisers." Although, arbitrators often are not limited to such a narrow decision as choosing another
firm of timber estimators, the selection of an impartial and fair firm of
estimators would be important to both Denkmann and Kraft. Thus, use
of the term arbitrators in this provision more closely reflects that the
parties did, in fact, contemplate arbitrators. These parties would not
have chosen appraisers to choose an estimator. Denmiss admits that
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8. Choice of Law Agreements
Mississippi courts
will give effect to an express agreement that the laws of a
specified jurisdiction shall govern, particularly where some
material element of the contract has a real relation to, or
connection with, such jurisdiction. The intention of the parties
as to the law governing the validity, construction and effect of
a property settlement or separation agreement will be respected in the absence of anything violating the public policy
of the forum jurisdiction.s
By so doing, "the law by which a contract is to be governed
is that which parties intended or may fairly be presumed to
have intended.""' However, while Mississippi courts will defer to the substantive law of another jurisdiction chosen by the
parties, Mississippi procedural and remedial law will still govern the enforcement of the contract.3

appraisers only engage in setting a value.
As stated earlier, the plain language of the purchase option provided for the price to be fixed by three arbitrators. Both Denkmann and
Kraft were knowledgeable and experienced timberland companies, if they
had intended any meaning other than arbitrators, they could have easily
substituted such term.
This Court finds, as a matter of law, that the term "arbitrators" as
used in the purchase option does unambiguously mean arbitrators. This
Court has long held that, "Articles of agreement to arbitrate, and awards
thereon are to be liberally construed so as to encourage the settlement
of disputes and the prevention of litigation, and every reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of the validity of arbitration proceedings."
Id. at 104-06 (quoting Hutto, 36 So. 2d at 812) (citations omitted).
382 Miller v. Fannin, 481 So. 2d 261, 262 (Miss. 1985); accord Cox v. Howard,
Weil, Laboussie, Friedrichs, Inc., 619 So. 2d 908, 911 (Miss. 1993); see, e.g.,
Crowe v. Smith, 603 So. 2d 301, 307-08 (Miss. 1992).
Cox, 619 So. 2d at 911.
3" Id. at 911-12.
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9. Liquidated Damages/Penalty Provisions
Mississippi courts will enforce a liquidated damages provision if the contractual damages are "reasonable and proper in
the light of the circumstances of the case."3" On the other
hand, Mississippi courts will not enforce contractual damages if
the amount provided is "not a reasonable pre-estimate of damages" or "constitute[s] a penalty."" 6
To determine whether a particular provision is a permissible liquidated damages clause or an impermissible penalty, the
terminology used by the parties is not controlling.3 87 Rather,
Mississippi courts "must look to the parties' intentions,""m
and must consider the difficulty in determining the actual
damages that might result from a breach." 9 Where damages
for breach are both "uncertain and difficult of estimation," the
Mississippi Supreme Court seems more inclined to construe
such clauses as permissible liquidated damages provisions."'
In Board of Trustees v. Johnson,"s ' for example, the
Board
entered into a contract with Johnson, agreeing to lend him
$24,000 for expenses .... The contract required Johnson to
practice [family practice, internal medicine, or pediatrics] for

3" Maxey v. Glindmeyer, 379 So. 2d 297, 301 (Miss. 1980); accord Board of
Trustees of State Insts. of Higher Learning v. Johnson, 507 So. 2d 887, 889-90
(Miss. 1987).
3" Johnson, 507 So. 2d at 890; see Wood Naval Stores Export Ass'n v.
Latimer, 71 So. 2d 425, 430 (Miss. 1954); Chicago Inv. Co. of Miss. v. Hardtner,
148 So. 214, 217 (Miss. 1933); Shields v. Early, 95 So. 839, 841 (Miss. 1923); see,
e.g., Maxey, 379 So. 2d at 301 (finding that forfeiture of $75,000 deposit was
inequitable because property survey determined that there was less acreage than
represented, and that proper remedy was, at most, judgment for vendor's actual
damages).
"8
See Latimer, 71 So. 2d at 430; Shields, 95 So. at 841.
3" Johnson, 507 So. 2d at 890; see Continental Turpentine & Rosin Co. v. Gulf
Naval Stores Co., 142 So. 2d 200, 209 (Miss. 1962); Jones v. Mississippi Farms
Co., 76 So. 880, 884 (Miss. 1917).
...See Johnson, 507 So. 2d at 890; Brown v. Staple Cotton Coop. As'n, 96 So.
849, 856-57 (Miss. 1923).
" Johnson, 507 So. 2d at 890. See, e.g., Latimer, 71 So. 2d at 431; Brown, 96
So. at 856.
391 507 So. 2d 887 (Miss. 1987).
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five years in a community of 7,500 population, since changed
to 10,000 population, or less. It also provided that Johnson
was to repay the loan at six percent interest, and upon breach
of its terms, to pay an additional $5,000 "per year for each
year remaining to be served" for liquidated damages."
Johnson breached, and the Board sued, seeking $24,000 in
unpaid principal, $25,000 in liquidated damages, and $9,187.50
in interest, for a total of $58,187.50. Johnson sought, and was
granted, summary judgment.39 3 The Board appealed, and
Johnson argued, inter alia, that the "liquidated damages" provision in the contract was, in fact, an impermissible penalty.
The supreme court disagreed:
[T]he loss arising from Johnson's refusal to engage in family
practice, internal medicine, or pediatrics, is difficult to assess;
consequently, the parties rightly agreed to include a liquidated damages provision in their contract. Moreover, such
damages are reasonable, since their amount varies with the
time remaining under the contract, thereby more accurately
reflecting the Board's losses. Indeed, since Johnson agreed not
only to repay the loan but also to practice one of the listed
specialties, the mere return of principal with interest does not
offer the State complete restitution for the loss of his servic3
es. 9
10. Grants of Real Property or Other Property Rights
a. Deeds and Related Documents
As a general rule, "where parcels of real estate are conveyed by well-known designations, such conveyances are valid,
though resort to extrinsic evidence may be necessary to show
what was accurately included in the general description employed in the conveyance. " "

" Johnson, 507 So. 2d at 888.
33 Id.
39

Id. at 890.

Kyle v. Rhodes, 15 So. 40, 40 (Miss. 1894); accord Jones v. Hickson, 37
So. 2d 625, 627-28 (Miss. 1948).
3'
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396 Baird agreed to sell Raines "that
In Raines v. Baird,
tract of land adjoining section Nine, and known as the Phil
Allen place, containing eighty acres more or less" for $800.00,
to be paid over five years and secured by a deed of trust
against the property until fully paid.397 Baird "alleged that
the contract was void because of a patent ambiguity in the
description of the property sold." 98 But, on cross-examination,
Baird accurately described the land in question:

The place was called the Phil Allen place because occupied by
a [person] named Phil Allen. A proper description of the land
is as follows: It is in the N. E. 1/4 of section seventeen, township seventeen, range four west, and is that part of the N. E.
1/4 which is east of a cypress brake dividing the quarter, and
most of the land is in the N. 1/2 of said quarter; being all the
N. E. 14 east of the brake.3
Applying the rule of Kyle v. Rhodes"°° that, where the
writing "describes the premises by reference to extraneous
facts,.., it is proper to resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain
those facts, in order to show what was embraced in the general
designations of the land which was employed by the grantor,"' the Raines court concluded that "resort to the extrinsic

37 So. 458 (Miss. 1904).
Raines, 37 So. at 458.
3" Id.
3" Id.
"®
15 So. 40 (Miss. 1894).
41 Kyle, 15 So. at 40; accord Jones v. Hickson, 37 So. 2d 625, 628 (Miss.
1948); see also Tucker v. Field, 51 Miss. 191, 194 (1875) ("If the meaning of the
'

"

instrument, by itself, is affected with uncertainty, the intention of the parties
may be ascertained by extrinsic testimony. Where subject of a devise was described by reference to some extrinsic fact, it was not merely competent but necessary to admit extrinsic evidence to ascertain the fact, and through that medium, to ascertain the subject of devise." (citation omitted)). See generally Holliman
v. Charles L. Cherry & Assocs., Inc., 569 So. 2d 1139, 1144 (Miss. 1990)
("[Wihere, as here, land is described by township, range and section, so that it
may be located with absolute certainty, it is of no importance whatsoever to the
validity of the conveyance that the lands or a portion thereof are recited as lying
in an incorrect county."); Cole v. Cole, 54 So. 953, 954 (Miss. 1911) ("[If the
description contained in the writing points to specific property, parol evidence is
admissible to identify it, because that is certain which is capable of being made
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evidence referred to in the contract determined with definiteness and certainty the premises intended to be conveyed"; 2
and, therefore, that "[tihere is no patent ambiguity on the face
of the contract of sale sued on herein." 3
Ordinarily Mississippi courts construe deeds of conveyance
most strongly against the grantor.4 °4 However, if the grantee
prepared the documents of conveyance, the presumption
against the grantor may be relaxed, and the deed construed according to rules of construction and interpretation applying to
contracts in general.4 5
For example, in Baker v. Columbia Gulf Transmission
Co.,406 the Bakers, "Grantors," sued Columbia Gulf, "Grantee," for damage to their property resulting from Columbia
Gulfs construction of a natural gas pipeline across their property. The court's attention focused on the following provisions
in the parties' right-of-way agreement:
2. By the terms of this agreement, Grantee has the right
to lay, construct, maintain, operate, alter, repair, remove,
change the size of, and replace at any time or from time to
time one or more additional lines of pipe and appurtenances
thereto, said additional lines not to necessarily parallel any
existing line laid under the terms of this agreement. Provided
however, that for each additional line laid after the first line
is laid hereunder, Grantee shall pay Grantor, his heirs or
assigns, One Dollar ($1.00) per lineal rod of additional pipe
line laid under, upon, over or through said hereinabove de-

certain.").
"

Raines, 37 So. at 458.

403

Id.
See Deason v. Cox, 527 So. 2d 624, 626-27 (Miss. 1988); Brashier v. Toney,

'

514 So. 2d 329, 332 (Miss. 1987); Baker v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 218
So. 2d 39, 41 (Miss. 1969); Fatherree v. McCormick, 24 So. 2d 724, 725 (Miss.
1946); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Lakeview Traction Co., 56 So. 393, 395

(Miss. 1911). MIss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-5 (1991), which permits transferring a fee
simple without using any of the "magic words" once required by common law,
does not change the presumption against the grantor. Deason, 527 So. 2d at 626.
' See, e.g., Clark v. Carter, 351 So. 2d 1333, 1335-36 (Miss. 1977); Baker, 218
So. 2d at 41; Hamilton v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 110 So. 2d 612,
613 (Miss. 1959).
" 218 So. 2d 39 (Miss. 1969).
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scribed property.
4. Grantee hereby agrees to bury the pipe line to a sufficient depth so as not to interfere with cultivation of the soil
and agrees to pay for any damage to growing crops and fences
which may arise from the construction, maintenance and
operation of said lines. Said damage, if not mutually agreed
upon, shall be ascertained and determined by three disinterested persons ....
The written award of such three persons
shall be final and conclusive.
6. It is understood and agreed that the sum of
Dollars per rod as damages in full will be paid to the Grantors herein by the Grantee herein before the said pipe line is
laid and the Grantors herein hereby agree that said sum of
Dollars per rod will be accepted by said Grantors as full
and complete settlement for any and all damages (real or
alleged) occasioned by the construction of said pipe line on
and across the above described land.4 '°
_

Columbia Gulf argued that the right-of-way agreement
between itself and the Bakers limited the Bakers' damages to
$1 per lineal rod foot, as provided for in paragraph two of the
agreement."°8 The Bakers argued that paragraph six, not
paragraph two, controlled." 9 Implicitly applying the rules
that the contract must be read as a whole,4 10 and that every
word or provision should be given meaning and effect,4" the
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment in favor of Columbia Gulf:
Paragraph 2 gives Columbia the right to maintain, repair and
change the size of pipes and to lay one or more additional
lines upon payment of $1.00 per lineal rod of additional pipe
laid. Nothing has been said thus far concerning damages
occasioned by construction, maintenance or operation ....
In

' Baker, 218 So. 2d at 39.
'0" Id. at 40-41.
409

Id.

"' See supra subpart 1I.C.2.
411

See supra subpart

1I.C.3.
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the grantee agrees (1) to bury the pipe lines

a sufficient depth so as not to interfere with cultivation of the
soil and (2) to pay for any damages to growing crops and
fences which may arise from the construction, maintenance or
operation of the lines ....

While construction is mentioned, it

is our opinion the parties intended for the provisions regarding damages in paragraph 4 to apply primarily to damages
arising from maintenance and operation after construction.
Paragraph 6 is by its terms concerned with "all damages"
occasioned, not by maintenance or operation, but solely from
"construction." ...

The presence of this paragraph shows that

the parties intended that the grantor would be paid for "all
damages" occasioned by the "construction." This is a different
category from the damages to growing crops and fences arising from maintenance and operation as provided in paragraph
4. The "all damages" occasioned by "construction" could not
apply to damages to growing crops and fences arising out of
"maintenance and operation" although "all damages" referred
to in paragraph 6 could include damages to growing crops and
fences occasioned by "construction." The right to construct
additional pipe lines extends to the indefinite future and
damages occasioned thereby would probably extend beyond
growing crops and fences. In our opinion this accounts for the
attempt to provide for an agreement concerning "all damages"
from construction. Otherwise there would have been no reason to add paragraph 6.
...

[Plaragraph 6, when considered with the other pro-

visions of the agreement, expresses an intention that grantor
would be paid for all damages occasioned by construction and
that the parties did not agree on the amount ... "'
A deed and mortgage executed contemporaneously between
or among the same parties should be construed together,4 13 as
should a deed and a "contemporaneous and kindred" instrument creating a trust,41 4 and a deed and a plat which includes
the property granted.4 15
412

Baker, 218 So. 2d at 42.

See Clark v. Carter, 351 So. 2d 1333, 1335 (Miss. 1977).
...See Doe v. Bernard, 15 Miss. 319, 323 (1846).
"1

411 See Duane v. Saltaformaggio,

455 So. 2d 753, 757 (Miss.

1984) ("The
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b. Deed vs. Mortgage
Mississippi courts presume that a deed conveys possession
to the grantee.416 Nonetheless, "a deed absolute on its face
may be found valid and effectual as a mortgage, if it were intended by the parties 'to operate as a security for the repayment of money."'4 17 In determining whether a transaction was
intended as a mortgage, rather than a deed, "there is no conclusive test"; rather, "each case must be decided upon its own
facts and all the surrounding circumstances."'15 The party
seeking to prove that a purported deed was merely a mortgage
bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.4 19
This burden may be met by proving, inter alia, that the
grantor has "retained and exercised after the transaction the
same control over the land as he did before the transaction
took place."42 °
For example, in Sweet v. Luster,421 the decedent (Sweet)
borrowed $1,100 from his uncle (Luster), in exchange for which
Sweet conveyed to Luster Sweet's one-fourth undivided interest
in 289 acres of real property. Upon Sweet's death, his heirs

parties' deeds incorporate the official plat to particularly describe the lot conveyed. Therefore, all the descriptive information in the plat should be considered
and harmonized as far as possible to achieve the intent of the grantor."). But see
Gilich v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 574 So. 2d 8, 12 (Miss. 1990) ("Descriptions in the original plat and other deeds are not considered as evidence of
intent, as intent is discerned from the four corners of the deed. These are considered only if the description in the deed is ambiguous and unclear. To look to
these descriptions or other outside evidence makes the deed, when clear and
unambiguous, of no value.").
,'lSee Sweet v. Luster, 513 So. 2d 1240, 1241 (Miss. 1987); Bethea v. Mullins,
85 So. 2d 452, 456 (Miss. 1956).
417 Harris v. Kemp, 451 So. 2d 1362,
1364 (Miss. 1984) (quoting Vasser v.
Vasser, 23 Miss. 378, 380 (1852)).
418 Harris, 451 So. 2d at 1365; see Lampley v. Pertuit, 199 So. 2d 452, 455
(Miss. 1967); Emmons v. Emmons, 64 So. 2d 753, 755 (Miss. 1953).
' See Sweet, 513 So. 2d at 1241; Harris, 451 So. 2d at 1364-65; Delancey v.
Davis, 91 So. 2d 286, 288 (Miss. 1956); Bethea, 85 So. 2d at 456; see also Conner
v. Conner, 119 So. 2d 240, 256 (Miss. 1960); Jordan v. Jordan, 111 So. 102, 10304 (Miss. 1927).
420 Emmons, 64 So. 2d at 755; accord Sweet, 513 So. 2d at 1241-42; see also
Bethea, 85 So. 2d at 457.
421

513 So. 2d 1240 (1987).
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attempted to have the deed set aside, arguing that it was merely a mortgage to secure the loan.4 22 The Mississippi Supreme
Court held that the chancellor erred in finding that the deed
was a conveyance, rather than a mortgage, because "there was
uncontradicted evidence that Sweet had retained and exercised
the same control over the land both before and after the deed's
execution."'23 The court also noted that
Luster stated not only to his loan officer and son, but
also at trial that the deed was a debt-securing mortgage ....
Moreover, Luster's comment, "Dennis, you don't owe the bank,
you just owe me," is wholly at odds with his present claim
that title vested in him no later than when Sweet failed to
pay the loan's principal in February, 1978.
Equally significant, the deed at issue stands as one of
several transactions, where individuals secured loans after
they had executed deeds to Luster. Upon repayment, Luster
would reconvey the property. In this instance, Luster endorsed a note for $1,100.00, receiving in return a deed to
property valued at as much as $24,500.00.
Finally, there was testimony that Sweet had continued to
express an ownership interest until the time of his death,
speaking to his children about the land and timber. 2
The Mississippi Supreme Court has also considered the
relation of the parties, the financial condition of the grantor,
possession by the grantor, the value of the property, the conduct of the parties, the payment of taxes, and the subsequent
dealings of the parties, as pertinent to deciding whether a particular grant was a deed or a mortgage.4 25
Thus, for example, in Harris v. Kemp,426 the court found
that a purported deed was, in fact, a mortgage, based on the
circumstances surrounding the transaction:

' Sweet, 513 So. 2d at 1241.
'I Id. at 1242.
424 Id. at 1242.

' See Harris v. Kemp, 451 So. 2d 1362, 1365 (Miss. 1984); Emmons, 64
So. 2d at 755.
'2 451 So. 2d 1362 (Miss. 1984).
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The financial condition of the grantor (Harris) was extremely poor and he was attempting, with Kemp's help, to
stave off foreclosure. Also Harris, the grantor, remained in
possession and control of the property after the execution of
the deed. The value of the property, however, was only
slightly higher than the total amount Kemp had invested,
though as noted below Harris remained obligated to repay
these amounts. And finally, the conduct of the parties showed
that Kemp acted to help Harris save his property and took a
special warranty deed and assignment of the Wesson Milling
Company deed of trust only to protect his interest by placing
himself above the judgment creditors. Moreover, and perhaps
more importantly, the evidence here showed that Kemp merely took an assignment of the $50,000 Wesson Milling Company deed of trust. The testimony indicated that this assignment did not cut off the indebtedness and that it has not
been cancelled. Indeed, on August 21, 1979, Kemp renewed
the Wesson Milling Company note. Also the evidence showed
$18,600 in promissory notes executed by Harris in favor of
Kemp and still outstanding. Thus all the evidence, including
the testimony of Kemp himself, indicates that a debtor-creditor relationship continues to exist and that the existing debt
by Harris was not extinguished by the giving of the special
warranty deed.4"
c. Deed vs. Will
If an instrument, though in the form of a deed, "makes no
present conveyance of an interest in land or otherwise directs
that the interest to be conveyed vests in the grantee only upon
the death of the grantor, such an instrument is regarded as
testamentary in character" and Mississippi courts will construe
and enforce it as a will, not a deed.4 28 On the other hand, if
the instrument "conveys a future interest in land which vests
in the grantee effective upon delivery of the deed, though reserving in the grantor a life estate, the effect of which is to

"2

Harris, 451 So. 2d at 1365.
Ford v. Hegwood, 485 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Miss. 1986); see also Tapley v.

McManus, 168 So. 51, 52 (Miss. 1936).
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postpone only the grantee's right of possession or occupancy,"
Mississippi courts will construe and enforce the instrument as
a deed. 2 9
In Ford v. Hegwood,"° the instrument at issue provided
in relevant part, "[We, the undersigned ... do hereby sell, convey and warrant to our son, . . at OUR DEATH, the following
described land ... .431 The Mississippi Supreme Court saw
4 2
this case as falling in between Tapley and Buchanan,
" and
construed the conveyance as a deed, rather than a will, as
follows:
Here the words used leave no reasonable doubt but that
J.O. Hegwood and Nannie Mae Hegwood intended to convey
the land as of June 20, 1951, so that there would be no
question of its ownership at their death. Lawyers may find interesting the subtle distinction between a conveyance in the
present of a future interest with a life estate reserved, on the
one hand, and, on the other, a conveyance to vest at death
and irrevocable only at death-and, as noted above, our law
recognizes it. We are confident that laymen would n[ot] understand such a distinction, much less have it in mind at the
time of the drafting of an instrument such as that in question. Doubtful cases will not turn on such subtleties.
The words of the instrument communicate to the reader
a dominant intention on the part of the Hegwoods that at
their death their property belong to their son and his
heirs....
... The object of persons such as the Hegwoods being
one which our law allows to be accomplished, we regard it as
a sound rule of construction to resolve doubts in favor of
treating the instrument as a deed rather than a will. Put
otherwise, an instrument such as that under consideration
here appearing in the form of a deed should be adjudicated
testamentary in character... only where such affirmatively
and clearly appears from the language of the instrument.'4
29 Ford, 485 So. 2d at 1045; see also Buchanan v. Buchanan, 112 So. 2d 224,
226-27 (Miss. 1959).
"' 485 So. 2d 1044 (Miss. 1986).
4"1 Ford, 485 So. 2d at 1045.
"' Id. at 1046; see also supra notes 428-29.
" Id. at 1046-47 (footnote and citations omitted). In so ruling, the court disre-
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d. Reservations of Rights
A valid reservation in or exception to a conveyance must
contain words "as definite as those required to convey title."
Everything "not unequivocally and specifically reserved" is
deemed to be "conveyed by the granting clause." The reser-6
vation must "describe the interest reserved with certainty,11
must be "of some portion of the granted premises, which, without the reservation, would be conveyed by the deed,"' 7 and
must "necessarily be of something which belongs to the grantor
at and before the execution of the deed."' 35

garded both parties' invitations to treat the instrument as ambiguous and construe it in light of extrinsic evidence, opting to "adjudicate its meaning solely by
reference to its language and the intention and purposes there revealed." Id. at
1047.
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Nettleton Fox Hunting & Fishing Ass'n, 672
So. 2d 1235, 1237 (Miss. 1996); Texas Co. v. Newton Naval Stores Co., 78 So. 2d
751, 753 (Miss. 1955); Richardson v. Marqueze, 59 Miss. 80, 94 (1881).
Thornhill v. System Fuels, Inc., 523 So. 2d 983, 989 (Miss. 1988); accord
Peoples Bank, 672 So. 2d at 1237; Bedford v. Kravis, 622 So. 2d 291, 294 (Miss.
1993).
16 Peoples Bank, 672 So. 2d at 1237; see also Federal Land
Bank of New
Orleans v. Cooper, 200 So. 729, 730-31 (Miss. 1941).
Barataria Canning Co. v. Ott, 37 So. 121, 124 (Miss. 1904).
" Barataria Canning Co., 37 So. at 125. Property or rights excluded from a
grant because they are not owned by the grantor at the time of the grant are
more properly termed "exceptions' rather than "reservations." See Fatherree v.
McCormick, 24 So. 2d 724, 725 (Miss. 1946). As the Fatherree court explained:
[A] reservation operates by way of a re-grant by the grantee to the
grantor of the estate or interest reserved.
By this test the grantor could not be said to have reserved one-half
of the minerals for he owned only one-eighth. If by a reservation the
grantee be viewed as re-conveying to the grantor such one-half, the latter would receive back more than he had. We remind ourselves again
that the grantor warranted only the undivided interest which he had yet
he did not except therefrom one-half of such interest but one-half of "all
mineral rights." This exception is consistent with the description of the
extent of his undivided interest and inconsistent with a reservation of an
undivided one-eighth interest. To give the exception any other character
it would have to be so amended or otherwise by simple and clear expression enlarged to indicate that there is a reservation of one-half of
the minerals owned by the grantor.
Fatherree, 24 So. 2d at 725 (citations omitted).
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In Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Nettleton Fox Hunting &
Fishing Assn,43 9 the purported reservation of mineral rights
read: "Oil and Mineral rights have been leased before we came
into possession of property title is not herein conveyed.""' Because the conveyance "fail[ed] to describe the interest being
reserved with certainty,""' the court concluded that the plain
language of the deed was "of little help,"" 2 and that it must
44 3
resort to the rule of contra proferentem,
whereby ambiguities are construed against the party who drafted the ambiguous provision."4
In Barataria Canning Co. v. Ott,"' the seller of certain
real property (appellee) attempted to reserve "littoral and
aquatic rights" over oyster beds, planted by the appellant adjacent to the appellee's property, and the oysters therein." 6
The court held that the reservation was unenforceable because
it attempted to reserve something which did not belong to the
reserving party:
The attempted reservation in the deed... [can] in no wise affect the rights of appellant to the oysters which it had bedded
and planted, and in which a right of property had been lawfully granted it.... Property cannot be conveyed by reservation, and yet that is what is attempted to be done if the construction contended for by appellee be sustained. At the date
of the deed appellee owned the land and the water front with
all littoral and aquatic rights lawfully appurtenant thereto.
Appellant owned the oysters which it had planted and bedded
in the waters in front of the land. By deeding a portion of the
land and reserving certain rights which are merely incident to
the land, appellees claim to have acquired title to the property of appellant. This view cannot be sustained. Appellant,
being the owner of the oyster beds which it had planted, can-

'3

442

672 So. 2d 1235 (Miss. 1996).
Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 672 So. 2d at 1237.
ld.
I'

Id.

See supra subpart II.D.1.
See Peoples Bank, 672 So. 2d at 1239-40.
,, 37 So. 121 (Miss. 1904).
,,' BaratariaCanning Co., 37 So. at 122.
"3
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not be divested of its ownership by implication, and appellees
can only acquire those rights by express grant."7
e. Restrictive Covenants
Mississippi courts generally disfavor restrictive covenants
as restraints on alienation,'
and should, if the terms are
ambiguous, strictly construe a restrictive covenant "against the
person seeking the restriction and in favor of the person being
restricted."" 9 Where the language of a restrictive covenant is
clear and unambiguous, on the other hand, Mississippi courts
should not disregard the covenant merely because a use is
prohibited or restricted. If the intent to prohibit or restrict be
expressed in clear and unambiguous wording, enforcement is
available in the courts of this state."5 °
In AA. Home Improvement Co. v. Hide-A-Way Lake Club,
Inc.,"" the court upheld a covenant against non-residential
use, stating:
There is no ambiguity in the expression "No lot shall be
used for other th[a]n residential purposes." Any additional
use must be reasonably incidental to residential uses and
such an inconsequential breach of the covenant as to be in
substantial harmony with the purpose of the parties in making the covenants, and without substantial injury to the
neighborhood. It is obvious that the use of Lot 52 on which
there is no residence as a connecting roadway to an adjoining
subdivision is not in any sense a residential use or a use
incidental thereto.... The covenant which requires the appellee Club to maintain the roads, with the expense to be shared
by all lot owners, shows an intent not to enlarge the exposure
of the streets to more traffic than the layout of the plat and

"7

Id. at 125.

See, e.g., Stokes v. Board of Dirs. of La Cav Improvement Co., 654 So. 2d
524, 527 (Miss. 1995); Kemp v. Lake Serene Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 256
So. 2d 924, 926 (Miss. 1971).
' Kemp, 256 So. 2d at 926; accord Stokes, 654 So. 2d at 527; see also City of
Gulfport v. Wilson, 603 So. 2d 295, 299 (Miss. 1992); Andrews v. Lake Serene
Property Owners Ass'n, 434 So. 2d 1328, 1331 (Miss. 1983).
Andrews, 434 So. 2d at 1331; accord Stokes, 654 So. 2d at 528.
393 So. 2d 1333 (Miss. 1981).
"a
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In determining whether a restrictive covenant is ambiguous, its language "is to be read in its ordinary sense, considering the entire document as well as the circumstances surrounding its formulation to ascertain its meaning, purpose, and intents."453
At issue in Stokes v. Board of Directorsof La Cay Improvement Co. 41' was
whether a deed restriction providing that "no building of any
kind whatsoever shall be constructed on said Lot 17" precludes the repair of an earthen pier and construction of an 1shaped earth and wood addition to that pier so as to create a
boat slip.'4
The Stokes court resolved the issue as follows:
The Stokes urge construction of this provision according to its
plain language, that is, as prohibiting the erection of a house
or other permanent structure on the lot. La Cav asserts that
aside from the Stokes' failure to obtain Building Committee
approval before repairing the pier, it objects only to construction of the boat slip. Based on the language used in the restrictive provisions of the warranty deeds to the other "nonbuilding lots," which provides "that no buildings, structures,
outbuildings or any other improvements shall be erected on
the property conveyed except that a pier may be erected in
the water in front of said lot," La Cav argues that although
construction of a pier is permissible, construction of a boat
slip is not.
...
The limiting language of the Stokes' warranty deed
restriction would clearly seem to prohibit construction of a

4

A.A. Home Improvement Co., 393 So. 2d at 1336-37 (citation omitted).

Stokes, 654 So. 2d at 527 (quotation omitted); see Wilson, 603 So. 2d at
299; Kinchen v. Layton, 457 So. 2d 343, 346 (Miss. 1984); Mendrop v. Harrell,
103 So. 2d 418, 422 (Miss. 1958); see also Schaeffer v. Gatling, 137 So. 2d 819,
820 (Miss. 1962) ("Covenants of this kind should be fairly and reasonably construed and the language used will be read in the ordinary sense.").
654 So. 2d 524 (Miss. 1995).
Id. at 528.
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boat house, storage shed or some other outbuilding which
would impede the view of the lake or clutter the small lot.
However, when read in light of the restrictive language in the
warranty deeds to the neighboring properties, we would construe the Stokes' deed as allowing construction of either a
pier or a boat slip on Lot 17.
Restrictive covenants may arise "by implication from the
language used in an instrument or from the conduct of the parties," but, to do so, "the7 implication must be plain and unmistakable, or necessary. 11
45 s
In Schaeffer v. Gatling,
for example, the subject deeds
contained the following covenants:
Said property is to be used strictly for residential purposes
and is not to be used for automobile filling station, repair
shop, tourist camp, bill boards, dance hall, store or for any
other commercial or manufacturing purposes. No residences
shall be erected on said land which shall cost less than
$6,000.00, exclusive of outhouses or other buildings in connection with said residence, and the front of said residence,
exclusive of any gallery or porch that may be attached to said
building, shall be set back from the front, or Highway 61 line
of said lot, not less than thirty-five (35) feet . .. ."
The issue was whether the use of a mobile home, if it met
the "not less than $6,000" test, was prohibited.46 ° The court
said "no":
The house trailer is being used "strictly for residential purposes."... Covenants of this kind should be fairly and reasonably construed and ....
the restriction should not be
extended by strained construction, especially when, as in this
case, the restrictive covenants expressly permit the use being
made of the land. If the original owner of the subdivision had
desired to prohibit the use of house trailers as residences, this

45

a

Stokes, 654 So. 2d at 528-29.

Wiener v. Pierce, 203 So. 2d 598, 603 (Miss. 1967).
137 So. 2d 819 (Miss. 1962).
a' Schaeffer, 137 So. 2d at 819.
See id. at 820.
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could easily have been accomplished by designating house
trailers as prohibited use, or by restricting architectural design, or by placing a minimum on the floor space for a residence, or by prohibiting temporary residences. None of these
things were done." 1

f. Easements vs. Fees
An instrument that specifically conveys a right-of-way "will
be construed as intending to convey only an easement " ' unless the terms of the instrument clearly indicate the parties'
intent to convey a fee. On the other hand, instruments "that
specifically refer to a strip, parcel, or tract of land have been
held to convey a fee"-again, subject to the clearly ex-

401

Id. (citation omitted).

Crum v. Butler, 601 So. 2d 834, 837 (Miss. 1992); see New Orleans & N.E.
R.R. v. Morrison, 35 So. 2d 68, 70 (Miss. 1948); Williams v. Patterson, 21 So. 2d
477, 478-80 (Miss. 1945).
Crum, 601 So. 2d at 838; see Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. v. Mashburn, 109
So. 2d 533, 535-36 (Miss. 1959); Mississippi Cent. R.R. v. Ratcliff, 59 So. 2d 311,
314 (Miss. 1952).
But what about a deed that mentions both a strip, a parcel, or tract of land
and a right of way? "It is here," cautions the Mississippi Supreme Court, "that
the instrument becomes unclear and leans toward ambiguity." Crum, 601 So. 2d
at 838. There were two deeds at issue in Crum-the "1883 deed" and the "1887
deed." The 1883 deed provided in relevant part:
[P]arties of the first part have granted, bargained and sold and by these
presents do grant, bargain and sell unto the said party of the second
part a right of way One Hundred Feet wide through the lands belonging
to said parties of the first part ....

The said right of way to extend

fifty feet on each side of the center of a Railroad to be constructed by
the party of the second part on such line as the said party of the second part may hereafter adopt as a permanent location for its road. To
have and hold unto the said party of the second party and assigns forever for the purposes hereinafter Specified and none other, that is to say
for the purpose of building, constructing and operating a line of railroad
on said right of way. And the said party of the second part shall have
the right to dig earth, quarry rock, Cut timber and do such other things
on said right of way as are necessary and convenient in constructing
and operating its line of Railroad thereon and to fell any timber beyond
the right of way herein granted which is sufficiently near the track of
said road to fall on and obstruct the same. The party of the second part
agrees and binds itself to construct and maintain such drains as will
prevent the railroad from interfering with the drainage of the property.
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It is understood that should the railroad herein mentioned not be built
within eighteen months from the date hereof then this Contract shall be
null and void.
Id. at 836-37 (emphases in original). The 1887 deed provided in relevant part:
I hereby give, grant, bargain, convey and sell to the Louisville New
Orleans and Texas Rail Road Company for Right of Way, a strip of land
100 feet wide that is 50 feet on each side of the center of the Road bed
now constructed thereon ....
To have and to hold unto the said Rail
Road Company and its assigns forever for the purpose of building and
constructing and operating a line of Rail Road on said Right of Way and
the said Rail Road Company to have the right to dig earth, quarry rock,
cut timber and do such other things on said right of way as are necessary and convenient in constructing and operating its line of Rail Road
thereon, and to fell any timber beyond the right of way herein granted,
which is sufficiently near the track of said Road to fall on and obstruct
the same ...
Id. at 838 (emphasis in original).
The court approved the chancellor's finding that the 1883 deed granted
"merely an easement." Id. The court found the 1887 deed to be "unclear and ambiguous." Id. at 839. Falling back on the contra proferentem maxim (the 1887 deed
having been drawn up by the railroad), see supra subpart II.D.1, the court held
that the 1887 deed, too, granted merely an easement. See Crum, 601 So. 2d at
839. The Crum court explained:
When we compare the 1883 deed and the 1887 deed it is clear that
the grantors in the 1883 deed intended only to convey a right of way.
The instrument states that they did "grant, bargain and sell . . . a right
of way 100 feet wide through the lands. . . ." The grant was for the

purpose of building, constructing and operating a line of railroad on the
right of way and none other. The instrument specifically points out that
it is a grant of a right of way through the land and not a grant of the
land. The chancellor correctly held that the 1883 deed granted merely an
easement.
... . Crum contends that the chancellor gave undue influence to
the term "right of way" in accepting it to mean merely an easement or
right to cross. .

.

. Crum contends that the term "right of way" has a

two fold significance; one being a mere intangible right to cross and the
other indicating a strip of land which a railroad appropriates for its use.
We are struck by the fact that both the 1883 deed and the 1887
deed clearly point out that the conveyances were for the purpose of
constructing and operating a railroad on the right of way. ...
The 1887 deed in its granting provision conveys "for a Right of
Way, a strip of land" to the railroad. The habendum clause of the deed
provides that the conveyance is to the railroad and "its assigns forever
for the purpose of building and constructing and operating a line of Rail
Road..."
The instruments here are unclear and ambiguous. Where terms of a
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pressed intent of the parties to the contrary.
In Dossett v. New Orleans Great Northern R.R.,4 ' the
grantors agreed to "grant, sell, assign, convey and warrant unto
New Orleans Great Northern Railroad ...

its successors or as-

signs," (1) "a strip of land for a right of way, to be selected by
survey and location by [the Railroad] ...

two hundred feet in

width (being one hundred feet on each side of the center line of
the Railroad Track) in, over, upon and across the following
described lands ... ."; and (2) "all the timber growing on said
right of way, together with the right to use therefrom earth,
gravel, stones, shells and other materials for the construction
and maintenance of said railroad[,] [t]o have and to hold...
forever, with full warranty, and substitution and subrogation to
all our rights in and to the lands hereby conveyed."465
The court opined
that the language used in the written instrument here involved was sufficient to indicate the sale of land, rather than
right to use land. Since, however, there are phrases, sentences and clauses in the deed which tend to make the meaning of
the deed unclear and ambiguous, we must resort to the legal
rules of construction as to what the parties considered the
instrument to be a deed. It is apparent that the parties considered the instrument to be a deed. Moreover, where the
language of an instrument is unclear and ambiguous as to the
estate intended to be conveyed, the instrument should be
construed to convey the fee rather than a lesser estate.4"

contract are vague or ambiguous, they are always construed most strongly against the party who drew it. The 1883 deed and the 1887 deed
were prepared not by Day, but by the railroad.
We are of the opinion that the chancellor correctly ruled that the
1887 deed also conveyed merely a right of way.
Id. at 838-39 (citations omitted).
4" 295 So. 2d 771 (Miss. 1974).
' Dossett, 295 So. 2d at 775-76.
"

Id. at 775.
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g. Leases
1). Renewal Options
6 7 ThereMississippi law does not favor perpetual leases."
fore, the parties' "intention to give the right to perpetual renewals must appear in clear and unequivocal language."'
In Howard v. Tomicich, 69 the written contract provided
that it would be effective "from January 1, 1901, to January 1,
1902, 'with privilege of longer."' 7 ° The question for the court
was "whether a lease of premises for one year 'with privilege of
longer,' secures to the lessee the right of renewal of the lease at
his option."'7 1 The court concluded that it did not:

It is too vague and uncertain to constitute a binding covenant.
In this writing the question is, what was the intention of the
parties, or, more properly, the meaning of the words in the
clause under consideration?... [Aippellee has testified that
in this clause he meant that appellant should have the preference of others for a new lease at whatever rental they could
agree upon, whilst appellant swore that he meant to secure to
himself the right to a second term of one year at the same
rent. So the wisdom of the law excluding parol proof of intention is justified by the evidence on that point in this case. An
unqualified covenant to renew a lease involves the making of
a new lease of the same premises for the same period and at
the same rent, and a stipulation providing for a refusal of the
premises for a fixed period gives a right to a new lease at the
same rent; but the covenant "with privilege of longer" has no
certain meaning in regard to the term or the consideration of
the lease. How much longer? Upon what conditions? Certainly
72
the stipulation is uncertain in both respects."

" See Stampley v. Gilbert, 332 So. 2d 61, 63 (Miss. 1976); Lloyd's Estate v.
Mullen Tractor & Equip. Co., 4 So. 2d 282, 285 (Miss. 1941)
4m Lloyd's Estate, 4 So. 2d at 285; accord Stampley, 332 So. 2d at 63.
4" 33 So. 493 (Miss. 1903).
00' Howard, 33 So.
at 493.
471

Id.

472

Id.

at 493-94 (citations omitted).
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2). Assignments
As a general rule, an assignee of a lease does not incur the
obligations of the assignor unless they expressly so agree.47 3
However, "in cases of general assignments involving leases, the
assignee takes on the obligations of the assignor when the
lease covenants involved 'run with the land,' regardless of express agreement."4 74 Lease provisions which affect the
property's use, condition, and value are said to "run with the
land."475
An assignee assumes no obligations under the
lease-including obligations that "run with the land"-when
the assignment is given as collateral for a security interest.4 7
11. Antenuptial Agreements
Mississippi courts have long favored antenuptial agreements, when fairly made,
not only on account of the security thereby provided for the
wife, but also because . .. provision for the issue of the marriage is usually the great and immediate object in view; and
therefore, the most favorable exposition will be made of the
such instruments, to support the intention of the
words of
477
parties.
An antenuptial contract is subject to the same rules of construction and interpretation applicable to contracts generally.

478

471

Midsouth Rail Corp. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 697 So. 2d 451, 455

(Miss. 1997); Coggins v. Joseph, 504 So. 2d 211, 213 (Miss. 1987).
474 Midsouth Rail, 697 So. 2d at 455; see Coggins, 504 So. 2d at
214.
475 Midsouth Rail, 697 So. 2d
at 455.
476 Id.
at 457; see also Kroger Co. v. Chimneyville Properties, Ltd., 784
F. Supp. 331, 340 (S.D. Miss. 1991). More generally, a collateral assignee of a
lease "should not be burdened with the obligations of the assignor." Midsouth
Rail, 697 So. 2d at 458.
'" Estate of Hensley v. Estate of Hensley, 524 So. 2d 325, 327 (Miss. 1988);
see Gorin v. Gordon, 38 Miss. 205, 210-11 (1859).
418 Estate of Hensley, 524 So. 2d
at 327.

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69

12. PostnuptialAgreements/PropertySettlement Agreements
Mississippi law
favors the settlement of disputes by agreement of the parties
and, ordinarily, will enforce the Agreement which the parties
have made, absent any fraud, mistake, or overreaching. This
is as true of agreements made in the process of the termination of the marriage by divorce as of any other kind of negotiated settlement. They are contracts, made by the parties,
upon consideration acceptable to each of them, and the law
will enforce them. Courts will not rewrite them to satisfy the
desires of either party. With regard to the property of the parties, this is a strong and enforceable rule with few, if any,
exceptions.47 9
The rules applicable to the construction of written contracts in general apply to postnuptial agreements (also known
as property settlement agreements)."0 That said, once a postnuptial agreement sufficient to comply with Mississippi's Irreconcilable Differences Divorce Act"81 is filed along with the
final divorce decree, the terms of the property settlement agreement are treated as a part of the chancery court's final decree.4" 2

...McManus v. Howard, 569 So. 2d 1213, 1215 (Miss. 1990) (citations omitted);
see also McBride v. Chevron U.S.A., 673 So. 2d 372, 379 (Miss. 1996) ("Our law
favors settlement for many reasons, not the least of which includes the expedi-

tious closure of cases."). See supra subpart II.E.5 for a discussion of construing
settlement agreements in general.
410 See Roberts v. Roberts, 381 So. 2d 1333, 1335 (Miss. 1980); see, e.g., Meek
v. Warren, 726 So. 2d 1292, 1293-94 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). Thus, for example,
"where ambiguities may be found, the agreement should be construed much as is
done in the case of a contract, with the court seeking to gather the intent of the
parties and render its clauses harmonious in the light of that intent." Switzer v.
Switzer, 460 So. 2d 843, 846 (Miss. 1984); see Owen v. Gerity, 422 So. 2d 284,
288 (Miss. 1982) (construing property agreement against ex-wife whose attorney
had prepared the agreement); Hoar v. Hoar, 404 So. 2d 1032, 1035 (Miss. 1981)
(where property agreement was ambiguous, court correctly allowed parol evident
to show intent); Roberts, 381 So. 2d at 1335.
481 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1998).
'
Id. In Switzer, the court explained that the Irreconcilable Differences Divorce Act
contemplates that the parties will negotiate a settlement of all matters,
including a division of property and respective rights and responsibilities
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Construing a postnuptial contract in the context of a dispute between the estate of one ex-spouse and the surviving exspouse, the Mississippi Supreme Court has written:
The rule is, as to a postnuptial agreement, that only such
rights in the estate of the deceased spouse are barred as are
expressly enumerated or reasonably inferable from the language employed therein. In construing such agreements the
purpose must be clear to exclude the surviving spouse from
having his or her rights of inheritance in the deceased spouse;
and they will be so construed only so far as the agreement
clearly requires.'

The court in Roberts v. Roberts' construed a property
settlement agreement that was filed but was not adjudicated
before the husband died suddenly. The court noted:
In support of their contention that the widow contracted
away her right to inherit, the appellants (brothers and sisters

in relation thereto. The statute further contemplates that this property
settlement agreement will be filed with the court before a final decree
may be entered.
When the statute has been complied with, the ...
agreement becomes a part of the final decree for all legal intents and purposes ...
If the agreement is sufficient to comply with the statute, that is enough
to render it a part of the final decree of divorce the same as if a decree
including the same provisions as may be found in the property settlement agreement had been rendered by the Chancery Court following a
contested divorce proceeding.
We have heretofore held that, for purposes of subsequent modification proceedings, alimony and child support provisions found in an agreement made incident to an irreconcilable differences divorce are treated
the same as though the chancellor had made the award after a contested divorce trial. There is no reason on principal why a property settlement provision such as that in controversy here should not be similarly
treated as though it were a part of the divorce decree.
As a matter of law, a property settlement prepared and filed in
compliance with the statute can never be a document extraneous to the
final decree. This rule is compelled by the logic implicit in Section 93-52. Any other rule would exalt form over substance and inevitably produce arbitrary and inequitable results.
Switzer, 460 So. 2d at 845-46 (citations omitted).
Kirby v. Kent, 160 So. 569, 572 (Miss. 1935) (citations omitted).
381 So. 2d 1333 (Miss. 1980).
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preamble to the

WHEREAS, irreconcilable difference having arisen between them, and they are now living separate and apart
and now desire to make a mutually acceptable settlement of their respective rights, liabilities, obligations
and property rights arising out of and during the course
of their marital relationship;...
The appellants urge this Court to adopt the reasoning
that the widow's status as an heir "arises out of"the marital
relationship. .. , and that she is precluded from asserting her
status as an heir of the deceased husband to claim the property allotted to him under the property settlement agreement.
....
[Clonsidering the language of the preamble... with
the language found in Paragraph eight which states: "This
agreement shall be binding not only upon the Husband and
Wife, but also upon their heirs, successors and assigns", and
together with the provision in Paragraph twelve that "This
agreement... is not contingent upon either party procuring a
divorce from the other", the instrument clearly manifests the
parties [sic] intention that the property settlement was to be
final and binding, not only while they lived, but, also, in the
event of the death of one of the parties whether a divorce was
obtained or not. Mrs. Roberts received her share of approximately one-half of the couple's property under the agreement,
and she is now precluded by that same agreement from claiming the other one-half as the sole heir of the deceased.'
13. Wills, Testamentary Trusts, and Related Documents
The same rules of construction and interpretation that
apply to written instruments generally also apply to trust instruments "whether they are contracts, deeds, or wills."' As
such, a court's primary responsibility is to determine and give
effect the intent of the testator or testatrix8 7 --as long as that

"8

Roberts, 381 So. 2d at 1334-35 (emphasis omitted).
Hart v. First Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 103 So. 2d 406, 409 (Miss. 1958).
See Estate of Williams v. Junius Ward Johnson Mem'l Young Men's Chris-
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intent is not contrary to law or public policy. 88

tian Ass'n, 672 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Miss. 1996); Estate of Blount v. Papps, 611
So. 2d 862, 866 (Miss. 1992); In re Estate of Dedeaux, 584 So. 2d 419, 421 (Miss.
1991); In re Estate of Vick, 557 So. 2d 760, 765 (Miss. 1989); Tinnin v. First
United Bank of Miss., 502 So. 2d 659, 663 (Miss. 1987); Stovall v. Stovall, 360
So. 2d 679, 681 (Miss. 1978); In re Estate of Granberry, 310 So. 2d 708, 711
(Miss. 1975); Hart, 103 So. 2d at 409; Yeates v. Box, 22 So. 2d 411, 413 (Miss.
1945); see also In re Raworth's Estate, 52 So. 2d 661, 663 (Miss. 1951) ("[11n the
absence of a clear intent to the contrary, that construction should be adopted
which will result in a just and reasonable disposition of the property."), quoted
with approval in Estate of Blount, 611 So. 2d at 866.
' Tinnin, 502 So. 2d at 664; see Dealy v. Keatts, 128 So. 268, 270 (Miss.
1930); In re Will of Griffin, 411 So. 2d 766, 767 (Miss. 1982). The Tinnin court
stated that
[fior reasons of social policy, our law has come to provide that one may
not wholly disinherit one's spouse, that one may not attempt purchase of
a ticket to heaven by leaving his entire estate to the church, that one
may not control ownership of property beyond life in being plus twentyone years land] ...
that entitlement one is eligible to enjoy on one's
merits shall not be denied by reason of one's race, color or creed.
Tinnin, 502 So. 2d at 664. In Tinnin, the court was asked to construe a will, the
residuary clause of which sought to set up a charitable educational trust to benefit
only Caucasian students. The court prefaced its analysis as follows:
Where a testamentary devise fails, because it "violates law or social policy" or for whatever reason, and where the will's residuary clause fails
to pick it up, again for whatever reason, the force of the private law is
thought spent. Our public law provides for the descent and distribution
of property not effectively devised by will ...
Our law in sum provides that the court, as here asked to construe
a will, supplement it by the statutes on descent and distribution-thus
adding the ultimate residuary clause-and by such administrative provisions or modifications as are authorized and necessary, and then restrict it by the various limitations our public law has imposed upon
testamentary power. The composite document thus constructed is then
construed as a whole with each part, each phrase, each word given effect, if that be possible....
Id. at 665 (citations omitted).
Turning to the will, the court held as follows:
We will never know what Allan Hobgood would have preferred to do
with his money if he had known that no court would enforce his wish
that his money be loaned exclusively to white students. The language he
employed leaves no doubt that he did not want any of his money to be
loaned to non-whites. Disingenuity attends the suggestion that the racially exclusive language of the will was incidental or an afterthought. ...
Recognition of the unmistakable meaning of this clause, however,
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The surest guide to testamentary intent is the wording employed by the maker of the will. Indeed, the intention of the
testator is to be found, not in what he intended to say but
what he did say. We have authority to give effect to the
testator's intent only where that intent has received some
form 9 of direct or reasonably implied expression in the
8

will.

leaves us far short of solution to today's construction riddle.. . . The
Chancery Court . . . . looked at the racially restrictive clause and asked
whether it was incidental or integral. The court should have directed its
attention to the alternative dispositions argued for and sought a just and
reasonable disposition of Allan Hobgood's will as consistent as may be
decreed by reference to the general plan reflected by his reconstructed
will. More precisely, the alternatives below and here are (a) striking the
racially restrictive clause and continuing the trust and (b) causing the
trust to fail and the property to be distributed to the Tinnins, the
testator's heirs at law. We know for a fact that Allan Hobgood did not
wish either of these alternatives. The question is which is less offensive
the general plan of his reconstructed will.
...
Lucille Hamilton Hobgood Tinnin, Allan's aunt of the half
blood, was not mentioned in his will. Indeed, when the will was made,
Allan's mother appears to have been his sole heir at law, so that there
is no reason for him to have thought of the possibility that Aunt Lucille
would share in his estate, much less that her four children might take it
all. While it is true that we construe wills favorably to those who would
take under the laws of descent and distribution, unless the testator has
manifest an intent to the contrary, we do so far more readily in favor of
next of kin than remote kin....
The Tinnins' argument is filled with anomaly: because of the unenforceable racially restrictive intention of the testator, the trust, they
argue, must fail and the assets must be distributed to four individuals
we may say with confidence the testator never intended to benefit. We
are asked to give effect to Allan Hobgood's intention by decreeing something we may say with confidence he never intended....
The question resolves itself to whether, given the unenforceability of
the racially restrictive clause, Allan Hobgood's reconstructed will should
be held to direct that the trust continue on a non-discriminatory basis or
that all of its assets go to the Tinnins. The will as reconstructed in
accordance with the principles of Section III above is unclear in this regard. The record before us, which is wholly documentary, is inadequate
to enable us to answer this question with confidence.
Id. at 668-69 (quotation and citations omitted). The court vacated the chancery
court's judgment and remanded for a trial on the merits, in which extrinsic evidence should be considered to resolve the ambiguities inherent in the reconstructed
will. See id. at 669-70.
'
In re Estate of Anderson, .541 So. 2d 423, 428 (Miss. 1989) (citations omit-
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Courts should construe, and the testatrix's intent pursued,
from the "usual and ordinary language" expressed in the
will."' "The words of a [will are to be construed according to
the rules of construction applicable to ordinary speech, except
when technical terms are employed.""9' Even then, "[wihere a
testator is not familiar with the technical meaning of words,
the words used in the
will are to be taken in their ordinary and
" 492
common acceptance.
[If what the testator has said leaves no doubt in the minds of
persons of ordinary experience and intelligence as to what he
meant[,] [t]he intention of the testator is not to be defeated
merely because apt legal words were not used and the language is ungrammatical and clumsy, or because words which
are clearly implied have been inadvertently omitted." s
4
The first granting clause in In re Estate of Dedeaux
read: "It is my desire that if I should preceed [sic] my wife Kay
in death that all of my earthly possessions be received by
her."9 5 The court found this effective to devise the testator's
entire estate to his wife:

There can be but little doubt that if this is all the instrument stated, his widow Kay would have been deemed the sole
legatee and devisee under his will, and would have taken all.

ted); accord Tinnin, 502 So. 2d at 663; Byrd v. Wallis, 181 So. 727, 732 (Miss.
1938); see also Estate of Dedeaux, 584 So. 2d at 421 ("[11n determining his intent
in this case, we are restricted to the four comers of the will itself."); Rice v.
McMullen, 43 So. 2d 195, 203 (Miss. 1949); Lanham v. Howell, 49 So. 2d 701,
702 (Miss.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 834 (1951). But see Hemphill v. Robinson, 355
So. 2d 302, 307 (Miss. 1978) (holding that wills are to be construed "in the light
of circumstances surrounding testator at the time the Will was written." (citing In
re Estate of Granberry, 310 So. 2d 708 (Miss. 1975)).
490 Hemphill, 355 So. 2d
at 306.
491

Id.

'" First Nat'l Bank of Laurel v. Commercial Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 157
So. 2d 502, 504 (Miss. 1963).
'9 Paine v. Sanders, 135 So. 2d 188, 192 (Miss. 1961); accord In re Estate of
Dedeaux, 584 So. 2d at 422.
49
584 So. 2d 419 (Miss. 1991).
4"
In re Estate of Dedeaux, 584 So. 2d at 421.
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When Dr. Dedeaux wrote "all of my earthly possessions"
we cannot avoid concluding he meant everything he owned.
Others might write it differently yet with no clearer meaning.
And just as clear is that by "received" Dr. Dedeaux meant for
Kay to get "all my earthly possessions." Kay and no one else
was to be the recipient of all his property ....
In giving legal effect to an instrument prepared by a
layman, a court should endeavor to ascertain what the words
contained in it meant to the author, not simply what they
could connote to a lawyer. Unless instructed in legal niceties,
by the ordinary words "possessions" and "receive" with no further qualification or restriction, Dr. Dedeaux must surely
have meant for Mrs. Kay Dedeaux to receive and own everything he possessed and owned.4"

If a will is reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, "it is the duty of the court to adopt that construction
which is most consistent with the intent of the testator [or testatrix]

"N

."9

Id. (citations omitted).

4 Estate of Williams v. Junius Ward Johnson Mem'l Young Men's Christian
Ass'n, 672 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Miss. 1996); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l
Bank of Jackson, 352 So. 2d 1324, 1327 (Miss. 1977); see Malone v. Malone, 379
So. 2d 926, 928 (Miss. 1980).
In pursuit of the decedent's intent, the Mississippi Supreme Court has, at
times, taken a more inclusive approach to construing wills than it does to other
instruments:
The first inquiry, when we come to the construction of [a] will, is
whether the court is shut up to a mere inspection of the instrument, or
may look to extraneous evidence for the purpose of discovering the
meaning of the testatrix, as found in the language she has employed ....

It is a well-settled canon for the construction of wills that the court
will take into consideration the attending circumstances of the testator,
the quantity and character of his estate, the state of his family, and all
facts known to him which may reasonably be supposed to have influenced him in the disposition of his property; that if, when viewed in this
light, and from the standpoint of the testator, the language of the will
cannot reasonably be so construed as to carry out his discovered purpose, the will and not the intent of the testator must control. In other
words, if the will, as made, may, without violence to its terms, be so
construed as to effectuate the purpose of the testator, as disclosed by the
will and attending circumstances, the courts will so construe it; but no
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[Nlo two wills probably ever were written in precisely the
same language throughout, and probably no two testators
ever did die under precisely the same circumstances in relation to their estate, family, and friends, so that technical rules
of law and adjudicated cases are not of as great assistance in

the construction of a will as they are in the construction of
some instruments of a different character, still they are not to
be disregarded altogether, but should be followed, unless to do
so would do violence to the clear intent of the testator.'

A will and any valid codicils thereto must be construed
together to ascertain the testatrix's intent.4 9 "Otherwise the
codicil cannot be given any operative
effect, and this would be
500
inconsistent with testatrix's intent."
The fact that a testator or testatrix made a written will is

circumstances are sufficient to control the clear and unambiguous language of the will.
Schlottman v. Hoffman, 18 So. 893, 895 (Miss. 1895); see also Henry v. Henderson,
60 So. 33, 37 (Miss. 1912) ("The sole object of construing a will is to arrive at the
intention of the maker, and this intention must be gathered from the whole instrument, construed in the light of the circumstances surrounding the maker at the
time of the execution thereof."). But see Estate of Blount, 611 So. 2d 862, 866
(Miss. 1992); Estate of Dedeaux, 584 So. 2d at 421; In re Estate of Anderson, 541
So. 2d 423, 428 (Miss. 1989); Tinnin v. First United Bank of Miss., 502 So. 2d
659, 663 (Miss. 1987); Cockrell v. Jones, 275 So. 2d 105, 107 (Miss. 1973) (all
requiring "four corners" approach).
Henry, 60 So. at 37.
Hemphill v. Robinson, 355 So. 2d 302, 307 (Miss. 1978); see also Hemphill
v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 145 So. 2d 455, 458 (Miss. 1962); Magee v.
Estate of Magee, 111 So. 2d 394, 402 (Miss. 1959); Joiner v. Joiner, 78 So. 369,
370-71 (Miss. 1918). The Joiner court stated that a
codicil is defined as an addition or supplement to a will, and, unless it
shall contain express words of revocation applicable to all existing wills,
it does not work a revocation, except to the precise extent that the intention of the testator as it is contained and expressed in the codicil is
irreconcilable and inconsistent with his intention as it has been expressed in the wills.
Joiner, 78 So. at 370. Therefore, "[a] devise contained in the will should not be
upset unless the words employed in the codicil show a manifest intention to revoke
the gift contained in the will, or unless such intention to revoke is necessarily
inferable from the words of the codicil." Id.
'* Hemphill, 145 So. 2d at 458.
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"powerful evidence" of his or her "intention that his [or her]
estate not pass according to the laws of descent and distribution."0 1 As a consequence, Mississippi courts should construe
wills so as to avoid intestacy, if that may reasonably be

done.502
a. CharitableGifts
If one construction of a will causes a charitable gift to fail
completely and another construction validates the gift, a court
should adopt the construction supporting the gift.5"3 That
said, Mississippi courts "are not at liberty to infer an intent different from that clearly shown by the language of the will" despite the Mississippi Supreme Court's "favorable disposition
toward charitable gifts."5 '
In Estate of Williams v. Junius Ward Johnson Memorial
Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 5 the will of the testatrix
Fannie A. Williams, provided for the creation of three charitable trusts which would be funded by the residuary estate to
benefit "the YMCA in Vicksburg, Kuhn Memorial Hospital in

501

Tinnin, 502 So. 2d at 663.

"'
Id.; see Richardson v. Browning, 192 So. 2d 692, 694 (Miss. 1966); Cooper
v. Simmons, 116 So. 2d 215, 218 (Miss. 1959); Richmond v. Bass, 32 So. 2d 136,
137 (Miss. 1947).
5"3 See Estate of Williams v. Junius Ward Johnson Mem'l Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 672 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Miss. 1996); Tinnin, 502 So. 2d at 670.
'" Johnson v. Board of Trustees of the Miss. Annual Conference of the United
Methodist Church, 492 So. 2d 269, 276 (Miss. 1986).
As the court stated in Tinnin:

Charitable trusts are favored and should be enforced where possible. Instruments to purportedly creating charitable trusts will be liberally construed in favor of the charity. Where there are two possible constructions
of the instrument in question, one of which will render the charitable
gift valid and the other of which will cause it to fail, we will adopt the
construction which will sustain the charitable bequest, absent manifest
countervailing considerations. Finally, there is a presumption, albeit a rebuttable one, that the testator preferred the charitable trust to survive
so far as may be within the law.
Tinnin, 502 So. 2d at 670 (citations omitted).
'0 672 So. 2d 1173 (Miss. 1996).
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Vicksburg, and the Old Ladies Home in Jackson."6 ' More
specifically, with respect to the Old Ladies Home, the will provided:
The trust for the Old Ladies Home in Jackson, Mississippi is
limited strictly for the use of that organization in Jackson,
Mississippi for the maintaining of an Old Ladies Home in
Jackson, Mississippi. If the Old Ladies Home ceases to operate in Jackson as a viable entity, that trust terminates and
all undistributed income and principal shall be divided equally among my other residuary trusts created by this article of
my Will which have not terminated prior to that time."3°
Some months prior to the execution of the will, and apparently unbeknownst to Ms. Williams, the Old Ladies Home relocated from West Capitol Street in Jackson to a newly-constructed facility in Madison, some three miles outside the Jackson city limits." 8 Kuhn Memorial Hospital having been closed
by the State, the Vicksburg YMCA sought to have itself declared the sole beneficiary of the residuary estate on the
grounds that the Old Ladies Home no longer existed "in Jackson."0 9 Reciting the preference for a construction that will
make a charitable gift valid, the Mississippi Supreme Court
held:
Although the testatrix's intent to establish a charitable
trust would not be completely defeated by the disqualification
of the Old Ladies Home Association, it is certainly more consistent with her testamentary intent to adopt a construction
of her will that validates as many of her charitable bequests
as possible. Fannie A. Williams clearly intended in her will to
benefit an organization known as the Old Ladies Home which
operated a home for elderly women in Jackson. There is nothing in the record that suggests that her interests were confined to the Jackson city limits as opposed to the Jackson
metropolitan area. In fact, the Old Ladies Home Association

Estate of Williams, 672 So. 2d at 1174.

Id.
508See id. at 1174-75.
5w

501

See id. at 1174.
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moved its facility outside the city limits of Jackson six months
prior to the execution of the will. Thus, the only possible way
to give effect to her testamentary wishes is to construe the
phrase "in Jackson, Mississippi" as encompassing a larger
geographic area beyond the city's corporate boundaries. This
is the only reasonable construction.5 1

b. Mutual, Joint, or Reciprocal Wills"'
The will of two or more persons "executed pursuant to an
oral agreement or understanding, may, within itself, when12
considered and construed together, constitute a contract."
"The construction of joint and mutual wills and the contract
under which they are made is governed by the rules relating to
the construction of wills and contracts generally, including the
rule that the situation of the parties and the surrounding circumstances are to be taken into consideration so as to determine the intent of the testators."5 13
In Alvarez v. Coleman,514 Vernard and Dixie Droke, at
the time husband and wife, executed a trust agreement transferring all their property into the "Droke Family Trust" to support them for life and then, after both had died, to be divided
into two trusts, one-half for the benefit of Dixie's great-grandchildren and one-half for the benefit of the First Seventh Day
Adventist Church in Memphis. The trust agreement was revo'1o

Id. at 1175.

A "mutual will" is "a will which is executed in pursuance of a compact or
agreement between two or more persons to dispose of their property, either to
each other, or to third persons in a particular manner." Monroe v. Holleman, 185
So. 2d 443, 448 (Miss. 1966). "The term 'mutual will' has frequently been used by
the courts interchangeably with 'reciprocal will,' and with the same meaning, and,
occasionally, as meaning a joint will; the terms 'joint wills' and 'mutual wills' are
sometimes inaptly used interchangeably." Id. (quotation omitted). "Reciprocal wills'
are those in which each of two or more testators makes a testamentary
disposition in favor of the other or others, under a similar plan, either by executing separate wills or by all uniting in the same will, a will of the latter sort, or
511

one both joint and reciprocal, being sometimes termed a 'double' will

....

"

Id.

(quotation omitted).
"' Monroe, 185 So. 2d at 448; accord Alvarez v. Coleman, 642 So. 2d 361, 372
(Miss. 1994).
51 Monroe, 185 So. 2d at 448; accord Alvarez, 642 So. 2d at 372.
...642 So. 2d 361 (Miss. 1994).
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cable by either Settlor until the death of either; at such point it
would become irrevocable.5 1 On the same day they executed
the trust agreement, Vernard and Dixie executed nearly identical wills, leaving virtually all of their property to the Trust.
Following Dixie's death, Vernard revoked the trust, and executed a new will leaving his estate to five of his nieces. Upon
Vernard's death in 1988, his 1981 will was offered into probate
by the
trustee, and his 1987 will was offered by one of the niec16
es.

5

Reviewing the law of joint wills set forth in Monroe v.
Holleman, discussed supra, the Mississippi Supreme Court held
that Dixie and Vernard had breached an enforceable contract to
make a joint will:
Vernard's and Dixie's wills were clearly executed, together with the trust instrument, pursuant to an agreement or
understanding. "Considered and construed together," as directed by Monroe, the instruments "constitute a contract."
We held in Monroe that the surviving wife impermissibly
repudiated the contract she and her husband had made concerning the disposition of their property ....
Vernard, the surviving testator, was similarly bound by
the contract contained in the November 18, 1981 wills and
trust instrument, and similarly estopped from repudiating
that contract. Dixie's half-interest in the marital estate became vested upon her death; Vernard could not thereafter
revoke the mutual wills and trust agreement.517

516
517

Alvarez, 642 So. 2d at 362.
Id. at 362-63.
Id. at 372.

Turning to the question of the remedy available to those who were damaged
by Vernard's breach of the joint will, the Alvarez court analogized the situation to
the breach of an agreement not to revoke a will:
In Trotter v. Trotter, we considered the breach of a contract not to
revoke a will. We stated that the breach of such contract was not
grounds for contesting the will itself, but that the promisor's heirs might
have a remedy "on the contract or perhaps upon a constructive trust
theory." In the case at bar, there was a contract to place all assets in a
trust, to give the surviving spouse unlimited use and control over the
assets, and to divide the residue of the estate (contained in the trust) at
the survivor's death between Vernard's designee, the Church, and Dixie's
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In the absence of an oral or written contract making the
joint wills irrevocable on the death of one of the makers, however, the Mississippi Supreme Court has been reluctant to
treat the two wills as anything more than two wills. In Lane v.
Woodland Hills Baptist Church,18 Julius and Beulah Rogers
executed a joint will that read:
Be it known that we, Julius P. Rogers and Beulah S.
Rogers,... do hereby make, declare and publish this one true

Joint Last Will and Testament, specifically revoking all previous wills.
1. On the death of one of us, the survivor shall become
the full owner of all interest of the one dying in real and
personal property, wheresoever situated, with full power in
the survivor to own and control the same, and full power to
sell and transfer any part of the said property, real, personal
or mixed, and to convey good title to any of the property conveyed, and to be transferred and conveyed for any reason
deemed good by the said survivor.
2. At the death of the survivor, the property not therefore
disposed of by the survivor shall be and become the property
of Woodland Hills Baptist Church, Old Canton Road, Jackson,
Mississippi ..

519

Unlike Alvarez, there was no separate trust document to which
the joint will bound the makers to devise their property, nor
was there any provision in the joint will or in a separate agreement (such as the trust agreement in Alvarez) making the joint
will irrevocable on the death of Julius or Beulah, whichever
might die first.520 Following Julius's death, Beulah executed a
new will leaving particular items of personal property to sever-

designee, her great grandchildren. Vernard breached this contract by
attempting to transfer the residue of the estate to his designee exclusively. Dixie's great grandchildren may maintain a third party claim on this
contract theory.
Id. at 372-73 (quoting Trotter v. Trotter, 490 So. 2d 827, 832 (Miss. 1986)).
"" 285 So. 2d 901 (Miss. 1973).
...Lane, 285 So. 2d at 901-02.
"'2 See supra note 515 and accompanying text.
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al individuals. 2 '
At trial, the chancellor held that Beulah's later-executed
will was otherwise valid, but that the earlier joint will could
not be revoked.52 2 The supreme court reversed:
It is well settled in this state that a joint will constitutes
the separate will of each executing it. On the death of each, it
may be probated as a will, and its legal effect is separate and

distinct-not joint. The declared intentions of each of the testators affect only his own property or his share in joint proper-

ty....
While two or more persons may jointly execute a
single testamentary document, sometimes spoken of as a
joint, double, mutual, or reciprocal will, it is well settled
in America that this document constitutes the valid separate will of each of those executing it, and that on the
death of each it may be probated as a will ....
If the will here involved constitutes anything more than
a joint will, it must be gleaned from the will itself, since there
is no evidence in the record to show any agreement or contract. After a careful study of the will executed by Mr. and
Mrs. Rogers, we are of the opinion that it is nothing more
than a joint will which under the law serves as the separate
will of each of the parties. When Mr. Rogers died, this joint
will was probated as his will. Whatever property he owned
passed under this will and it cannot now be revoked. Since it
was a separate will of each of the parties, Mrs. Rogers was
free to make another will. This she did by executing the holographic will on December 20, 1968. The chancellor correctly
found that the instrument was a valid will but was in error in
holding that Mrs. Rogers could not revoke the joint will. 2 3

521 Lane, 285 So. 2d at 902.

Id. at 903.
" Id. at 903-04 (citations omitted) (quoting Hill v. Godwin, 81 So. 790, 791
(Miss. 1919)).
'2
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c. PerpetuitiesProblems
If reasonably possible, Mississippi courts should construe
an ambiguous will so as to avoid conflict with the rule against
perpetuities.52 4 If part of the will conflicts with the rule
against perpetuities and part does not, the court "should save
such parts of the gift as the rigid requirements of the rule do
not strike down, provided such action carries out the testator's
principal purpose."525 Such an approach "will preserve the policy of the rule, and at the same time preserve so far as may be
the intention of testator."5 2 Whether a testator's plan would
be emasculated by sustaining only a part of it is a question of
fact in each particular case.527
d. Other Special Rules
1). Time of Vesting
Mississippi law favors the vesting of an estate "at the earliest possible moment."52 8 In the absence of contrary intent, a

See Carter v. Berry, 136 So. 2d 871, 874 (Miss.) ["Carter 1"], modified on

62

other grounds, 140 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1962).
" Carter v. Berry, 140 So. 2d 843, 850 (Miss. 1962) ["Carter I"]. As the Carter II court explained:
Infectious invalidity is not a universal doctrine . . . . Where part of the
testator's plan is valid and part invalid, the normal procedure is to examine the total plan of testator, and determine whether that part which
is invalid is so integral to the total plan that it can be inferred testator
would have preferred all to fail, rather than to have the valid part
stand alone. If the valid part actually accomplishes most of testator's
desires, then that portion should stand. The all-or-nothing rule ignores
the proposition that the problem is one of separability, not of perpetuities; a question of construction, not of application of a rule of law.
There is no reason to totally amputate an arm in order to save an infected finger. The general dispositive intent should control. The court
should save such parts of the gift as the rigid requirements of the rule
do not strike down, provided such action carries out the testator's principal purpose.
Id.

528 Id.
52

Id.

" In re Raworth's Estate, 52 So. 2d 661, 663 (Miss. 1951); see In re Estate of
Blount, 611 So. 2d 862, 866 (Miss. 1992); Allen v. Allen, 110 So. 685, 686 (Miss.
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devise to a class of persons "vests immediately upon the death
of the testator in the members of the class then in being, subject to open up and let in members of the class who may afterwards come into being, before the date fixed for the
ascertainments of the members of the class."52
2). Life Estates vs. Fees
Life tenancies "are not favored,"' 0 such that
where a grant or devise is made to one and his children, or
issue, or the children or issue of his body, or equivalent
words, and the named person has no child at the effective
date of the instrument, that the named person takes a feesimple title to the property conveyed or devised, unless the instrument by express words or necessary implication, shows a
clear intent to create a life estate in the named person, remainder to after-born children or issue.53
3). Presumption in Favor of Next of Kin
If a provision remains unclear after applying more general
rules of construction, Mississippi courts should construe that
provisions "in a manner favorable to the next of kin." 32
14. 'Dragnet"Clauses
Mississippi courts should enforce a "properly executed and
unambiguous dragnet clause in a deed of trust ... according to
its terms."5 3 A dragnet clause is "properly executed" as long
1927); Branton v. Buckley, 54 So. 850, 850 (Miss. 1911).
52 Allen, 110 So. at 686; accord Branton, 54 So. at 850.

Raworth's Estate,
Ewing v. Ewing, 22 So.
"'
Ewing, 22 So. 2d
First Natl Bank

52 So. 2d at 663; see Estate of Blount, 611 So. 2d at 866;
2d 225, 227 (Miss. 1945).
at 227.
of Laurel v. Commercial Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 157

So. 2d 502, 504 (Miss. 1963); see Hart v. First Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 103 So. 2d
406, 409 (Miss. 1958); Cross v. O'Cavanagh, 21 So. 2d 473, 474 (Miss. 1945).
' Iuka Guar. Bank v. Beard, 658 So. 2d 1367, 1371 (Miss.' 1995); see Kelso v.
McGowan, 604 So. 2d 726, 729 (Miss. 1992); Whiteway Fin. Co. v. Green, 434
So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Miss. 1983); Trapp ex rel. First Miss. Bank of Commerce v.
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as "both parties have agreed to the clause, and there was no
fraud in the making of the contract."" In the absence of
fraud or ambiguity, a properly executed dragnet clause "should
be construed as written to cover subsequent debts created" by
the debtor."'
If the creditor claims that a dragnet clause ensnares property that is otherwise exempt from execution as a matter of
law, the court must strictly construe the clause in favor of the
party entitled to the exemption." 6 A security agreement or
mortgage that "employs broad language which purports to
secure all debts of a borrower, but does not specifically list

Tidwell, 418 So. 2d 786, 792 (Miss. 1982); Newton County Bank v. Jones, 299
So. 2d 215, 218 (Miss. 1974).
A "dragnet clause" typically consolidates all prior indebtedness between the
parties, as well as any future indebtedness, into the debt evidenced by the writing containing the dragnet clause. For example, in Hudson v. Bank of Leakesville,
the dragnet clause provided:
In addition to the indebtedness specifically mentioned above, and
any and all extensions or renewals of the same, or any part thereof, this
conveyance shall also cover such future and additional advances as may
be made to the grantor, or either of them, by the beneficiary, not to
exceed the sum of $125,000.00, the beneficiary to be the sole judge as to
whether or not such future and additional advances shall be made. In
addition to all of the above, it is intended that this conveyance shall
secure, and it does secure any and all debts, obligations, or liabilities,
direct or contingent, of the grantor herein, or either of them, to the
beneficiary, whether now existing or hereafter arising at any time before
actual cancellation of this instrument on the public records of mortgages
and deeds of trust, whether the same be evidenced by note, open account, over-draft, endorsement, guaranty or otherwise.
Hudson v. Bank of Leakesville, 249 So. 2d 371, 373 (Miss. 1971); see also, e.g.,
Walters v. Merchants & Mfrs. Bank of Ellisville, 67 So. 2d 714, 717 (Miss. 1953)
("In addition to the aforesaid indebtedness and any and all extensions or renewals
of the same or any part thereof, this instrument is intended to secure and does
secure any and all debts that the said Grantors or either of them may incur with
or owe to the said Beneficiary within 10 years from the statutory limitation of the
within instrument from the date hereof, whether the same be evidenced by note,
open account, assignment endorsement, or otherwise.").
...Iuka Guaranty Bank, 658 So. 2d at 1371; see Walters, 67 So. 2d at 717-18.
luka Guaranty Bank, 658 So. 2d at 1371.
5' See Hudson, 249 So. 2d at 373; Biggs v. Roberts, 115 So. 2d 151, 153
(Miss. 1959); Gardner v. Cook, 158 So. 150, 152 (Miss. 1934).
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existing debt,... is ambiguous as to whether the antecedent
debt is secured by the agreement."537
In such cases certain principles must be applied to deter-

mine the intent of the parties. First, it must be considered
whether the dragnet clause employed in the agreement is

"boilerplate." The Stewart court noted that "[oiften these
clauses are not discussed between the borrower and the lender so that the borrower is not aware of the existence or the
effect of these clauses." Second, the nature of the secured debt
must be examined to determine the validity of the dragnet
clause with respect to other debt. Where the debt which the
lender seeks to have included under the dragnet clause is
different in kind from the primary debt secured by the agreement, it is less likely that it was intended to be encompassed
by the agreement. Third, heavy emphasis is placed on the fact
that the antecedent loans are not listed in the agreement.
"The rationale for excluding antecedent loans is that they are
known to the lender at the time the agreement is drafted and
should be included, if there is an intent to do so, since those
loans are easily identifiable." Finally, this Court will consider
whether the debt which the lender seeks to have included
under the dragnet clause is otherwise fully secured.5
Merchants National Bank v. Stewart,53 9 discussed in the
preceding quotation, involved the sale of a farm by the
Stewarts to their son and son-in-law, who agreed that the purchase price would include a balance of $400,000 on the original
purchase still owed by the Stewarts plus the assumption of a
small business loan in the amount of $108,000. The son and
son-in-law each (1) executed a deed of trust in favor of the
elder Stewarts in the amount of $170,000 for the purchase of
land, (2) signed a second deed of trust in favor of the
bank-securing a note for the remainder of the purchase money, which was also guaranteed by the Farmers' Home Adminis-

'
Wallace v. United Miss. Bank, 726 So. 2d 578, 586-87 (Miss. 1998); see
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Stewart, 608 So. 2d 1120, 1126 (Miss. 1992).
Wallace, 726 So. 2d at 587 (citations and parentheticals omitted).
608 So. 2d 1120 (Miss. 1992).
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tration (FmHA)-and (3) signed notes for crop production and
irrigation loans. The Stewarts signed a hypothecation agreement in favor of the bank as security for the crop and irrigation
loans, giving the bank an assignment of the first deeds of trust
owed to them by the son and son-in-law. 4
The issue for the Stewart court was whether the hypothecation agreement also covered the notes for the purchase money secured by the second deed of trust."l The bank argued
that it did, relying on the language granting the bank "a security interest in. .. any and all other indebtedness of [the son
or son-in-law] to [the bank], created at any time before [the
bank] shall have received written notice from [the Stewarts]
terminating this Hypothecation
Agreement and all renewals
542
thereof."
extensions
and
The Stewart court held that the purchase money loans
were not within the scope of the hypothecation agreement:
The language used by [the bank] in these agreements is
"boilerplate" in nature as the agreement was a standard form
used by the bank. The bank contends that the Stewarts were
fully aware that [their son and son-in-law] had signed second
mortgages before the hypothecation agreements were signed.
This fact is undisputed, because all of the agreements were
signed on the same day. The bank was aware also of the obligations and, as the drafter of the document, could have easily
and explicitly included them within the hypothecation agreements.
The primary debt secured by the hypothecation
agreement was a line of credit to be used for crop production and irrigation. The notes the bank seeks to have
included within the scope of the hypothecation agreement were for money to purchase land and were secured
by that land, FmHA guarantees, and second liens. The
chief obligation covered by the hypothecation agreement
is different in nature. Moreover, the fact that these

~Stewart,

541

Id.

5"2 Id.

608 So. 2d at 1122-23, 1125.

at 1125 n.4 (emphasis omitted).
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notes were otherwise fully secured, further indicates
that they were not intended to be included under the
hypothecation agreements."'3
Dragnet clauses do not "extend to debts purchased or otherwise acquired by a mortgagee from third parties against a
mortgagor."' Nor may a dragnet clause be used to collect a

" Id. at 1126-27. Notice the not-so-subtle invocation of contra proferentem in
the first paragraph-when in doubt, hold the drafter "responsible" for any ambiguity. See supra subpart II.D.1. The Wallace court, likewise, appears to have resorted to contra proferentem to resolve the scope of the "dragnet" clause before it.
See Wallace v. United Miss. Bank, 726 So. 2d 578, 588 (Miss. 1998).
'" Hudson v. Bank of Leakesville, 249 So. 2d 371, 374 (Miss. 1971). The Hudson court stated:
It is contended . . . that the language of the "dragnet" clause, "any
other or further indebtedness in the way of future advances hereunder,
or otherwise, that the grantor, or either of them, may now or hereafter
owe the beneficiary . . . assented to by both grantors in the trust deed,
is sufficiently broad and clear in its terms to secure the indebtedness of
one of the grantors subsequently made to a third party. We are of the
opinion that it is not. A majority of the states hold, and we find no Mississippi case in point, that the "dragnet" clause of a deed of trust or
mortgage does not extend to debts purchased or otherwise acquired by a
mortgagee from third parties against a mortgagor. We are of the opinion
that the better and majority rule is pronounced in Wood v. Parker
Square State Bank, 400 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tex. 1966), with regard to the
construction of a "dragnet" clause expressed in these terms:
"And this conveyance is made for the security and enforcement of
the payment of said indebtedness and also to secure the payment
of any and all other sums of money which may be advanced for or
loaned to grantors by the beneficiary, his heirs or assigns."
The court stated, in rejecting security for the third party indebtednesses:
* * * [It] was not contemplated or meant that the mortgagee could
buy up third party debts which after the purchase would be secured by the mortgage; and that a mortgagee buying up claims
held against his mortgagor by third persons cannot have them
embraced in, and secured by, his mortgage, or included in the
foreclosure decree, unless the language of the instrument provides
in the clearest and most unmistakable terms for their inclusion,
and unless such stipulation was expressly called to the mortgagor's
attention and he assented thereto. These policy expressions are
basically sound. (400 S.W.2d at 902).
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debt owed by only one of multiple joint debtors, unless the
clause specifically and expressly allows it." 5 On the other
hand, where a single debtor owes secured debts to more than
one joint creditor, the dragnet clause will encompass debts
owed to less than all of the joint creditors.'

The term "in the way of future advances hereunder, or otherwise"
used in the present trust deed is not sufficiently clear or in such unmistakable terms as to include the indebtedness made to the Leakesville
Hardware Company. This is particularly so, we think, when it is considered that the enlargement of the security afforded is a direct diminution
of the homestead and as such is subject to a liberal construction in favor
of the exemptionist both as to common assent necessary for encumbering
the homestead property and specificity of terms necessary to further
encumber.
Hudson, 249 So. 2d at 374 (citation and emphasis omitted).
" See, e.g., Holland v. Bank of Lucedale, 204 So. 2d 875, 877 (Miss. 1967);
Walters v. Merchants & Mfrs. Bank of Ellisville, 67 So. 2d 714, 717 (Miss. 1953);
Davis v. Crawford, 168 So. 261, 262 (Miss. 1936) (all holding that dragnet clause
in deed of trust executed by husband and wife which secured future advances
made to "them" did not secure advance made only to husband). As one court
stated:
The rationale undergirding the strict construction of dragnet clauses
in co-debtor situations is that one co-debtor should not be held to have
risked his equity for the future debts of another debtor absent a clear
expression of intent . . . . If a creditor were allowed to foreclose against
one such debtor, the other co-debtors would be in danger of losing their
interest in the collateral without ever having defaulted on their own
debts ....
Kelso v. McGowan, 604 So. 2d 726, 729-30 (Miss. 1992) (citations omitted). But cf
luka Guar. Bank v. Beard, 658 So. 2d 1367, 1371 (Miss. 1995) ("There is no requirement that the co-tenants have knowledge of the existence of other debts, or
each others' consent to the creation of debt and the attendant lien against the
property, in order for the dragnet clause to be enforceable.").
"' See, e.g., Kelso, 604 So. 2d at 729. In Kelso, one of the joint creditors, Pollack,
sought to collect the amount of Kelso's two dishonored checks through
foreclosure under the dragnet clause found in the deed of trust which
secured Kelso's $50,000 notes to Pollack and Todaro. The subject dragnet
clause states: "This Deed of Trust shall also secure any and all other
Indebtedness of Debtor due to Secured Party . . . ." The deed of trust
identifies "S.E. Pollack and Sal Todaro" as the "Secured Party." Kelso
maintains that since the dragnet clause secured only debts owed to "Secured Party," and since the instrument referred to Pollack and Todaro
collectively as "Secured Party," then the dragnet clause did not secure
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15. 'Acceleration" Clauses

An acceleration clause contained in a mortgage, lease, or
security agreement will be effective only if it is "clear and unequivocal."' Any reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the
language employed, requires a construction that will prevent
the acceleration of maturity.648
Thus, in Frey v. Abdo, 9 the Mississippi Supreme Court
held:
[I]n order to find an acceleration clause in the instant lease
agreement, the contractual language must clearly and unequivocally set forth such a clause. Careful reading... of the
lease reveals no such clearly and unequivocally stated clause.
Reasonable interpretation of the [lease] allows lessor, upon

the two dishonored checks-an alleged debt owed to Pollack individually.
Id.
Kelso argued that the dragnet clause could not be invoked with regard to
debts owed to less than all of the joint creditors:
Kelso's proposed interpretation is facially contradicted by the express
language of the deed of trust. The premises clause refers to the principal debt as follows: "WHEREAS, Debtor is indebted to Secured Party in
the full sum of. . . $100,000.00 . . . evidenced by two promissory
notes . . . in favor of Secured Party." (emphasis added). There is no way
that the term "secured party," as used in the premises clause, can logically refer to the creditors as a collective entity: Pollack and Todaro do
not hold the two promissory notes jointly. One note is in favor of Pollack
only; the other is in favor of Todaro only.
If the term "secured party" is not limited to a collective entity in
the premises clause, then it cannot be so limited in the dragnet clause.
Consequently, we must read the dragnet clause as securing "all other
Indebtedness" of Kelso due to Pollack and/or Todaro, either jointly or
individually.
Id. at 730 (citations and parentheticals omitted).
, Frey v. Abdo, 441 So. 2d 1383, 1385 (Miss. 1983).
An "acceleration clause" gives the creditor or lessor the power, upon the
debtor's or lessee's default as to a single payment, to demand payment in full of
the entire outstanding balance, including installments not yet due. See, e.g., Frey,
441 So. 2d at 1384 ("It is further agreed that in default of any one or more of
said rental payments, or any part thereof, this lease may be declared forfeited by
the Lessor at her option, in which event the Lessee shall be liable for all rents
remaining unpaid under this lease agreement . ... ).
' Id.; see Boatright v. Horton, 86 So. 2d 864, 868 (Miss. 1956).
'49 441 So. 2d 1383 (Miss. 1983).

234

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69

the default by the lessee, to forfeit the lease, but whether it
allows acceleration of amounts to become due in the future is
not clearly stated. The provision could give two results: (1)
the Lessor could immediately collect all the payments that
are past due, or (2) the lessor could immediately collect all
payments that the lease provides for-both past due and due
in the future.
Inasmuch as the lease is susceptible to two interpretations, the rule of Boatright v. Horton, supra, resolves the
doubt in favor of that construction which would prevent acceleration. Thus we hold that the lease agreement did not contain an acceleration clause and any payment not yet due
before suit was brought was not yet actionable."0
16. Bills of Lading
Mississippi courts should resolve any reasonable doubt
regarding the construction of a bill of lading against the carrier
and in favor of the shipper.5 51
Bills of lading "are subject to regulation under the law, and
when a lawful regulation has been imposed it is not within the
power of the carrier to destroy the regulation, by any printed
form of contract required to be signed by shippers."5 52 Stipulations and reservations in bills of lading "are made entirely for
the benefit of the carrier, and will receive strict construction, to
the end that through it just claims of shippers may not be
defeated by dilatory methods in handling the claim."" As the
court in Lasky v. Southern Express Co.5"' explained: "These
stipulations are made on the back of contracts of shipment, and
are rarely read by the shipper, and the one ground upon which
they can be upheld is that they are reasonable regulations-not
contracts in the true sense."555

...Frey, 441 So. 2d at 1385.
551 See Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Nichols & Co., 83 So. 5, 7 (Miss. 1919),

aff'd, 256 U.S. 540 (1921).
552 Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. G.W. Bent & Co., 47 So. 805, 806 (Miss.
1908).
Id. (quotation omitted).
45 So. 869 (Miss. 1908).
s51 Lasky, 45 So. at 870; accord G.W. Bent, 47 So. at 806-07; see also Illinois
51
5'
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The Mississippi Supreme Court
has repudiated the idea that these printed stipulations may
be given the force of a contract, fully, freely, fairly, and voluntarily entered into by private parties, but regards such stipulations more as regulations made by the carrier for its own
benefit, the validity of which must depend on reasonableness
and consistency with the general law."
17. Covenants Not To Compete
Mississippi law disfavors covenants not to compete as restraints of trade and individual freedom. 5 7 Nonetheless, Mississippi courts will enforce them "when reasonable.""5 8
In Landry v. Moody Grishman Agency, Inc.,"' the parties
entered into a written agreement whereby Landry agreed to
work solely for Moody Grishman during the term of the agree-

Cent. R.R. v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 30 So. 43, 43-44 (Miss. 1901) ("The common
carrier must at all times be ready and willing to contract with the shipper on the
terms and conditions imposed by law. If the carrier desire to limit its commonlaw liability, it can only do so by special contract with the particular shipper,
freely and fairly entered into, and upon sufficient consideration.").
' G.W. Bent, 47 So. at 807
...See Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain, 599 So. 2d 971, 975 (Miss. 1992);
Texas Rd. Boring Co. of La.-Miss. v. Parker, 194 So. 2d 885, 888 (Miss. 1967);
Frierson v. Sheppard Bldg. & Supply Co., 154 So. 2d 151, 156 (Miss. 1963).
As to the enforceability of such covenants, the Empiregas Court explained:
The validity and, therefore, the enforceability of a non-competition
provision is largely predicated upon the reasonableness and specificity of
its terms, primarily, the duration of the restriction and its geographic
scope. The burden of proving the reasonableness of these terms is on the
employer. However, our inquiry does not end there. In Donahoe u.
Tatum, 242 Miss. 253, 261, 134 So. 2d 442, 445 (1961), we acknowledged
that the need to balance the rights of employers and employees "requires
us to recognize that there is such a thing as unfair competition by an
ex-employer as well as by unreasonable oppression by an employer." In
so doing, we revitalized the rule first articulated in Wilson v. Gamble,
180 Miss. 499, 177 So. 363, 365 (1937), that non-competition agreements
are only valid 'within such territory and during such time as may be
reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer or principal,
without imposing undue hardship on the employee or agent ..
Empiregas, 599 So. 2d at 975 (citations omitted).
'" Frierson, 154 So. 2d at 156.
559 181 So. 2d 134 (Miss. 1965).
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ment, in return for which Moody Grishman agreed to compensate Landry with a salary and a share of commissions.5 " The
agreement provided that, if either party terminated the agreement prior to its expiration date, or if the agreement was not
renewed at the end of the term, then
the Employee agrees as a part of the consideration hereof not
to compete with the employer in Harrison, Jackson or Hancock Counties, Mississippi, within a period of five (5) years
from the date of termination of the contract, for whatever
cause the same may be terminated. This agreement not to
compete applies equally to the Employee acting in his own
capacity or serving as an agent or Employee of another."'
The question was whether the clause "became operative
upon the termination of the relationship of employer and employee on September 1, 1964. " "52The court found that it did
not:
This contract is plain and unambiguous. The restrictive
clause became operative only if (1) the contract was terminated before December [311, 1963, or (2) if the parties did not
enter into a contract for further employment (after December
[311, 1963). Neither of the contingencies occurred ....
...

Landry was not prohibited from competing with the

Grishman Agency under the terms of the contract and the
undisputed facts. A restrictive clause in a contract is not
favored by the law and the court will not exercise power
which the contract itself does not invoke.5"
18. Contingent Fee Contracts
"Every contingency fee contract has a provision, incorporated by implication if it does not explicitly appear in the text,
that permits the client to discharge the attorney at any time
with or without cause." 564
Landry, 181 So. 2d at 135-36.
at 137-38.
62 Id. at 139.
s6 id. at 139-40.
'
Estate of Stevens v. Wetzel, No. 96-CA-00343-COA, 1999 WL 58566, at *3
'60
-'

Id.
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19. Express Warranties
An express warranty that warrants "each and every part"
of a product "not only warrants each separate part, but warrants all the parts as a whole."5" If the express warranty provides the method by which it is to be fulfilled, the warrantor is
bound only to that method of performance unless the written
warranty is unclear or ambiguous."'
In Ford Motor Co. v. Olive," 7 the written warranty provided that "defective parts were to be 'replaced or repaired' by
'the selling dealer at his place of business" :
The plaintiff testified that the [selling dealer] did all it
could to repair the automobile; that it replaced the defective
parts and did everything plaintiff requested it to do; that
plaintiffs relations with [the selling dealer] were very cordial ....
The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show that
the warranty was not "fulfilled" by the "selling dealer" by its
failure to replace or repair defective parts, unless it was
shown that the article sold was incapable of being repaired.
In the instant case the testimony shows that the plaintiff
made no attempt to rescind the sales contract, although he
returned the automobile to the dealer many times for repair.
The dealer repaired the automobile and the manufacturer furnished the parts and paid for the cost of labor. The plaintiff
continued to use the automobile until he had driven it 24,000
miles. He returned it then, only when it was being repossessed.
... [Clontinued use of an automobile for a long period of
time after it has been repaired in compliance with the
manufacturer's warranty is sufficient to show that the repair
was satisfactory to the purchaser.5"

(Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1999).
"
Ford Motor Co. v. Olive, 234 So. 2d 910, 913 (Miss. 1970).
"'

See id.

67234 So. 2d 910 (Miss. 1970).
"'
Id. at 913.
"6 Id. (citation omitted).
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III. THE ROLE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
IN CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

Application of "canons" of construction may provide a
court with an objective inference of the parties' intent.
But if, at this step in the process, intent remains unascertainable... , then the court may resort to a final
tier in the three-tiered process of construction. This
final tier entails considerationof extrinsic or parol evidence.57 0
As a general rule, when two or more parties have executed
an unambiguous, fully integrated, written agreement, extrinsic
evidence is not admissible to prove either their intent or the
meaning of the terms they used in the writing. However, if the
court determines that the agreement is not fully integrated, or
that the agreement is ambiguous, then the factfinder is free to
consider extrinsic evidence that supplements, but does not
contradict, those portions of the written agreement that are
final and unambiguous, as well as any extrinsic evidence pertinent to those portions of the agreement that are not final and
unambiguous, in order to resolve the ambiguity and determine
the terms of the entire agreement-subject, of course, to the
rules of evidence. Moreover, certain statutory and common law
exceptions permit the factfinder to consider certain extrinsic
evidence even though an agreement is fully integrated and
unambiguous.
In order to better understand the body of common and
statutory law permitting or proscribing the use of extrinsic
evidence to construe and interpret written agreements, it helps
to distinguish between, on the one hand, extrinsic evidence
offered to explain the intent of the contracting parties at the
time the contract was executed, and, on the other, extrinsic
evidence offered to add to, subtract from, or otherwise modify
the terms of a written agreement. The former "interpretive"

.70Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 349, 353 (Miss. 1990).
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type of evidence is not subject to the parol evidence rule. The
latter "suppletive" type of evidence is subject to the parol evidence rule, and the trier of fact may not consider it until the
trial court first finds that a written agreement is either not
fully integrated or ambiguous, or both. Naturally, the line between interpretive and suppletive evidence is not nearly as
clear in practice as it is in theory.
A.

The Common Law Parol Evidence Rule

The essence of the parol evidence rule is that the embodiment
of an agreement into a single writing makes all other utterances of the parties on that topic legally immaterial for the purpose of determining what are the terms of the contract. vl

As a general rule, evidence regarding prior or contemporaneous oral agreements or prior written agreements is inadmissible when it is offered to add to, subtract from, vary, or
contradict the terms of a fully integrated, unambiguous, written agreement.57 2 Put another way: "[In measuring the rights
of the parties to a written contract or conveyance which, on its
face, is unambiguous and expresses an agreement complete in
Chism v. Omlie, 124 So. 2d 286, 288 (Miss. 1960).
...See Security Mut. Fin. Corp. v. Willis, 439 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (Miss. 1983);
51

Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Lackey, 397 So. 2d 1100, 1102 (Miss. 1981); Byrd v.
Rees, 171 So. 2d 864, 867 (Miss. 1965); Fuqua v. Mills, 73 So. 2d 113, 118-19
(Miss. 1954); Allen v. Allen, 168 So. 658, 659 (Miss. 1936); Housing Auth., City of
Laurel v. Gatlin, 738 So. 2d 249, 251 (Miss. 1998).
One commentator offers the following "working definition" of the parol evidence rule:
When the parties to an agreement have reduced their agreement to
a writing intended by them, or treated by the court, as a final and complete statement of the entire agreement, the writing may not be contradicted, varied, or even supplemented by prior oral or written understandings of the parties. If the parties intended, or the court believes, that
the writing was to be merely a final expression of some of the terms of
the agreement, the writing may be supplemented but not varied or contradicted by prior oral and written understandings of the parties.
George I. Wallach, The Declining "Sanctity" of Written Contracts-Impact of the
Uniform Commercial Code on the Parol Evidence Rule, 44 MO. L. REV. 651, 651
(1979).
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all its essential terms, the writing will control." 7 3
This "venerable, honored, and well-established" 574 rule
has been a fixture of Mississippi common law for nearly 180
years.5 7 5' Therefore, any examples of its application must be
understood as exactly that-mere examples.
In Kerr v. Calvit, 7 the first generally reported Mississippi Supreme Court case considering the application of the
parol evidence rule, the dispute centered around a note, in the
amount of $2,000, representing one-half the amount to be paid
for a certain parcel of land, and a deed warranting that the
land to be conveyed was "not more than 240 or 250 acres" and
that the consideration for the conveyance was the sum of
$4,000. 57 7 The plaintiff sued for payment of the note; the defendant sought to have the amount due reduced on the ground
that the property conveyed was less than the defendant had
anticipated.5 7' The jury found, in part, for the defendant, and
...Edrington v. Stephens, 114 So. 387, 389 (Miss. 1927).
57, Byrd, 171 So. 2d at 867; see also Gatlin, 738 So. 2d at 251
(referring to
parol evidence rule as "bedrock" rule of Mississippi law).
...See, e.g., Houser v. Brent Towing Co., 610 So. 2d 363, 365 (Miss. 1992);
Cooper v. Crabb, 587 So. 2d 236, 241 (Miss. 1991); Godfrey, Bassett &
Kuykendall Architects, Ltd. v. Huntington Lumber & Supply Co., 584 So. 2d
1254, 1257 (Miss. 1991); Ross v. Brasell, 511 So. 2d 492, 495 (Miss. 1987); Security Mutual Finance, 439 So. 2d at 1281; Lackey, 397 So. 2d at 1102; Byrd, 171
So. 2d at 867; Fuqua, 73 So. 2d at 118-19; Credit Indus. Co. v. Adams County
Lumber & Supply Co., 60 So. 2d 790, 791 (Miss. 1952); Taylor v. C.I.T. Corp.,
191 So. 60, 62 (Miss. 1939); Fornea v. Goodyear Yellow Pine Co., 178 So. 914,
917 (Miss. 1938); State Hwy. Dep't v. Duckworth, 172 So. 148, 150 (Miss. 1937);
Welch v. Gant, 138 So. 585, 585-86 (Miss. 1932); Jeffery v. Jeffery, 127 So. 296,
297-98 (Miss. 1930); Stirling v. Logue, 123 So. 825, 827 (Miss. 1929); Edrington,
114 So. at 389; Maas v. Sisters of Mercy of Vicksburg, 99 So. 468, 472 (Miss.
1924); Pole Stock Lumber Co. v. Oakdale Lumber Co., 54 So. 596, 596 (Miss.
1911); Hightower v. Henry, 37 So. 745, 745 (Miss. 1905); Maxwell v. Chamberlin,
23 So. 266, 267 (Miss. 1898); Pine Grove Lumber Co. v. Interstate Lumber Co.,
15 So. 105, 106 (Miss. 1894); Kerr v. Kuykendall, 44 Miss. 137, 146 (1870); Wren
v. Hoffman, 41 Miss. 616, 619-20 (1868); Thigpen v. Mississippi Cent. R.R., 32
Miss. 347, 353-54 (1856); Kerr v. Calvit, 1 Miss. (Walker) 115, 118 (1822); Gatlin,
738 So. 2d at 251.
176 1 Miss. (Walker) 115 (1822).
7 Kerr, 1 Miss. at 115-16.
17, Id.
at 115. Both of these claims-failure of consideration and fraudulent
misrepresentation-are legitimate contract defenses, and have been held, in other
cases, to be exceptions to the parol evidence rule.
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awarded the plaintiff $800.25, instead of the $2,000 stated in
the note.5 79 The plaintiff appealed.
The only evidence at trial that appeared to support the
defendant's position and the jury's finding was the testimony of
one James Bouth, "who was a subscribing witness to the deed,
but not present at its delivery." 5 ° Bouth testified that "at the
time of signing the deed, he expressed some surprise" that the
amount of land being conveyed was "only 250 acres, since he
understood the sale to have been for four hundred acres," having lived on the tract for a year, and since Terry, the seller of
the land, had told Bouth that the buyer "might get four hundred acres, more or less."5 1 ' Another witness at trial, Fake,
was present at the sale, and stated that the quantity represented was 250 acres and the consideration $4,000.582 Finding
Fake's testimony to be more reliable than Bouth's .. . , given

Fake's presence at the closing and Bouth's absence, the Mississippi Supreme Court held for the plaintiff:
[All the evidence, which by any construction could imply
fraudulent misrepresentations, goes to a period anterior to
the deed, and is removed thereby, where the [seller] states
the true quantity, and the true price, of which [the defendant]
could not but be cognizant;... but it is sought to affect the
consideration it acknowledges, by a reduction, in consequence
of conversations which passed between the parties prior to the
consummation of the contract ....
I.... [It cannot be a safe or salutary rule, to allow a
contract to rest partly in writing, and partly in parol. Whenever it is reduced to writing, this has to be considered the evidence of the agreement, and every thing resting in parol becomes thereby extinguished.
....

In the absence of fraud, which we consider this

case not corrupted with, it will readily be conceded ...
that... the consideration for the land sold by [Terry] to Mrs.
Covington could not be impeached, by parol evidence, having

519
510

Be'
58

See id.
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id.
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In Southern School Book Depository v. Holmes,5
the
court considered whether parol evidence could be used to identify the "real parties in interest"-who the party proffering the
parol testimony contended differed from the parties named in
the written agreement. The court found this to be an impermissible attempt to use parol evidence to contradict an unambiguous writing:
[Tihe defect in counsel's position is that, in order to reach the
end sought, he must by such evidence take from the contract
the agreement to indemnify Davidson & Wardlaw, a partnership composed of E. A. Davidson and S. W. Wardlaw, and
substitute therefor the very different agreement to indemnify
the Southern School Book Depository, a partnership composed
of Victor R. and Burgess Smith.
If this can be done, then under the guise of identifying
the parties in interest, or applying the terms of a contract to
the subject-matter thereof, the intention of the parties to a
contract can be shown by parol evidence to have been very
different from that which appears from the written words
thereof. In the case at bar, for instance, it could then, under
such guise, be shown that it was not the contract of StegerHolmes Company, the performance of which was intended to
be guaranteed, but the contract of quite another and different
party; that, while the penalty of the bond is recited to be
$3,000, the real penalty was in fact in a different amount;
that, although the contract on its face guarantees the performance by Steger-Holmes Company of a certain contract, the
real contract intended to be performed was quite another and
different one, etc."
In Credit Industrial Co. v. Adams County Lumber & Supply Co.,58 the plaintiffs alleged that they were owed payment
by the defendant of three notes the plaintiffs purchased from

5I

Id. at 116-18 (quotation omitted).

5" 61 So. 698 (Miss. 1913).
". Id. at 699.
s" 60 So. 2d 790 (Miss. 1952).
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Carbozite Protective Coatings, Inc., from whom the defendants
had purchased roofing materials under the terms of a franchise
agreement entered into between the defendants and
Carbozite.58 7 The defendants sought to introduce testimony to
support their defense that they were misled by Carbozite and
that the plaintiffs knew or had reason to know of Carbozite's
double dealing."' The trial court excluded this evidence, 8 9

5
s

Credit Indus., 60 So. 2d at 792.
See id. at 792-93. Specifically, the defendants
admitted that the above mentioned drafts had been accepted by the
defendant partnership, as alleged in the plaintiffs' declaration, but the
defendant partners alleged that they were not legally liable for the payment of said instruments because of the false representations made by
the Carbozite Protective Coatings, Inc., in the procurement of said trades
acceptances; and the defendant partners gave notice in their answer that
they would offer to prove as a defense to the plaintiffs' action that said
drafts were drawn on and accepted by the defendant partnership in
payment of the purchase price of roofing materials purchased by the
defendant partnership under the terms of a franchise agreement entered
into by and between the Carbozite Protective Coatings, Inc., and the defendant partnership on January 4, 1950, a copy of which was attached
to the defendant partners' answer; that as a part of the consideration for
the execution of said instruments by the defendant partnership the
Carbozite Protective Coatings, Inc., promised and agreed that it would
make available to the defendant partnership a trained representative to
instruct the defendant partners and their employees and prospective
customers in the proper use and proper method of application of the
Carbozite waterproofing materials, and that the Carbozite company
would sponsor and conduct an intensive national and local advertising
campaign to promote the sale of Carbozite roofing materials, and that a
special truck, containing all the special equipment and machinery necessary to demonstrate the proper use and method of application of
Carbozite roofing materials, would be made available to the defendant
partnership for such advertising purposes; and that none of the above
mentioned promises had been fulfilled. And as an additional ground of
defense, the defendant partners alleged that the Ohmlac Paint and Refining Company, Inc., a corporation affiliated with the Carbozite company, which manufactured roofing materials of substantially the same texture as Carbozite roofing materials, had granted to the Feeders' Service
Company, of Natchez, the exclusive right to sell Ohmlac roofing materials in the Natchez area, and that the sale of Ohmlac products in the
trade territory covered by the defendants' franchise constituted a violation of the defendants' rights under the agreement entered into by and
between the defendant corporation and the Carbozite Protective Coatings,
Inc. The defendants alleged that the plaintiffs were well acquainted with

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69

and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed:
There was no error in the court's ruling on the plaintiffs'
objection to the testimony offered by the defendants to prove
that the Carbozite Protective Corporation, Inc., had agreed to
send a trained salesman to Natchez equipped with special
trucks and machinery designed to demonstrate the proper use
and application of the Carbozite waterproof roofing materials,
and that the Carbozite Protective Coatings, Inc., had agreed
to conduct an intensive national and local sales and advertising campaign to stimulate sales of the Carbozite roofing
materials. The trade acceptances sued on in the plaintiffs'
declaration were issued in payment of the purchase price of
700 gallons of Carbozite waterproof roofing materials delivered to the defendant partnership under the terms of the
written franchise agreement dated January 4, 1950, a copy of
which the defendants attached to their answer. The purchase
order for the 700 gallons of waterproof roofing materials was
incorporated in the agreement. The agreement expressly provided that "Orders are not subject to countermand." And in
the agreement it was expressly stated that "It is understood
that this contract covers and includes the entire agreement
between the parties and any changes binding upon the company must be incorporated in this contract. No warranty or
conditions will be recognized unless specified in this contract."
Each of the drafts sued on in this case contained a provision that "the transaction which gives rise to this instrument
is the purchase of goods by the acceptor from the drawer."
The... promises which the defendants' attorney proposed to prove by J. W. Claughton were verbal promises to do
certain acts in the future. The offer to prove such promises

the practice of the above mentioned corporations in granting overlapping
franchises in the same territory for the sale of their respective products
under different trade names, and the misrepresentations made by the
Carbozite Protective Coatings, Inc., concerning the advertising campaign
and large scale demonstration program which the Carbozite company
proposed to conduct for the benefit of their retail dealers, and that the
plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers of the trade acceptances described in the plaintiffs' declaration.
Id. at 792-93.
a' Id. at 793.
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was in effect an offer to vary and add to the terms of the
written instruments by parolO testimony; and the testimony
was properly rejected for the reason.5"
Houser, who
Finally, in Houser v. Brent Towing Co.,
was injured while in the employ of Brent Towing, settled with
Brent Towing and executed a release of liability which provided
in part:
[F]or and in consideration of the full sum of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND AND NO/100 ($160,000.00) DOLLARS,... Jimmy Ray Houser and Gladys Vivian Houser do hereby release,
and forever discharge Brent Towing Company, Inc., ... from
any and all rights, claims, causes of action liens or remedies
of whatever kind or nature which he or she now has or hereinafter acquired for damages or expenses arising out of Jimmy Ray Houser's employment and injury with Brent Towing
Company, Inc.,. .. including past or future maintenance, cure
or wages, or under any compensation statute, Federal or
State, or under any contract or policy of insurance, and
whether at law, in equity or in admiralty, an[d] whether the
same be now known or hereafter discovered. 5"
When Houser later sued Brent Towing for unpaid medical
bills, Brent Towing moved for summary judgment based on the
release.59 3 Houser answered the motion
by arguing that despite the language of the written release,
the parties had intended that Brent Towing Company would
pay, in addition to the sum certain specified in the settlement, all maintenance and medical expenses incurred prior to
the payment of the settlement funds. Attached to the response were, inter alia, an affidavit by Houser's attorney, the
letters referred to above, and the outstanding medical bill for
the percutaneous discetomy.' 94

ago Id.

610 So. 2d 363 (Miss. 1992).
5 Houser, 610 So. 2d at 364.
5

Id.

'" Id. at 364-65.
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The trial court granted Brent Towing's motion for summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed:
The question we must resolve is simple: Can Houser
avoid the clear and unconditional language of the written release by introducing extrinsic evidence of a contrary intent?
The August 13 release unequivocally discharges any and all
"damages or expenses arising out of Jimmy Ray Houser's
employment and injury with Brent Towing Company, Inc.,...
including past or future maintenance, cure or wages" in exchange for the $160,000.00 settlement. Houser maintains,
however, that the June 11 and July 27 letters demonstrate
that he intended to additionally hold Brent Towing Company
responsible for the cost of his back surgery if the surgery
occurred before Houser received the settlement proceeds.
It is axiomatic that the terms of a clear and unambiguous writing may not be varied by parol evidence. When
Houser signed the August 13 release, all prior agreements,
including any evidenced by the letters to which Houser refers,
were merged into the writing.5"
1. The Purpose of the Rule
The "essence" of the parol evidence rule "is that the embodiment of an agreement into a single writing makes all other
utterances of the parties on that topic legally immaterial for
the purpose of determining what are the terms of the con5 96

tract."

Parties to a transaction should be able to clearly express
their intent regarding the nature and scope of their legal relationship and be able to rely on the legal certainty of that expression. The purpose of memorializing an agreement is to
definitely settle its terms and to exclude all oral understandings to the contrary. In the words of the Fifth Circuit:
Both the parol evidence rule and the doctrine of integration exist so that parties may rely on the enforcement of
agreements that have been reduced to writing. If it were not

"

I" at 365 (citations omitted).
ld.
Chism v. Omlie, 124 So. 2d 286, 288 (Miss. 1960).
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for these established principles, even the most carefully considered written documents could be destroyed by "proof" of
other agreements not included in the writing. The importance
of these principles is well established .. in contract law generally. True, [contract] law recognizes a number of exceptions
to the parol evidence rule. We believe, however, that these
exceptions are carefully and narrowly crafted to permit a
court to consider parol evidence only in certain well-defined
circumstances. If it were otherwise, the exceptions would
become the rule, and the general prohibition against parol
evidence would cease to have any legal effect."s

2. The Scope of the Rule
The parol evidence rule applies only to controversies between the parties to the written agreement, the existence of
which is the basis for invoking the rule. 98 As such, the rule
may not be invoked by" or against"0 non-parties to the
written agreement.
By its own terms, the parol evidence rule does not bar
extrinsic evidence that is offered merely to explain, not to add
to, contradict, vary or change, a written agreement.60" Nor
does the rule bar extrinsic evidence regarding collateral agree-

.. Jack H. Brown & Co. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 906 F.2d 169, 176 (5th Cir.
1990) (applying analogous Texas law).
5" See Sullivan v. Estate of Eason, 558 So. 2d 830, 832 (Miss. 1990); Smith v.
Falke, 474 So. 2d 1044, 1046 (Miss. 1985); National Cash Register Co. v. Webb,
11 So. 2d 205, 205 (Miss. 1942); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 347 (1971) (adopting rule that parol evidence rule is
only operative as to parties to written agreement).
'" See, e.g., Falke, 474 So. 2d at 1047; National Cash Register, 11 So. 2d at
205 (both holding that third parties seeking to invoke the rule to their benefit
lack privity to and are unintended beneficiaries of contract; and, therefore, cannot
invoke rule).
" See, e.g., Sullivan, 558 So. 2d at 832 (holding that named insured could not
exclude evidence of separate agreement between named insured and her co-tenants regarding distribution of insurance proceeds by arguing that the insurance
policy clearly and unambiguously provided that proceeds would be paid by insurer
to named insured).
"' See infra subpart III.A.2.a.
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ments, °2 subsequent oral or written agreements,os or writings that are "not contractual in nature."6
The rule does not apply in the absence of a written agreement."°s
a. Explanatory Evidence
Parol evidence is admissible if offered merely to explain a
written agreement.606 Put another way: "Parol evidence is admissible to show the meaning which the parties themselves

'

See infra subpart III.A.2.b.

60

See infra subpart III.A.2.c.

Wilkins v. Bancroft, 193 So. 2d 571, 574 (Miss. 1966) (holding that oral
testimony regarding letter did not invoke parol evidence rule because letter was
merely proposal and "not contractual in nature").
'
See, e.g., Sloan v. Taylor Mach. Co., 501 So. 2d 409, 410 (Miss. 1987); see
also Ludke Elec. Co. v. Vicksburg Towing Co., 127 So. 2d 851, 857 (Miss. 1961)
("Where a case is taken out of the Statute of Frauds, for any reason, parol evidence is properly admissible to prove the terms of the agreement."). The Sloan
court stated:
[Wihere a person is not named in the written contract and parol evidence is necessary to show the existence of the contractual relationship,
the contract is unwritten insofar as that person is concerned ....
Sloan, 501 So. 2d at 410 (quotation omitted). Moreover,
[ilf parol evidence merely establishes the exact amount of money to be
paid or physical specifications of work to be performed, the contract is
written, but it is unwritten where the parol evidence establishes the basic existence of an obligation to pay or perform.
Id. at 411.
'
See Keppner v. Gulf Shores, Inc., 462 So. 2d 719, 725 (Miss. 1985); Byrd v.
Rees, 171 So. 2d 864; 867 (Miss. 1965); Valley Mills, Div. of Merchants Co. v.
Southeastern Hatcheries of Miss., Inc., 145 So. 2d 698, 702 (Miss. 1962); Miles v.
Miles, 30 So. 2, 3 (Miss. 1901); Shackelford v. Hooker, 54 Miss. 716, 719 (1877);
Peacher v. Strauss, 47 Miss. 353, 361-63 (1872); see, e.g., Swinny v. Cities Serv.
Oil Co., 197 So. 2d 795, 798 (Miss. 1967) (holding that extrinsic evidence of oral
agreement about amount of distributor's commission was not an effort to change
or amend parties' written contract, notwithstanding presence of merger and nooral-modification clause, when written contract contained provision that amount of
any commissions owed distributor would be paid "as shall be agreed upon");
Wilkins, 193 So. 2d at 573-74 (holding that oral testimony to explain meaning of
notation "Loan on 1/4 int. prop. located at NE corner Delaware & 6th 200 x 125
ft." on memo line of check did not violate parol evidence rule because
the notation was ambiguous and the testimony was offered to explain, not contradict, the notation).
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attached to words
they themselves employed in their own writ60 7
ten contract."
In the early case of Kerl v. Smith,"° the issue for the
court was the meaning of the word "timber" in the parties'
contract. The plaintiff (Kerl) proffered testimony that "timber"
meant "merchantable pine timber." °9 The trial court excluded
the testimony, and the defendant (Smith) prevailed. On appeal,
the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed:
It was competent for the plaintiff to show what was
meant by the word "timber" in this contract, and it was error
for the court to exclude testimony offered for this purpose.
The use of the word "timber" in the contract, with nothing to
explain in the contract what kind of timber is meant, is not so
accurate a designation of what was sold as to preclude investigation as to what was meant by it in this ambiguous contract. It was permissible for plaintiff to show what particular
business he was engaged in and known to defendant, and
what the common acceptation of the word "timber" meant in
that business and at the place where he was conducting it.
Such testimony is in no sense contradictory of the terms of
the contract, but it is essential to explain its meaning, since
the contract itself does not do that.610
In Byrd v. Rees,6" ' the written contract recited, in part:
It is the intention of all parties hereto that the business of the
Credit Bureau of Hattiesburg Collection Service shall continue uninterrupted just as though there had been no change of

' Miles, 30 So. 2, 3 (Miss. 1901). By the same rationale, extrinsic evidence,
which might otherwise be excluded by operation of the parol evidence rule, may
be admissible to explain or interpret technical terms used in a written agreement.
See, e.g., Mississippi State Hwy. Comm'n v. Dixie Contractors, Inc., 375 So. 2d
1202, 1205 (Miss. 1979). See generally 4 WALTER H.E. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 613 (3d ed. 1961), and cases cited therein. "Technical terms and
words of art [should be] given their technical meaning when used in a transaction
within their technical field." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3)(b)
(1981).
51 So. 3 (Miss. 1910).
w Kerl, 51 So. at 3.
6'0 Id. at 4.
6" 171 So. 2d 864 (Miss. 1965).
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ownership and that such operation by the Buyer shall conform in general to the plan of the operation heretofore in ef61 2
fect.
Examining this language, the court opined:
What then was the "plan of operation heretofore in effect?"
The contract itself does not indicate what is meant by "the
plan of operation heretofore in effect." We are of the opinion
that parol evidence could be introduced to explain the intention of the parties as to what operation had been in effect.6 13
In Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Dixie Contractors, Inc.,614 the issue was the admissibility of evidence of
agreed meanings and trade usages:
We are of the opinion that much of the interpretative testimony which the highway commission tried unsuccessfully to
introduce should have been admitted under the exception to
the parol evidence rule which permits clarification of contract
ambiguities by testimony showing agreed meanings between
the parties or those common to the trade generally.
....
A course of performance under the first segment,
depicted in plan sheet 2-E, could be a material aid in construing the performance to be required under identical pay items
on the 11.4-mile segment depicted in the plan sheet. Moreover, any competent evidence of trade usage should have been
admitted to clarify, hopefully, the complex and somewhat
ambiguous language used by the commission in the technical
documents constituting the contract at issue.615

612

Byrd, 171 So. 2d at 868 (emphasis added).

613 Id.

375 So. 2d 1202 (Miss. 1979).
Dixie Contractors, 375 So. 2d at 1205 (citation omitted).
Addressing the argument that any ambiguity should be construed against the
drafter, see supra subpart II.D.1, the Dixie Contractors court held:
Dixie correctly states an abstract rule of law requiring that ambiguities
in a written contract be resolved unfavorably to the party who drafted
the contract. However, this rule may not be enlarged, as it seems to
have been done, to exclude the drafting party's evidence aimed at clearing the ambiguity by showing reasonable commercial understandings,
concerning the meanings of technical terms, arising from usage of trade
614

615
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b. Evidence of CollateralAgreements

A contemporaneous collateral agreement, though it may
affect the rights of the parties under the written contract, may
be proven by extrinsic evidence if it is not inconsistent with the
integrated contract."'
In the early case of Green v. Booth, 17 the parties entered
into two agreements: a written option to purchase certain real
property, and an oral agreement regarding the commission to
be paid if the holder of the option arranged the sale of the
property to someone else rather than buying it himself. The
option holder (Booth) arranged the sale of the property and
requested his commission from the owner (Green).618 Green
refused to pay the commission, and Booth sued Green. At trial
Green asked the court to instruct the jury that any oral agreement was inadmissible to vary the terms of the written option
contract.619 The court refused, and the jury found for Booth.
Green appealed. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's refusal of the requested instruction on
the ground that the proffered evidence did not violate the parol
evidence rule:
The suit of appellee to recover commissions for effecting
the sale of the property mentioned in the pleadings is not
based on the option contract, wherein appellee is given the

right to buy the property for the sum of $6,000 cash, or
$6,500, one-half cash and the balance in two equal annual
payments, with 8 per cent. interest, but on an oral contract to

or a course of performance.
Id. at 1205-06 (citation omitted).
16 See, e.g., Knight v. McCain, 531 So. 2d 590, 595-96 (Miss. 1988); Universal
Computer Servs., Inc. v. Lyall, 464 So. 2d 69, 76 (Miss. 1985); Valley Mills, Div.
of Merchants Co. v. Southeastern Hatcheries of Miss., Inc., 145 So. 2d 698, 702
(Miss. 1962); Chism v. Omlie, 124 So. 2d 286, 288-89 (Miss. 1960); see also supra
notes 100, 103-09 and accompanying text for additional discussion of collateral
agreements.
117 44 So. 784 (Miss. 1907).
1' Green, 44 So. at 784.
19

Id.
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pay 5 per cent. commissions for effecting the sale of the property. These two contracts are wholly independent of each other, and to allow proof of the oral contract to pay 5 per cent.
commissions for effecting the sale of the property in no way
affects the written option contract; nor does it add to, alter, or
in any way vary its terms. The written contract is complete in
itself, and gives Mr. Booth the right to buy the property for a
certain stipulated price. In establishing the oral contract to
pay 5 per cent. commissions for effecting the sale of the property, the rule against the admission of parol testimony to
contradict or vary the written instrument is no way invaded,
because this is not the effect or object of the testimony.62
In Universal Computer Services, Inc. v. Lyall,62 1 the parties had a written employment contract "covering duties of employment, non-competition restrictions, etc., but which did not
cover [the employee's] remuneration."6 22 The employee proffered extrinsic evidence regarding, inter alia, a sales plan and
commissions.6" The employer argued that the evidence
should be excluded because it "tend[ed] to prove the existence
of an employment agreement in lieu of the employment agreement itself." 4 The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed:
[Tihe employment contract.., did not address salary or commission .... It therefore follows that the employment agreement is not the entire contract between the parties and therefore the chancellor was correct in admitting other evidence to
evince the total agreement .... 6. "
A collateral agreement must be independent of and collateral to the written agreement and not such that the parties
might reasonably expect it to be merged in the final writing.626 Such an agreement, to be performed after the contract

620

Id.

621

464 So. 2d 69 (Miss. 1985).

" Lyall, 464 So. 2d at 71.
62

Id.

" Id. at 76.
625 Id.
'"

Knight v. McCain, 531 So. 2d 590, 596 (Miss. 1988).
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is executed, is not merged into the written contract.62 7
In Knight v. McCain,6 the McCains agreed to purchase
from Johnson certain real property on which to build a house.
Furthermore,
[biased upon information that building permits could not be
secured on this particular property, the McCains secured from
Johnson an amendment to the contract, or an independent
stipulation, that if a building permit could not be obtained
their purchase price would be refunded. Since the purpose of
buying this property was for residence construction, the inability to secure a building permit eliminates the purpose for
which the conveyance was executed.' 9
Citing cases from thirty-seven jurisdictions recognizing an
exception to the merger doctrine for collateral agreements "to
be performed subsequent to the conveyance" (and from three
other jurisdictions not recognizing such an exception),' ° the
Knight Court adopted the majority view and held, therefore,
that "[tihe independent and collateral agreement was enforceable between the McCains and Johnson."6 1
c. Evidence of Subsequent Agreements
The parol evidence rule does not apply to oral or written
agreements made between some or all of the same parties after
the parties executed the prior written agreement' 2 -provided
Id. at 595.
531 So. 2d 590 (Miss. 1988).
62 Knight, 531 So. 2d at 596.
630 See id. at 595 & n.1.
61 Id. at 595.
' See Iuka Guar. Bank v. Beard, 658 So. 2d 1367, 1372 (Miss. 1995); Bell v.
Hill Bros. Constr. Co., 419 So. 2d 575, 576-77 (Miss. 1982); see, e.g., Kelso v.
McGowan, 604 So. 2d 726, 731 (Miss. 1992) ("Since the writing whereby Pollack
agreed to guarantee the Eastover loan was executed prior to Kelso's promise to
pay an additional $10,000, the parol evidence rule does not apply to the parties'
agreements relating to the Eastover loan."); Ham v. Cerniglia, 18 So. 577, 578
(Miss. 1895) (MThe excluded evidence was offered to show that there was an
agreement of the parties, made after the sale of the first items of furniture,...
by which it was understood between the parties that the payments from time to
time were to be entered as credits generally upon the entire account of the pur6
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that the subsequent agreement is supported by separate consideration 3 and satisfies the other requisites to be a valid
contract."4 Extrinsic evidence may be admitted to prove a
subsequent oral or written agreement "although it may alter or
abrogate" the prior written agreement.'
In Iuka Guaranty Bank v. Beard," the plaintiff (Beard)
and her former husband, in November 1982, jointly borrowed
$46,512.31 from Iuka Guaranty Bank:
Previous notes to Iuka in the sum of $1,300 and $15,000 were
consolidated into the balance of this new note on the advice of
Gene Jourdan, a banker at luka Guaranty since 1962, who
noted that [Mr. Beard] had been having difficulty making
payments on previous loans. The Beards signed two deeds of
trust as security for the 1982 loan.... Both of these deeds of

trust contained a "dragnet clause" asserting that the instruments secured not only the principal scheduled debt, but also
any other 6separate
or joint indebtedness owed to Iuka by ei37
ther party.

The deeds of trust covered two lots--"Lot 7," on which the
Beards' house stood, and "Lot 44," a vacant parcel in the same
development." 5
In 1985, having been notified by luka that it was considering foreclosure, Beard obtained a loan of $38,000 in her own

chaser, and not upon any particular items in any particular purchase. This evidence was admissible. It did not vary or alter the written agreement. Its purpose
was to show the whole contract of the parties ..
").
See luka Guaranty Bank, 658 So. 2d at 1372; Edrington v. Stephens, 114
So. 387, 389 (Miss. 1927).
' See Singing River Mall Co. v. Mark Fields, Inc., 599 So. 2d 938, 947 (Miss.
1992).
Sammons Communications, Inc. v. Polk, 429 So. 2d 564, 567 (Miss. 1983);
see luka Guaranty Bank, 658 So. 2d at 1371-72; Renfroe v. Aswell, 21 So. 2d 812,
813 (Miss. 1945); Lee v. Hawks, 9 So. 828, 828 (Miss. 1891); see also Housing
Auth., City of Laurel v. Gatlin, 738 So. 2d 249, 259 (Miss. 1998) (Diaz, J., dissenting). See infra subparts III.B.12.a & III.B.12.d for discussions of the related
topics of subsequent oral modification and rescission, respectively.
658 So. 2d 1367 (Miss. 1995).
luka Guar. Bank, 658 So. 2d at 1369.
I/d.
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name from Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan, giving First
Fidelity a deed of trust on Lot 7, and forwarded the entire
amount to Iuka in full satisfaction of the outstanding balance
on the November 1982 loan." s The plaintiff
testified that before they satisfied the loan, Jourdan assured
them that he would immediately cancel the deeds of trust on
Lot 7 and Lot 44 upon payment. She claimed that Jourdan
repeated his guarantees that they had successfully fulfilled
all of their obligations to Iuka necessary to release the two
deeds of trust. She testified that Jourdan made no mention.of
any other debts preventing Iuka from releasing both deeds of
trust. Though the Beards paid the entire balance of the loan
on August 23, 1985, Jourdan testified that the bank would
have been equally content had the Beards merely tendered
their overdue payments. Jourdan said he canceled the Lot 7
deed of trust on the day following full payment of the 1982
loan.'

In 1990, Beard, who had since divorced, received a notice of
foreclosure from Iuka on Lot 44. 1 Beard wrote Jourdan, re-

questing that the deed of trust on Lot 44 be released. Jourdan
denied the request and carried out the foreclosure. 2
Beard sued Iuka for breach of contract in failing to cancel
the deed of trust on Lot 44 and improperly exercising the dragnet clause contained in the deed of trust. 3 Beard prevailed
at trial. Iuka appealed, arguing that the deed of trust containing the dragnet clause unambiguously entitled Iuka to foreclose
on Lot 44 due to Mr. Beard's failure to satisfy debts subject to
the dragnet provision.' The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed
because the evidence [Beard] provided the jury was never
contradicted or discredited by the defense. The uncontradicted

63

Id.

at 1369-70.

Id. at 1370.
641

Id.

62

See id.

6"4

Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1371.
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evidence sufficiently demonstrated that if Beard repaid the
$46,000 loan extended in 1982, then Iuka would cancel the
deed of trust on Lot 7 and Lot 44 ....
While there was sufficient evidence demonstrating a
subsequent agreement between Iuka and Beard, consideration
must exist to make it legally binding on Iuka .... Faced with
the possible foreclosure of Lot 44, Beard prematurely paid the
balance of the $46,512.31 loan to Iuka in full. Regardless of
how Beard was able to obtain the funds to pay the entire
balance due, we find that the act of prematurely satisfying
her debt to Iuka was a legal detriment sufficient to enforce
the subsequent agreement which the jury found existed between Nancy and Iuka. 6'
3. General Application of the Rule
Additionally, parol evidence should be admissible in the"
following circumstances:
a. PartiallyIntegrated, Unambiguous Agreements
If the writing is not the final and complete agreement of
the parties as to one or more terms, parol evidence may be
admitted to add to, clarify, explain, or give meaning to the
writing6' 6-- but only insofar as the evidence does not vary or
contradict those terms of the writing that are complete and
final.6 7
Id. at 1371-72 (citations omitted).
64

See Keppner v. Gulf Shores, Inc., 462 So. 2d 719, 725 (Miss. 1985); Carter

v. Collins, 117 So. 336, 338 (Miss. 1928); see also Walley v. Bay Petroleum Corp.,
312 F.2d 540, 543-44 (5th Cir. 1963) (applying Mississippi law) ("The parol evidence rule does not preclude the introduction of evidence showing a prior or contemporaneous agreement if the writing, or writings, constitute only a partial integration of the agreement between the parties. That is, if the writings are but a
partial integration of the agreement, the rest of the agreement, or collateral
agreements, may be shown through parol." (footnote omitted)).
"' See J.O. Hooker & Sons, Inc. v. Roberts Cabinet Co., 683 So. 2d 396, 400
(Miss. 1996); Busching v. Griffin, 542 So. 2d 860, 865 (Miss. 1989); Carter, 117
So. at 338; see also Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510, 517
(1891) (holding that parol evidence cannot be used to vary one of written terms
of partially integrated document where particular term is "complete and perfect
on its face, without ambiguity"); Walley v. Bay Petroleum Corp., 312 F.2d 540,
545 n.9 (5th Cir. 1963) (applying Mississippi law) ("Even in situations in which
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In Keppner v. Gulf Shores, Inc.,'
the Omelette Shoppe, Inc., Wen Coast-Wendelta, Inc., and
Gulf Shores, Inc., owned properties contiguous to one another
which properties were located on the west side of U.S. Highway 49 in Gulfport. The Omelette Shoppe, Inc., and Wen
Coast-Wendelta, Inc. (Wendy's) each planned to build and
operate a fast food restaurant, and Gulf Shores, Inc., planned
to build and operate a 150 room motel, restaurant, lounge,
swimming pool and related facilities under a franchise from
Holiday Inns of America.
The parties were aware that sewage collection and disposal would be required for the operations of their respective
facilities, and jointly agreed to build such facility which consisted of collection lines from each of their properties to a lift
station with all necessary pumps, electrical circuits and controls, and a discharge line from such lift station to a sewage
collection system which had been jointly built by the City of
Gulfport and Harrison County in an unincorporated area
located north of the city.
The parties also agreed to construct and operate a water
main from such system built by Gulfport and Harrison County which would serve each of their properties.
This agreement was incorporated into a document dated
November 11, 1979, and provided inter alia, that the parties
would construct a 4 inch water and force main along with a

the writings are but a partial integration of the agreement, that part of the
agreement which is reduced to writing cannot be contradicted by parol.").
For example:
If a contract provides in writing for a term of "Ten years from date"
but is silent as to salary, the salary could be supplied by parol-but the
term for which the salary is to be paid could not be shown to be something inconsistent with the ten years ....
Although under certain conditions parol evidence may be used to supplement a partially written but
unintegrated contract, such testimony cannot disintegrate the unimpeachable portions of the written partial integration. An unintegrated written
contract having a positive element or term cannot be negatived by parol
proof of a contradictory and inconsistent positive that was existent before
the writing was signed.
Matthews v. Drew Chem. Corp., 475 F.2d 146, 150 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying
analogous Florida law).
'" 462 So. 2d 719 (Miss. 1985).
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lift station according to plans drawn by T.L. Reynolds at a
cost of $50,425.00. The water was to be separately metered,
and all maintenance costs of the system were to be divided
equally by the original owners and any subsequent users."9
Sometime after this sewage and water agreement was
signed, the Omelette Shoppe went bankrupt." ° The property
was eventually purchased by Shular, who owned the Sheraton
Inn adjoining the Omelette Shoppe property."1 When a dispute subsequently arose regarding the Sheraton's use of the
sewage treatment plant originally shared by Wendy's, Gulf
Shore, and the Omelette Shoppe, the trial court permitted Gulf
Shore's vice president to testify that the objective of the agreement was to provide a sewage treatment facility which would
service two fast-food restaurants and one motel, and that the
parties understood that the Holiday Inn would use more capacity than the two restaurants."2
Shular argued on appeal that this evidence was improperly
admitted in violation of the parol evidence rule."5 3 The supreme court disagreed:
The parol evidence rule has no application where the writing
is incomplete, ambiguous or where the evidence is not offered
to vary the terms of the written agreement.
In the case sub judice the agreement between the Omelette Shoppe, Wendy's and Gulf Shores is silent on the sub-

ject of the relative use of the sewage treatment system by the
parties. Therefore, the admission of testimony regarding the
matter does not violate the parol evidence rule. "
In Fortune Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v. Pate's Electronic Co.,
the written contract between the parties did not
specify the time by which the plaintiff (Pate) was to per-

6'
6W

Id. at 721.
Id.

631 Id.
6"2 Id. at 725.
6"

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
356 So. 2d 1176 (Miss. 1978).
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form. 6 However, the defendant (Fortune) testified that Pate
had orally promised at the time the written agreement was
made that he would perform within 30 days. 7 The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling prohibiting
the jury from considering Fortune's testimony about the oral
agreement. The court stated
[t]he general rule is that what is a reasonable time for performance when there is no time specified in the contract is a
question of law for the court. The general rule is that what is
a reasonable time for performance when there is no time
specified in the contract is a question of law for the court.
However, in this case the appellant pled and Sidney Whitlock,
its president, testified that at the time he signed Pate's proposal, M. L. Pate told him that the system would be installed
within thirty days ....
Since the question whether the written contract was the
final and complete expression of the agreement between the
parties can be decided only on the basis of the evidence and
since the evidence in this case was conflicting, it is clear that
a jury issue was presented as to whether Pate had contracted
to complete installation of the system within thirty days.'
b. Integrated,Ambiguous Agreements
If the fully or partially integrated writing is ambiguous,
parol evidence may be admitted to clear up the ambiguity, 9
6' Fortune Furniture,356 So. 2d at 1177.
657

Id.

Id. at 1178 (citations omitted).
See Kight v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply, Inc., 537 So. 2d 1355, 1358 (Miss.
1989) ("Where, as here, the writing is ambiguous, courts are obligated to pursue
the intent of the parties by resort to parol evidence."); Cherry v. Anthony, Gibbs,
Sage, 501 So. 2d 416, 419 (Miss. 1987) ("Parol evidence as to surrounding circumstances and intent may be brought in where the contract is ambiguous . .. ");
Keppner, 462 So. 2d at 725; Baylot v. Habeeb, 147 So. 2d 490, 494 (Miss. 1962)
("Whenever.. . an ambiguity arises .. . parol evidence may be introduced to
show what was in the minds of the parties at the time of making the contract."),
modified on other grounds, 149 So. 2d 847 (Miss. 1963); see also IP Timberlands
Operating Co. v. Denmiss Corp., 726 So. 2d 96, 104, 110 (Miss. 1998); Century 21
Deep South Properties, Ltd. v. Keys, 652 So. 2d 707, 716-17 (Miss. 1995); Dennis
v. Searle, 457 So. 2d 941, 945 (Miss. 1984); Barnett v. Getty Oil Co., 266 So. 2d
581, 586 (Miss. 1972); Byrd v. Rees, 171 So. 2d 864, 867 (Miss. 1965).
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but may not vary or contradict those integrated terms that are
unambiguous. 6 "
In Traders' Insurance Co. v. E.D. Edwards Post No. 22,
G.A.R.,661 the insurance policy included two statements of duration-"for the term of three years" and "from the fourteenth
day of January, 1903, at noon, to the fourteenth day of January, 1904, at noon."662 Finding each statement to be "perfectly
clear in itself, but ... mutually inconsistent and contradictory,"
the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the trial court
erred in not permitting the introduction of parol evidence to
show which of the two periods named in the policy was the
one in contemplation of the parties. Parol evidence is admissible in such a case, not to vary the contract, nor to make a
contract for the parties, but to make clear what the contract
really was."
In HattiesburgPlumbing Co. v. A.E. Carmichael & Co.,'
the contract in question called for the provision of an "artesian
well." 5 Unable to afford an unambiguous "plain meaning"
construction to the term, the Mississippi Supreme Court approved the use of parol evidence:
The primary definition in all the dictionaries of the word
"artesian" indicates a well from which the water flows natu-

Indeed, the Mississippi Supreme Court and the Mississippi Court of Appeals
have both stated that, upon a finding of ambiguity, the trier of fact must resort
to extrinsic evidence. See, e.g., Century 21, 652 So. 2d at 716-17; Barnett, 266
So. 2d at 586; Freeman v. Greenville Convalescent Home, Inc., No. 96-CA-00466COA, 1998 WL 881772, at *5 (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998).
' See Busching v. Griffin, 542 So. 2d 860, 865 (Miss. 1989) (holding that the
fact that the parol evidence rule does not bar extrinsic evidence "where the writing is incomplete, ambiguous or where the evidence is not offered to vary the
terms of the written agreement" means "at most. . . that parol evidence is admissible on those points where there is ambiguity" and, therefore, "[sluch evidence
may not be received to contradict parts of the option that are not ambiguous").
"' 38 So. 779 (Miss. 1905). See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text for
more discussion of this case.
' Traders' Ins., 38 So. at 779.
663
"6

'

Id.

31 So. 536 (Miss. 1901).
Hattiesburg Plumbing, 31 So. at 536.
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rally without artificial pressure; but the secondary definition
of this word in the Century and Standard Dictionaries and
others seems to indicate that it may be applied, also, to wells
from which the water is made to flow by artificial means. The
word "artesian," therefore, becomes a term of equivocal significance, standing unexplained in a contract. It was hence competent to introduce parol testimony to show what meaning it
had in this particular contract. The court consequently erred
in excluding this testimony. It should receive all parol testimony showing what meaning this word "artesian" had, as
used by the parties to this contract."'
The Mississippi Supreme Court has repeatedly approved
the resort to extrinsic evidence in cases involving latent ambiguity, 7 but has charted a somewhat more winding path on
the admissibility of parol evidence to resolve patent ambiguities.'

Id. at 537.
See, e.g., Tinnin v. First United Bank of Miss., 570 So. 2d 1193, 1195
(Miss. 1990); Claughton v. Leavenworth, 37 So. 2d 776, 777-78 (Miss. 1948); Butler v. R.B. Thomas & Co., 116 So. 824, 824-25 (Miss. 1928); Miles v. Miles, 30
So. 2, 3 (Miss. 1901); Hanna v. Renfro, 32 Miss. 125, 129-30 (1856). See supra
notes 34, 42-45 and accompanying text for further discussion of "latent" ambiguity.
"
Compare, e.g., Seal v. Anderson, 108 So. 2d 864, 866-67 (Miss. 1959); Sack
v. Gilmer Dry Goods Co., 115 So. 339, 340 (Miss. 1928); Haughton v. Sartor, 15
So. 71, 71 (Miss. 1894) (all holding that patent ambiguity in deed cannot be resolved by parol evidence) with, e.g., Sunnybrook Children's Home, Inc. v. Dahlem,
265 So. 2d 921, 924 (Miss. 1972); Smalley v. Rogers, 100 So. 2d 118, 120 (Miss.
1958) (both holding that parol evidence was admissible to address patent ambiguity in suit to reform ambiguous instrument); Carlisle v. Carlisle's Estate, 252
So. 2d 894, 895-96 (Miss. 1971) (holding that parol evidence was admissible to
resolve meaning of "home" in will); Ham v. Cernigilia, 18 So. 577, 578 (Miss.
1895) (holding that parol evidence was admissible to resolve patent ambiguity
regarding point at which "lease" payments would terminate and status of title to
"leased" goods after payments equaling full value of goods were made). See supra
notes 33, 35-41 and accompanying text for further discussion of "patent" ambiguity.
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c. UnintegratedAgreements
If the writing is not the final and complete agreement of
the parties
as to its terms, the parol evidence rule does not ap669
ply.
4. The Parol Evidence Rule Is a Rule of
Substantive Law, Not a Rule of Evidence
The parol evidence rule is "not merely a rule of evidence,
but is one of substantive law,"67 which "is foremost a rule
that prescribes conditions for the exercise of powers other law
confers upon" the parties to the written contract.6 1' Because
the parol evidence rule is a matter of substantive law, a federal
court sitting in diversity or another state's court hearing a
dispute over a Mississippi contract, will apply
the parol evi6 72
dence rule in accordance with Mississippi law.
5. Invoking the ParolEvidence Rule
A party may not successfully raise the parol evidence rule
for the first time on appeal. 7 3 A party seeking to exclude evidence based on the parol evidence rule must object to its consideration before the trial court enters its judgment.6 74
...See Broome Constr. Co. v. Beaver Lake Recreational Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d
545, 547 (Miss. 1969) ("[Tlhe parol evidence rule does not become applicable unless there is an integration of the agreement, that is, unless the parties have
assented to a certain writing as a [complete and accurate] statement of the agreement between them."); see also Fortune Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Pate's Elec. Co.,
356 So. 2d 1176, 1178 (Miss. 1978) ("[Plrior and contemporaneous negotiations are
merged only into the writings that are adopted by the parties as the final and
complete expression of their agreement.").
670 Kendrick v. Robertson, 111 So. 99, 101 (Miss. 1927); accord Cooper v.
Crabb, 587 So. 2d 236, 241 (Miss. 1991); Security Mut. Fin. Corp. v. Willis, 439
So. 2d 1278, 1281 (Miss. 1983); Fuqua v. Mills, 73 So. 2d 113, 119 (Miss. 1954);
Edrington v. Stephens, 114 So. 387, 389 (Miss. 1927); Housing Auth., City of
Laurel v. Gatlin, 738 So. 2d 249, 251 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 cmt. a, at 129 (1981).
671 Cooper, 587 So. 2d at 241.
672 See supra note 5.
"' See Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Craft, 67 So. 2d 874, 876 (Miss. 1953); accord
Estate of Parker v. Dorchak, 673 So. 2d 1379, 1384 (Miss. 1996).
64 Estate of Parker, 673 So. 2d at 1384. The court explained:
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6. Summary Judgment Considerations

The interpretation of a written agreement becomes an
issue for the trier of fact only when there remains a genuine
uncertainty as to which of two (or more) meanings is proper.675 If the contract is worded so that it can be given a certain and definite meaning, it is not ambiguous; therefore, a
trial court may construe it as a matter of law, "even though the
parties disagree regarding the meaning and import of [its]
terms."6 7 In such a case, summary judgment on the contract
is proper, even though the provisions of the contract are "not
perfectly clear."6 ' On the other hand, when a contract contains an ambiguity, summary judgment is improper because
the interpretation of the ambiguous instrument becomes a fact
issue."'

Given that the Parol Evidence Rule is a rule of substantive law, a
party should not lose the right to claim the benefit of said law merely
because he failed to make a contemporaneous objection at the time the
evidence was offered. We thus hold that, so long as evidence violative of
the Parol Evidence Rule is properly objected to prior to the consideration
of said evidence by the trier of fact, such evidence should properly be
disregarded by said trier of fact in accordance with the law. In the case
of a trial by jury, a limiting instruction instructing the jury to disregard
said evidence should be granted by the trial judge on proper motion
prior to the submission of the case to the jury. In the context of the
present case, the objection to the testimony of Dorchak was made prior
to the consideration of such testimony by the Chancellor as trier of fact
in his Supplemental Opinion and Ruling and was thus timely.
Id. But see Kelso v. McGowan, 604 So. 2d 726, 730 n.4 (Miss. 1992) (McRae, J.)
('[Slince the parol evidence rule is substantive, it prevails even in the absence of
objection." (quoting-and apparently misapplying-Edrington, 114 So. at 389)).
.7 See supra subpart II.A.3.

...Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247, 252 (Miss. 1985).
' Id.; see Smith v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Grenada, 460 So. 2d 786,
790 (Miss. 1984).
...See Ellis v. Powe, 645 So. 2d 947, 952-53 (Miss. 1994) ("[Wlhere the contract is ambiguous and its meaning uncertain, questions of fact are presented
which are to be resolved by the trier of facts after plenary trial on the merits.");
Shelton v. American Ins. Co., 507 So. 2d 894, 896 (Miss. 1987) ("[Wlhere a contract is ambiguous .

.

. questions of fact are presented .

.

. and the granting of

summary judgment is inappropriate."); Shaw, 481 So. 2d at 252 ("[W]e take a
dim view of the practice of resolving contract ambiguities via summary judgment."); Dennis v. Searle, 457 So. 2d 941, 945-46 (Miss. 1984) ("The interpretation
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For example, in Dennis v. Searle,79 the Mississippi Supreme Court was presented with a contract that provided, in
relevant part: "Sale conditioned on... house free of termites
based on certificate of pest control concern acceptable to purchaser and termite damage repaired.' °0 Reversing the chancery court's summary judgment in favor of the seller of the
house, the court reasoned:
There are any number of "ambiguities" in this language.
On the one hand, this language may arguably be construed to
mean that "house free of termites" is an absolute condition
precedent to the obligation of Dennis to purchase the house
and that the "certificate of pest control concern" is merely a
procedural mechanism for determining when the sale should
be closed. On the other hand, it may be argued that the contract means that the acceptance of a termite certificate by
Dennis binds him and does not, under the language of the
agreement, permit him any relief if he subsequently finds
that the information contained in the termite certificate was
inaccurate.
Finally, the language in the agreement "termite damage
repaired" is susceptible of the construction that the Searles
remained obligated to repair any termite damage existing at
the time of closing, period. Those three words could reasonably be read as meaning that any termite infestation or damage existing at the time of closing would be the Searles' responsibility, even though not disclosed in the infestation report. It cannot be said that the agreement expressly provides
that the damage must be discovered and that Dennis on pain
of waiver, must insist upon its repair before closing.
These musings are not intended to suggest the final and
of an unclear contract generally involves questions of fact sufficient so that our

summary judgment procedure will be an inappropriate vehicle for final decision.");
see also Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Pursue Energy, 781 F.2d 1079, 1081 (5th
Cir. 1986) ("[A] district court may properly grant summary judgment when a
contract is unambiguous, but may not grant summary judgment when a contract
is ambiguous and the parties' intent presents a genuine issue of material fact."
(citations omitted)) (applying Mississippi law).
679 457 So. 2d 941 (Miss. 1984).
"o
Dennis, 457 So. 2d at 945.
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authoritative construction of this agreement and language in
question. They are presented as undergirding for our conclusion that, as a matter of law, the language employed in the
agreement is ambiguous. Having in mind that, on a summary
judgment procedure, the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the party against whom the motion has
been made, we have merely tried to demonstrate that there
are reasonable constructions of the language of the agreement
favorable to the Searles. Because of these, we find the document ambiguous and its proper construction to present questions of fact which ought not to have been determined on
summary judgment. 8 1
In Taylor Machine Works, Inc. v. Great American Surplus
Lines Insurance Co.," the question for the court was whether
a letter written by a deceased worker's employer (ITS) to the
manufacturer of the fork-lift (Taylor) involved in the employee's
death, notifying the manufacturer of the accident involving the
employee (Dacquisto), constituted a "claim" under the
manufacturer's "claims-made" liability insurance.'
Taylor's
policy with its insurer (Great American)
defined claim as "a notice received by the insured of an intention to hold the insured responsible for an occurrence involving the insurance provided under this policy, and shall include the service of suit or institution of arbitration proceedings against the insured.""'
Taylor received ITS's letter on or about December 8, 1986.
Dacquisto's heirs did not file suit against Taylor until 1987.
When Taylor sought to have Great American treat the
Dacquisto claim as having been made in 1986 (Taylor having
exhausted its 1987 policy limit on another claim), Great American refused, and Taylor sued.'
Great American moved for
and received summary judgment on the grounds that, inter

6
6

Id. at 945-46.
635 So. 2d 1357 (Miss. 1994).
Taylor Mach. Works, 635 So. 2d at 1361.
Id. at 1359.
Id.
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alia, the December 8, 1996 letter from ITS to Taylor was not a
"claim" as defined by the Taylor policy.' The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, finding summary judgment inappropriate under the circumstances:
The question of whether the December 8 letter was a
claim or not, following the definition under the contract, was
subject to the context in which the letter was written, the
intent of the letter writer, the understanding of the parties,
etc. Therefore, since this is a vital fact issue, and the parties'
evidence is in dispute as to what the letter meant and also as
what the policy meant to be a "claim," summary judgment
was improper. The trier of fact should determine whether the
letter reveals an intention to hold Taylor responsible for the
damages." 7
In Lowery v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.,'
(Lowery)

the decedent

acquired credit life insurance for a term of 104 days (June 19,
1984 to October 1, 1984) on the $9,000.00 note, and for a term
of 244 days (from February 14, 1984 to October 1, 1984) on
the $2,000.00 note. The record clearly indicates that the credit life insurance terminated with the maturity date of the
notes.5 9
The policy included the following "grace period benefit:"
Grace Period Benefit: In addition to the death benefit for reducing life insurance as provided in the Death
Benefit Provision, the Company will pay an additional
benefit to the Creditor Beneficiary of an amount, if any,
that the unpaid balance of the loan at the date of death
exceeds the death benefit, except that the amount of
such additional benefit shall not exceed two (2) times the
uniform monthly decrease as defined in the Death Benefit Provision. No Grace Period Benefit will be paid if
death occurs sixty (60) or more days after the expiration

"'

See id. at 1359-60.
Id. at 1361 (citations omitted).
592 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1991).

"'

Lowery, 592 So. 2d at 82.
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of the term of insurance.
On Level Life Insurance, the Company will pay the
death benefit if the Insured Debtor should die within
seven (7) days after the expiration of the term of the
insurance and the insured loan is unpaid and outstanding as of the date of death.6
Thus, where the credit life insurance death benefit is "reducing life," the grace period for reducing life insurance is 60
days. If the death occurs within 60 days of the expiration of
the insurance, the death benefit will still be paid. The grace
period for "level life" is seven (7) days, i.e., the death benefit
is paid if the insured debtor dies within seven (7) days of the
expiration of the term of the insurance.691
If the type of credit life coverage on each note had been
clear, the trial court might well have been correct in granting
summary judgment. Such was not the case:
Assuming that Mr. Lowery owned the "reducing life"
form of credit life insurance, then he had 60 days of additional coverage from the expiration of the insurance. Mr.
Lowery's death occurred well within that 60 day period and
the insurance would pay both notes. However, if he had "level
life," the insurance would not cover the notes. Mr. Lowery
would have only had a seven day grace period and his death
was beyond that period for both notes.
There is no indication from the notes whether the credit
life insurance on the Lowery notes was "reducing life" or
"level life," so there is no indication as to which grace period
applies to Mr. Lowery's death. Treating the insurance as
"reducing life" places the Lowerys within the 60 day grace
period. Treating it as "level life" excludes the Lowerys ....
There is a material issue of whether the Lowerys fit
within one of the grace periods, and whether coverage by
[Defendant] is available to the Lowerys even after the insurance expired. 6 '

690
691
6"

Id.
Lowery, 592 So. 2d at 82.

Id. (citation omitted).
The Lowery court passed (twice) on the chance to "stick it" to the defendant
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B. Common Law Exceptions to the ParolEvidence Rule
It is always allowable to show that the instrument
sued on was never valid, either for fraud or illegality,
or want of consideration, or for failure of some condition on which the instrument was to take effect; or that,
having been valid, from something occurring subsequently, it has ceased to be operative wholly or partially. It is not admissible to vary the terms of a valid
written instrument by parol; but it is allowable to attack the instrument, and seek to overthrow it as never
valid or having ceased to be ....

The former cannot be

altered by parol. The latter may be.69
The parol evidence rule is "subject to many exceptions" and
"very flexible." The exceptions discussed in this subpart are
roughly organized into two groups: (1) exceptions relating to
the validity or enforceability of the writing at the time the
contract was formed;69 and (2) exceptions relating to the validity or enforceability of the written contract at the time of the
alleged breach or at the time declaratory judgment was
sought.696
If one or more of the following exceptions applies, the parol
evidence rule will not bar the introduction of extrinsic evidence

insurer. Id. First, the court remarked that '[ambiguities in an insurance contract
are resolved in favor of the insured" but then declined to so construe the apparent ambiguity in this case as to what kind of grace period benefit Lowery contracted for. Id. Second, the court then noted that it has "in the past held that
credit life insurance such as that taken out by the Lowerys may be 'reducing life'
insurance and the grace period applied" but again declined to so hold in this
case. Id. Put them together, and you have to wonder whether the "contra insurer"
rule, see supra subpart II.E.4, is weaker than it used to be.
'
Cocke v. Blackbourn, 57 Miss. 689, 691 (1880).
Byrd v. Rees, 171 So. 2d 864, 867 (Miss. 1965). See Valley Mills, Div. of
Merchants Co. v. Southeastern Hatcheries of Miss., Inc., 145 So. 2d 698, 702
(Miss. 1962). See generally HUNTER, supra note 5, §§ 7:12-7:17.
69 See infra subparts III.B.1-.7.
69 See infra subparts III.B.7-.12. (The consideration topics overlap the two
categories-thus, II.B.7 is included in both lists).
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to explain, expand, or modify the written provisions of an otherwise integrated and unambiguous contract.
1. Fraud
The parol evidence rule does not bar extrinsic evidence
that the party offering the evidence was fraudulently induced
to enter into the written agreement6 9 7-even if the agreement
states that the parties thereto are relying solely on his or her
own knowledge and not on any representations by the other
party that are not included in the writing.698
Extrinsic evidence may also be admissible to show "fraud
of the draftsman"-i.e., that the drafting party fraudulently

"
See Bank of Shaw v. Posey, 573 So. 2d 1355, 1359 n.3 (Miss. 1990); Franklin v. Lovitt Equip. Co., 420 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Miss. 1982); Patten-Worsham
Drug Co. v. Planters' Mercantile Co., 38 So. 209, 210 (Miss. 1905); see also Phillips v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 792 F.2d 521, 525-26 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Mississippi law). See generally Byrd, 171 So. 2d at 867; Stirling v. Logue, 123 So.
825, 827 (Miss. 1929) (both reciting that, absent fraud, mistake, accident, or other
factor sufficient to invalidate contract, parol evidence is not admissible to add to,
subtract from, vary or contradict unambiguous, integrated contract). But see McCall Co. v. Parsons-May-Oberschmidt Co., 66 So. 274, 275-76 (Miss. 1914) (finding
error in trial court's admission of parol evidence, notwithstanding offering party's
argument that evidence was to show that other party fraudulently induced offering party to enter into written contract, on ground that "[tihe same argument can
always be made when it is sought to vary a contract by parol on the ground that
the parties thereto placed a construction upon it at variance with its plain meaning"). "Fraud vitiates all things, and may be predicated of promises designed to
entrap the unwary, and never intended to be kept, as well as of misstatements of
existing facts." Patten-Worsham Drug, 38 So. at 210.
' Brown v. Ohman, 42 So. 2d 209, 213 (Miss. 1949). The Brown court stated

there is an exception to the parol evidence rule in actions of fraud and
deceit even though the contract itself recites that each contracting party
relies and acts upon his own knowledge and not upon the representations of his adversary, this being for the reason that misrepresentations
may induce a party to enter into a contract which contains such a provision.
Brown, 42 So. 2d at 213. But see J.B. Colt Co. v. Harris, 171 So. 695, 697 (Miss.
1937) ("M[The written contract . . . was based upon the terms of the contract in
which appellees plainly stated to the appellant that they were not relying upon
any statement or representation which was not contained therein; and the evidence
as to the representations . . . was incompetent and should have been excluded by
the court.").
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omitted some term to which the parties had agreed prior to the
execution of the written document-on the theory that "the
writing does not evidence the real contract"6":
The fact that a contract is in writing does not preclude the introduction of evidence to show that a material stipulation
therein was founded on the misrepresentations and fraud of
one of the parties, or inserted by fraud, or that a material
stipulation was omitted on account of fraud.
....
[W hen fraud enters into a transaction to the extent
of inducing a written contract, the instrument never becomes
a valid contract and hence.., the parol evidence rule is not
applicable ....

[Firaud cannot be merged; hence, the doctrine

that prior negotiations and conveyances leading up to the
formation of a written contract are merged therein is not
applicable to preclude the admission of parol or extrinsic
evidence to prove that a written contract was induced by
fraud. The reduction of an agreement to writing is not at all
conclusive against fraud in the contract, and the admission of
extrinsic evidence which bears clearly upon the existence of
fraud sought to be established for the purpose of avoiding the
effect of the written agreement-as by rescission, reformation,
or the establishment of a trust-or as the basis of a tort action, does not constitute an attempt to vary the terms of the
agreement by parol. It was never intended that the parol
evidence rule be used as a shield to prevent the proof of
fraud, or that a person could arrange to have an agreement
obtained by him through fraud exercised upon the other contracting party reduced to writing and formally executed, and
thereby deprive the courts of the power to prevent him from
reaping the benefits of his chicanery .... The general rule
that parol or extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove that a
written contract was procured by fraud applies ... whether
the evidence offered relates to fraud in the omission of a material provision or to fraud in the insertion of, or a misrepresentation concerning, a certain term in the instrument, or
whether the evidence offered directly contradicts the writing
or merely covers a point not referred to in the writing, and in
spite of special provisions in the contract which purport to
'"

Sistrunk v. Wilson, 54 So. 89, 89 (Miss. 1911).
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limit the application of parol evidence by stating that the
writing contains all the terms involved and the representations made, or that the written contract shall be the sole
evidence of the transaction, or that each contracting party
relies and acts only upon his own knowledge, and not upon
the representations of his adversary."°

Indeed,
[ilt is practically a universal rule that in suits to reform written instruments on the ground of fraud..., parol evidence is
admissible to establish the fact of fraud. .. and in what it
consisted, and to show how the writing should be corrected in
order to conform to the agreement or intention which the
If this were not so, a rule
parties actually made or had ....
adopted by the courts as a protection against fraud and false
swearing would, as has been said in regard to the analogous
rule known as the statute of frauds, become the instrument of
the very fraud it was intended to prevent. Evidence of
fraud.., is seldom found in the instrument itself, and unless
parol evidence may be admitted for the purpose of procuring
its reformation, the aggrieved party would have as little hope
of redress ... '0

" Brown, 42 So. 2d at 212-13; see also McArthur v. Fillingame, 186 So. 828,
829 (Miss. 1939) ("Parol evidence may be admitted to avoid a contract in toto, as
for fraud and the like, at the time of the execution thereof, but not to vary its
terms so that it may stand in part as written, and go down as to other parts.");
Howie Bros. v. Walter Pratt & Co., 35 So. 216, 217 (Miss. 1903) ("'[P]arol evidence may be admitted to show that the instrument is altogether void, or that it
never had any legal existence or binding force, . . . by reason of fraud . . . . This
It is one thing to attempt
qualification of the rule applies to all contracts.' ....
to vary, alter, or contradict the terms of a written contract once validly executed,
and quite a different thing to show that the contract offered never had any legal
existence, because its execution was procured by fraud." (quoting Wren v.
Hoffman, 41 Miss. 616, 620 (1868)); Grayson v. Brooks, 1 So. 482, 483 (Miss.
1887) ("Where the parties have reduced their agreements to writing, it is not admissible to show another contract than that evidenced by the writing. But where,
by the fraud of one or both of the parties, the true contract is not shown by the
writing, and is not intended to be so shown, the principle invoked has no application."). See generally Broome Constr. Co. v. Beaver Lake Recreational Ctr., Inc.,
229 So. 2d 545, 547 (Miss. 1969) (reciting that parol evidence may be used to
show written contract's validity is impaired by, inter alia, fraud).
701 Smalley v. Rogers, 100 So. 2d 118, 119-20 (Miss. 1958), quoted with ap-
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In State Highway Commission v. Powell, °2 an agent of
the Commission was dispatched to negotiate a right-of-way
across the plaintiffs' land. °3 On assurances from the agent
that the Commission would provide an underpass through
which the plaintiffs' livestock could go to and from the pasture
and the water supply, and by means of which the plaintiffs
could have access to and from the field, the plaintiffs
agreed.'" The Commission, in fact, only provided drainage
under the new highway, and the plaintiffs sued to rescind the
contract.7 °5 Despite the fact that the written agreement between the plaintiffs and the Commission said nothing about
the Commission building an underpass sufficient to permit the
plaintiffs and their livestock to pass under the road, the plaintiffs prevailed both at trial and before the supreme court on the
strength of their testimony regarding the agent's oral misrepresentations"':
The chancellor found from the testimony that this assurance
given them by the agent amounted to a representation of an
existing fact, and not merely a promise to do something in the
future; that except for the representation that the State Highway Commission had already planned to provide such an
underpass the deed of conveyance here involved would not
have been executed for the consideration of $325 paid therefor; and that since the Highway Commission had not planned
to provide the underpass, but had planned to install and did
in fact install, only a 3 x 3 foot culvert in the hollow underneath the proposed highway, the appellees were entitled to a
cancellation of the deed upon the return of the consideration
paid on the ground that there had been a false and fraudulent representation as to an alleged existing fact in regard to
what the Commission had planned to do in that behalf ....

proval in Bedford v. Kravis, 622 So. 2d 291, 294 (Miss. 1993).
702 185 So. 589 (Miss. 1939).
71 Powell, 185 So. at 589.
'"

See id.

705

Id.

7o8 Id. at 591.
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The agent who procured the execution of the conveyance
denied having made the representation, but several witnesses
having testified to the contrary, and the chancellor having
found in favor of appellees on such conflict in the testimony,
we must assume that the deed was procured under the circumstances hereinbefore mentioned. The parol evidence was
admissible, since it did not vary, alter or contradict a valid
written instrument, but showed that there was no valid contract at all by reason of the fraud alleged to have been perpetrated.7 °

A party seeking to prove either variety of fraud (i.e.
fraudulent inducement or "fraud of the draftsman") must do so
by clear and convincing evidence. °8
2. Negligent Misrepresentation
By the same rationale, parol evidence should also be admissible to show that the offering party was induced to enter
into the contract by some material misrepresentation, even if
that misrepresentation did not rise to the level of fraud.70 9
3. Duress or Undue Influence
Parol evidence may be admitted to establish that a facially
integrated and unambiguous written agreement was formed as

"o' Id. at 589-90; see also Fornea v. Goodyear Yellow Pine Co., 178 So. 914,
918 (Miss. 1938) ("[Ihf the writing is procured by false representations, or fraud,
committed by one of the parties to the writing on the other, on which he might
reasonably rely, the court will permit the facts to be shown, and if fraud was
committed in the procurement of the contract, it will be avoided; in other words,
no contract exists in legal contemplation which is procured by fraud.").
...See, e.g., Franklin v. Lovitt Equip. Co., 420 So. 2d 1370, 1373 (Miss. 1982);
Bethea v. Mullins, 85 So. 2d 452, 456 (Miss. 1956); Pearce v. Pierce, 58 So. 2d
824, 825 (Miss. 1952); Grenada Auto Co. v. Waldrop, 195 So. 491, 492-93 (Miss.
1940). See generally Foster v. Wright, 127 So. 2d 873, 875 (Miss. 1961) ("It is a
well-settled doctrine that in all cases the presumption of evidence is in favor of
honesty.").
"' See Nichols v. Shelter Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1158, 1163 (5th Cir. 1991)
(applying Mississippi law); see, e.g., Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566
So. 2d 1172, 1181-82 (Miss. 1990); Scott v. Transport Indem. Co., 513 So. 2d 889,
895-96 (Miss. 1987).
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a result of duress or undue influence. v0
4. Mutual Mistake
The parol evidence rule does not bar extrinsic proof of
mistake.7 11 As with fraud,7 12
"It is practically a universal rule that in suits to reform
written instruments on the ground of... mistake, parol evidence is admissible to establish the fact of... a mistake and
in what it consisted, and to show how the writing should be
corrected in order to conform to the agreement or intention
which the parties actually made or had .... Evidence of...
mistake is seldom found in the instrument itself, and unless
parol evidence may be admitted for the purpose of procuring
its reformation, the aggrieved party would have as little hope

71

See Broome Constr. Co. v. Beaver Lake Recreational Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d

545, 547 (Miss. 1969) (discussing duress); see also Sheehan v. Kearney, 21 So. 41,
42 (Miss. 1896) (holding that, in absence of undue influence or other issue of
"testamentary capacity being involved,...
parol evidence is not competent to
vary, enlarge, or contradict the will"). See generally Hitz v. Jenks, 123 U.S. 297,
305-06 (1887) (holding that, absent fraud or duress, extrinsic evidence was incompetent to impeach written, signed agreement); F.R. Hoar & Sons, Inc. v. McElroy
Plumbing & Heating Co., 680 F.2d 1115, 1117 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[lit may be

shown by parol evidence . . . that the proffered instrument was not the complete
contract, or that its validity was impaired by .

.

. duress

....

") (applying Missis-

sippi law).
711 See Bedford v. Kravis, 622 So. 2d 291, 295-96 (Miss. 1993);
Holliman v.
Charles L. Cherry & Assocs., Inc., 569 So. 2d 1139, 1145-46 (Miss. 1990); Penfield
v. Cook, 355 So. 2d 1104, 1105 (Miss. 1978); Brimm v. McGee, 80 So. 379, 380-81
(Miss. 1919); see also, e.g., F.R. Hoar & Sons, 680 F.2d at 1115-17 (finding that
parol evidence rule did not bar evidence of mistake). See generally Broome Construction, 229 So. 2d at 547 (reciting that parol evidence may be used to show
that written contract's validity is impaired by, inter alia, mistake).
Mutual mistake occurs when both (or all) parties to an agreement have contracted under a misconception about or ignorance of a material fact. See Greer v.
Higgins, 338 So. 2d 1233, 1236 (Miss. 1976). "The mistake may apply to the
nature of the contract, the identity of the person with whom it is made, or the
identity or existence of the subject matter; but in order to relieve a party from
liability on the contract, the mistake must relate to a material fact, past or present." Id. To qualify as an exception to the parol evidence rule, the mistake must
be mutual. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 152, 155 (1981). But see
F.R. Hoar & Sons, 680 F.2d at 1115-17 (finding that the parol evidence rule did
not bar evidence of unilateral mistake).
712 See supra subpart III.B.1.
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of redress ....
"Generally, it may be said that any testimony which
tends to prove the mistake alleged or the intention of the
parties is admissible. A witness in a position to know may
testify concerning the intention of the parties to an
agreement, to the same effect as to any other fact."713

That said, parol testimony to reform a writing on the basis
of mistake "must be received with 'great caution and distrust.'"7 4 Mistake must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. 715 The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that "it is
better that a doubtful written instrument should stand[] than
that a 71
doubtful
provision should be substituted by parol testi6
mony."

5. Illegal Provisions or Agreements

Parol evidence is admissible to show that part or all of an
otherwise integrated, unambiguous contract is, or was entered
into in a manner that is, contrary to law, public policy, or public morals.717

'
Smalley v. Rogers, 100 So. 2d 118, 119-20 (Miss. 1958) (quoting 45 AM.
JUR. Reformation of Instruments § 113), quoted with approval in Bedford, 622
So. 2d at 294.
.1,Watson v. Owen, 107 So. 865, 866 (Miss. 1926); accord Frierson v.
Sheppard, 29 So. 2d 726, 727 (Miss. 1947).
" See Penfield v. Cook, 355 So. 2d 1104, 1106 (Miss. 1978); Sunnybrook
Children's Home, Inc. v. Dahlem, 265 So. 2d 921, 925 (Miss. 1972); Brown v.
King, 58 So. 2d 922 (Miss. 1952); Frierson, 29 So. 2d at 727.
716 Harrington v. Harrington, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 701, 718 (1838), quoted with
approval in Frierson, 29 So. 2d at 727, and Progressive Bank of Summit v.
McGehee, 107 So. 876, 877 (Miss. 1926); see also Jones v. Jones, 41 So. 373, 373
(Miss. 1906) (stating that evidence to warrant reformation of written instrument
must sustain allegation of mutual mistake "practically to the exclusion of every
other reasonable hypothesis"); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McQuaid, 75 So.
255, 257 (Miss. 1917) (same). See generally Lauderdale v. Hallock, 15 Miss. (7 S.
& M.) 622, 629 (1846) (stating that parol evidence to explain or vary terms of
writing must be received with "great caution and distrust").
717 Broome Constr. Co. v. Beaver Lake Recreational Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d 545,
547 (Miss. 1969); see, e.g., Wilson Indus., Inc. v. Newton County Bank, 245 So. 2d
27, 31 (Miss. 1971) ("In cases involving usury, parol evidence is admissible to
show that writings are not what they seem and to establish the true facts with
respect to the transaction. In such cases it may be shown by parol that a docu-
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In Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Walker,71 Walker gave
the Bank a note in the amount of $450. Walker argued that the
note, given for a balance due on a former note given by him to
the Bank in payment for five shares of the Bank's corporate
stock, was unenforceable as against statute.7 19 The Bank, on
the other hand, argued that Walker gave the Bank the (second)
note in exchange for a loan by the Bank to enable Walker to
purchase five shares of the Bank's capital stock.720 Apparently, the note itself did not describe the obligation for which it
was given. Therefore, the trial court permitted Walker to present evidence of the note's illegal purpose, and Walker ultimately prevailed at trial. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court
considered whether the trial court had properly allowed the
evidence:
Whether the note.., was given to. the appellant in payment
for shares of its corporate stock was submitted to the jury
which found on ample evidence therefor that it was so given ....
There was no error in admitting the appellee's evidence
which contradicted the statement in his letter to the appellant that he was making a loan with the appellant in order to
complete the purchase of the five shares of stock. This letter
is not a contract but at most constitutes a mere admission of
a fact and even if it were a contract the evidence does not
simply contradict it but if true discloses that it was made in
" '
furtherance of an object forbidden by law.72

ment, legal in form, was in fact a device to disguise usurious interest or does not
reflect the real agreement, and that sums mentioned are in truth, usurious interest."); see also Yeager v. Ainsworth, 32 So. 2d 548, 550 (Miss. 1947); Grayson v.
Brooks, 1 So. 482, 483 (Miss. 1887) (both holding, likewise, that parol evidence is
admissible to show usury).
718 6 So. 2d 107 (Miss. 1942).
719 Walker, 6 So. 2d at 107. The applicable statute provided that "a note, obligation, or security of any kind given or transferred by any subscriber for stock in
any corporation shall not be considered, taken, or held as payment of any part of
the capital stock of the company." MISS. CODE ANN. § 4148 (1930).
'" Walker, 6 So. 2d at 107.
721

Id. at 108-09.
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In Mitchell v. Campbell,7 22 the court held that parol evidence was admissible to prove that a lease was entered into
with the intent to carry on an illegal business-namely, a
brothel and bar:
[Ihf a landlord knowingly leases his property to be used for
the purposes of prostitution, he cannot recover for rents which
a tenant has agreed to pay. The whole contract is against
public policy, an offense against morality, and absolutely

void ....
.... If the contract is in writing, parol evidence is admissible to expose its immoral and unlawful character.7 2

6. Non-Existent, or "Sham," Contracts
Parol evidence is admissible to show that a valid contract
never, in fact, existed between the purported contracting parties, or that, despite the existence of a written instrument purporting on its face to be a contract, the parties never intended
to perform it, or that the purported contract is a "sham" agreement.7 24

2

72 So. 231 (Miss. 1916).

7" Mitchell, 72 So. at 232-33 (citations omitted); accord Lavecchia v. Tillman,

76 So. 266, 266 (Miss. 1917). The Mitchell court stated that
courts will not lend their aid in enforcing illegal contracts. The door of
the court is and must always be open to litigants having substantial
rights to be enforced or wrongs to be redressed, and in searching for
truth and justice much perjury, filth, and crime are often necessarily
exposed. The law, however, is always on the side of morality. Courts are
founded to execute the laws, and not to sanction or assist in their violation. As well said by Johnson, J., in Bank. v. Owens, "No court of justice
can in its nature be made the handmaid of iniquity."
Mitchell, 72 So. at 233 (citation omitted) (quoting Bank of U.S. v. Owens, 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 527, 538 (1829)).
72" See, e.g., Clow Corp. v. J.D. Mullican, Inc., 356 So. 2d 579, 583 (Miss.
1978) (holding that parol evidence was properly admitted to address whether an
individual who purported to execute an otherwise unambiguous written contract
on behalf of corporate defendant had actual or apparent authority to do so); Lewis v. Lewis, 129 So. 2d 353, 358 (Miss. 1961) ("When the validity of an instrument of this kind is questioned, .. . evidence which tends to prove or disprove [its] existence . . . should be admitted; and many courts have held that the
declarations of the testator that he had made a will and that he kept it in a
certain place are admissible, at least to corroborate evidence of the existence or
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7. Evidence Pertinent to Consideration
a. Lack of or Failureof Consideration
Parol evidence is admissible to show want or failure of
consideration7 ":
The rule of exclusion does not apply to evidence of failure of
consideration ....

[Ilt is allowable to show by parol that the

writing never had validity, or, that having had a legal existence, it has for some reason ceased to be operative.72

nonexistence of the will in question."); Owen v. Sumrall, 36 So. 2d 800, 803
(Miss. 1948) ("We think that evidence was relevant on this trial and will be relevant on another trial, if one is had, grounded upon the existence or non-existence
of an agreement of Owen to pay drafts drawn by Davis upon him in favor of
Sumrall in payment of the price of cattle purchased by Davis from Sumrall until
Owen should notify Sumrall to the contrary."). See generally Martin v. Smith, 3
So. 33, 34 (Miss. 1887) ("It is true that, generally, extrinsic testimony is not admissible to vary or explain negotiable instruments, but one exception to the rule
is that where anything appears on the face of the paper to suggest a doubt as to
the party bound, or the character in which any of the signers acted in affixing
his name, parol testimony may be admitted, as between the original parties, to
show the true intent and meaning of the parties."). But see Martin v. First Nat'l
Bank of Hattiesburg, 164 So. 896, 898 (Miss. 1936) ("Under well-settled principles,
the parol evidence to the effect that while the appellants executed a contract of
assignment in writing in favor of Watkins, the terms of which were clear, binding, and unambiguous on its face, yet it was understood that they were not to be
performed as therein stated, or indeed at all, was clearly incompetent.").
725 See, e.g., In re Will of Johnson,
351 So. 2d 1339, 1341 (Miss. 1977);
Merchants' & Farmers' Bank v. Smith, 64 So. 970, 971 (Miss. 1914); Cocke v.
Blackbourn, 57 Miss. 689, 691 (1880); see also Broome Constr. Co. v. Beaver Lake
Recreational Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d 545, 547 (Miss. 1969) (reciting that parol evidence may be used to show that written contract's validity is impaired by, inter
alia, lack of or failure of consideration). See generally C & D Inv. Co. v. Gulf
Transp. Co., 526 So. 2d 526, 530 (Miss. 1988) ('The general rule is that consideration for a contract need not appear on the face of the instrument, but may be
proved by extrinsic evidence.").
"" Meyer v. Casey, 57 Miss. 615, 617 (1880). Furthermore,
[wihere a written agreement requires consideration and none is stated in
the writing, a finding that the writing is a completely integrated agreement would mean that it is not binding for want of consideration. Since
only a binding integrated agreement brings the parol evidence rule into
operation, evidence is admissible to show that there was consideration
and what it was.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 218 cmt. d, at 145 (1981); see also id.

19991 CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION & INTERPRETATION

279

In In re Will of Johnson,72 7 the appellant (wife) testified
that the only "consideration" she received for agreeing not to
renounce her husband's will was the provision in her husband's
will that she was to have a life estate in the homestead property, 728 which, she claimed, was no consideration, as she was
entitled to a life estate in the homestead as a matter of
law.72 9 The court stated that
[tihe appellee m[et] this by contending that since the contract
recited that there were other considerations besides the life
estate devised to the widow that the appellant could not show
by parol evidence that there was in fact no other consideration and that the appellant is bound by the recitation in the
contract. However, that rule of exclusion does not apply to
evidence of failure of consideration. In the case of Meyer v.
Casey,73 this Court addressed itself to that point:
The consideration [for] the bill of sale of the cotton
wholly failed as to Casey. The written instrument recites
a consideration, and it is claimed that it is not allowable
to contradict the writing in this respect. The rule of
exclusion does not apply to evidence of failure of consideration. It is not admissible to vary by parol the terms of
a valid written instrument. If it has a valid existence, it
must stand as the sole expositor of the terms of the contract it evidences; but it is allowable to show by parol
that the writing never had validity, or, that having had
a legal existence, it has for some reason ceased to be
operative.
We therefore hold that the chancellor properly admitted
parol evidence to show that there was in fact no consideration
other than the devise to the widow of a life estate in the

§ 218(2) ("[Extrinsic elvidence is admissible to prove whether or not there is consideration for a promise, even though the parties have reduced their agreement to
a writing which appears to be a completely integrated agreement.").
7' 351 So. 2d 1339 (Miss. 1977).
7 Will of Johnson, 351 So. 2d at 1340-41.
729 See id. at 1341 (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-23 (1972)).
70 57 Miss. 615 (1880).
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b. True Consideration

Parol evidence may also establish the real consideration
given for a written agreement where that real consideration is
different from what is recited in the agreement,73 2 where the

...Will of Johnson, 351 So. 2d at 1341 (quoting Meyer, 57 Miss. at 617).
" The Mississippi Supreme Court has explained that
[tihe terms of an obligation, assumed to be valid, cannot be varied by
parol; but it may be shown by parol what caused the party to thus
oblige himself. That consists with the written obligation, and does not
vary it. The right to show the real consideration is a qualification of the
general rule of the admissibility of parol evidence to alter the terms of a
written contract, and is as well established as the rule itself. What I
bind myself by writing to do cannot be varied by parol; but I may always show by parol what induced me to thus bind myself ....
Cocke v. Blackbourn, 57 Miss. 689, 691-92 (1880) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Raleigh State Bank v. Williams, 117 So. 365, 367 (Miss. 1928) (holding that seller
was entitled to present extrinsic evidence that true consideration for sale of property was $5,850, even though written conveyance of the lands recited a consideration
of only $3,500 "cash in hand," because "the true consideration for the conveyance
may be shown by parol. The principle that parol evidence is not admissible to vary
the terms of a written contract has no application to the consideration recited in a
contract."); Campbell v. Davis, 47 So. 546, 546 (Miss. 1908) (holding that parol
evidence that the $700 due stated in writing was actually only $200 was admissible). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 218 cmt. e, at 145
("Where consideration is required, the requirement is not satisfied by a false recital
of consideration . . . . An incorrect statement of a consideration does not prevent
proof either that there was no consideration or that there was a consideration
different from that stated."). But see Noble v. Logan-Dees Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 293
So. 2d 14, 15 (Miss. 1974) (holding that trial court improperly considered testimony
that insurance check, not mentioned in parties' written contract, was part of the
consideration for deal because "the evidence offered would show a different consideration from that expressed in the writing."); Thompson v. Bryant, 21 So. 655, 656
(Miss. 1897) ([A] consideration recited or admitted merely as a fact may be varied
by parol, while the terms of a contract may not be, and that, where a stipulation
as to the consideration becomes contractual, it, like any other written contract, is
the exclusive evidence, and cannot be varied by parol."); Baum v. Lynn, 18 So.
428, 430 (Miss. 1895) (same). As one court wrote,
ordinarily parol evidence is admissible to explain, or even contradict, a
written contract as to the mere consideration; but, when the consideration is contractual, parol evidence is no more admissible to vary that
than it is any other part of the written instrument ....
[A] consideration, recited in a written contract merely as a fact, may be varied by
parol evidence; but, when the stipulation of the writing concerning the
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or where

consideration is contractual, it cannot be so varied. The terms of the
contract are the propositions stated and accepted by the parties, and
when these are reduced to writing the writing settles the contract and
binds the parties, and it is not competent afterwards for one of them to
show by parol evidence that the written contract does not express the
real agreement. So to do would be in the very teeth of the rule prohibiting the variance or contradiction of a written contract by parol. The very
object of the parties in reducing the contract to writing is that it shall
no longer be subject to oral disputation.
Dodge v. Cutrer, 58 So. 208 (Miss. 1912) (emphasis added).
The court in Thompson v. Bryant, found that extrinsic evidence of consideration was incompetent to prove the "real consideration" for the agreement between
the parties:
The terms of the contract are embodied in the note and bill of sale, and
the contract they disclose shows what each of the parties finally agreed
and contracted to do, and what they did, in relation to the transaction.
Thompson sold and warranted his half interest in stock of goods, merchandise, etc., in the business of Buford & Thompson, to J. 0. Bryant,
and Bryant paid him $1,200 in cash, and gave him his note for $500,
payable in 90 days. It is clear that the consideration is contractual, and
is not a mere fact recited or admitted in the written contract. It cannot
be said that the proffered testimony would not contradict, alter, add to,
or vary the terms of the contract, but only a mere fact recited or admitted in the contract. To permit appellant to show that Bryant assumed
his part of the debts of Buford & Thompson at the time he executed his
note to appellant would most certainly import a new element into the
contract. The testimony was properly excluded.
Thompson, 21 So. at 656,
' See Sunflower Bank v. Pitts, 66 So. 810, 812 (Miss. 1914) ("The parol evidence introduced does not vary the express terms of the contract, for the simple
reason that the contract does not recite any consideration. If no consideration is
expressed in a written contract, the real consideration may be shown."); see, e.g.,
Boatright v. Horton, 86 So. 2d 864, 867-68 (Miss. 1956).
In Walley v. Bay Petroleum Corp., 312 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1963),
the defendants sought to introduce evidence tending to show that
appellant's guaranty was made in reliance upon appellee's promise to
sell refined petroleum products to Walco on terms competitive with the
independent field. Appellant (and his son) contended that the appellee
failed so to price its products, and that such failure, which constituted a
breach of appellee's promise, was the cause of the Walleys' breach, if
any. The trial judge excluded that evidence on the basis of the parol
evidence rule.
Walley, 312 F.2d. at 543 (applying Mississippi law). The Fifth Circuit held that the
trial court had erroneously excluded the evidence, and remanded the case for a
new trial:
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the agreement describes some form of consideration and adds
"and other valuable consideration," or words to that effect." 4
The Mississippi Supreme Court stated nearly 120 years
ago:
We consider it well settled that the real consideration of a
[contract] may be shown by parol, what ever may be the
statement of the [contract] as to the consideration. If this
were not so, all inquiry could be shut out by the easy process
of stating the consideration in every [contract] to be gold coin
or other equally unassailable consideration, and then the
defence of illegality, or want or failure of consideration would
be unknown, to the great relief of courts, but at the expense

In essence, the evidence offered, and rejected, went to show that, in
addition to the recitation of consideration received, contained in the
notes, there was promissory consideration to the appellant, namely,
appellee's promise to sell the products to Walco on competitive terms.
The only written consideration for appellant's promise of guaranty is the
recital in the notes, "for value received." Of course, that recitation, being
only the recital of a fact, could be contradicted in parol because, not
being promissory, the recital is not part of the agreement .. . On a
new trial, therefore, any evidence offered by appellant to show the existence of a collateral promise by appellee to sell its products to Walco on
a competitive basis, is to be admitted ....

Of course, it will be for the

jury to determine whether the appellee did, in fact, make the promises
as alleged by appellant.
Id. at 544-45 (footnotes omitted).
...See, e.g., Management, Inc. v. Crosby, 197 So. 2d 247, 251 (Miss. 1967)
('consideration of ten dollars, and other good and valuable consideration");
Morehead v. Morehead, 75 So. 2d 453, 456 (Miss. 1954) ("$500, and other valuable considerations"); Haden v. Sims, 150 So. 210, 210 (Miss. 1933) ("$1 and other
considerations"); Blum v. Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 135 So. 353, 355 (Miss.
1931) ("$10 and other consideration, good and valuable"). The mere presence of a
phrase to the effect of "other valuable considerations" will not necessarily open
the door to extrinsic evidence if it is followed by some qualifier that would,
standing alone, constitute "other valuable consideration." See, e.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 43 So. 434, 434-35 (Miss. 1907) (prohibiting extrinsic evidence where conveyance described consideration as '$1 and other valuable consideration, that J.T.
Rogers shall look after my welfare and business when so required to do"); State
Hwy. Dep't v. Duckworth, 172 So. 148, 149-50 (Miss. 1937) (holding that extrinsic
evidence was not invited by including "and other valuable consideration" in the
deed when deed proceeded to recite that "ft]he consideration herein stated includes all damage to fences, property and the like, and the rebuilding of fences
caused by the construction of said highway").
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8. Scrivener's Error
Extrinsic evidence may be admissible to show the existence
of a clerical error or omission in a written instrument.73 6
In Traders' Insurance Co. v. E.D. Edwards Post No. 22,
G.A.R. ,
[tihe time for which appellant undertook to insure the society
hall of appellee and its furniture and paraphernalia is fixed
in the policy as being "for the term of three years from the
fourteenth day of January, 1903, at noon, to the fourteenth
day of January, 1904, at noon. " "
The court found that the trial court had erred in failing to
admit oral testimony to clear up the internal conflict on the
face of the policy:
This attempted statement of the time for the duration of the
contract involves two descriptions, each of which is perfectly
clear in itself, but which are mutually inconsistent and contradictory. It is a palpable case of equivocation in description,
induced, doubtless, by clerical misprision. The court erred in
not permitting the introduction of parol evidence to show
which of the two periods named in the policy was the one in
contemplation of the parties. Parol evidence is admissible in
such a case, not to vary the contract, nor to make a contract
for the
parties, but to make clear what the contract really
9
was.

73

'
Cocke v. Blackburn, 57 Miss. 689, 691 (1880).
7 See Robinson v. Martel Enters., Inc., 337 So. 2d 698, 701 (Miss. 1976) ("A
written contract should be construed according to the obvious intention of the
parties, notwithstanding clerical errors or inadvertent omissions therein, which
can be corrected by perusing the whole instrument. If an improper word has been
used or a word omitted, the court will strike out the improper word or supply
the omitted word if from the context it can ascertain what word should have
been used."); see, e.g., Webb v. Mobile & Ohio R.R., 62 So. 168, 168 (Miss. 1913)
(holding parol evidence admissible to correct date from "1906" to "1907").
7 38 So. 779 (Miss. 1905).
73 Traders' Ins., 38 So. at 779.
'
Id.; see also, e.g., Barnett v. Getty Oil Co., 266 So. 2d 581, 586 (Miss.
1972) (holding that parol evidence was admissible to show that "through a
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If the intention of the parties is obvious from the contract,
despite the scrivener's error, a court "may strike an improper
word or clerical error or include an inadvertent omission so
long as the court understands what words should have been
used."74 °
In Newell v. Hinton,741 the court was faced with a property settlement agreement entered into between the parties addressing the disposition of and responsibility for payments on a
"1984 Ford Mustang," despite the fact that Hinton and Newell
traded their 1984 Ford Mustang for a 1985 Ford Mustang on
June 28, 1985-roughly six weeks before they signed the property settlement agreement.7 42 The Newell court explained:
On the other hand, however, when the judgment was
executed, there remained some forty-four monthly payments
for the 1985 Mustang. Indeed if the parties were contracting
the obligations concerning the 1984 Mustang, then they would
have failed completely to address the payments of the new
car. If they had failed to address this concern, then the obvious question would be: who would be responsible for paying
the notes on the 1985 Mustang? Consequently, it is obvious
the parties were not referring to the 1984 Mustang when they
drafted and executed the property settlement agreement.
...

Newell concedes that the parties did trade in their

1984 Mustang for a 1985 Mustang ....
Newell maintains, however, that she and Hinton reached
an agreement as to the division of property and delegation of
debts, that they spoke with their attorney and provided him
with lists for his use in drawing up the property settlement
agreement, and that they did this prior to the time they traded the 1984 Mustang. Newell further claims that she never
agreed to be solely responsible for the lease on the new car

scrivener's error the subject land was specifically described as the south onefourth of northwest one-fourth (S 1/4 of NW 1/4) of said Section 17 instead of the
south one-half of the northwest one-fourth (S 1/2 of NW 1/4) of said Section 17").
"' Newell v. Hinton, 556 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Miss. 1990).
741 556 So. 2d 1037 (Miss. 1990).
7' Newell, 556 So. 2d at 1042.
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and that Hinton agreed to help her with the lease. Because
Hinton did not assist her, Newell had to let the car go back to
Ford because she could not handle the payments alone.
Newell's defense can be summed up in one sentence: "I only
agreed to be responsible for the payments on the 1984 Mustang, not the 1985 Mustang." With this in mind the focus
once again is turned to the 1985 Mustang.
....
The property settlement agreement has become a
part of the final divorce decree for all legal intents and purposes. When ambiguities, such as the one involved in this
case, are discovered the agreement should be construed "much
as is done in the case of a contract, with the court seeking to
gather the intent of the parties and render its clauses [words
or numbers] harmonious in light of that intent." It could not
have been the intent of the parties to enter a contract involving a car they no longer owned.7"
9. Lost or Destroyed Contract
If a written and signed contract is lost or destroyed, such
that the party seeking to prove or enforce the agreement is
unable to produce the written agreement in court, the party
must prove its execution, terms, and loss or destruction, and
may do so by parol evidence. 7"
In Bolden v. Gatewood,7" Gatewood and Bolden were
equal partners in the Marshall County Equipment Company.
Prior to Gatewood's death, Gatewood and Bolden each took out
$25,000 life insurance policies on the other. The partners were
also to have executed a contingent "buy-sell" agreement that, in
the event one of them died, would enable the surviving partner
to buy-out the deceased partner's share of the partnership
Id. at 1042-43 (citations omitted).
'" See, e.g., Bolden v. Gatewood, 164 So. 2d 721, 730-31 (Miss. 1964); Dewees
v. Bostick Lumber & Mfg. Co., 50 So. 865, 866 (Miss. 1910); see also Howie Bros.
v. Walter Pratt & Co., 35 So. 216, 217 (Miss. 1903) (holding that trial court erred
by refusing to allow testimony regarding contents of letters from one of parties
where party offering testimony had shown letters to have been lost or destroyed).
But cf Gulfport Sash, Door & Blind Mfg. Co. v. Town of Bond, 49 So. 260, 261
(Miss. 1909) (holding parol evidence of contents of writing not competent if party
proffering parol evidence failed to account for absence of writing).
"3

4 164 So. 2d 721 (Miss. 1964).
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using the proceeds of the life insurance policy "plus any additional sum required."746 After Gatewood died,
the policies were found, but the 'buy-sell' agreement was not
found. Bolden collected the $25,000 on the policy issued on
the life of Gatewood, but denied the execution of the 'buy-sell'
partnership agreement and refused to pay over to the legal
representative of Gatewood's estate the proceeds of the policy
as the purchase price of Gatewood's interest in the estate of
the partnership.7"7
Gatewood's executrix sued Bolden for the proceeds of the policy,
arguing that the "buy-sell" agreement that obligated Bolden to
use the insurance proceeds to buy-out Gatewood's partnership
interest "had either been lost or destroyed, or was being withheld from [Gatewood's executrix and heirs], but that the defendant Edgar Lee Bolden had admitted the execution of such
agreement."74 The chancellor, having heard and considered
considerable oral testimony regarding the alleged "buy-sell"
agreement, held:
It is not humanly possible for the court to know whether or
not the agreement was executed, and if so, what became of it.
However, by a preponderance of the evidence, I am forced to
reach the conclusion that the complainant has met the burden
of proof, that it was executed in the form copy of which is in
evidence, and that it was lost or destroyed; and that under
the law, and in good conscience and under the principles of
equity, it should be enforced.749
The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, finding "ample
evidence in the record to support the finding of the chancellor
that the complainant had met the burden of proof, that the
'buy-sell' agreement... was executed and lost or destroyed."6 ' In support of its holding, the court specifically
'"

Bolden, 164 So. 2d at 722-23.

7

Id. at 722.

-8

Id.

74

750

at 723-24.
Id. at 730.

Id.
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referred to the oral testimony of the insurance agent who sold
Gatewood and Bolden their policies and provided them with the
draft "buy-sell" agreement, as well as oral testimony by
Gatewood's executrix and her brother regarding statements
made to them by Bolden shortly after Gatewood's death.75 '
This exception to the parol evidence rule is not intended to
vitiate the "best evidence" rule.75 2 Rather, the exception applies only where the "best evidence" is not available.7 5
10. Material Alteration
If one party alleges that a written and signed contract
offered into evidence lacks or alters some material provision
that was present when the party signed the contract, or includes a material provision that was not present when the
party signed the contract, the terms of the written contract at
the time its was actually agreed to by the parties may be
proved by parol evidence.75" An alteration is "material" if it
"enlarges the scope of an instrument as a means of
...Id. at 731.
752 See Casey v. Valentour, 218 So. 2d 863, 865 (Miss. 1969) ('Ordinarily, the
contents of documents or records cannot properly be shown except by introducing
the document itself, which is the best evidence."); see, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 119 So. 2d
780, 648 (Miss. 1960) ("It is true that the plaintiff didn't offer to introduce the
policy in evidence after being advised that her husband, Clyde Lee, had the policy ....
The court was correct in holding that oral testimony was not competent
to prove the terms and provisions of the policy . . . ."). For Mississippi's "best
evidence" rule, see MISS. R. EVID. 1002 ("requirement of original").
7" See, e.g., Universal Computer Services, Inc. v. Lyall, 464 So. 2d 69, 76
(Miss. 1985) (recognizing viability of "best evidence" rule, but holding that it did
not apply where written contract did not address certain terms of parties' agreement).
'" See Jones v. Index Drilling Co., 170 So. 2d 564, 572 (Miss. 1965). See, e.g.,
Broome Constr. Co. v. Beaver Lake Recreational Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d 545, 546-47
(Miss. 1969) (holding that parol evidence was admissible to resolve defendant's
claim that the copy of written contract tendered into evidence by plaintiff lacked
an essential term that was present when defendant signed the contract).
There would seem to be no question as to the admissibility of parol
evidence to show an unauthorized alteration of a written instrument, the
object of such evidence being not to vary the terms of the instrument
but, on the contrary, to prove the terms thereof as originally executed.
Jones, 170 So. 2d at 572 (quotation omitted).
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evidence."755
In Jones v. Index Drilling Co.,"' the question for the

court was whether the trial court had erred in permitting oral
testimony by a client (Williams) to explain the scope of his
written agreement with his attorney. While employed by Production Services, Inc., Williams was injured as a result of the
negligence of one of Index Drilling's truck drivers.757 Williams
received worker's compensation benefits for approximately one
year. Thereafter, he approached attorney Jones to ask whether
he was entitled to additional worker's compensation benefits.75 In October 1958, Williams signed a "Contract for Legal
Services," assigning to Jones "an undivided one-fourth interest
in said claim and also in and to all sum, or sums, received
therefrom (one-third if the case is appealed)."759
Several months passed, during which Williams received no
additional worker's compensation and, apparently, no word
from Jones regarding his efforts to secure more benefits for
Williams.76 ° In August 1959, Williams consulted attorney Collins, who told Williams that he "would not interfere in the
compensation matter" because Williams had already employed
Jones to handle that, but Collins would take Williams's "third

"
'5

J.R. Watkins Co. v. Fornea, 100 So. 185, 187-88 (Miss. 1924).
Index Drilling, 170 So. 2d 564 (Miss. 1965).

757 Id.
71 Id.

at 565.

...Id. The contract, which was typewritten, except for two-and-one-half lines

"which were underscored and filled in with pen and ink," id. at 567, and was
signed by Williams, id. at 568, read in relevant part:
For and in consideration of legal services rendered in my behalf in the
prosecution of my claim against Index Drilling Co., Dapsco Inc., Martin
Connection Works & Maryland Casualty Co. or any other person, firm or
corporation I hereby assign and set over to W. Arlington Jones, Attorney, an undivided one-fourth interest in said claim and also in and to
all sum, or sums, received therefrom. (one-third if case is appealed).
I hereby authorize the above attorney, W. Arlington Jones, to prosecute this claim in my name, and I hereby ratify his actions in all things
pertaining thereto.

Id.

7®Id. at 565.
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party suit against Index Drilling."7 61 When Collins filed suit
against Index Drilling on Williams's behalf, Jones attempted to
intervene in order to establish his right to a share of any settlement or award. 2 :
Williams testified that he had been paid workmen's compensation after his injury, but payments had been stopped
during the year 1957; and after waiting several months he
went to see Mr. Jones and asked him about his workmen's
compensation claim. He asked Mr. Jones, "Wasn't I entitled to
some more workmen's compensation?" Mr. Jones told him he
would have to look into the matter. Mr. Jones then handed
him a sheet of paper that had two blank lines. Williams

161

Id.

at 568.

7' Id. The court continued:

Jones testified that after the signing of the above mentioned contract he
represented Williams in his claim for compensation for injuries received
by him as a result of the accident referred to in the plaintiffs declaration. Jones was then asked whether he was presently employed by Williams. His answer was "No." He then identified and introduced in evidence a letter which he had received from Williams, postmarked October
17, 1959. The letter signed by Williams appears in the record, and is as
follows:
Dear Mr. Jones:
This is to advise you that now that the Workmen's Compensation
case against Martin Connection Works and Welding Shop that you
handled for me has now been settled and you have been paid your
fee in full and have been paid for your services in full, and I will
not be in need of any further services from you. I am writing this
letter to you in order that you will know that our relationship at
attorney and client terminated as of the date of the settlement of
the suit as mentioned above, and that I no longer retain you as
my attorney in any wise.
Yours truly,
Charles Williams
Jones stated that ...

he had been discharged and he understood

that Williams had employed Judge Burkitt Collins to represent him.
Jones stated that he had given notice to Index Drilling Company of the
assignment which he held of a 25 percent interest in Williams' claim,
that he had also given notice to the other corporations mentioned and
the Maryland Casualty Company of his interest in the claim.
Id. at 568.
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asked Mr. Jones what the paper was, and Mr. Jones said,
"This is to give me authority to look into your medical reports
** * I cannot look into them without your permission." Wilhams was asked to examine the contract dated October 31,
1958, which he had signed and which Jones had offered in
evidence during the hearing on September 6. Williams stated,
"That is the contract with the exception of the pencil writing
was not in there." Williams was asked to read that part of the
instrument which he said was not in the instrument when he
signed it. He then read the two and one-half lines of the contract which were filled in with a pen or a pencil. He stated
that the two words "one-half', which appeared in the typewritten form, were blocked out and the words "one-fourth"
were inserted in their place at the time he signed it. Williams
was asked when that part of the instrument that was left
blank, which was later written in by pencil, "When was that
done?" His answer was, "It was done after I had left or sometime, because it was not in there when I signed the contract."
Williams stated that about three or four months later he went
back to see Mr. Jones, that his father went with him, and he
asked Mr. Jones if anything had been done about his
workmen's compensation. Mr. Jones advised him at that time
that he had been paid and he could not receive anything else.
Williams stated that he went back to see Mr. Jones again
about two months later, and Mr. Jones again advised him
that he did not have anything except workmen's compensation. Williams stated that his foot was hurting him and he
went back to Mr. Jones' office a third time to see if he was
not entitled to some more medical care, and Mr. Jones again
told him that he had been paid all that he could be paid; that
he then asked Mr. Jones, "Wasn't there any person or corporation that would be responsible for his accident other than
Production Service?" And Mr. Jones told him, "No Sir."
Williams stated that he then went to see Judge Burkitt
Collins; that he told Mr. Collins that he had given a contract
to Mr. Jones for his workmen's compensation, and Mr. Collins
would not advise him as to that; that Collins told him that he
would not interfere with another lawyer's contract, but if he
had not given his Index Drilling case to anyone he would take
that. Williams stated that a few days after he had turned the
matter over to Judge Collins he received word from Mr. Jones
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that he could settle his workmen's compensation claim for
about $2000. That was after Judge Collins had filed suit
against Index Drilling Company.
At the conclusion of the hearing the court found that
Jones had a contract with the plaintiff Williams to represent
him in a workmen's compensation case, but the contract covered only the matter of workmen's compensation and had no
relation to a third party suit; that Jones had no contract with
Williams to represent him in a third party suit against Index
Drilling Company for damages arising out of the injury for
which he had received workmen's compensation .... "
On appeal, Jones argued that the trial court erred in permitting Williams to testify "as to the facts and circumstances
surrounding the execution of the contract for legal services and
the changes made in the written instrument after it was signed
by Williams."7 ' The supreme court disagreed:
[We think there was no error in the court's admitting the
testimony of Williams relating to the interview he had with
Jones which led to the signing of the instrument and the fact
that the blank spaces had not been filled in when the instrument was signed.
Williams' testimony that the two and one-half lines of
blank spaces in the typewritten instrument had not been
filled in when he signed the instrument, that the words "onehalf were stricken out and the words "one-fourth" inserted in
place of the words "one-half' before he signed the instrument,
and that Jones said that the paper which he was requested to
sign was needed to give him authority to look into Williams'
medical reports, that he could not look into them without
Williams' permission, shed light upon the meaning of the
words "my claim" as used in the instrument which Jones
prepared and which Williams signed. That testimony was
uncontradicted, and in our opinion, lends support to Williams'
contention that his employment of Jones as an attorney was
limited to the prosecution of his claim for additional

76 Id. at 570-71.
76 Id. at 572.

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

292

[Vol. 69

workmen's compensation only.7 "

If an instrument is signed with one or more, terms left

blank, parol evidence may be admissible to show that a term
later filled in by one of the parties was not what was agreed to
by both parties at the time the instrument was signed.7 "A
party who signs a blank piece of paper"-or, it would seem, a
piece of paper with one or more blanks on it-"cannot be bound
to the obligation written therein, unless it can be shown that
he gave the person 767who wrote it"---or who filled in the
blank(s)-"authority.
11. Condition Precedent
A "condition precedent" is one "which must be performed
before the agreement of the parties shall become a binding
contract" or "which must be fulfilled before the duty to perform
an existing contract arises."7 6 Parol evidence of a condition
precedent to a contract or contractual provision is generally
admissible, irrespective of whether the contract or term is integrated or ambiguous.769
765

Id.

761

See First Nat'l Bank of Jackson v. IDS Mortgage Corp., 353 So. 2d 775,

777-78 (Miss. 1978); Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Craft, 67 So. 2d 874, 876-77 (Miss.
1953). In Craft, the missing information was the amount of consideration to be
paid for a release, Craft, 67 So. 2d at 876; in IDS Mortgage, it was the effective
dates, amount, and recording data for a subordination agreement, IDS Mortgage,
353 So. 2d at 776-77. In both cases, the court found that parol evidence as to the
terms left blank did not contradict the written instrument as of the time it was
signed. Id. at 778; Craft, 67 So. 2d at 876. Therefore, the party contesting the
written instrument was not prohibited 'from showing by parol testimony the true
intention of the parties." IDS Mortgage, 353 So. 2d at 778.
"7 Craft, 67 So. 2d at 877, quoted with approval in IDS Mortgage, 353 So. 2d
at 778.
' Turnbough v. Steere Broad. Corp., 681 So. 2d 1325, 1327 (Miss. 1996). A
condition precedent is distinguished from a "condition subsequent" for purposes of
the parol evidence rule. A condition subsequent is "a condition referring to a
future event, upon the happening of which the obligation becomes no longer binding upon the other party, if he chooses to avail himself of the condition." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 293-94 (6th ed. 1990).

'" See, e.g., Ohio Pottery & Glass Co. v. J.R. Pickle & Son, 66 So. 321, 322
(Miss. 1914).
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The general rule which excludes parol evidence, when offered
to contradict or vary the terms, provisions, or legal effects of a
written instrument, is subject to many qualifications. Among
these qualifications is one to the effect that conditions relating to conditions precedent may be shown by extrinsic evidence. A party who concedes that the instrument evidencing
the contract was placed in the possession of the party seeking
relief, but claims that the latter took it with the understanding that it was not to go into effect until the happening of
some other or further event, and that such event has not
transpired, is not considered as one seeking to vary or contradict a written contract, but as one endeavoring to show that
no contract between the parties ever in fact came into existence. For this reason, evidence of such conditions precedent
is held admissible."
In Turnbough v. Steere Broadcasting Corp.,771 the appellees personally guaranteed the indebtedness and all interest
due in accordance with a promissory note tendered for the
radio station. The personal guaranty stated that it could "only
be enforced after the default procedures specified in the Security Agreement" between Turnbough and the Caravelle Broad-

Where parties to a writing which purports to be an integration of a contract between them orally agree, before or contemporaneously with the
making of the writing, that it shall not become binding until a future
day or until the happening of a future event, the oral agreement is
operative if there is nothing in the writing inconsistent therewith.
Plant Flour Mills Co. v. Sanders & Ellis, 157 So. 713, 714 (Miss. 1934).
77
Ohio Pottery, 66 So. at 322 (quoting 2 WILUAM F. ELLIOmr, ELLioTr ON
CONTRACTS 1 1636 (1913)). But cf Paoli v. Anderson, 208 So. 2d 167, 168 (Miss.
1968) (holding that, where the written instrument "contained no conditions or
restrictions on its effectiveness," permitting plaintiff "to set up a condition by
parol evidence would contradict her deed, which is unambiguous on its face"; and,
therefore, "such parol evidence as to conditional delivery" was inadmissible). The
holding in Paoli may be explained by a special rule applying to deeds. The court
mentions "the importance of stability of title[]" to real property among its rationale for its holding. Id. at 169. But, to the extent that the court has generally
construed deeds according to the same rules as contracts, and vice versa, Paoli
may have broader application.
.. 681 So. 2d 1325 (Miss. 1996)
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cast Group had been observed7 72 :
There was little evidence presented as to whether the
parties ever intended to have a security agreement executed.
When asked about the security agreement, Alfred Koenenn,
Turnbough's attorney during closing, testified that Turnbough
discussed the execution of a security agreement with
Caravelle, but realized that such execution was "impossible."
Therefore, "the personal guaranties of the limited partners
was accepted rather than any kind of security agreement,
either for the personal property or mortgage on the real property which was sold." There was no testimony presented by
any of the members of Caravelle. The evidence does not contain any other reference to any security agreement or default
procedures within any type of agreement. Therefore, the only
indication of the parties' intent is Koenenn's testimony as to
what Turnbough may have told him during closing."'
The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's
grant of summary judgment for the guarantors, holding that
the language of the personal guaranty was "ambiguous as to
whether the parties intended that the execution of a security
agreement operate as a condition precedent to performance
under the personal guaranty""' and, therefore, summary
judgment was inappropriate.77 5
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "where
the parties to a written agreement agree orally that performance of the agreement is subject to the occurrence of a stated
condition, the agreement is not integrated with respect to the
77 The commentary
oral condition."
to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts elaborates:
[An oral requirement of a condition is never completely consistent with a signed written agreement which is complete on
its face; in such cases evidence of the oral requirement bears

772

Turnbough, 681 So. 2d at 1327.

.. Id. at 1328.
.. Id. at 1325.
77
Id. at 1328.
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTS § 217 (1981).
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directly on the issues [of] whether the writing was adopted as
an integrated agreement and if so whether the agreement
was completely integrated or partially integrated ....
If the
parties orally agreed that performance of the written agreement was subject to a condition, either the writing is not an
integrated agreement or the agreement is only partially integrated until the condition occurs. Even a "merger" clause in
the writing, explicitly negating oral terms, does not control
the question [ofi whether there is an integrated agreement or
the scope of the writing.777

12. Subsequent Acts or Agreements
The parol evidence rule excludes only extrinsic evidence of
prior or contemporaneous oral agreements and prior written
agreements.77 Evidence of occurrences after the contract is
executed is not excluded by the rule.779

a. Subsequent Conduct
What the parties to a contract do thereunder "is relevant
extrinsic evidence, and often the best evidence, of what the
contract requires them to do."" s The "construction placed up-

'" Id. § 217 cmt. b; see also Plant Flour Mills Co. v. Sanders & Ellis, 157 So.
713, 714 (Miss. 1934) ("The stipulation in the contract that it 'constitutes the
complete agreement between the parties hereto and cannot be changed in any
manner whatsoever without the written consent of both buyer and seller' is not
inconsistent with the oral agreement that it should not become operative until
approved by Ellis & Sanders.").
The Restatement advises further that "1a] major rationale expressed by the
courts for the rule of this Section is that it has to do with an oral condition that
must occur before the written contract comes into existence. Thus, if the oral
condition is not met there is no subsequent and superseding agreement and no
reason to apply the parol evidence rule." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 217 reporter's note to cmt. b, at 143 (emphasis added).
m See supra text accompanying note 572. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212.
.7 See Kelso v. McGowan, 604 So. 2d 726, 731 (Miss. 1992); supra subpart
III.A.2.c.
71 Kight v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply, Inc., 537 So. 2d 1355, 1358 (Miss. 1989);
see also, e.g., UHS-Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hosp., Inc., 525
So. 2d 746, 754 (Miss. 1987) ("Where what the parties have said is less than
clear and definite in material part, the court may resort to extrinsic aids to as-
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on an instrument by the parties thereto is entitled to very
great weight in reaching the intent and purpose of the instrument."' 1 The parties' subsequent conduct "may support a
finding that the original contract has been modified to an extent consistent with the subsequent course of conduct." 2
In Delta Wild Life & Forestry, Inc. v. Bear Kelso Plantation, Inc.," the question for the court was whether the
lessee's assignee, Bear Kelso, was obligated to quit the leased
premises because Bear Kelso was using the leased premises for
crop farming rather than pasturage, as was provided for in the
original lease:
The lease, originally entered into by Delta, lessor, and G. L.
Johnson, lessee, on August 21, 1962, provided for annual
rental payments of $2,500 per year and was for an initial
five-year period with the privilege of lessee to renew same for
four successive five-year periods at a rental of $2,500 per
year. It also provided that if any of the described premises
should, during the term of the contract or any renewal thereof, be assessed for ad valorem taxes at a value "in excess of
that at which uncultivatable land in Issaquena County is
assessed" that the lessee, in addition to the annual rental
specified, would pay the increase in as valorem taxes thereby
imposed as additional rental.

sign meaning to contract terms . . . . [O]ne of those extrinsic aids should be the
construction which the parties themselves have given to a contract in the course
of their life together under it." (citation omitted)); Sumter Lumber Co. v. Skipper,
184 So. 296, 298-99 (Miss. 1938) ("[Wihen the parties have for some time proceeded with or under the deed or contract, a large measure, and sometimes a
controlling measure, of regard will be given to the practical construction which
the parties themselves have given it, this on the common sense proposition that
actions generally speak even louder than words."); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v.
Lakeview Traction Co., 56 So. 393, 395 (Miss. 1911) ("We must look to and consider the contemporaneous construction which the parties themselves place upon
the instrument. In cases of ambiguity, this contemporaneous interpretation becomes of great value, and frequently is decisive.").
701 A. & S. Spengler v. Stiles-Tull Lumber Co., 48 So. 966, 968 (Miss. 1908).
See supra subpart II.C.8 for more discussion of construing and interpreting a
written contract in light of the parties' performance of the contract.
"2
Kight, 537 So. 2d at 1359. See Stinson v. Barksdale, 245 So. 2d 595, 597-98
(Miss. 1971).
78 281 So. 2d 683 (Miss. 1973).
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Said lease also provided, among other things, that:
LESSEE shall have the right and privilege to put any
part or all of said land in pasture, and to erect such
fences or other improvements thereon as Lessee may
need in and about such operations, and may remove at
Lessees (sic) option such fences or improvements at the
termination hereof.
At the time G. L. Johnson entered into the above mentioned lease, he and his brother, Wendell Johnson ... were
raising cattle on what was described by the witnesses as
woods pasture. After leasing the 1,240 acres in question, they
fenced these lands and ran cattle thereon until sometime
prior to the middle of 1964 by which time they had sold all of
the cattle. During this same period, beginning in 1963, the
Johnsons began to clear all of the trees and buck vines from
the leased lands and converted them into cultivated row crop
lands for the purpose of growing soybeans. Prior to being
cleared, a large portion of the land was covered with timber,
the value of which was estimated at some $23,370. It was
estimated that the cost of clearing the land would run between $75 and $90 per acre, and that the total cost of drainage structures was approximately $30,000. The total of this
being well in excess of $100,000 ....
...
[Aifter observing the Johnsons' successful soybean
operations . . . , by a second lease, Delta cleared and leased to
Johnson additional acres known as the "thousand acre deadening," being between 1,000 and 1,200 acres. This second
lease to the Johnsons did not prohibit a sublease and they
sublet it in part to Claude Cook and in part to W. L. and Lee
Braxton. On January 10, 1967, when the second lease had
about four years to run, Delta decided after negotiations to
allow the Johnsons to sublease the disputed 1962 lease on
certain conditions. Delta's corporate minutes of that date provide:

2. RESOLVED,... Delta Wild Life shall amend
that certain written lease from Delta Wild Life to G. L.
Johnson and Wendell Johnson... so as to grant the
said G. L. and Wendell Johnson the right to sublease
said premises, provided said premises be kept in a good
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state of cultivation and properly farmed by the sublessee.
On August 11, 1967, G. L. "Doc" Johnson advised Delta
by letter that he was exercising his option to renew the disputed 1962 lease for an additional five years and enclosed his
check in the amount of $2,500 which check was accepted and
cashed by Delta. Thereafter, the 1968 annual rental was paid
and the check therefor was deposited to Delta's account on
August 16, 1968.
G. L. "Doc" Johnson died on November 4, 1968, and on
November 19, 1968, Wendell H. Johnson, his partner, and
Mrs. Jeryl T. Johnson, his widow and sole devisee and legatee, quitclaimed to the appellee, Bear Kelso, their rights as
lessee to the 1962 lease in question. Agricultural operations
continued as usual on the leased properties. Then, on August
19, 1969, Delta forwarded to Bear Kelso a notice to quit on
the 1962 lease, giving a number of reasons why the lease had
been breached. The appellee, Bear Kelso, refused to quit the
leased land and has remained in possession and continued to
row crop its property until the present. Suit was filed on
August 26, 1971.' M
After setting forth these pertinent facts, the court turned
to Delta's argument that Bear Kelso was in violation of the
"pasturage" requirement of the lease because Bear Kelso was
using the land for row crops:
It is undisputed that in early 1963 the Johnsons began
clearing the land in question at considerable expense to
themselves and that this was known by officers of Delta and
that virtually all of the clearing had been completed in 1964.
With this knowledge, Delta accepted the annual rental payments each year, and in 1967, after negotiations, the
Johnsons were allowed to sublet and assign the questioned
lease, and speaking through its minutes, Delta expected,
among other things, that the leased premises "be kept in a
good state of cultivation and properly farmed." Such a provision is wholly inconsistent with Delta's present contention

7" Delta Wild Life, 281 So. 2d at 683-85 (emphases deleted).
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that the land was to be used for pasture only. Further, Delta's
agreement to allow the Johnsons to sublease the property was
granted only after the Johnsons agreed to give up valuable
leases that they had on other properties belonging to Delta
and which Delta immediately released to third parties at a
considerable profit. If a bona fide serious dispute existed between the parties as to the interpretation of the lease then
certainly it would have manifested itself in the terms of this
new agreement. Also, the satisfaction of Delta with the arrangement between the parties, which had been going on for
several years, was further evidenced by the acceptance by
Delta, without protest, in 1967 of a notice by Johnson of renewal of the lease for an additional five years and the acceptance of the annual rental payment of $2,500 at that time and
again in 1968. It was not until August, 1969, after G. L.
Johnson died and after the lease had been quitclaimed to
Bear Kelso that Delta decided that the Johnsons had
breached the lease. This decision comes too late. The contemporaneous construction placed upon the instrument by the
parties thereto is entitled to very great weight in reaching the
intent and purpose of the instrument. It is evident from the
acts of the parties themselves covering many years that they
contemplated that these lands covered by the 1962 lease
would be converted to row crop use. The lease itself provided
that the lessee would pay any increase in taxes resulting from
an assessment of taxes in excess of that at which uncultivated
land in Issaquena County is assessed.7"
b. Abandonment of Contract
Extrinsic evidence may also be admitted to prove that one
or both parties abandoned a contract at some date after its
execution."' In such a case, extrinsic evidence may be admitted even in the face of an unambiguous, fully integrated, writ-

7 Id. at 686 (citations omitted).
7 See Broome Constr. Co. v. Beaver Lake Recreational Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d
545, 547 (Miss. 1969) ("Rights acquired under a contract may be abandoned . . .
by . . . conduct clearly indicating such purpose. Intent to abandon . . . may be
inferred from conduct of the parties which is inconsistent with the continued existence of the agreement.").
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ten contract.787
c. Subsequent Oral Modification
The parol evidence rule does not bar extrinsic evidence
regarding subsequent oral modification of a prior written
agreement."s Nor does it preclude extrinsic evidence of an
oral agreement to waive or modify a particular provision in a
written contract.8 9
In Albert Mackie & Co. v. S.S. Dale & Sons, 790 the written contract was for the purchase of six carloads of potatoes.
The defendant argued that, by a subsequent parol agreement,
the plaintiff agreed to accept and the defendant agreed to deliver only three carloads instead of six.79 ' The court held:
[Sitrict performance of a written contract within the statute
of frauds may be waived by a parol understanding or by
words and acts inconsistent with an intention to require performance where the other party has been misled or kept from
performing ....
7' Id. at 545-46.
7 See Williamson v. Metzger, 379 So. 2d 1227, 1229 (Miss. 1980); St. Louis
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 230 So. 2d 580, 581-82 (Miss. 1970); Flowood
Corp. v. Chain, 152 So. 2d 915, 920 (Miss. 1963); Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Long, 82 So. 2d 847, 848 (Miss. 1955); see also Lusk-Harbison-Jones, Inc., v. Universal Credit Co., 145 So. 623, 624 (Miss. 1933) ("[A] subsequent oral agreement
to modify a prior written contract is valid and proof thereof does not violate the
parol evidence rule, especially where the subsequent agreement is acted upon.").
'" See Williamson, 379 So. 2d at 1229; Long, 82 So. 2d at 848; Oden Constr.
Co. v. Helton, 65 So. 2d 442, 446 (Miss. 1953).
As the court observed in Lee v. Hawks, 9 So. 828, 828 (Miss. 1891):
The statute of frauds debars one of an action on a contract, in
certain cases, unless the contract be in writing; but a parol agreement to
annul or waive a particular stipulation in the written contract which has
been mutually assented to and fully performed, may be offered in evidence in defense of an action for a breach of the original written contract. An action may not be maintained, in cases within the statute,
upon a contract not in writing; but a defense may be made by showing
an executed parol agreement waiving or annulling a particular provision
of the written contract.
Id. at 828, quoted with approval in Williamson, 379 So. 2d at 1229.
784
So. 453 (Miss. 1920).
79' Albert Mackie & Co., 84 So. at 453-54.
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The simple contention is made that the purchaser agreed
to accept one-half of the property contract to be delivered and
waive performance as to the other half. It is immaterial
whether this action be termed a waiver, modification, or release. The parties acted upon the parol agreement, and, if the
testimony on behalf of appellee be true, it would be very inequitable to award damages in this case. 7"
A no-oral-modification clause may be waived by a party
either by accepting non-written changes from the other party or
by making non-written changes.79 3 The question of whether or
not the parties waived the requirement of a writing is a question for the trier of fact.7
d. Rescission
A prior written contract may be rescinded by subsequent
oral agreement or subsequent conduct. 9 While rescission
may be inferred from conduct, as opposed to an agreement
71 Id. at 454-55; accord Williamson, 379 So. 2d at 1229-30 (holding that parol
evidence was admissible to prove the assent of the lessors to a substituted mode
of performance of the original lease).
" The Mississippi Supreme Court has often recognized the validity of a subsequent oral modification, even where the prior written contract requires that any
modification be in writing. See, e.g., Singing River Mall Co. v. Mark Fields, Inc.,
599 So. 2d 938, 946 (Miss. 1992); Eastline Corp. v. Marion Apts., Ltd., 524 So. 2d
582, 584 (Miss. 1988); Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247, 253 (Miss. 1985). But
see MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-209(2) (1981) ("A signed agreement which excludes
modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified
or rescinded . . . ."). The Mississippi Supreme Court wrote that

[flor a subsequent agreement to modify an existing contract, the later
agreement must, itself, meet the requirements for a valid contract. Since
a contract modification must have the same essentials as a contract, a
binding post-contract agreement must fulfill the requirements of a contract regardless of whether a party characterizes it as a modification or
a stand-alone contract.
Singing River Mall, 599 So. 2d at 947 (citations omitted).
7" Id. at 946; Eastline, 524 So. 2d at 584; Green v. Pendergraft, 179 So. 2d
831, 836 (Miss. 1965).
'" See Broome Constr. Co. v. Beaver Lake Recreational Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d
545, 547 (Miss. 1969); Sammons Communications, Inc. v. Polk, 429 So. 2d 564,
567 (Miss. 1983).
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between the parties,
notice for the rescission or termination of a contract must be
clear and unambiguous, conveying an unquestionable purpose
to insist on the cancellation. To effect a rescission, an airmative act on the part of the person desiring to rescind is
necessary. Although notice of rescission need not consist of a
formal written notice, the declaration or acts constituting
rescission must be definite and unequivocal and clearly indicate the right asserted.7"
Merely ignoring or disregarding the terms of a contract may
not be sufficient to constitute rescission.797
Extrinsic evidence offered to prove the rescission may be
admitted even in the face of an unambiguous, fully integrated,
written contract.798
In Renfroe v. Aswell,799 Aswell and Renfroe were partners
in a sawmill. Renfroe executed four notes, totaling $1,000,
which Aswell claimed represented Renfroe's purchase of
Aswell's half of the business. 8° When Renfroe did not pay,
Aswell sued. At trial, Renfroe offered to prove that, after he
executed the notes but was unable to borrow the rest of the
money he needed to complete the purchase and pay off outstanding debts of the partnership, he and Aswell
got together and had a further parol understanding that the
purported sale would be, and was, rescinded by mutual agreement, and that pursuant thereto Aswell was redelivered his
half interest in the business and property, and that the parties jointly took charge of the property and assets and sold
the same and applied the proceeds of the sale to payment of
the partnership debts.0 1
The supreme court concluded that the trial court erred by ex-

U.S. Fin. Co. v. Barber, 157 So. 2d 394, 398 (Miss. 1963).
" Wiener v. Pierce, 203 So. 2d 598, 603 (Miss. 1967).
7" Broome Construction, 229 So. 2d at 545-46.
7" 21 So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1945).
Renfroe, 21 So. 2d at 812.
"'
Id. at 813.
7"
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cluding that proof:
Evidence is generally admissible to show a subsequent parol
agreement, valid under the law and effective as to its subject
matter, between the parties to a written instrument, although
it may alter or abrogate such writing, and especially so where
such parol agreement is acted upon by the parties."
e. Novation

A novation "is a contract that discharges at once an existing obligation and creates a new contractual obligation" and
substitutes at least one party to the original contract with "a
party who was not previously obligated." 0 3 A novation "may
be implied from the circumstances absent an express substituHowever, implied novation requires "substantial
tion."'
proof" that the surviving party from the original contract "impliedly accepted" the new party in lieu of the party to the original contract the new party seeks to replace.0 5 The party asserting novation bears the burden of proving it."'6 The determination of whether there has been a successful novation-and
a successful implied novation-is a question of
particularly
7
fact.

80

The Mississippi Supreme Court explored novation-both
express and implied-at length in Mississippi Motor Finance
Co. v. Enis:"5
On June 22, 1962, defendant [Enis] purchased a 1962
Rambler from Safety Motors... [and] executed to Safety Mo-

802

Id.

First Am. Nat'l Bank of Iuka v. Alcorn, Inc., 361 So. 2d 481, 487 (Miss.
1978). See Mississippi Motor Fin., Inc. v. Enis, 181 So. 2d 903, 904 (Miss. 1966).
Without a change in at least one of the parties, there is no novation. See, e.g.,
Hoerner v. First Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 254 So. 2d 754, 760 (Miss. 1971).
" First American, 361 So. 2d at 487-88.. See American Blakeslee Mfg. Co. v.
Martin & Son, 91 So. 6, 6 (Miss. 1922).

801

See First American, 361 So. 2d at 488.
Morgan v. Jackson Ready-Mix Concrete, 157 So. 2d 772, 780 (Miss. 1963).
See First American, 361 So. 2d at 488; Giles v. Friendly Fin. Co. of Biloxi,

185 So. 2d 659, 661 (Miss.), appeal dism'd, 385 U.S. 21 (1966); Morgan, 157

So. 2d at 780; American Blakeslee, 91 So. at 6-7.
86 181 So. 2d 903 (Miss. 1966).
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for $4,172.80, payable in
Failure to pay any installThe conditional sales conwith recourse ....

On June 28, 1963, defendant purchased a 1963 Rambler
from W.H. Cooper, doing business as Safety Motors, and executed to Safety Motors a conditional sales contract for the full
purchase price .... Cooper had told a representative of plaintiff, prior to the purchase by defendant of the 1963 Rambler,
that the trade would be made and that he, Cooper, would pay
off the balance due on the 1962 Rambler when he sold it. A
representative of plaintiff knew when the trade was consummated between Cooper, doing business as Safety Motors, and
defendant, and that the 1962 Rambler was on the yard of
Safety Motors after the transaction. As between Cooper and
defendant it was agreed that Safety Motors would pay off the
balance due on the 1962 Rambler, and words to that effect
were written by Cooper on the invoice. Plaintiff did not receive this invoice.
After the trade on June 28, 1963, two payments on the
1962 Rambler for the months of July and August, 1963, were
made by defendant, but he testified that the money was furnished him by Cooper.
Cooper... went out of business [in 1963]. He sold the
1962 Rambler and failed to pay plaintiff. Plaintiff sued defendant Enis for the balance due on the conditional sales contract for the 1962 Rambler.
A novation involving substitution of debtors is a contract
that (a) discharges immediately an existing contractual obligation, (b) creates a new contractual obligation by,
(c) including as the new obligor a party who was not previously obligated. The contract of novation is a mutual undertaking
among all parties concerned.
In order to establish his affirmative defense of novation,
it was necessary for defendant Enis to prove (a) that he, Enis,
was immediately discharged from the obligation to pay the
debt evidenced by the conditional sales contract for the 1962
Rambler, (b) a new contractual obligation was created between plaintiff and Cooper, whereby Cooper would become
liable to plaintiff, and (c) that Cooper was not previously
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obligated to plaintiff on the conditional sales contract for the
1962 Rambler.
There was no express agreement that Enis was released
from payment of the debt, evidenced by the conditional sales
contract, for the purchase of the 1962 Rambler. No new contractual obligation between Cooper as debtor and plaintiff as
creditor was created in connection with the trade between
Cooper was already liable to plaintiff
Cooper and Enis ....
on the 1962 contract by reason of his assignment thereof with
recourse. For the same reason, defendant failed to prove that
Cooper was not previously obligated on the 1962 contract. We
find no evidence of an express contract of novation.
....
[N]ovation may be implied where the facts and
circumstances demonstrate that it was the intention of the
parties to substitute one party for another .... The circumstances relied upon by Enis as establishing a novation by
implication include the fact that Cooper told the manager of
plaintiff that he was going to trade with Enis and that he,
Cooper, would pay off the indebtedness on the 1962 Rambler.
The manager of plaintiff knew the trade was made, and knew
the 1962 Rambler was on Safety Motors' lot .... Plaintiffs
manager talked to Cooper a number of times after the trade
between Cooper and Enis, and requested Cooper to pay off the
balance due on the 1962 Rambler. The conditional sales contract involved in this case was one of many Cooper had assigned to plaintiff, and a representative regularly went over
these accounts with Cooper. The payments for the months of
July and August were made by Enis, although Cooper furnished Enis the money. We are of the opinion that all that
was said and done by the parties was consistent with Enis'
remaining liable for the indebtedness on the 1962 Rambler.
The evidence did not justify a finding of novation by implication. Plaintiff continued to hold the original conditional sales
contract. There was no new document signed. The agreement
between Cooper and Enis that Cooper was to pay the balance
on the contract and plaintiff's knowledge of it was no proof
that plaintiff intended to release Enis ....

'

Enis, 181 So. 2d. at 903-05 (citations omitted).
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C. The Common Law Parol Evidence Rule in Action: A
Simplified Checklists"'
Few subjects connected with the interpretationof contracts present so simple and uniform a statement of
principle, bedeviled by such a perplexing and harassing
number of difficulties in its application, as the parol
evidence rule."1 '
While the parol evidence rule may be easy to recite, it is
much more difficult to pin down in practice. As discussed previously, and as is apparent from the foregoing statements of the
parol evidence rule, before a trial court reaches the question of
whether evidence offered regarding a prior agreement or prior
discussions will be admitted before the trier of fact, the court
must make the following threshold determinations:
(1) Is there a written agreement covering the subject matter of the proffered extrinsic evidence?
(2) If so, does the written agreement constitute the final
agreement of the parties regarding the subject matter of the
proffered extrinsic evidence? 12
(3) If so, does the written agreement constitute the complete and exclusive agreement of the parties regarding the
subject matter of the proffered extrinsic evidence? 13
(4) If so,14 is the final and complete written agreement unambiguous?
(5) If so, does the proffered extrinsic evidence concern a
prior or contemporaneous oral term or agreement or a prior
written term or agreement?1 5

810

This checklist is adapted from Glasser & Rowley, supra note 10, at 743-45.

See generally Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 60310 (1944); HUNTER, supra note 5, §§ 7:6-7:8.
s 4 JAEGER, supra note 607, § 632A, at 984.
812 That is to say: Is the written agreement integrated? See supra notes 70-73
and accompanying text.
813 That is to say: Is the integrated written agreement fully integrated? See
supra notes 74-77, 83-86 and accompanying text.
14 See supra subpart II.A.
"" See supra note 572 and accompanying text; subpart III.A.2.c.
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(6) If so, does the proffered extrinsic evidence contradict,
vary, or supplement some term of the written agreement that
the court has previously determined to be unambiguous, final,
and complete?" 6
If the answer to any of the foregoing questions is "No,"
then the parol evidence rule does not prevent the trier of fact
from considering some or all of the proffered extrinsic evidence. 1 7 If the answer to all of the foregoing questions is
"Yes," then the trial court must answer the following additional
question:
(7) Does the proffered extrinsic evidence, which is otherwise subject the parol evidence rule, fit within one or more of
the numerous exceptions to the rule?8 '
If so, then, again, the parol evidence rule should not prevent the trier of fact from considering the proffered extrinsic
evidence. If not, and only if not, then the parol evidence rule
properly bar the trier of fact from considering the proffered
extrinsic evidence.
In answering the foregoing questions, a Mississippi trial

816 See supra notes 572-73 and accompanying text; subparts III.A.2.a-.b.

" Briefly: (1) The parol evidence rule does not apply in the absence of a
written agreement. See supra note 605 and accompanying text. (2) The parol
evidence rule does not apply to unintegrated agreements, even if they are in
writing. See supra subpart III.A.3.c. (3) If the written agreement is not fully integrated, the parol evidence rule does not bar evidence offered to add to, clarify,
explain, or give meaning to the writing, as long as the proffered evidence does
not vary or contradict any terms of the writing that are integrated. See supra
subpart III.A.3.a. (4) Even if the written agreement is fully integrated, and more
so if it is less-than-fully integrated, the parol evidence rule does not bar evidence
offered to resolve any ambiguity, as long as the proffered evidence does not vary
or contradict any terms of the writing that are both integrated and unambiguous.
See supra subpart III.A.3.b. (5) Even if the written agreement is both integrated
and unambiguous, the parol evidence rule, by its own terms, does not bar evidence of subsequent oral or written agreements. See supra subpart III.A.2.c.
(6) Even if the written agreement is both integrated and unambiguous, the parol
evidence rule, by its own terms, does not bar evidence that is offered merely to
explain, not to add to, contradict, vary, or change, a written agreement, nor does
the rule bar extrinsic evidence regarding collateral agreements or writings that
are not "contractual in nature." See supra notes 601-02, 604 and accompanying
text; subparts III.A.2.a-.b.
"" See supra subpart III.B.
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court appears to be bound by the three-tiered process prescribed in Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins.19
These questions should be raised and resolved as early in
the case as possible, as they will govern the extent and types of
evidence that may be submitted to the trier of fact, as well as
the extent to which the written agreement will be open to interpretation. 20
D. Special Case: Contractsfor the Sale or Lease of Goods
[Tihe meaning of commercial contracts is not necessarily to be
found exclusively within the four corners of the document but
must take into account the commercial circumstances surrounding the transaction.... The court ... should recognize

that the words selected by the parties may have a special
meaning to them or to the trade in which they operate and
that some terms may have been omitted from the formal contract, because they are so well understood by the parties that
putting them into the final writing was deemed unnecessary.
Indeed, some aspects of the agreement may be so clear to the
parties that suggesting that these terms be written into the
contract would be insulting. These "missing" terms are really
implied parts of the agreement which in many cases may be
ascertained by resort to course of performance, course of dealing or usage of trade.s2'
The Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code codifies the
parol evidence rule pertaining to contracts for the sale 22 or

819

558 So. 2d 349 (Miss. 1990). See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.

8

See generally HUNTER, supra note 5, §§ 7:8, at 7-14.
1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 1-205:2, at

821

1-246 to -247 (1998) (footnote omitted).
an The statute reads:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties
agree or which are otherwise set for in a writing intended by the parties
as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as
are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained

or supplemented
(1) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) 1§ 75-1-
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lease"= of goods. These codified versions of the parol evidence

205] or by course of performance (Section 2-208) [§ 75-2-208]; and
(2) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds
the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-202 (1981). Other than the addition of parenthetical crossreferences to the Mississippi Code versions of Sections 1-205 and 2-208, the Mississippi Code version of Section 2-202 is identical to the "uniform" version. Compare
id. with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202 (1999).
Contracts for the sale of goods between a Mississippi resident and a resident
of a foreign country may be governed by the 1980 United Nations Convention on
the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"). See United Nations Convention on the
International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Annex I,
reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668. The CISG does not apply if the foreign buyer or seller's
place of business or "habitual residence" is in a country that has not ratified the
CISG. See id. arts. l(1)(a) &10(b). The CISG does not apply if, even though the
foreign buyer or seller's place of business or habitual residence is in a country that
has ratified the CISG, if the Mississippi buyer or seller neither knew nor had
reason to know that it was dealing with a party whose place of business or habitual residence was in a foreign country. See id. art. 1(2). Nor does the CISG
apply to contracts for goods being purchased for personal, family, or household use
where the seller neither knew nor had reason to know at any time prior to or at
the conclusion of the contract of the goods' intended use by the buyer. See id. art.
2(a). Parties to a contract that would otherwise be governed by the CISG may
contractually agree not to be governed by it in part or in whole, see id. art. 6,
subject to certain limitations, see id. art. 12.
The CISG provides that "[a] contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and . . . may be proved by any means, including witnesses." Id.
art. 11; see also id. art. 8(3) ("In determining the intent of a party . . . . due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the
negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between themselves,
usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties."). The few courts to have considered these provisions of the CISG, have read them to mean that the CISG has
no parol evidence rule. See, e.g., MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica
Nuova d'Agostino, 144 F.3d 1384, 1389-90 (11th Cir. 1998); Mitchell Aircraft
Spares, Inc. v. European Aircraft Service AB, 23 F. Supp. 2d 915, 919-20 (N.D. Ill.
1998); Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd., 1998 WL 164824, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
7, 1998).
There are no reported Mississippi state or federal cases addressing the CISG,
and a discussion of construing and interpreting contracts subject to the CISG is
beyond the scope of this article. The point of raising the issue of the CISG here is
to make the reader aware of its existence and possible application to certain contracts that would otherwise be governed by Article 2 of the Mississippi Uniform
Commercial Code. See Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229,
1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that the CISG "trumps" the UCC in cases where the
CISG applies), appeal dism'd, 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1993).
8' See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2A-202 (Supp. 1998). Section 2A-202 is identical
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rule are presumed to "trump" common law approaches to construing and interpreting contracts - even fully integrated contracts - for the sale 24 or lease 5 . of goods.

to Section 2-202, supra note 822, except for the parenthetical cross-references.
For a discussion of parol evidence issues under Article 2A, see WILLIAM H.
LAWRENCE & JOHN H. MNAN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY LEASING 1 4.02,
at 4-18 to -35 & S4-3 to -8 (1993 & Supp. 1999).
' The Uniform Commercial Code clarifies, for purposes of disputes over contracts for the sale or lease of goods, that the language used in a written contract
should be afforded "the meaning which arises out of the commercial context in
which it was used," rather than the meaning that might be attributed to it "by
rules of construction existing in the [common] law." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-202 cmt. 1(b).
Contracts for the sale or lease of goods
are to be read on the assumption that the course of prior dealings between the parties and the usages of trade were taken for granted when
the document was phrased. Unless carefully negated they have become an
element of the meaning of the words used. Similarly, the course of actual
performance by the parties is considered the best indication of what they
intended the writing to mean.
Id. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (emphasis added). The Code "rejects both the 'lay-dictionary' and
the 'conveyancer's' reading of a commercial agreement. Instead the meaning of the
agreement of the parties is to be determined by the language used by them and
by their action, read and interpreted in light of commercial practices and other
surrounding circumstances." Id. § 1-205 cmt. 1 (emphasis added). And the "measure
and background for interpretation are set by the commercial context which may
explain and supplement even the language of a [fully integrated] writing." Id. (emphasis added). Compare Franz Chem. Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co., 594 F.2d
146, 149 (5th Cir. 1979) (outlining the various parol evidence provisions in Texas's
analogy to § 75-2-202 and their effects on the issues before the court) with Citizens Natl Bank of Meridian v. L.L. Glascock, Inc., 243 So. 2d 67, 70-71 (Miss.
1971) (refusing to consider evidence of custom and usage in construction industry,
under pre-Code law, when doing so would result in a different construction of the
contract than that afforded by a "plain meaning" approach).
As the Fifth Circuit explained nearly thirty years ago:
[Elvidence of course of dealing and usage of trade [is] necessarily and
properly admissible to explain, qualify, or supplement the provisions of
[the] written agreement. In providing for the admission of such evidence,
the [UCCI manifests the laws recognition of the fact that perception is
conditioned by environment: unless a judge considers a contract in the
proper commercial setting, his view is apt to be distorted or myopic,
increasing the probability of error.
Chase Manhattan Bank v. First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040, 1046 (5th Cir. 1971).
8' There is no corresponding comment to Section 2A-202. Rather, the Official
Comment for that section merely refers the reader to Section 2-202. UNIFORM
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1. Similarities to the Common Law Parol Evidence Rule
As is true at common law, 2 ' the Code's parol evidence
rules governing written contracts for the sale or lease of goods
bar extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements or representations and prior written agreements or representations to the extent that Such evidence contradicts the
terms of an integrated writing.8 27
For example, in General Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v.
American Air Filter Co. ,828
the written quotation-contract prepared by American and
accepted by General was specifically made subject to terms
and conditions that included (1) the quotation was expressly
limited to the terms within the document, with "no understandings, agreements, or obligations (outside of this quotation) unless specifically set forth in writing"; and (2) any
quoted shipping date or acknowledgment was American's best
estimate but that American made no guarantee of shipment
by that date and assumed no obligation for failure to ship on
such date."

General sued American for breach of contract, claiming
that American agreed that it would deliver the equipment
within six weeks of the order or, at least, by a date sufficient

COMMERCIAL CODE § 2A-202 cmt.
"2 See supra note 572 and accompanying text.
827 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-202 (1981); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2A-202; see,
e.g., Security Mut. Fin. Corp. v. Willis, 439 So. 2d 1278, 1282 (Miss. 1983) (reversing the trial court's ruling admitting extrinsic evidence because "the parol
evidence was not in explanation of or supplementary to the contemporaneous
writing but rather was contradictory to it"); U.S. Axminster, Inc. v. Directions in
Design, Inc., 1996 WL 671403, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 24, 1996) ("An alleged
agreement wherein the defendant's duty to pay is conditioned upon receipt of
payment from its customer is clearly contradictory to the payment terms of 'net
30 days'after invoice. It is quite a stretch to assert that the alleged oral agreement merely explains or supplements the payment terms set forth in writing.").
See generally Mygsa, S.A. de C.V. v. Howard Indus., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 624, 630
(S.D. Miss. 1995) ("Under [§ 75-2-202], parol evidence is not admissible to contradict the express terms of an agreement.").
828 696 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying Mississippi law).
8'2 General Plumbing, 696 F.2d at 377.
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for General timely to complete its renovation subcontract.
American prevailed in the trial court, owing largely, according
to General, to the trial court's refusal to admit evidence of the
oral agreement. The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's ruling:
General contends that this oral understanding constitutes a "course of dealing" or "usage of trade," which is admissible into evidence in order to "explain or supplement" the
written contract, as an exception to the parol evidence rule,
§ 75-2-202(a). American counters that ....

General's pro-

posed testimony would impermissibly "contradict" the express
term contained in the contract providing that any shipping
date is a best estimate, that no guarantee of any shipping
date is made, and that it would incur no liability for untimely
shipment unless expressly stated otherwise in the agreement.
We agree with American that the express terms and
conditions contained in the written contract preclude the
introduction of oral testimony regarding delivery dates....
Since no firm delivery date is specified in the contract,
evidence of a promised six week delivery may arguably "supplement" rather than "contradict" contract terms. However,
the only reason General urges introduction of a firm delivery
date is to suggest that delivery after that date constitutes a
breach of contract for non-timely delivery, by reason of which
American is liable for incidental and consequential damages.
The testimony is inadmissible under § 75-2-205 because its
intended use flatly contradicts the unambiguous language of
the contract that any date agreed upon by the parties is only
a "best estimate" and that American would incur no obligation or liability from untimely delivery.'
As is true at common law,"

l

the Code does not bar ex-

a Id. at 377-78. That said, the court also recognized that the written contract
was silent as to price "because the contract contains no price terms, an oral
agreement concerning price does not impermissibly 'contradict' this written con-

tract, as would introduction of oral terms regarding delivery dates." Id. at 378
n.4.
"1 See supra subparts III.A.2.b & III.A.2.c and note 580 and accompanying
text, respectively.
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trinsic evidence of collateral agreements 2 of subsequent
agreements or modifications. 3 Nor does the Code bar extrinsic evidence in the absence of a writing' or when the writing
against which the evidence is offered is unintegrated, in whole
or in relevant part. 5 Likewise, the various "judge-made" ex-

'

Cf. Security Mut. Fin. Corp. v. Willis, 439 So. 2d 1278, 1281-82 (Miss.

1983) (describing the rule that the written provisions adopted by the parties do
not merge a separate contract, entered into to explain or supplement the existing
contract, as "consistent" with Section 75-2-202).
See, e.g., Bell v. Hill Bros. Constr. Co., 419 So. 2d 575, 576-77 (Miss. 1982).
See generally 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-202:2, at 2-176 to -177 & n.4; 1
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES § 2-10, at 88 & n.1 (4th ed. 1995).
m See 2 DEBORAH K. NELSON & JENNIFER L. HowiCz, WILLISTON ON SALES
§ 13-27, at 90 (5th ed. 1995).
a
Professor Hawkland explains:
The parol evidence rule of Section 2-202 operates only with regard
to "Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such
terms as are included therein. . .. '
The concept of finality is an important limitation on the parol evidence rule, because it means that not all writings are protected by that
rule. For example, there is no finality of agreement in a memorandum
that is sent by one party to the other. The fact that the recipient does
not reject it may deprive him of the protection of the statute of frauds
under Section 2-201(3), but the failure to reject does not prevent the
recipient showing that the terms of the contract are different from those
stated in the memorandum, or, indeed, that no contract ever came into
existence. This idea is reinforced by the language "confirmatory memoranda" found in Section 2-202, indicating that more than one memorandum is necessary to establish the kind of final written expression that is
needed to make the parol evidence rule operate.
Even where the parties have exchanged memoranda or have signed
a written contract, it does not necessarily follow that the terms stated
therein express their final agreement. A contract can be worked out in
great detail with respect to some terms, while failing to address others
in any way. In that case, it is possible to say that the contract is final
as to one term but not as to another. Even where a term is defined
precisely, there may be no finality as to certain aspects of it. For example, the parties may state the place and manner of delivery in great
detail but not the time. The fact that the term is a final expression of
their agreement as to place and manner, does not prevent the parties
from showing by parol evidence what they had in mind as to the time
the delivery was to be made. Similarly, the fact that they have made a
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ceptions to the common law parol evidence rule, 38 also apply
to contracts for the sale or lease of goods. 3 7
In Franklin v. Lovitt Equipment Co.,83 the Mississippi
Supreme Court considered whether the exception to the common law parol evidence rule for extrinsic evidence of fraudulent
inducement 9 applied in a case governed by section 2-202:
Prior to enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code as a
part of our statutory law, it was a well-established principle

final agreement on the price term, does not necessarily mean that they
have made such an agreement on, for instance, the quantity term,
though both may be discussed rather fully in the written contract it-

self.
The fact that the parties have reduced a term to writing is some
evidence that it was intended as the authentication of their final agreement, but they have the competence to show otherwise. This competence
is not destroyed by an integration or merger clause, because that clause
cannot lift itself by its own bootstraps so as to be immune from contrary
parol evidence that the parties did not intend integration. The merger
clause is strong evidence that integration was intended, but it is not the
sole evidence to be considered.
1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-202:2, at 2-176 to -178 & -181 to -182 (footnotes
omitted); see also 1 WHrrE & STMMERS, supra note 833, § 2-10, at 88 & n.3 (observing that the UCC parol evidence does not "exclude evidence that the parties
did not intend the writing to be binding").
See supra subpart III.B.
See 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 833 § 2-12, at 104. For example,
Section 2-202 has no application to a writing that was obtained or executed through fraud, duress, or mistake. These matters are sometimes
said to constitute exceptions to the parol evidence rule, but they are
assimilated under the "intended by the parties as a final expression of
their agreement" language of Section 2-202. In other'words, the parties
are always competent to show under the section that they did not make
a contract, and the parol evidence rule does not prevent them from making this showing. They are also competent to show that no contract was
formed because of lack of consideration, even though the writing recites
that a consideration was given, or that the contract has failed because
oral conditions precedent to its existence have not been satisfied, notwithstanding the fact that the writing contains no recital of these conditions or, conversely, states that the obligation is absolute.
1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-202:2, at 2-179 to -181 (footnotes omitted).
420 So. 2d 1370 (Miss. 1982).
See supra subpart III.B.1.
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that where fraud was alleged with respect to the formation of
a written contract, the parol evidence rule would not bar
consideration of a contemporaneous oral agreement. Further,
section 75-1-103 of the Mississippi Code Annotated (1972)
explicitly provides that the common law principles of fraud
and misrepresentation should supplement the commercial
code provisions. On the basis of this background, our Court
has continued to recognize the fraud exception to the parol
evidence rule subsequent to the passage of section 75-2-202.
Thus, we conclude that the chancellor was required to consider the testimony offered by Franklin and his friends.'

2. DistinguishingFeatures
Unlike common law, the terms of a written contract for the
sale or lease of goods - even an integrated, unambiguous contract for the sale or lease of goods - may be supplemented by
non-contradictory evidence 41 of course of dealing, usage of
trade, course of performance," 42 or evidence of consistent addi-

'o

Franklin, 420 So. 2d at 1372 (citations omitted).

81

Professor Hawkland provides an interesting discussion of contradiction ver-

sus explanation or supplementation, see 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-202:3,
at 2-187 to -196, as do Professors White and Summers, see 1 WHrTE & SUMMERS,
supra note 833, at 92-102.
80 See MiSS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-202(1) (1981). The Code also allows a court to
admit such evidence to explain the terms of a writing, see id., but that allowance
is afforded by the common law as well, see supra subpart III.A.2.a.
Professor Hawkland argues that even contradictory evidence of course of
performance is admissible under Section 2-202 because
under Section 2-202, the final expression of written terms cannot be
.contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement." Course of performance involves neither a prior nor
a contemporaneous agreement, and thus is beyond the proscription of the
section.
.... According to the comments to Section 2-208, course of performance is the best indication of what the contract means, and it is always admissible to show what that meaning is. This does not mean, of
course, that it stands higher in the hierarchy of probative value than
the express term itself. Indeed, the converse is true. That is a different
matter, however. Course of performance is always admissible to show the
meaning of a term. Where there is a difference in the meaning derived
from the term itself and the course of performance, the court is directed
by Section 2-208(2) to construe the two consistently, and that can usual-
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tional terms."3
The Code dispenses with the presumption that a written
contract is fully integrated," as well as the requirement that

ly be accomplished by finding that the course of performance has resulted in a modification or waiver of the express term.
In the rare case where neither modification nor waiver can be established, and no other reasonable way of reconciling course of performance with the express term is available, the express term controls.
Even in this situation, however, course of performance is admissible, and
it fails only when the court cannot reconcile it with the express term, a
process that has no connection with the parol evidence rule.
I HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-202:3, at 2-196 to -197.
M See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-202(2). However, if (but only if) the court finds
the writing to be fully integrated, then evidence of consistent additional terms
(and only evidence of consistent additional terms) is not admissible to explain or
supplement the writing. See id. Furthermore,
[tihis proviso is essentially what distinguishes Section 2-202(b) from Section 2-202(a). Under subsection (a), trade usage and course of performance may be admitted to explain or supplement a written contract
even where the contract is found to be integrated in the sense of being
a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. This
is because commercial documents are to be read on the assumption that
the course of prior dealings between the parties and usage of trade were
taken for granted when the document was written. Unless that assumption is negated expressly or by strong implication, these implied terms
become elements of the contract itself. No such assumption is made with
regard to other additional terms, and, therefore, they cannot be said to
exist where the written contract is found to contain a complete and
exclusive statement of terms.
1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-202:4, at 2-197 to -199 (footnote omitted). See
generally id. § 2-202:3, at 2-187 & n.3.
84 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202 cmt. 1(a) (1999). See generally 1
HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-202:1, at 2-175 & n.5; 2 NELSON & HowicZ,
supra note 834, § 13-23, at 85 & n.71. But cf 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note
833, -§ 2-9, at 87-88 (observing that '[slome commentators and at least a few
courts conclude that 2-202 abolishes any presumption that a writing apparently
complete on its face is complete and exclusive," but then admitting uncertainty,
as between White and Summers themselves, about how far section 2-202 erodes
the presumption that "elaborate writings" are complete). In other words,
[bjy asking whether the 'writing [was] intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein," the Code shifts the initial inquiry to the question of partial integration. A judge working through the parol evidence rule finds the
question of total integration the last question, rather than the first,
because it is found in the last clause of Section 2-202, which asks
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a trial court must find that a written contract is ambiguous or
less-than-fully integrated before the court may admit any evidence beyond the four comers of the writing, including but not
limited to evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade, course
of performance, or consistent additional terms.'
In the estimation of the Mississippi Supreme Court, the
Code
provides a more permissive approach for the admission of
extrinsic evidence than that found in our general body of law.
Specifically, § 75-2-202 does not require that the agreement in
question first be found to be incomplete or ambiguous before
evidence of course of dealing and usage of trade may be considered.
whether the writing was "intended also as a complete and exclusive

statement of the terms of the agreement."
WiLIAM H. HENNING & GEORGE I. WALLACH, THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
3.05, at 3-32 to -33 (1992) (footnotes omitted) (quoting UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202).
80 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202 cmt. 1(c); see also Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Pursue Energy, 781 F.2d 1079, 1081 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (observing
that, under section 75-2-202, a court "may be able to consider course of dealing,
usage of trade, and course of performance in determining whether the contract is
ambiguous," but not reaching that issue in the case sub judice "because the parties d[id] not contend on appeal that course of dealing, usage of trade, or course
of performance should be considered in determining whether the contract between
Southern and Pursue is ambiguous"). But see id. at 1082 n.5 (citing Pfisterer v.
Noble, 320 So. 2d 383 (Miss. 1975), a non-Code case, as authority for refusing to
consider evidence beyond the four corners of the contract in determining whether
the contract is ambiguous). See generally 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-202:1,
at 2-175 & n.6; 2 NELSON & HOWICZ, supra note 834, § 13-23, at 85.
Section 2-202
recognizes the value of certainty in commercial dealings by giving primacy to written terms, but it also acknowledges that the purpose of sales
law is not only certainty of result, but the enforcement of the agreement
of the parties.
1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-202:1, at 2-174. In this way, Professor Hawkland
argues, Section 2-202 forges a "compromise' between Professor Williston's view that
the words or a written contract should be given their usual, objective meaning,
notwithstanding the meaning the parties actually attributed to them, and Professor
Corbin's view that the words or a written contract can only be understood in the
context in which the agreement was formed. See id. at 2-172 to -174. However, the
"compromise" seems to come out rather more in Professor Corbin's favor. See id. at
2-174 to -176 and authorities cited therein.
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Under our general, non-UCC, parol evidence rule, by
contrast, a document must first be found to be incomplete or
ambiguous before said document may be explained, but not
contradicted, by extrinsic evidence'
a. Course of Dealing

A "course of dealing" is "a sequence of previous conduct
between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly
to be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct.""7 A
course of dealing "give[s] particular meaning to and supplement[s] or qualifies] terms of an agreement"8-that is to
say, a course of dealing may (1) explain or qualify the terms of
the written agreement or (2) supplement or modify the terms of
the written agreement. 9 The parties' course of dealing "may
enter the agreement either by explicit provisions or the agreement or by tacit recognition" arising out of prior conduct.'
A prior single act cannot constitute a "course of dealing" as
that term is defined in section 1-205,"' nor can "the mere
84 J.O. Hooker & Sons v. Roberts Cabinet Co., 683 So. 2d 396, 400 (Miss.
1996); accord Yazoo Mfg. Co. v. Lowe's Cos., 976 F. Supp. 430, 433 (S.D. Miss.
1997). See generally supra notes 572-73 and accompanying text.
847 MISs. CODE ANN. § 75-1-205(1) (1981) (emphasis added).

84 Id. § 75-1-205(3).
8,8 See id. See generally 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 1-205:1, at 1-245 to 246 & n.5. That is not to say, however, that a prior single act is not relevant at
all to determining the intent of the parties to a written contract for the sale or
lease of goods:

Because of the requirement that course of dealing involve sequential,
previous conduct, a single prior act of the parties can never become a
course of dealing. A prior single act may, however, be some evidence of
what the parties had in mind in the transaction presently at issue and
should be admitted into evidence to prove that intent, unless it violates
the parol evidence rule stated by Section 2-202. As a single act it is not
entitled to control usage of trade in accordance with the hierarchy set
forth in Section 1-205(4). In other words, while a course of dealing may
show that the parties have their own special way of doing business that
is at odds with usual trade practice, a single act cannot be used to establish that idiosyncratic behavior which one of the parties denies.
1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 1-205:3, at 1-254 (footnotes omitted).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205 cmt. 3 (1999) (emphasis added).
"'

International Therapeutics, Inc. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 721 F.2d 488, 491
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sending of terms back and forth... , without more." 2 Nor
does the conduct of the parties after they have executed the
written agreement constitute a course of dealing. 1 3 The
parties' course of dealing "is restricted, literally, to a sequence
of conduct between the parties previous to the agreement."'

(5th Cir. 1983); see also Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 792 F.2d 1380,
1385 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying analogous Texas law), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906
(1987). See generally 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 833, § 3-3, at 114 and
authorities cited therein.
2 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 833, § 3-3, at 114.
'
See Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117, 1123 (5th Cir.
1985); Mygsa, S.A. de C.V. v. Howard Indus., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 624, 630 n.8
(S.D. Miss. 1995) (both emphasizing that "course of dealing" deals with conduct
between the parties prior to the transaction at hand). The conduct of the parties
after the written agreement is more properly termed their "course of performance." See infra subpart III.D.2.c. See generally 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 833, § 3-3, at 115 & n.5.
85 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205 cmt. 2. Courts may consider prior
dealings between the party against whom the course of dealing is offered and
third parties; but, a court asked to do so should exercise caution:
If the evidence proffered relates to dealings with a third party, rather
than to prior dealings between the litigating parties, courts have noted
that "[slubsidiary evidence of parallelism must be strong and convincing... [and] standards of admissibility should be higher than when
dealing with transactions between the same parties."
H&W Indus., Inc. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 911 F.2d 1118, 1122 (5th Cir. 1990)
(applying Mississippi law) (quoting Cibro Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Sohio Alaska
Petroleum Co., 602 F. Supp. 1520, 1551 (N.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 798 F.2d 1421
(Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 979 (1986)).
In Carlo Corp. v. Casino Magic of La. Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 904 (S.D. Miss.
1998), the court rejected an argument by the thwarted seller of a vessel (Casino
Magic) that the would-be buyer (Carlo) was required by its "past course of conduct"
to give the seller a "reasonable basis" for refusing to consummate the sale:
[Tihe language and terminology centered upon the understanding by both
parties that if Carlo accepted the vessel, it did so according to the following limitations set forth at page 3 of the Agreement:
Seller shall deliver the Vessel to Buyer "as is and where is". Except with regard to title, Seller makes NO WARRANTY of any
kind whatsoever, whether expressed or implied, including without
limitation, any implied warranty of merchantability, quality, condition, fitness for any particular purpose, seaworthiness, or against
any redhibitory vices or defects, hidden, latent or otherwise, all
such warranties being expressly WAIVED by Buyer.
It is this Court's opinion that [this] Condition Precedent

....

is
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A sequence of conduct does not require a sequence of contracts. "A pattern for purposes of course of dealing ... may be
established under a single contract presenting repeated occasions for tender and rejection. " "
The probative value of the parties' prior course of dealing
is a function of the similarities between the prior transaction(s)
and the one before the court:
Section 1-205(1) provides that course of dealing is restricted to the parties' activity "which is fairly to be regarded
as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." This reservation
does not mean that the current transaction must be identical
to previous ones but that it must be sufficiently analogous to
make probable a finding that the parties intended to give

clearly in the nature of caveat emptor; with the drafter's express intent
that the burden was upon the buyer, should it accept the vessel "as is,"
to perform such inspections as it deemed necessary to justify its decision.
Such language clearly anticipates and prepares to defend against any
subsequent claim by the buyer, after acceptance, that it was prohibited
from inspecting the merchandise.
What was intended as a shield against liability, at the outset, is
now being employed as a sword to force a prospective buyer to pay a
penalty for electing to withdraw.
Carlo's reasons for electing to not take the vessel "as is"

are

now being challenged as not the reasons that Casino Magic would have
accepted; however, no where within the four comers of the Agreement is
it stated or implied what the parties agreed would be acceptable reasons.... The Court does not find that the terms, when construed within the context of the Agreement as a whole, are ambiguous ....
Curiously, Casino Magic asserts in the alternative that "the evidence
concerning Carlo's past course of conduct supports Casino Magic's interpretation requiring that Carlo provide a reasonable basis for refusing to
accept the Vessel 'as is." . . .
As to "course of conduct" or "course of dealing," [Casino Magic]
apparently concedes that this term, under the UCC, requires previous
conduct between the parties. Casino Magic, however, argues that as Mr.
Paulson [Carlo's apparent alter ego], in an unrelated transaction, employed different language to allow him to reject a vessel, he should have
placed the same or similar language in the subject Agreement. The
Court rejects this "back door" approach . . . . [This] Agreement was not
drafted by Mr. Paulson, but by Casino Magic.
Id. at 908.
'
1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 1-205:3, at 1-255.
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their present contract the same meaning they had assigned to
their previous deals through their conduct. Similarity of contracts is not the only test in determining this probability. The
determination must also take into account changes in conditions and any other factors that affect the probable validity of

the analogy.85

Whether the prior course of dealing is sufficiently similar to be
deemed to have informed the parties' agreement is an issue for
the trier of fact. 7
In Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney's, Inc.,' the Fifth
Circuit considered whether the parties' prior course of dealing
created a reasonable expectation that an invoice, containing
terms additional to those orally agreed to by the parties, would
be sent by the seller (Mid-South), in response to the buyer's
(Shoney's) purchase order; and, therefore, whether the additional terms contained within the invoice became part of the
parties' agreement under section 2-207."' The court explained

that
[slection 75-2-207 applies to the situation in which an agreement has been previously reached either orally or by informal
writings, and one or both parties send written confirmation of

"v

Id. at 1-256 to -257 (footnotes omitted).
See id. at 1-257 & n.8.

761 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Mississippi law).
Section 2-207, addressing the so-called "Battle of the Forms," provides in
relevant part:
(1) A defimite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition
to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-207(1)-(2) (1981).
"'
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terms discussed, adding certain terms not discussed. The
written confirmation is recognized primarily as a writing
necessary to satisfy the statute of frauds when the agreement
reached is at least partially unenforceable for lack of a writing; this appears to be the primary basis for permitting a
written confirmation to act as an acceptance under § 75-2207(1). We think this rationale properly applies to contracts
that are partially oral, i.e., the offer is oral and the acceptance written, so long as the written acceptance does not
purport to contain the entire agreement.
Here, Mid-South's August 12 offer to sell was orally
made. Thus, the contract, concluded by Shoney's purchase
orders, was initially unenforceable against Mid-South because
not evidenced by a writing signed by Mid-South. Mid-South's
invoice rendered the contract enforceable against it under the
statute of frauds. By the same token, the extensive course of
dealing between the two parties clearly indicated to Shoney's
that the invoices would follow its purchase orders and,
Shoney's having received several of the invoices in prior
transactions, the interest and collection costs terms came as
no surprise to Shoney's. Moreover, Shoney's purchase orders
did not purport to contain all of the terms of the agreement
and Mid-South's invoice, sent only one day following shipment, added a certainty and definiteness to the contract's
terms that both parties expected and, presumably, desired.
Finally, Shoney's had the right and the opportunity to prevent, in the usual way, the proposed terms from becoming
part of the contract....
To be sure, courts have expressed some doubt, in contexts different from that presented here, whether a writing
sent subsequent to the closing of the bargain may operate as
an acceptance under § 2-207(1). However, under the circumstances of this transaction, and for the reasons stated, we
think Mid-South's invoices constituted "written confirmations"
within that section.8"°
In Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Merchants National
Bank," 1 the issue for the Fifth Circuit was whether a course

8O

Mid-South Packers, 761 F.2d at 1123 (footnotes and citations omitted).

'1

670 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Mississippi law).
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of dealing between a bank (Merchants) and its customer
(Southern) could establish whether the bank made presentment
and notice of dishonor within a "reasonable" time under section
4-202."2 The court held that Merchants had, based on its prior dealings with Southern, acted with a "reasonable" time despite delaying notice of dishonor for fifty-two days:
A course of dealing may establish the seasonableness of an
action. A course of dealing had been established between the
Bank and Southern prior to the present controversy. In seven
prior transactions, delays from 9 to 45 days had been experienced. In three similar transactions involving drafts drawn by
Southern on another customer, the payments were each delayed by 48 days. This history of slow payment was acceptable until, of course, a buyer became bankrupt in the interim.
In light of this established course of dealing, we are in agreement with the District Court's implied finding that the Bank
acted seasonably in delaying notice of dishonor for 52
days.'

'

Section 4-202 provides, in relevant part:

(b) A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximately
caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item. Liability is limited to actual
damages proved and may include damages for an arrest or prosecution
of the customer or other consequential damages. Whether any consequential damages are proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor is a question of fact to be determined in each case.
(c) A payor bank's determination of the customer's account balance on
which a decision to dishonor for insufficiency of available funds is based
may be made at any time between the time the item is received by the
payor bank and the time that the payor bank returns the item or gives
notice in lieu of return, and no more than one determination need be
made. If, at the election of the payor bank, a subsequent balance determination is made for the purpose of reevaluating the bank's decision to
dishonor the item, the account balance at that time is determinative of
whether a dishonor for insufficiency of available funds is wrongful.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-4-202 (Supp. 1998). "Reasonable time" for taking any action
"depends on the nature, purpose and circumstances of such action." MISS. CODE
ANN. § 75-1-204(2) (1981).
'
Southern Cotton Oil, 670 F.2d at 550.
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b. Usage of Trade

A "usage of trade" is a "practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade
as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect
to the transaction in question."' To establish "regularity of
observance," the proffering party "must demonstrate a dominant pattern of use within the industry."m
The language of any commercial contract "is to be interpreted as meaning what it may be fairly expected to mean to
parties involved in the particular commercial transaction in a
given locality or in a given vocation or trade."' An absurd or
unreasonable meaning will not suffice.867
Usages of trade "furnish the background and give particular meaning to the language used, and are the framework of
common understanding controlling any general rules of law
which hold only when there is no such understanding."" To
8'4

MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-1-205(2) (1981). See generally 1 WHrrE & SUMMERS,

supra note 833, § 2-10, at 101 & n.54 and cases cited therein. "When a trade
usage is widespread, there is a presumption that the parties intended its incorporation, unless the contract language carefully negates it." Id. at 101.
' H&W Indus., Inc. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 911 F.2d 1118, 1122 (5th Cir.
1990) (applying Mississippi law). Thus, for example, "Itihe testimony of one officer
as to that company's practices is generally insufficient to establish such a pattern." Id. (citing First Flight Assocs., Inc. v. Professional Golf Co., 527 F.2d 931
(6th Cir. 1975), Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422
F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970), and Magnolia Lumber
Corp. v. Czerwiec Lumber Co., 43 So. 2d 204 (Miss. 1949)).
866 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205 cmt. 4 (1999).
867 See Yazoo Mfg. Co. v. Lowe's Cos., 976 F. Supp. 430, 436 (S.D. Miss. 1997)
("[D]efendant has not produced any evidence that its definition of 'committed to
take' is embodied in any written trade code or similar writing. Defendant would
simply have the court take its word on the subject and ask the trier of fact to
accept that the words used actually mean the opposite of what they say. This
court is persuaded otherwise, and holds that a trier of fact would find that to
construe the phrase 'committed to take' to mean 'forecast' leads to an impractical
and absurd result. The words 'committed to take' mean what they say and clearly
connote Lowe's promise to purchase the lawn mowers at issue.").
s8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205 cmt. 4. The Mississippi Supreme Court
staated that
any competent evidence of trade usage should have been admitted to
clarify, hopefully, the complex and somewhat ambiguous language used
by the commission in the technical documents constituting the contract
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be recognized as such, a trade usage need not be "'ancient or
immemorial,' 'universal,' or the like." 9 Rather, Section 1-

at issue.
Dixie correctly states an abstract rule of law requiring that ambiguities in a written contract be resolved unfavorably to the party who
drafted the contract. However, this rule may not be enlarged, as it
seems to have been done, to exclude the drafting party's evidence aimed
at clearing the ambiguity by showing reasonable commercial understandings, concerning the meanings of technical terms, arising from usage of
trade ....
Mississippi State Hwy. Comm'n v. Dixie Contractors, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1202, 120506 (Miss. 1979) (citations omitted).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205 cmt. 5. In this way, Section 1-205
displaces the ancien regime of "custom." See 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 1205:4, at 1-257. That said, Professor Hawkland advises:
Although displaced, common law custom provides a good vantage
point from which to view usage of trade. To be effective common law
custom had to be: "(1) legal; (2) notorious; (3) ancient or immemorial and
continuous; (4) reasonable; (5) certain; and (6) universal and obligatory."
Several of these requirements are continued in modified form as aspects
of trade usage under the Code.
The requirement that custom be "legal" undoubtedly carries over to
the UCC. A usage of trade involving illegal activities may form a part of
the parties' agreement but is unenforceable and, accordingly, does not
form a real part of the contract. The requirement that custom be 'notorious" means, in effect, that it is binding only upon those who know of it.
Section 1-205(2) modifies this requirement and is reinforced through the
rule announced in Section 1-205(3) that usage of trade binds all members of that trade and, additionally, binds others who are, or should be,
aware of it. If both the seller and the buyer are in the sugar business, a
trade usage among sugar merchants would bind them, even if they are
ignorant of it. On the other hand, if the seller is a sugar merchant but
the buyer is not, the trade usage would not become an implied term of
their contract, unless the buyer actually knew of it or should have
known of it.
The fact that Section 1-205 seems to have rejected outright the
requirements that custom be immemorial or ancient does not create
"instant" trade usage, because subsection 1-205(2) defines "usage of
trade" as "any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of
observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that
it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." . . .
The Code seems to continue the quality of reasonableness required
by custom. Official Comment 5 states that trade usage includes "usages
currently observed by the great majority of decent dealers, even though
dissidents ready to cut corners do not readily agree." This language
suggests, as would be expected, that neither unreasonable nor unethical
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205(b) encompasses any usage "currently observed by the great
majority of decent dealers, even though dissidents ready to cut

kinds of usage may qualify as trade usage. Official Comment 6 discusses
the matter more explicitly:
The policy of this Act controlling explicit unconscionable contracts
and clauses (Sections 1-203, 2-302) applies to implicit clauses
which rest on usage of trade and carries forward the policy underlying the ancient requirement that a custom or usage must be
"reasonable." However, the emphasis is shifted. The very fact of
commercial acceptance makes out a prima facie case that the usage is reasonable, and the burden is no longer on the usage to establish itself as being reasonable. But the anciently established
policing of usage by the courts is continued to the extent necessary to cope with the situation arising if an unconscionable or
dishonest practice should become standard.
The requirement that custom be certain meant that widespread
variation from a "customary norm" could prevent its efficacy. If, for example, allowing late deliveries was usual in a particular trade but the
tardiness varied from two days with respect to some merchants to 10
days with respect to others, no custom existed. Official Comment 9 indicates that the Code rejects this view and states in part that
[iln cases of a well established line of usage varying from the
general rules of this Act where the precise amount of the variation
has not been worked out into a single standard, the party in relying on the usage is entitled, in any event, to the minimum
variation demonstrated. The whole is not to be disregarded because no particular line of detail has been established.
For the late deliveries example Official Comment 9 requires that the
seller be given two days of tolerance.
The requirement that custom be universal to be effective meant that
almost all persons who were supposed to adhere to the custom did, in
fact, observe it. Although mere majority compliance was insufficient to
establish custom, some noncompliance was allowed, because perfect compliance was an obvious impossibility. The Code changes this requirement
for its concept of trade usage but only in matter of degree. While Section 1-205(2) provides that trade usage comes into existence when "regularity of observance" causes people to rely on it, not everyone need observe the practice involved, as Official Comment 5 states that full recognition is "available for new usages and for usages currently observed by
the great majority of decent dealers, even though dissidents ready to cut
corners do not agree. There is room also for proper recognition of usage
agreed upon by merchants in trade codes." "Great majority," as used in
this comment, probably means something less than what "universality"
meant at common law so that a trade code may rise to the level of
trade usage, although a slim plurality of the affected merchants adopt it.
Id. at 1-257 to -261 (footnotes omitted).
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corners do not agree." 7 ' Both parties need not be "consciously
aware" of the usage for the court to consider it; 7' rather, "[iut
is enough if the trade usage is such as to 'justify an
expectation' of its observance." 7 '
A court should consider any usage of trade in the vocation
or trade in which the parties are engaged;87 3 in the place

where any performance is to occur; 74 or of which the parties
are or should be aware. 75
The party asserting a trade usage must prove its existence
and its applicability to the other party. 76 The existence and
scope of trade usage by which the terms of a written contract
for the sale or lease of goods may be explained are fact
questions. 77
c. Course of Performance
The meaning of words is not as clear as many suppose.
Justice Holmes once observed that "you cannot prove a mere
private convention between two parties to give language a
different meaning from its common one. It would open too

great risks if evidence were admissible to show that when
they said five hundred feet they agreed it should mean one
hundred inches, or that Bunker Hill Monument should signify
Old South Church." If the parties through repeated performances, however, indicate that they regard "five hundred
feet" as meaning "one hundred inches" or that "Bunker Hill
Monument" means "Old South Church" this evidence of
course of performance should be admitted, and probably relied

878 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205 cmt. 5.
871 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 833, § 3-3, at 114. Indeed,

"a party can

be chargeable with a usage of trade of which it is ignorant." Id. at 115.
872 Id. at 114 (quoting the analog of Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-1-205(2)).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-1-205(3) (1981).
I' § 75-1-205(5).
ld.
875 Id. § 75-1-205(3). See generally 1 WHITE & SUMMERs, supra note 833, § 3-3,
at 114 & n.4.
878 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 1-205:4, at 1-261.
877 MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-1-205(2) ("The existence and scope of such a usage
are to be proved as facts."). See generally 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 1-205:4,
at 1-261 & n.14.
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8 78

on.

A "course of performance" is a sequence of previous occasions to tender or to perform under the contract in dispute,
provided that on all such occasions, the non-tendering or nonperforming party was aware of the tender or performance, had
an opportunity to object to it, and did not object in a timely
manner, if at all. 79 A single act or omission does not constitute a course of performance." ° Rather, a course of perfor-

878

1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-208:3, at 2-305 (quoting Oliver Wendell

Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417, 420 (1899)).
17' The Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code provides
that:
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance
by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and
opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance
accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-208(1) (1981) (emphasis added). Section 2A-207 sets forth
the analogous provision regarding lease contracts. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2A-207(1)
(Supp. 1998).
Course of performance, under the Code, is similar to, but distinct from the
common law doctrine of "practical construction,' discussed supra subpart II.C.8. See
1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 833, § 1-6, at 48 (discussing both the similarities
and the differences between course of performance and practical construction). Professor Hawkland sees far more similarity than difference:
"Course of performance" is new language for an old idea called
"practical construction." For more than a century, United States courts
have recognized that the actual performance of a contract by the parties
had high probative value in determining its actual meaning, particularly
when its express terms were vague, missing or ambiguous. . . . Section
2-208 extends this approach by making course of performance relevant to
determine the meaning of the contract, even where the meaning of its
express terms seems clear on their face.
1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-208:1, at 2-299 (footnote omitted).
880 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-208 cmt. 4 (1999). See generally 1
HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-208:2, at 2-301 & n.3; 1 WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 833, § 1-6, at 48. In other words,
[a]lthough a single occasion of performance does not amount to a "course
of performance," where it is tendered and accepted under a contract to
be performed in stages, there is a waiver of the express term as to that
occasion of performance. Depending on the circumstances, it also might
constitute the kind of conduct that would impose upon the other party
the duty to notify the variant performer that subsequent stages must be
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mance deals with a contract which provides for several "occasions for performance. " 1
Unilateral acts or omissions, undertaken without the
knowledge or consent of the other party to the contract, cannot
rise to the level of course of performance. 882
The parties' course of performance of a particular contract
is always relevant to determine the meaning of their written
agreement.'
The parties' course of performance may also
performed in accordance with the express contract terms. This notification need not be given in any formal way, and may be accomplished in
most cases by a grumbling acceptance of the defective tender. The whole
idea, of course, is not to lull a party into thinking that strict performance is not required so that he is surprised by a rejection of a subsequent tender which he had some reason to think would be acceptable.
1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-208:3, at 2-310.
88 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-208(1); see also Mygsa, S.A. de C.V. v. Howard
Indus., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 624, 630 n.8 (S.D. Miss. 1995). See generally 1 WHITE
& SUMMERS, supra note 833, § 1-6, at 48. Furthermore,
[tihe words "repeated occasions" suggest [a] contract that is to be performed in several stages, but only two occasions of conduct are needed
to trigger the operation of the section. Obviously, the greater the number
of performances that are made and accepted, the greater will be the
probative value of the course of performance in establishing the meaning
of the contract. Moreover, the relationship is not necessarily a direct one,
because three successive performances of an installment contract, given
by one party and accepted by the other, may be worth proportionally
more than two successive performances by the same parties as an aid in
determining their actual agreement.
1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-208:2, at 2-301 to -302 (footnote omitted).
m See 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-208:2, at 2-302. Before invoking Section 2-208, the party seeking to invoke it must show
that an occasion of performance was accomplished under circumstances
in which the other party had knowledge of its nature and the opportunity to object to it. Hence, a sudden, unilateral act of performance thrust
upon the other party cannot be considered a "course of performance,"
though it may be incumbent upon the other party to object to it after it
is made, lest he mislead the first actor into thinking that the performance was satisfactory and a proper basis for accomplishing latter stages of the contract. Conversely, if the other party does object to performance in a timely manner, given the circumstances of the situation, the
performance, whether proffered or accomplished, thereafter can form no
part of a course of performance.
Id. (footnote omitted).

am See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-208 cmt. 2; see, e.g., Mississippi State
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modify or waive the express terms of the written agreement,'" notwithstanding the hierarchical preference for express terms over course of performance and other terms implied by the Code," 5 as long as it does not run afoul of one or
both of the provisions in Section 2-209 that (1) any subsequent
modifications must be in writing, if the parties include such a
requirement in their written contract," and (2) the modified
agreement must satisfy the statute of frauds." 7

Hwy. Comm'n v. Dixie Contractors, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1202, 1205 (Miss. 1979) ("A
course of performance under the first segment, depicted in plan sheet 2-E, could
be a material aid in construing the performance to be required under identical
pay items on the 11.4-mile segment depicted in the plan sheet."). See generally 1
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 841, § 1-6, at 47-48.
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-208(3) ("[Ciourse of performance shall be relevant to show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with such course
of performance."). See generally 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 833, § 1-6, at
47 ("[If, in light of a 'relevant' course of performance, either a waiver or a modification . . . is thus shown, courts sometimes say that course of performance
'controls' and thus alters the express term.").
'8 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-208(2); infra notes 911-14 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, a
course of performance is relevant under section 2-208(1) to determine the
.meaning of the agreement" in the first place. When the section is so
used, the apparent inconsistency between an express term and course of
performance can melt away. After all, the very theory of course of performance, according to Comment 1, is that "[tihe parties themselves
know best what they have meant by their words of agreement and their
action under that agreement is the best indication of what that meaning
was." When course of performance thus "controls," despite a seemingly
inconsistent express term, the express term is not modified or
waived ....
1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 833, § 1-6, at 47-48 (quoting UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-208 cmt. 1).
" See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-209(2) (1981).
8' See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-209(3).
However, Professor Hawkland emphasizes that, even if the course of performance does run afoul of either Section 2-209(2) or (3), and is, therefore, not a
valid modification, the course of performance is still relevant evidence of the
parties' construction and interpretation of the (unmodified) written agreement:
The parties are always competent to perform their contract differently
from the manner contemplated by its express terms, and their actual
performance will always be relevant and admissible to show their actual
agreement. At minimum, this actual performance will show a waiver of
the express term for the particular stage of performance; at maximum it
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Unlike a usage of trade, with which a party may be
deemed to have knowledge despite the parties' actual ignorance
of the usage,' the party against whom a course of performance is offered to modify, waive, or supplement the express
terms of the written agreement must have had "knowledge of
the nature" of the other party's non-conforming performance, or
non-performance, and the opportunity to object to that
(non)performance,' 9 and must have either accepted or acquiesced in the other party's act or omission or failed to object in a
timely manner." Unlike course of dealing and trade usage,
course of performance may not be "carefully negated" by the
terms of the written agreement in order to proscribe its use in
the event of a dispute over the contract's meaning and construction. 91
d. Consistent Additional Terms
[Clonsistent additional terms, not reduced to writing, may be

proved unless the court finds that the writing was intended
by both parties as a complete and exclusive statement of all
terms. If the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon,
they would certainly have been included in the document in
the view of the court, then evidence of their alleged making
must be kept from the trier of fact."9
may show that the express term has been modified and replaced by a
new term indicated by the course of performance.
1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-208:2, at 2-306.
m See supra note 871.
8
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-208(1).
, See id. See generally 1 WHrTE & SUMMERS, supra note 833, § 1-6, at 48,
and authorities cited therein.
891 See 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-208:3, at 2-306 (observing that Comment 2 to Section 2-202, while counseling that course of dealing and usage of
trade may be superseded if the writing carefully negates them, makes no such
provision for carefully negating course of performance "because course of performance necessarily involves activities that occur after the contract is made").
892 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202 cmt. 3 (1999); see also Paymaster Oil

Mill Co. v. Mitchell, 319 So. 2d 652, 656-57 (Miss. 1975) ("We ascertain the legislatiye intent from [§ 75-2-202] to be that parol evidence may not be used to contradict the terms of confirmatory memoranda of a written agreement intended as
the final expression of a contract, but that it might be explained or supplemented
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The party proffering evidence of a consistent additional
term, under Section 2-202(2), must satisfy the court that (1) the
proffered term is "consistent" with the terms contained in the
writing and (2) the writing is not fully integrated, thereby
proscribing additional terms, consistent or otherwise. As Professor Hawkland explains:
[B]efore evidence of a consistent additional term becomes
inadmissible, both parties must have intended the writing to
"be a complete and exclusive statement of all the terms."
Merger and other terms in a form contract, or those inserted
unilaterally into a negotiated contract, and not carefully considered by both parties, may be found not to reflect the actual
agreement of the parties, particularly where they thrust in a
different direction from the dickered terms. Evidence explaining or supplementing these unbargained-for terms will normally be found to be consistent and thus admissible, because
the circumstances will probably show that the parties did not
intend the written term in question to reflect their complete
and exclusive statement of the agreement. This point, however, cannot be carried too far, lest the stability of contractual
undertakings be unduly threatened. To become admissible,
evidence of additional terms must overcome two hurdles. Such
terms are inadmissible unless the court answers two questions in the negative: (1) Did the parties actually intend the
writing to represent their entire agreement? (2) If not, is the

by evidence of consistent additional terms unless there be an adjudication the

writing was intended as an exclusive statement of the agreement.").
Section 216 of the Restatement (Second) takes a similar position as the UCC,

but in some ways goes further from the Code toward allowing evidence of consistent additional terms:
(1) Evidence of a consistent additional term is admissible to supplement an integrated agreement unless the court finds that the agreement

was completely integrated.
(2)

An agreement is not completely integrated if the writing omits

a consistent additional agreed term which is
(a) agreed to for separate consideration, or

(b) such a term as in the circumstances might naturally be
omitted from the writing.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216 (1981) (emphasis added).
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proffered additional term of such a kind and nature that it
certainly would have been included in the written contract
had the parties, in fact, agreed upon it?8"
In Noble v. Logan-Dees Chevrolet-Buick, Inc.,' the written contract between the parties recited, inter alia, the total
consideration ($6,615) to be paid by the buyer (Noble) - consisting of a cash down payment, trade-in allowance, and $2,150
payable on delivery - and that "The front and back of this
order comprises the entire agreement pertaining to this purchase and no other agreement of any kind, verbal understanding or promise whatsoever, will be recognized."8 95 The
seller (Logan-Dees) offered trial testimony that, in addition to
the $2,150 payable at delivery, Noble had verbally agreed to
transfer to Logan-Dees an insurance check in the amount of
$1,532.66, pertaining to the vehicle Noble was trading in."
The trial court admitted the evidence and entered a judgment
ordering Noble to pay the proceeds of the insurance check to
Logan-Dees. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for Noble:
Noble contends that under the provisions of MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-202 (1972) the court erred by permitting parol testimony contradicting the terms of the agreement of the parties as
expressed in the contract. Logan-Dees contends that it was
entitled to offer parol testimony under subsections (a) and (b)
of the statute.

'

1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-202:4, at 2-201 to -203 (footnotes omit-

ted). Furthermore,
[uin answering these questions ....

the court is entitled to listen to all
[Tihe test .. . centers
on the actual, subjective intent of the parties, and the "certainly-wouldhave-been-included" standard becomes one of credibility rather than an
exclusionary force in and of itself ....
But the standard seems to be
something more than a mere indication that certain facts are to be scrutinized for credibility;, it is, itself, a test of credibility.
Id. at 2-203.
"' 293 So. 2d 14 (Miss. 1974).
Noble, 293 So. 2d at 15.
the evidence out of the hearing of the jury ....

890 See id. at 14-15.
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We hold that, under the facts as disclosed by the record,
Logan-Dees was not entitled to offer parol testimony under
subsection (a) because the evidence does not disclose a course
of dealing and usage of trade as defined in MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 75-1-205, neither does it disclose a course of performance as
defined by MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-208 (1972).
We hold that Logan-Dees was not entitled to introduce
parol testimony under subsection (b) because the evidence offered was not of consistent additional terms, but the evidence
offered would show a different consideration from that expressed in the writing. We also hold that parol evidence was
not admissible under subsection (b) because the contract, by
its own terms, was a complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement of the parties.
If Logan-Dees expected to receive the proceeds of the
insurance check as part of the consideration for the car sold
to Noble, it would have been a very simple matter to include
such a provision in the contract. Where parties, without any
fraud or mistake, have deliberately put their contract in writing, the writing is not only the best, but the only, evidence of
their agreement."9
Where a written agreement is not the final and complete
expression of the parties' agreement, Mississippi courts have
permitted extrinsic evidence of additional consistent terms 98

"

Id. at 15.

Compare, e.g., Paymaster Oil Mill Co. v. Mitchell, 319 So. 2d 652, 657
(Miss. 1975) (holding that testimony regarding oral agreement which purportedly
explained or supplemented written agreement was admissible because the written
agreement provided that it was "as per our conversation"), with Ralston Purina
Co. v. Hooker, 346 So. 2d 901, 902 (Miss. 1977) (distinguishing Paymaster Oil
Mill, on the ground that the written agreement sub judice did not contain any
language to the effect of the "as per our conversation" language in Paymaster Oil
Mill, and concluding, therefore, that "the terms of the written contract were intended as the exclusive statement of the agreement between the parties" and that
the proffered parol evidence that the parties understood that the defendant would
only provide the plaintiff with the "soybeans produced from a particular farm, up
to 4,500 bushels, [wa]s inconsistent with the contract provisions for buying and
selling 4,500 bushels of soybeans" without regard to their source).
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e. Terms Implied by the UCC (a.k.a. "Gap-Fillers")
Article 2 provides a number of "default" or "gap-filler"
terms to which a court may resort if the written agreement of
the parties is silent on a subject or if the express term(s) proffered by the parties create(s) a conflict or ambiguity that cannot be resolved by referring to course of performance, course of
dealing, usages of trade, or consistent additional terms.89 9 A
court is often unable to resolve an ambiguity or conflict without
resort to one or more "gap-filler"
when the parties have omitted a term through inadvertence
or ignorance, because in that situation they have made no
agreement on the matter, either express or implied. In setting
forth a number of statutory terms to be used to fill some of
these gaps, the Code supplies the commonly accepted term on
the matter and perhaps prevents the contract from failing for
lack of a reasonable basis for enforcement.'
3. Applying the UCC ParolEvidence Rules
Subject to the free admissibility of non-contradictory evidence of trade usages, course of dealing, and course of performance, 1 the admissibility of any other evidence extrinsic to
a writing governed by the Code depends, at least in part, on
the familiar issues of integration and ambiguity.
a. Questions of Integration
When may a judge invoke the applicable Code parol evidence rule to exclude evidence extrinsic to the terms of an
unambiguous writing:
First, the judge may exclude the evidence on finding that
the parties intended the writing to be a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement (unless it be
evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of

9

See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-305, 75-2-307, 75-2-308, 75-2-309(1)-(2),

75-2-310 & 75-2-311 (1981).
'0 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 1-205:2, at 1-251.
,' See supra subpart III.D.2.
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performance introduced only to explain or supplement the
writing).... Second, the judge may exclude evidence extrinsic
to terms set forth in the writing if he or she decides that the
writing is a final written expression as to these terms and
that the other evidence contradicts these terms.... Third, in
passing on any parol evidence rule objection, the judge may
decided that the proffered evidence of terms extrinsic to the
writing is not credible, and he or she may exclude it on that
ground alone. Section 2-202 is silent on this, but Professor
McCormick thought that the "real service" of the parol evidence rule was here.'
Conversely, when may a judge admit extrinsic evidence
notwithstanding the existing of an unambiguous writing:
A court may decide that the writing is not a "final written expression" as to any terms and admit the evidence. A
court may decide that the writing is a final written expression
of some terms, but not a "complete and exclusive" statement
of all terms, and admit evidence of "consistent additional
terms" [unless he or she also determines that the alleged
extrinsic term, if agreed upon would certainly have been included in the writing]. A court may decide that the writing is
a final written expression as to terms and also that the writing is a "complete and exclusive statement," yet admit evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance to "explain" the meaning of the terms in the writing.903
The questions of whether a writing is integrated, or "complete," and, if so, whether it is fully integrated, or "exclusive,"
are questions of law for the trial judge to decide outside the
presence of the jury':

1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 833, § 2-9, at 86-87 (footnotes omitted).
1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 833, § 2-12, at 104; see also id. § 2-10, at
91; 2 NELSON & Howicz, supra note 834, § 13-24, at 86 (observing that, if there
is "any doubt" whether the parties intended their writing to be "the exclusive
statement" of their agreement, "then parol evidence should be admitted, at least
on the matter of consistent additional terms, to aid the court in giving full effect
to the meaning of the contract").
9' See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-202(2) (1981); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2'
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The language of 2-202 does not expressly set forth "tests"
by which the judge is to determine whether the writing is a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the contract.
Over the years, courts have devised different tests. One of
these is the so-called "four corners" test by which the trial
judge simply looks at what is within the four comers of the
writing and decides if the writing looks complete. The structure of section 2-202 seems less congenial to this test than
earlier versions of the parol evidence rule. The section may
not adopt any presumption that the entire agreement is embodied in the writing. A four corners test thrives more readily
under a rule that presumes full embodiment in the writing
unless only partial embodiment is proved. Further, Comment
3 to 2-202 may reject a four corners test. Usually a judge
should be willing to go beyond the four corners and consider
any proffered evidence on the issue of completeness and exclusivity. At minimum the judge must learn of the context
and of the character of the terms not in the writing; otherwise
he or she will be in the dark at least as to some of the respects in which the writing might not be complete and exclusive......

202 cmt. 3 (1999); 2 NELSON & HowIcZ, supra note 834, § 13-29, at 95 & n.19.
See generally 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 833, § 2-10, at 86-87 & nn.7-9
and authorities cited therein.
' 1 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 833, § 2-10, at 89-90 (footnotes omitted);
see also 2 NELSON & Howicz, supra note 834, § 13-21, at 83 ("In order to make
a determination of when a contract is the alleged full integration of all prior or
contemporaneous negotiations, one must look to the conduct of the parties, to the
contract language itself, and to the circumstances surrounding the making and
performance of the contract."). Namely,
[tihe parties may expressly provide that the written contract is the full
and final integration of their agreement by including an integration or
merger clause within the contract. While the existence of an integration
or merger clause in a contract does not in itself render a writing as the
complete and exclusive statement of the parties' agreement, it is strong
evidence of the parties' intention that the written instrument is the
complete embodiment of the contract.
2 NELSON & Howicz, supra note 834, § 13-29, at 95 (footnotes omitted).
That said,
[t]he fact that the parties have integrated their contract through a merger clause which states that the writing is intended as a complete and
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b. Questions of Ambiguity
As is true at common law, 6 even if the judge finds that
the writing is fully integrated, she may admit extrinsic evidence (that does not contradict any integrated, unambiguous
term) if she finds that one or more terms in the fully integrated
writing is/are ambiguous. 7
According to the Fifth Circuit, the Code
adds a third level to the traditional two-level [ambiguity]
inquiry. Instead of asking, "Were the contract terms ambiguous" and then, "If they were ambiguous what do they mean in
light of extrinsic evidence," the Code poses three inquiries:
1. Were the express contract terms ambiguous?
2. If not, are they ambiguous after considering evidence of
course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance?
3. If the express contract terms by themselves are ambiguous, or if the terms are ambiguous when course of dealing,
usage of trade, and course of performance are considered (that
is, if the answer to either of the first two questions is yes),
what is the meaning of the contract in light of all extrinsic
evidence?'
exclusive statement of terms is not sufficient to negate the force of trade
usage and course of dealing, because these are such an integral part of
the contract that they are not normally disclaimed by general language

in the merger clause.
1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 2-202:3, at 2-187.
See supra subpart III.A.3.b.
9w
See 2 NELSON & HoWicz, supra note 834, § 13-28, at 92-93 ("While the
court need not make a finding of ambiguity prior to the admission of evidence of
consistent additional terms, if the court rules that the contract in question is
ambiguous . . . or uncertain in any of its terms, then parol evidence as to the
meaning of the terms in the contract may be admitted."); see also 1 WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 833, § 2-10, at 99 & n.47 (observing that the reasons for
admitting evidence of a course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance are even stronger if the writing is, inter alia, ambiguous, and citing cases
in accord).
See Paragon Resources, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 695 F.2d
991, 996 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying parallel Texas law).
With respect to the second and third "prongs,"
parties who enter into a contract and are aware of some current usage
of trade by implication can be said to have incorporated that usage into
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The first inquiry is a question of law; the third inquiry is a
question of fact.° 9 The "thorny problem," in the words of the
Fifth Circuit, is determining whether the second inquiry is one
of law, fact, or both.91 ° Neither the Mississippi courts nor the
Fifth Circuit have as yet resolved this thorny question.
In both finding and resolving ambiguity, Mississippi courts
should strive to construe the express terms of the written
agreement, the parties' prior course of dealing, any relevant
usages of trade, the parties' course of performance, any consistent additional terms, and any terms implied as a matter of
law as being consistent one with another.9 1' However, when

their written agreement, even where the contract seems clear and unambiguous and does not include any precise language concerning that
usage. The Code has clearly indicated that as far as sales [or lease]
contracts are concerned, any evidence of usage of trade . . . is admissible
to make a determination concerning the parties' intention, even if the
contract terms are not ambiguous.
2 NELSON & Howicz, supra note 834, § 13-44, at 111. The same rationale can
clearly be applied to the parties' own course of dealing prior to the execution of
the written instrument. And, with course of dealing, there is no question of whether the party against whom the course of dealing is offered knew or should have
known, because it was a party to the course of dealing.
m Paragon Resources, 695 F.2d at 996.

See id. Eleven years later, the Fifth Circuit again took the opportunity not
to decide whether the effect of trade usage, course of dealing, and course of performance was to be determined by the court as a matter of law or by the trier of
fact. See Bloom v. Hearst Entertainment, Inc., 33 F.3d 518, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1994)
(quoting the passage above from Paragon Resources, observing that the Paragon
Resources court did not resolve the question of who was to answer the second
inquiry, and then failing to resolve the issue itself).
910

9" MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-208(2) (1981). See generally 1 HAWKLAND, supra

note 821, § 2-208:3, at 2-304. Professor Hawland writes that
[tihe full meaning of many contracts may be determined only by considering their express terms in conjunction with the implied terms developed through resort to course of performance, course of dealing and
usage of trade and augmented by the statutory (gap-filling) terms provided by the UCC itself. A bare bones sales contract usually will contain
only three express terms - the description, quantity, and price of the
goods. Important matters such as delivery, credit, quality and details of
performance may be completely omitted ....

Sections 1-205(4) and 2-

208(2) direct[1 the courts to try to harmonize the express terms that are
provided in the written contract with the implied and statutory terms
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such a construction is unreasonable, the Code prescribes the
following hierarchy: (1) express terms control course of performance; (2) course of performance controls course of dealing; (3)
course of dealing controls usages of trade; and (4) usages of
trade control terms implied as a matter of law (i.e., "gap fillers"),912 other than "mandatory" terms. 13
that are to be determined by going outside of it. Additionally, the courts
must try to achieve harmony among the implied terms whenever possible. In the bare bones sales contract which contains express terms only
on price, description and quantity, the court may, for example, find the
delivery term by resorting to course of dealing, the credit term by resorting to usage of trade, some details of performance by resorting to course
of performance, and the warranty or quality term by resorting to the
statutory gap-filling provisions of the UCC, found in this case in Sections
2-314 and 2-315.
Id. § 1-205:2, at 1-247 to -248 (footnote omitted).
'1
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-205(5) & -2-208(2) (1981); see Mygsa, S.A. de C.V.
v. Howard Indus., Inc., 879 F. Supp. 624, 630 n.9 (S.D. Miss. 1995); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(b) (1981) (setting forth the same
priority scheme established in §§ 1-205(d) & 2-208(b) for all contracts, not only
those governed by the UCC). See generally 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 1205:2, at 1-248 to -250. Professor Hawkland writes that
[tihese priorities reflect the relative ability of the various concepts to
determine the parties' actual intent. As the most reliable evidence of
that intention, an express term of the contract controls any inconsistent
implied term. Course of performance is considered the next best test of
the parties' intention, because it relates to the very contract involved in
the dispute, unlike course of dealing which relates to the sequence of
conduct between the parties prior to the transaction at hand and may
include dealings other than the current transaction. Because both course
of performance and course of dealing involve the parties to the current
dispute whose activities may reveal their own special way of doing business, these are better tests of meaning than is trade usage. Trade usage
reflects only the normal conduct of the trade in a particular vocation or
community and may not describe the idiosyncrasies of particular members.
....
In cases of conflict the statutory terms are subordinated in
rank to course of performance, course of dealing and usage of trade. This
subordination is sound because course of performance, course of dealing
and usage of trade are methods of identifying the implied terms of the
contract, part of the agreement itself, while the statutory terms are not
part of any agreement between the parties.
1 HAWELAND, supra note 821, § 1-205:2, at 1-251 to -252 (footnote omitted).
Section 2A-207(b) sets forth the analogous provision regarding lease contracts.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2A-207(2) (Supp. 1998).
913
Professor Hawkland explains that
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The hierarchy established by Section 2-208(2) does not necessarily mean that evidence of trade usage, for example, may
not be admitted to determine the meaning of an agreement,
merely because it is inconsistent with evidence of course of
performance or course of dealing. The hierarchy only emphasizes the weight to be given to various kinds of evidence, and
does not go to its admissibility. Conceivably, in this connection, a court might prefer to make a finding on the basis of
very strong evidence of trade usage, when contradicted by
very weak evidence of course of performance or course of dealing.914

As is true with non-Code cases,9"' the construction and

{M]andatory terms found in the UCC have absolute priority over any
agreement of the parties, whether that agreement is expressed or implied through course of performance, course of dealing or usage of trade.
It should be recognized, however, that the UCC mandates only a few
terms and is generally committed to the ideal of freedom of contract.
Consequently, efforts to defeat the force of agreements found through express terms or impliedly as a result of course of performance, course of
dealing or usage of trade, usually have been unsuccessful.
1 HAWKLAND, supra note 821, § 1-205:2, at 1-250 to -251 (footnote omitted). Professor Hawkland offers the Code's statute of frauds as a prime example of a "mandatory" term in Article 2. See id. at 1-250 n.9.
914 Id. § 2-208:3, at 2-304. Professors White and Summers are even more skeptical of the Code's hierarchy, arguing that "the provision that express terms control inconsistent course of dealing and its cohorts really cannot be taken at face
value, at least in some courts." 1 WHIM & SUMMERS, supra note 833, § 3-3, at
120. They explain:
[C]ourse of dealing and one or more of its cohorts may cut down or even
subtract what would otherwise be whole terms of the express agreement
of the parties. Section 1-205 says that course of dealing and usage of
trade may "qualify the express terms of the agreement. Thus, "delivery
June-August" may be qualified by trade usage to require deliveries
spread through these three months rather than all at once. And 2-208(1)
on course of performance is drafted broadly enough to allow for the
same kind of effect. A major function of course of performance, together
with the law of modification and waiver, is to help cut down or subtract
express terms altogether. Section 2-208(3) says that a course of performance inconsistent with any [express] term of the agreement "shall be
relevant to show a waiver or modification" of the [express] term . ...
Id. at 117-18 (footnotes omitted).
915 See supra notes 32, 53 and accompanying text.
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interpretation of an unambiguous contract for the sale or lease
of goods is a matter of law for the court, while the construction
and interpretation of an ambiguous contract for the sale or
lease of goods, through the lens of extrinsic evidence of the
parties' intent, is a matter of fact.916 Thus, a trial court may
properly grant summary judgment when a contract for the sale
or lease of goods is unambiguous, but should not grant summary judgment when a contract for the sale or lease of goods is
ambiguous and the parties' intent presents a genuine issue of
material fact.917
IV.

CONCLUSION

Extrinsic evidence, admitted or excluded by the operation
of one or more of the rules of contract construction and interpretation at the disposal of Mississippi courts, often plays a
dispositive role in contract litigation. The parol evidence rule once thought to be a bastion which would turn away any unwanted agreements or evidence that added to, altered, or contradicted the express rights and obligations provided by a written contract - has been eroded by many judicially-created exceptions and exclusions, to say nothing of the exceptions embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code. Indeed, in light of the
various statutory and common-law exceptions and exclusions,
one might conclude that, to the extent that the parol evidence
rule acts as a "rule" in cases governed by the Code, it does so
more in the nature of an "enabling" rule, permitting parties to
present extrinsic evidence that might otherwise be excluded,
rather than an "exclusionary" rule, preventing parties from
presenting extrinsic evidence that might otherwise be admissi-

*" Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Pursue Energy, 781 F.2d 1079, 1081 (5th Cir.
1986) (applying Mississippi law) (citing Carpenters Amended & Restated Health
Benefit Fund v. Holleman Constr. Co., 751 F.2d 763, 766-67 (5th Cir. 1985), and
Paragon Resources, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 695 F.2d 991, 995-96
(5th Cir. 1983)).
.17Id. (citing Union Planters Nat'l Leasing, Inc. v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117, 120
(5th Cir. 1982), and Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 465 (5th Cir.
1967)); see also supra subpart III.A.6, discussing the propriety of summary judgment in cases governed by the common law parol evidence rule.
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ble. Moreover, many instances exist in which extrinsic evidence
will be considered where the parol evidence rule is of no consequence.
Over time, courts, primarily in other jurisdictions, seem to
have concluded that this result is not all bad - and they are
probably correct. Given that the stated purpose of contract
construction and interpretation is to give maximum effect to
the intent of the parties at the time they executed the agreement, that purpose may indeed be better served by a rule that
does not screen out relevant evidence simply because there
exists a written instrument that appears on its face to be complete and unambiguous. Unfortunately, such a rule is not currently followed by the Mississippi Supreme Court except in
cases governed by the Uniform Commercial Code - and then, it
seems at times, only grudgingly.
One consequence of the Mississippi Supreme Court's unwillingness to follow the lead of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, the Uniform Commercial Code by analogy to nonCode cases, leading treatises and commentators, and a majority
of sister jurisdictions with respect to non-Code cases is that
parties to contracts and other similar instruments governed by
Mississippi common law face a markedly different set of rules
that will be used to construe and interpret their written agreements than they might be accustomed and/or entitled to in
other jurisdictions. Whether that, in turn, encourages or discourages non-Mississippians to contract with Mississippians is
a question for another day - even if we assume that non-Mississippians know of and understand the difference between the
Mississippi Supreme Court's approach to contract construction
and interpretation and that followed by a majority of other
jurisdictions, there is certainly room to debate whether
Mississippi's approach increases or decreases the frequency of
disputes over the meaning and consequence of the terms of a
written contract and the predictability of the outcome of those
disputes. What does seem clear is that a non-Mississippian who
is unaware of Mississippi's approach to contract construction
and interpretation may be in for a pleasant surprise or a rude
awakening, depending on which side he takes in the writing-
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versus-extrinsic-evidence issue.
Another consequence of the Mississippi Supreme Court's
unwillingness to follow the lead of the Restatement, the Code
by analogy to non-Code cases, leading treatises and commentators, and the "majority rule" of sister jurisdictions with respect
to non-Code cases is that parties to contracts and other similar
instruments governed by Mississippi common law face a markedly different set of rules that will be used to construe and
interpret their written agreements than will be used to decide
otherwise identical disputes in cases that are governed by the
Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code. Depending on whether
one thinks that the Code or the court has it right, the fact that
different rules apply to Code and non-Code cases may be troubling because it affords "better" treatment to one class of disputes and disputants than to another. Moreover, the variance
between the Code approach and the court's approach in nonCode cases may cause problems for lower courts trying to "get
it right" in the first place.
A final consequence of the Mississippi Supreme Court's
unwillingness to follow the lead of the Restatement, the Code
by analogy to non-Code cases, leading treatises and commentators, and the "majority rule" of sister jurisdictions with respect
to non-Code cases is that the outcome of non-Code cases may
tend to hinge more on the applicability of one or more exceptions to the common law parol evidence rule than on the application of a well-reasoned process of construction and interpretation.
Until the Mississippi Supreme Court decides to abandon a
"four corners" approach to construction and interpretation and
embrace a more modern contextual approach, if ever, Mississippi judges, lawyers, and litigants - and those in other jurisdictions who are asked or compelled to apply, explain, or adhere
to Mississippi law - need to understand the rules, guides, and
exceptions discussed in this article and in the source materials
from which it draws. I hope the reader finds it educational.

